


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HISTORY  
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HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.

COLONEL 27TH REGIMENT

IN SIX VOLUMES

WITH FIFTY-FIVE MAPS AND PLANS

VOL. VI.

LONDON

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\* Since colonel and surveyor-general of South Australia.

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# HISTORY

OF THE

## PENINSULA WAR.

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### BOOK THE TWENTY-THIRD.

#### CHAPTER III.

[Plan 10, page 387, vol. v.]

BAYONNE, although a mean fortress, was at this period truly designated by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks of France. Covered by an entrenched camp, which the deep country and inundations rendered nearly impregnable while held by an army, it could not be assailed; and to pass it would have left the enemy free to cut off the allies' communications with the sea-coast and Spain. To force Soult to abandon Bayonne and adopt a new front of operations was therefore Wellington's design, and the passage of the Nive and the five days' fighting effected the first step towards its accomplishment. Those events had cut Soult's direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port—gave access to a fertile country for the cavalry, menaced the navigation of the Adour by which Soult obtained his supplies, and opened a way for intercourse with the malcontents of France. It was however only a step, for the country beyond the Nive was of the same deep clay, and traversed by many rivers, flooding with every shower in the mountains and offering in their courses to the Adour successive barriers, behind which Soult could oppose Wellington's right and still be connected with St. Jean Pied de Port. He would thus hem in the allies as before, because the wide operations necessary to force those rivers and tear the French

army from Bayonne, could not be undertaken until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter had been peculiarly inclement.

To nourish their own armies and circumvent their adversaries in that respect were the objects of both generals. Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain, Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne, or so reduce his force that the entrenched camp might be stormed. The French general's recent losses forbad extended positions except during the wet season—three days' fine weather made him tremble—and his camp was still too unfinished for a small force. The bad roads and want of transport threw his army upon water-carriage for subsistence, and his great magazines were therefore established at Dax on the Adour and at Peyrehorade on the Gave of Pau, the latter being twenty-four miles from Bayonne. These places he fortified to resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge across the Adour at the port of Landes, just above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation of the Adour below that point, especially at Urt, the stream being confined there, could be interrupted by the allies who were now on the left bank; whereupon he ordered Foy to pass the Adour at Urt and construct a fortified bridge. Wellington menaced Foy with a superior force, he recrossed the river, and the navigation was then carried on at night by stealth, or guarded by the French gun-boats and exposed to the fire of the allies; provisions became scarce and the supply would have failed, if the French coasting-trade, now revived between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted by the navy, but this was still unheeded.

Soult, embarrassed by Foy's failure, reinforced him with Boyer's and D'Armagnac's divisions, which were extended to the Port de Landes; then leaving Reille with four divisions in the entrenched camp, he completed the garrison of Bayonne and transferred his head-quarters to Peyrehorade. Clausel with two divisions of infantry and the light cavalry took post on the Bidouze; being supported with Trielhard's heavy dragoons, and having his left in communication with general Paris, and with St. Jean Pied de Port, where there was a garrison of eighteen hundred men besides national guards.

Pushing advanced posts to the Joyeuse and the Aran, streams which unite to fall into the Adour near Urt, he also occupied Hellette, Mendionde, Bonloc, and the Bastide de Clerence. A bridge-head was constructed at Peyrehorade; Hastings was fortified on the Gave de Pau; Guiche, Bidache, and Came, on the Bidouze; and the works of Navarens were augmented. Soult thus threw himself on a new line against the allies' right. Wellington made corresponding dispositions; for having strengthened his works at Barrouilhet, he shifted some of Hope's troops towards Arcangues, and placed the sixth division at Villefranque, which permitted Hill to extend his right up the Adour to Urt. The third division was also posted near Urcuray, the light cavalry on the Joyeuse, and a chain of telegraphs was established from the right of the Nive by the hill of San Barbe to St. Jean de Luz. Freyre's Gallicians were in reserve about St. Pé, Morillo was sent to Itzassu; where, supported by the Andalusians and by Freyre, he guarded the valley of the upper Nive and watched Paris beyond the Ursouia mountain.

Such was the general state of affairs the 1st of January, but previously the minor events had become complicated. The allies had seized the island of Holriague in the Adour; Foy kept possession of the islands of Berens and Broc higher up the river; Wellington's bridges of communication on the Nive were destroyed by floods; and Morillo, with a view to plunder, for he had not orders to move, obtained from Victor Alten two squadrons of the eighteenth hussars under pretence of exploring the enemy's position towards Mendionde and Maccay. Their commander, major Hughes, reinforced with some Spanish caçadores, having crossed the bridge of Mendionde commenced a skirmish; but Morillo retreated without notice during the action, the caçadores fled in a shameful manner, and the British cavalry escaped with difficulty, having had one captain killed, two others, a lieutenant, and Hughes himself, badly wounded. This disaster was falsely reported at the time as the result of the hussars' bad conduct; and they had in like manner been previously; from the same source, misrepresented at head-quarters as more licentious than others at Vitoria; whereas they had fought as well and

plundered less than many who were praised for orderly demeanour.

About the same time Mina, pressed for provisions, invaded the Val de Baygorry and the Val des Osses, and committed the greatest enormities, plundering and burning, and murdering men women and children without distinction. The people of these valleys, distinguished amongst the Basques for their warlike qualities, immediately took arms under the command of one of their principal men, named Etchevery; and being reinforced with two hundred and fifty men from St. Jean Pied de Port, surprised one of Mina's battalions and attacked the rest with great vigour. This event gave Soult hopes of exciting such a war as the Basques had carried on during the French revolution; and he had for two months been expecting the arrival of Harispe, whose courage and talents have been frequently noticed in this History, and who being the head of an ancient Basque family had great local influence. If Harispe had come as expected in November, Wellington being then unknown to the people, a formidable warfare would have commenced in the mountains; now the English general's attention to all complaints, his proclamation, and the sending the Spaniards away for misconduct, had, in conjunction with the love of gain, that master passion with all mountaineers, tamed the Basque spirit and disinclined them to exchange ease and profit for turbulence and ravage. Nevertheless Mina's murdering incursion and Morillo's licentious conduct, awakened the warlike propensities of the Val de Baygorry Basques, and Harispe was enabled to make a levy with which he immediately commenced active operations.

Soult, to aid Harispe, to widen his own cantonments and restrict those of the allies, resolved to drive the latter altogether from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port and fix Clausel's left at Hellette, the culminating point of the great road to that fortress. To effect this, he caused Clausel on the 3rd to establish two divisions of infantry at the heights of La Costa, near the Bastide de Clerence beyond the Joyeuse. Buchan's Portuguese brigade was thus forced to retreat upon Briscous; and Paris, advancing to Bonloc, connected his right with Clausel's left at

Clausel's  
Reports  
and Orders,  
MSS.



Ayherre, while the light cavalry menaced all the line of outposts. Informed of this movement by telegraph, Wellington, thinking Soult was seeking a general battle on the side of Hasparen, made the fifth division and lord Aylmer's brigade relieve the light division, which marched to Arauntz; the fourth division then passed the Nive at Ustaritz; the sixth division made ready to march from Villefranque by the high road of St. Jean Pied de Port towards Hasparen, as a reserve to the third, fourth and seventh divisions; and the latter was concentrated beyond Urcuray the 4th, its left in communication with Hill at Briscons, the right supported by Morillo, who advanced from Itzassu.

Wellington meant to fall on at once, but the swelling of the small rivers prevented him and on the fifth he ascertained the true object and dispositions of the enemy. However, having twenty-four thousand infantry a division of cavalry and five brigades of artillery in hand, he resolved to attack Clausel on the heights of La Costa. Le Cor's Portuguese marched against the French right, the fourth division marched against their centre, the third division, supported by cavalry, against their left; the remainder of the cavalry and the seventh division, the whole under Cotton, were posted at Hasparen to watch Paris. Soult was in person at the Bastide de Clerence, and a general battle seemed inevitable; but Wellington's intent was merely to drive Clausel from the Joyeuse, and Soult, who thought the whole allied army was in movement, withdrew fighting to the Bidouze: thus the affair terminated with a slight skirmish on the evening of the 6th. The allies then resumed their old positions on the right of the Nive, the Andalusians went back to the Bastan, and Carlos d'España's Gallicians came to Ascain in their place.

Clausel finding nothing serious was designed, sent his horsemen to drive away Hill's detachments, which had taken advantage of the great movements to forage on the lower parts of the Joyeuse and Aran rivers. Soult seeing his adversary so sensitive to a demonstration beyond the Bidouze, then resolved to maintain those two rivers and in that view reduced his defence of the Adour to a line drawn from the confluence of the Aran to Bayonne, which enabled him to

reinforce Clausel with Foy's division and all the light cavalry. Meantime Harispe, having Paris and Dauture's brigade placed under his orders to support his mountaineers, fixed his quarters at Hellette and commenced an active partisan warfare. On the 8th he fell upon Mina in the Val des Osses and drove him with loss into Baygorry; the 10th, returning to Hellette he surprised Morillo's foragers with some English dragoons on the side of Maccaye, and took a few prisoners; the 12th he again attacked Mina and drove him up into the Alduides. During these affairs beyond the Nive an ineffectual effort was made to launch some armed craft on the Adour, where Soult had increased his flotilla to twenty gun-boats for the protection of his convoys, yet they were still compelled to run past Urt under Hill's battery.

While the French marshal was engaged on the Bidouze and Joyeuse rivers his entrenched camp at Bayonne might have been stormed; but as it could only be held under the fire of the fortress, and nothing was prepared for a siege, the allies remained quiet; for the weather, again become terrible, would not permit a general movement against Harispe in the high country, and to avoid irritating the mountaineers by a counter partisan warfare he was unmolested. Wellington now dreading the effects likely to result from Mina's and Morillo's excesses, for the Basques were beginning to speak of vengeance, put forth his authority again in repression. Rebuking Morillo for his unwarranted advance upon Mendionde and for the misconduct of his troops, he ordered him to keep the latter constantly under arms. This was resented generally by the Spanish officers, and especially by Morillo, whose savage, untractable, and bloody disposition, since so horribly displayed in South America, prompted him to encourage violence; he asserted falsely that his troops were starving, declared that a settled design to ill-use the Spaniards existed, and that the British soldiers were suffered to commit every crime with impunity. The English general in reply, explained himself both to Morillo and to Freyre, who had alluded to the libels about San Sebastian, with a clearness and resolution that showed how hopeless it would be to strive against him.

‘He had not,’ he said, ‘lost thousands of men to enable the

Spaniards to pillage and ill-treat the French peasantry; he preferred a small army obedient to a large one disobedient and undisciplined. If his measures to enforce good order deprived him of the Spanish troops the fault would rest with those who suffered their soldiers to commit disorders. Professions without corresponding actions would not do; he was determined to enforce obedience one way or another and would not command insubordinate troops. The question between them was whether they should or should not pillage the French peasants. His measures were taken to prevent it, and the conduct which called them forth was more dishonouring to the Spaniards than the measures themselves. For libels he cared not, he was used to them and he did not believe the union of the two nations depended upon such things; but if it did he desired no union founded upon such an infamous interest as pillage. He had not lost twenty thousand men in the campaign to enable Morillo to plunder and he would not permit it. If the Spaniards were resolved to do so let them march their great armies into France under their own generals; he would meanwhile cover Spain itself and they would find they could not remain in France for fifteen days. They had neither money nor magazines, nothing to maintain an army in the field, the country behind was incapable of supporting them; and were he scoundrel enough to permit pillage, France rich as it was could not sustain the burthen. Even with a view to living on the enemy by contributions it would be essential to prevent plunder; and yet in defiance of all these reasons he was called an enemy by the Spanish generals because he opposed such conduct, and his measures to prevent it were considered dishonouring! Something also he could say against it in a political point of view, but it was unnecessary, because careless whether he commanded a large or a small army, he was resolved that it should obey him and should not pillage.

‘General Morillo expressed doubts of his right to interfere with the Spaniards. It was his right and his duty, and never before did he hear that to put soldiers under arms was a disgrace. It was a measure to prevent evil and misfortunes. Mina could tell by recent experience what a warfare the



French peasants could carry on, and Morillo was openly menaced with a like trial. It was in vain for that general to palliate or deny the plundering of his division, after having acknowledged to general Hill that it was impossible to prevent it, because the officers and soldiers received by every post letters from their friends congratulating them upon their good luck in entering France, and urging them to seize the opportunity of making fortunes. General Morillo asserted that the British troops were allowed to commit crimes with impunity. Neither he nor any other man could produce an instance of injury done where proof being adduced the perpetrators had escaped punishment. Let him inquire how many soldiers had been hanged, how many stricken with minor chastisements and made to pay for damages done. But had the English troops no cause of complaint against the Spaniards? Officers and soldiers were frequently shot and robbed on the high roads, and a soldier had been lately murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca; the English stores and convoys were plundered by the Spanish soldiers, a British officer had been put to death at Vitoria and others were ill-treated at Santander.'

A sullen obedience followed this correspondence for the moment; but the plundering system was soon renewed, and the inhabitants of Bidarray as well as those of the Val de Baygorry were provoked to action. Wellington, incensed by their activity, then issued a proclamation calling upon them to take arms openly and join Soult or stay peaceably at home, declaring he would otherwise burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants. Thus, notwithstanding the outcries against the French for this system of repressing the partida warfare in Spain, it was considered by the English general justifiable and necessary. The threat however sufficed; the Basques set the pecuniary advantages derived from the friendship of the British troops and the misery of an avenging warfare, against the evils of Spanish plunder, and generally disregarded Harispe's appeals to their patriotism. Soult also, expecting reinforcements, seeing little to be gained by insurrection, and desirous to resume the offensive, ordered Harispe to leave only the troops absolutely necessary for the defence

of St. Jean Pied de Port and its entrenched camp, with a few Basques as scouts in the valleys, to concentrate his force at Mendionde, Hellette and La Houssoa, hem in the right of the allies and make incursions beyond the upper Nive. This was on the 14th; the 23rd Harispe, knowing Morillo was to forage on the side of Bidarray, fell on him, and though the supporting troops repulsed his first attack he finally pushed all back with some loss. About the same time one of Hill's posts near the confluence of the Aran with the Adour was surprised by some French, who remained until fresh troops forced them to repass the river again. This was in retaliation for the surprise of a French post a few days before by the sixth division, which was attended with circumstances repugnant to the friendly habits long established between the French and British troops at the outposts. The value of such a generous intercourse old soldiers well understand, and some illustrations of it at this period may be quoted. On the 9th of December, the forty-third was assembled on an open space within twenty yards of the enemy's out-sentry; yet the latter continued to walk his beat for an hour, relying so confidently on the customary system that he placed his knapsack on the ground to ease his shoulders. When the order to advance was given, one of the soldiers having told him to go away helped him to replace his pack, and the firing then commenced. Next morning the French in like manner warned a forty-third sentry to retire. A more remarkable instance happened however, when Wellington, desirous of getting to the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne, ordered some riflemen to drive the French away; seeing them stealing up too close as he thought. he called out to fire; but with a loud voice one of those old soldiers replied, '*no firing!*' and holding up the butt of his rifle tapped it in a peculiar way. At the well-understood signal, which meant '*we must have the hill for a short time,*' the French, who though they could not maintain would not have relinquished the post without a fight if they had been fired upon, quietly retired. And this signal would never have been made if the post had been one capable of a permanent defence, so well do veterans understand war and its proprieties.

The English chief now only waited for practicable roads to take the offensive with an army superior in every point of view to Soult's; for that marshal's numbers were about to be reduced, his conscripts were deserting, and the inclemency of the weather was filling his hospitals; but the bronzed veterans of his adversary, impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in execution, were free from serious maladies, and able to plant their colours wherever their general listed. All the country was however a vast quagmire; it was with difficulty provisions or even orders could be conveyed to the different quarters, and a Portuguese brigade on the right of the Nive was several days without food from the swelling of the rivulets which stopped the commissariat mules. At the sea-side the troops were better off, yet with a horrible counterpoise; for on that iron-bound coast storms and shipwrecks were so frequent, that scarcely a day passed but some vessel, sometimes many together, were seen embayed and drifting towards the reefs, which shoot out like needles for several miles. Once in this situation there was no human help! a faint cry might be heard at intervals, but the tall ship floated slowly and solemnly onwards until the first rock arrested her; a roaring surge then dashed her to pieces and the shore was strewn with broken timbers and dead bodies. December and January were thus passed by the allies, but February saw Wellington break into France the successful invader of that mighty country. Yet neither his nor Soult's military operations can be understood without a previous description of political affairs, which shall be given in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER IV.

*Portugal.*—When Beresford quitted Lisbon to rejoin the army, the vexatious conduct of the government was renewed with greater violence; and its ill-will was vented upon the English residents, whose goods were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned without regard to justice or international law. The supply and reinforcing of the army were the pretences for these exactions, yet the army was neither supplied nor recruited; for though Beresford's new regulations produced nine thousand trained soldiers, they were, in contempt of the subsidising treaty, retained in the dépôts. At first this was attributed to want of means for marching, and Wellington then obtained shipping to convey them; but the regency still withheld the greatest number, alleging in excuse, the ill-conduct of the Spaniards relative to the military convention established between the two countries.

Mr. Stuart,  
MSS.

This convention had been concluded in 1812 to enable the Portuguese troops to establish hospitals and draw certain resources from Spain upon fixed conditions; one of these was that supplies might be purchased, half with ready money, half with bills on the Portuguese treasury; yet in December 1813 the Spanish envoy informed the regency, that to give up the shells of certain public buildings for hospitals was all that would be done under the convention. Wherefore as neither troops nor horses could march through Spain, and the supply of those already with the army became nearly impossible, the regency detained the reinforcements. Wellington reproached the Spanish government for this foul conduct; yet observed with great force to the Portuguese regency, that the treaty by which a certain number of soldiers were to be constantly in the field was made with England not with Spain; and that



the former had paid the subsidy and provided ships for the transport of the troops. His remonstrances, Beresford's orders, and Mr. Stuart's exertions, backed by the menaces of lord Castlereagh, were alike powerless; the regency embarked only three thousand men out of nine thousand, and those not until the month of March when the war was on the point of terminating.

Thus instead of thirty thousand Portuguese Wellington had less than twenty thousand; and yet Mr. Stuart affirmed, that by doing away with the militia and introducing the Prussian system of granting furloughs, one hundred thousand troops of the line might have been furnished and supported by Portugal, without pressing more severely on the finances of the country than the system which supplied these twenty thousand. The regency were however more than usually importunate to have the subsidy paid in specie, in which case their army would have disappeared altogether, and Mr. Stuart firmly opposed their importunity. It was indeed peculiarly ill-timed when their troops were withheld, and Wellington, having to pay ready money for his supplies in France, wanted all the specie that could be procured for the military chest. Such was the Portuguese ingratitude, and if the war had not terminated immediately afterwards, the alliance could not have continued. The British army deserted by Portugal, and treated hostilely, as we shall find, by Spain, must then have abandoned the Peninsula.

*Spain.*—The malice evinced towards the English general by the Spanish government—the libels upon him and his army—the vicious system of supplying the Spanish troops, and their evil propensities, exacerbated by neglect and suffering—the intrigues of politicians inimical to the British alliance—the insolence and duplicity of the minister of war—the growing enmity between Spain and Portugal—the virulence of all parties and the absolute hostility of the local authorities against the British officers and soldiers, who were treated rather as invaders than friends, drove Wellington in the latter end of November to extremity. He thought the general disposition of the people still favourable to the alliance, and with the aid of the serviles hoped to put down the

liberals; but an open rupture with the government he judged inevitable; and if the liberal influence should prove most powerful with the people he could not effect a retreat into Portugal. Wherefore he recommended the British ministers to take measures with a view to a war against Spain! And this when, victorious in every battle, he seemed to have placed the cause he supported beyond the power of fortune! Who, when Napoleon was defeated at Leipsic, when all Europe and part of Asia were pouring their armed hordes into the northern and eastern parts of France, when Soult was unable to defend the western frontier—who then could have supposed that Wellington, the long-enduring general, whose profound calculations and untiring vigour had brought the war in the Peninsula to its apparently prosperous state, who could have supposed that he, the victorious commander, would thus describe his own situation to his government?

‘Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously to the subject. You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I know were written and published by an officer of the war department, and I believe under the direction of the minister at war Don Juan O’Donoju. Advantage has been taken of the impression made by these libels to circulate others in which the old stories are repeated about the outrages committed by sir John Moore’s army in Galicia; and endeavours are made to irritate the public mind about our still keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagea, and particularly in Ceuta. They exaggerate the conduct of our traders in South America, and every little concern of a master of a ship, who behaves ill in a Spanish port, is represented as an attack upon the sovereignty of the Spanish nation. I believe these libels all proceed from the same source, the government and their immediate servants and officers; and although I have no reason to believe that they have as yet made any impression on the nation at large they certainly have upon the officers of the government, and even upon the principal officers of the army. These persons must see that if the libels are not written or encouraged by the government they are at least not discouraged; they know that we are odious to

the government and they treat us accordingly. The Spanish troops plunder everything they approach, neither their own nor our magazines are sacred. Until recently there was some semblance of inquiry and of a desire to punish offenders, lately these acts of disorder have been left entirely unnoticed; unless when I have interfered with my authority as commander-in-chief of the Spanish army. The civil magistrates in the country have not only refused us assistance but have particularly ordered the inhabitants not to give it for payment; and when robberies have been discovered and the property proved to belong to the commissariat the law has been violated and possession withheld. This was the case lately at Tolosa.

‘Then what is more extraordinary and more difficult to understand, is a transaction which occurred lately at Fuenterrabia. It was settled that the British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that town. There is a building there which has been a Spanish hospital; the Spanish authority who gave it over wanted to carry it off, in order to burn as fire-wood, the beds, that our soldiers might not have the use of them; and these are people to whom we have given medicines instruments and other aids, who when wounded and sick we have taken into our hospitals, and to whom we have rendered every service in our power after having recovered their country from the enemy! These are not the people of Spain but the officers of government, who would not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that their conduct was agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not checked, if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury done to our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly nature of such proceedings, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave towards us in the same manner and we shall have no friend, or none who will dare to avow himself as such in Spain. Consider what will be the consequence of this state of affairs if any reverse should happen, or if an aggravation of the insults and injuries or any other cause should cause the English army to be withdrawn. I think I should experience great difficulty, the Spanish people being hostile, in retiring through Spain into Portugal from the peculiar nature of our equipments; and I think I

might be able to embark the army at Passages in spite of all the French and Spanish armies united. But I should be much more certain of getting clear off as we ought if we had possession of San Sebastian; and this view of the subject is the motive for the advice I am about to give you as the remedy for the evils with which I have made you acquainted.

‘First then I recommend to you to alter the nature of your political relations with Spain and to have nothing there but a *chargé-d’affaires*. Secondly, to complain seriously of the conduct of the government and their servants, to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagená, and I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned by British troops at their earnest request, and that the troops were not sent to the two former till the government agreed to certain conditions. If we had not garrisoned the last it would before now have fallen into the hands of the Moors. Thirdly to demand, as security for the safety of the king’s troops against the criminal disposition of the government and of those in authority under them, that a British garrison should be admitted into San Sebastian, giving notice that unless this demand was complied with the troops should be withdrawn. Fourthly, to withdraw the troops if this demand be not complied with, be the consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You may rely upon this, that if you take a firm decided line and show your determination to go through with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, and will bring the government to their senses; and you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals and counter-action existing at the present moment, and you will not be under the necessity of bringing matters to extremities; if you take any other than a decided line and one which in its consequences will involve them in ruin you may depend upon it you will gain nothing and will only make matters worse. I recommend these measures whatever may be the decision respecting my command of the army. They are probably the more necessary if I should keep my command. The truth is that a crisis is approaching in our connexion with Spain, and if you do not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from services rendered to them.’



Thus Wellington at the end of the war described the Spaniards precisely as sir John Moore described them at the beginning. But the seat of government was now transferred to Madrid, and the new Cortes, as already noticed, decided, against the wishes of the regency, that the English general should keep the command of the Spanish armies. The liberals indeed sought to establish a system of control over the Cortes by means of the populace of Madrid as they had done at Cadiz; and they were so active and created so much alarm by their apparent success, that the serviles, backed by the Americans, were ready to make Carlotta sole regent as the only resource for stemming the progress of democracy. However, when they had proved their strength upon the question of Wellington's command, they deferred the princess's affair and resolved to oppose their adversaries more vigorously in the assembly; being encouraged by a tumult which happened at Madrid, where the populace, instigated by their agents or disliking the new constitution, for the measures of the democratic party were generally considered evil in the great towns, rose and forced the authorities to imprison a number of obnoxious persons. The new Cortes then arrived, the serviles got the upper hand, and having resolved to change the regency took as their ground of attack its conduct towards the English general. Pursuing this scheme of opposition with ardour they caused the minister of war to be dismissed, and were ready to attack the regency itself, expecting full success; when to their amazement and extreme anger, Wellington, far from desiring to have his personal enemies thus thrust out of power, expressed his earnest desire to keep them in their stations!

To men devoid of patriotism or principle, whose only rule of action was the momentary impulse of passion, such a proceeding was incomprehensible; yet it was a wise and well-considered political change on his part, showing that private feelings were never the guides of his conduct in public matters; and that he ever seemed to bear in mind the maxim which Sophocles has put into the mouth of Ajax, '*carrying himself towards his friends as if they might one day become enemies, and treating his foes as men who might become friends.*' The new spirit had given him no hopes of any alteration

system, nor was he less convinced that sooner or later he must come to extremities with the Spaniards; but he was averse to any appearance of disunion becoming public when he was invading France, lest it should check his projects of raising an anti-Napoleon party in that country. He therefore advised the British government to keep his hostile propositions in abeyance, leaving it to him and to his brother to put them in execution or not as events might dictate. Meanwhile he sent orders to evacuate Cadiz and Carthagena, and opposed the projected change in the Spanish government. He said, that as 'the minister of war was dismissed, the most obnoxious opponent of military arrangement was gone; that the mob of Madrid, worked upon by the same press in the hands of the same people who had made the mob of Cadiz so ungovernable, would become as bad as these last; and though the mercantile interest would not have so much power in the capital, they would not want partisans when desirous of carrying a question by violence. The *grandees* were too poor to retain their former natural influence, and the constitution gave them no political power. The only chance which the *serviles* had was to conduct themselves with prudence, and when in the right with a firm contempt for the efforts of the press and the mob: but this was what no person in Spain ever did, and the smaller party being wiser bolder and more active would soon govern the Cortes at Madrid as they did at Cadiz.'

No permanent change for the better could be expected, and meanwhile the actual government, alarmed by the tumults in the capital, by the strength of the *serviles* in the Cortes, by the rebukes and remonstrances of the English general and ministers and by the evident danger of an open rupture, displayed, according to Wellington, the utmost prudence and fairness on a most important event which occurred at this time. That is to say, their own views and interests coinciding with those of the English commander and government there was a momentary agreement, and this opening for conciliation was preferred to the more dangerous mode before recommended. This event was the secret arrival of the duke of San Carlos at Madrid in December. He brought with him a treaty of peace, proposed by Napoleon and accepted by Ferdinand.

called the treaty of Valençay. It acknowledged Ferdinand as king, and the integrity of the Spanish empire was recognised: he was in return to make the English evacuate Spain, and the French were to abandon the country at the same time. The contracting powers were to maintain their respective maritime rights as they had been stipulated by the treaty of Utrecht and observed until 1792. The sales of national domains by Joseph were to be confirmed; all Spaniards attached to the French were to be reinstated in their dignities and property, and those who chose to quit Spain were to have ten years to dispose of their possessions. Prisoners, including those delivered by Spain to the English, were to be sent home on both sides. The king was to pay annually thirty millions of reals to his father Charles IV., two millions to his widow, and a treaty of commerce was to be arranged.

Ferdinand here acted with that cunning which marked his infamous career through life. He gave San Carlos secret instructions to tell the serviles, if he found them all-powerful in the Cortes, to ratify this treaty with a secret resolution to break it when time served; but if the jacobins were strongest he was merely to ask them to ratify it, Ferdinand in that case reserving to himself the task of violating it on his own authority. These secret instructions were made known to the English ministers and general; but they, putting no trust in such a negotiator and thinking his intention was rather to deceive the allies than Napoleon, thwarted him as much as they could, and in this they were joined by the Portuguese government. The British statesmen were natu-

Mr. Stuart's  
Correspondence, MSS.

rally little pleased with the prospect of being forced to abandon Spain under a treaty which would give Napoleon great influence in after times, and at the present enable him to concentrate all the old troops on his eastern frontier: nor was the jacobinical Spanish government content to have a master. Wherefore, all parties being agreed, the regency kept the matter secret, and dismissed San Carlos the 8th of January with a copy of the decree passed by the Cortes; which rendered null and void all acts of Ferdinand while a prisoner, and forbade negotiation for peace while a French army remained in the Peninsula. And that the

king might fully understand them, they told him '*the monster despotism had been driven from the throne of Spain.*' Meanwhile Joseph Pálafox, a prisoner since the siege of Zaragoza, was first sent to Valençay, and then, closely following San Carlos, arrived at Madrid four days after the latter's departure. His negotiations were equally fruitless, and in the secret sittings of the Cortes measures were discussed for watching the king's movements, and forcing him to swear to the constitution and to the Cortes before he passed the frontier.

Wellington was alarmed at the treaty of Valençay. He had, he said, long suspected Napoleon would adopt such an expedient, and if he had shown less pride and more common sense it would have succeeded. This sarcasm was perhaps well applied to the measure as it appeared at the time; but the emperor's real proceedings he was unacquainted with, and this splenetic ebullition only indicated his own vexation at approaching mischief. He acknowledged that the project was not unlikely even then to succeed, because the misery of Spain was so great; and so clearly to be traced to the views of the government and of the new constitution that many persons must have been desirous to put an end to the general suffering under the sanction of this treaty. 'If Napoleon,' he said, 'had withdrawn the garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia and sent Ferdinand, who must be *as useless a person in France as he would probably be in Spain*, at once to the frontier, or into the Peninsula, peace would have been made, or the war at least rendered so difficult as to be almost impracticable and without hope of great success.' Now this was precisely what Napoleon had designed, and it seems nearly certain that he contemplated the treaty of Valençay as early as the battle of Vitoria, if not before.

His scheme demanded secrecy, that it might be too sudden for the English influence. He had therefore designed that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in November, when it would have been most injurious to the English interest; because then the disputes in Cortes between the serviles and jacobins were most rancorous, and the hostility of the regencies in Portugal and Spain towards the English undisguised. Suchet had then also proved his superiority to the allies in



Catalonia, and Soult's gigantic lines being unessayed seemed impregnable. But in Napoleon's council were persons seeking only to betray him; and it was the great misfortune of his life to have been driven by circumstances to suffer such men as Talleyrand and Fouché, whose innate treachery has become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs or even to approach his court. Mischief of this kind however necessarily awaits men who, like Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell, have the courage to attempt after great convulsions and civil wars the rebuilding of the social edifice without spilling blood. Either to create universal abhorrence by their cruelty or to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands, Fouchés, and Monks of revolutions, is their inevitable fate; and never can they escape the opposition, more dangerous still, of honest and resolute men, who unable to comprehend the necessity of the times see nothing but tyranny in the vigour which prevents anarchy.

This treaty of Valençay was too important a measure to escape the traitors around Napoleon, and when their opposition in council and secret insinuations proved unavailing to dissuade him from it, they divulged the secret to the partisans of the Bourbons. Taking advantage of the troubled state of public affairs they contrived that Ferdinand's emissaries should precede him to Madrid, and delayed his own departure until March when the struggle was at an end. Nevertheless the chances of success, even with this imperfect execution, were so many and so alarming, that Wellington's sudden change from fierce enmity to a warm support of the regency, when he found it resolute and frank in its rejection of the treaty, although it created so much surprise and anger at the moment cannot be judged otherwise than as the wise prudent proceeding of a consummate statesman. Nor did he fail to point out to his own government the more distant as well as the immediate danger to England and Spain involved in this singularly complicated and important affair.

As affecting the war and English alliance with Spain the evil was obvious, but the articles providing for Ferdinand's parents, and for the Spaniards who had joined the French, involved great interests. <sup>T</sup> was essential, Wellington observed,

that the Spanish government should explicitly declare its intentions. Negotiations for a general peace were said to be commenced; of that he knew nothing; but he supposed, such being the case, that a basis would be embodied in a preliminary treaty which all the belligerents would ratify, each power then to arrange its own peculiar treaty with France under protection of the general confederation. Napoleon would necessarily put forward his treaty with Ferdinand. It could be got rid of by the statement that the latter was a prisoner when negotiating; but new articles would then have to be framed, and therefore the Spanish government should be called upon previously to declare what their intentions were as to the two articles in the treaty of Valençay. His objections to them were that the allowance to Charles IV. was beyond the financial means of Spain, and were it not so, Napoleon should not be allowed to stipulate for any provision for him. Neither should he be suffered to embody or establish a permanent French party in Spain under protection of a treaty, an article of which provided for the restoration of the Spaniards who had taken part with the French. It would give him the right, which he would not fail to exercise, of interfering in their favour in every question of property or other interest, and the Spanish government would be involved in perpetual disputes with France. It was probable the allied sovereigns would be desirous of getting rid of this question and would think it desirable that Spain should pardon her rebellious subjects. For this reason he had before advised the Spanish government to publish a general amnesty with the view of removing the difficulty when a general peace should come to be negotiated, and this difficulty and danger be enhanced, if not before provided for, by the desire which each of the allied powers would feel when negotiating on their separate grounds to save their finances by disbanding their armies.

This recommendation of an amnesty, made ten days before the battle of Vitoria, illustrates Wellington's sagacity, his long and provident reach of mind, his discriminating and magnanimous mode of viewing the errors and weaknesses of human nature. Let it be remembered that in the full tide of success, after having passed the Douro, when Joseph surprised and



bewildered was flying before him, that he who has been called the iron duke, in the midst of his bivouac fires, found time to consider and had sufficient humanity and grandeur of mind thus to address the Spanish government on the subject.

‘A large number of Spaniards who have taken the side of the French are now with the enemy’s army, many of these are highly meritorious and have rendered most essential service to the cause even during the period in which they have been in the service of the enemy. It is also a known fact that fear, the misery and distress which they suffered during the contest, and despair of the result, were the motives which induced many of these unfortunate persons to take the part which they have taken; and I would suggest for consideration whether it is expedient to involve the country in all the consequences of a rigid adherence to the existing law in order to punish such persons. I am the last man who will be found to diminish the merit of those Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the country during the severe trial which I hope has passed; particularly of those, who, having remained amongst the enemy without entering their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. But at the same time that I can appreciate the merits of these individuals and of the nation at large I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror by distress or by despair to pursue a different line of conduct.

‘I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the commencement and of the different stages of this eventful contest; and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and disorganization that followed, and let them decide whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner; and many, now deemed guilty in the eye of the law as having served the

pretended king, have by that very act acquired the means of serving and have rendered important services to their country.

‘It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the government and the Cortes to grant a general amnesty with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of failing or succeeding in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort fail the enemy will by an amnesty be deprived of the principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed; he will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partisans in Spain, and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that the country is divided in opinion. If the effort succeed the object of the government should be to pacify the country and to heal the divisions which the contest has unavoidably occasioned. It is impossible to accomplish this object while there exists a great body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest property in the country and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest, conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted. These persons their friends and relations will if persecuted naturally endeavour to perpetuate the divisions in the country in the hope at some time to take advantage of them; and advertng to their number and to that power which they must derive from their property and connexions it must be feared that they will be too successful.

‘But there are other important views of this question. First, should the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed, at some time or other approaches to peace must be made between the two nations, and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement. Secondly, should even Spain be at peace with France and the proscription against these persons be continued, they will remain in France a perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless power to disturb the internal tranquillity of Spain; and in case of a renewal of the war, which will be their wish and object, they will be the most mischievous and most inveterate enemies of their country; of

that country which with mistaken severity aggravates her misfortunes by casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects. On every ground then it is desirable that the measure should be adopted and the present moment should be seized for adopting it.'

Then pointing out with great accuracy and justice those who should be exempted from an amnesty, he thus terminated this record of his own true greatness and of the littleness of the people to whom it was fruitlessly addressed.

'In bringing this subject under the consideration of the government, I am perhaps intruding my opinion on a subject in which as a stranger I have no concern; but having had an advantage enjoyed by few of being acquainted with the concerns of the country since the commencement of the contest, and having been sensible both in the last and present campaign of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper as a well-wisher to the cause to bring it under the consideration of the government, assuring them at the same time that I have never had the slightest communication on the subject with the government of my country, nor do I believe that they have ever turned their attention to it. What I have above stated are my own opinions to which I may attribute more weight than they merit, but they are founded upon a sincere devotion to the interests of the country.'

Such was the general political state of the Peninsula as bearing upon the military operations at the close of the year 1813, and the state of England and France shall be shown in the next chapters. But however hateful and injurious to England the conduct of the Peninsular government appears, and however just and well-founded were the greatest part of Wellington's complaints, it is not to be assumed that the Spanish government and Cortes were totally without excuse for their hostility or ingratitude. It was not solely upon military grounds that they were obnoxious to the English general. He united heartily with the English government in hatred of democratic institutions as opposed to aristocratic domination. Spain with the former seemed scarcely worth saving from France, and in a letter written about that period to

H. O'Donnel, who it would appear proposed some immediate stroke of violence against the regency, he openly avowed that he was inimical to the constitution, because it admitted a free press and refused to property any political influence beyond what naturally belonged to it. That is, it refused to heap undue honours privileges and power upon those who already possessed all the luxury and happiness which riches can bestow,—it refused to admit the principle that those who have much should have more—that the indolence corruption and insolence naturally attendant upon wealth should be supported and increased by irresponsible power;—that those who laboured and produced all things should enjoy nothing—that the rich should be tyrants the poor slaves. But these essential principles of aristocratic government have never yet been, and never will be quietly received and submitted to by any thinking people—where they prevail there is no real freedom. Property inevitably confers power on its possessors, and far from adding to that natural power by political privileges it should be the object of all men who love liberty to balance it by raising the poorer classes to political importance: the influence and insolence of riches ought to be tamed and subdued instead of being inflated and excited by political institutions. This was the guiding principle of the most celebrated Greek legislators; the opposite principle produced domestic dissensions with the Romans and was the ruin of Carthage. It was the cause also of the French revolution. But after many years of darkness, the light of reason is now breaking forth again, and that ancient principle of justice which places the right of man in himself above the right of property is beginning to be understood. A clear perception of it has produced the American republic. France and Spain have admitted it and England ripens for its adoption. Yet pure and bright and beautiful and healthful as the light of freedom is in itself, it fell at this time in Spain on such foul and stagnant pools, such horrid repulsive objects, that millions turned at first from its radiance with disgust and wished for darkness again.





## CHAPTER V.

NAPOLEON'S energy was evinced in a marvellous manner by the rapidity with which he returned to Germany at the head of an enormous army before his enemies had time even to understand the extent of his misfortunes in the Russian campaign. The victories of Lutzen and Bautzen then seemed to reinstate him as the arbiter of Europe; but those battles were fought with the heads of columns the rear of which were still filing out of France, and with young troops. Wherefore when he had given himself a fixed and menacing position in Germany he more readily listened to the fraudulent negotiations of his trembling opponents, partly in hope of fair dealing, partly to organize and discipline his soldiers, confident in his own unmatched skill in directing them if war was finally to decide his fate. He counted also upon the family tie between him and Austria; he saw indeed that with her hope to regain former possessions was uppermost and he was prepared to concede them; yet he seems to have been quite unsuspecting of the long course of Austrian treachery. He knew not that while negotiating with France an offensive and defensive treaty in 1812, the Austrian cabinet was secretly aiding the plan of a vast insurrection extending from the Tyrol to Calabria and the Illyrian provinces. The management of this scheme was entrusted by the English cabinet in concert with that of Austria to general Nugent and Mr. King at Vienna, while their agents went from thence to Italy and the Illyrian coast. Many Austrian officers were employed, and Italians of

great families entered into commercial houses to enable them with more facility to carry on this plan. Moreover Austria, while actually signing the treaty with Napoleon, was with unceasing importunity urging Prussia to join the Russians in opposition to him; the

feeble operations of Prince Swartzenberg, the manner in which he uncovered the emperor's right flank and permitted Tschitchagoff to move to the Beresina in the Russian campaign, were but continuations of this deceitful policy. And it was afterwards openly advanced as a merit by the Austrian cabinet, that her offer of mediation after the battle of Bautzen was made solely with the view of gaining time to organize the army which was to join the Russians and Prussians: finally the armistice itself was violated, hostilities being commenced before its termination to enable the Russian troops safely to join the Austrians in Bohemia.

Nevertheless Napoleon's genius triumphed at Dresden over the unskilful operations of the allies directed by Swartzenberg, whose incapacity as a commander was made manifest in this campaign. Nor would the after misfortunes, of Vandamme and Macdonald, or the defeat of Oudinot and Ney, have prevented final success, but for the continuation of a treachery which seemed at the time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns who were unceasingly accusing their more noble adversary of the very baseness they were practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a project so vast, so original, so hardy, so far above the imaginations of his contemporary generals that even Wellington's sagacity failed to pierce it, and he censured Napoleon's long stay on the Elbe as an obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. Yet he urged as a reason for not invading France the emperor's tenacity in holding Dresden; thus showing how widely the moral influence of that position was felt. Napoleon had more profoundly judged his own situation. The large forces he left at Dresden, at Torgau, and Wittemberg, blamed by shallow military critics, were essential parts of his gigantic plan. He quitted Dresden, apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies; but with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing that river and throwing his opponents into a false position. Then he would have seized Berlin and re-opening his communications with his garrisons both on the Elbe and the Oder have operated between those rivers; and with an army much augmented in power, because he would have recovered many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons—an army



more compact and firmly established also; because he would have been in direct communication with the Danes and with Davoust's force at Hamburgh, and both his flanks would have been secured by his chains of fortresses on the two rivers. Already had Blucher and the Swedes felt his first stroke; the next would have taught the allies that the lion was still abroad in his strength, if at the very moment of execution, his marshals had not opposed his views, and the Bavarians, on whom he depended to check the Austrians in the valley of the Danube, had not made common cause with their opponents and marched together towards the Rhine. The battle of Leipsic followed, the well-known treason of the Saxon troops led to the victory gained there by the allies, and Napoleon, now the prey of misfortune, reached France with only one-third of his army; having on the way however trampled in the dust the Bavarian Wrede who attempted to stop his passage at Hannau.

Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, by giving hopes to their subjects that constitutional liberty would reward their prodigious exertions against France, hopes which with the most detestable baseness they had previously resolved to defraud, assembled greater forces than they were able to wield and prepared to pass the Rhine. Yet distrusting their immense superiority of numbers they still pursued their faithless system. When Napoleon marched to Leipsic he sent orders to St. Cyr to abandon Dresden and unite with the garrisons on the lower Elbe; the messengers were intercepted, and St. Cyr, too little enterprising to execute such a plan of his own accord, surrendered on condition of being allowed to regain France. The capitulation was broken and general and soldiers remained prisoners.

After the Leipsic battle Napoleon's adherents fell away by nations. Murat the husband of his sister joined Austria and thus forced prince Eugene to abandon his position on the Adige. A successful insurrection in favour of the prince of Orange broke out in Holland. The neutrality of Switzerland was then violated, and more than half a million of armed men were poured across the frontiers of France in all the violence of brute force; for their military combinations were con-

temptible and their course marked by murder and devastation. But previous to this they gave one more notable example of their faithless cunning.

St. Aignan the French resident minister at Gotha had been taken at Leipsic and treated at first as a prisoner of war; he remonstrated and being known to entertain a desire for peace was judged a good tool with which to practise deception. Napoleon had offered on the field of Leipsic to negotiate, no notice was taken of it at the time, but now the Austrian Metternich and the Russian Nesselrode had an interview with St. Aignan at Frankfort and assured him the Prussian minister agreed in all things with them. They had previously arranged that Lord Aberdeen should come in during the conference as if by accident; and though nothing was put down in writing St. Aignan was suffered to make minutes of their proposals in reply to the emperor's offer to negotiate. These were generally, that the alliance of the sovereigns was indissoluble—that they would have only a general peace—that France was to be confined to her natural limits, the Alps, the Rhine and the Pyrenees—that the independence of Germany was a thing not to be disputed—that the Spanish Peninsula should be free and the Bourbon dynasty be restored—that Austria must have a frontier in Italy the line of which could be afterwards discussed, but Italy itself was to be independent of any preponderating power—that Holland was to be independent and her frontier to be matter for after discussion—that England was ready to make great sacrifices for peace upon these bases and would acknowledge that freedom of commerce and of navigation which France had a right to pretend to—and when St. Aignan observed that Napoleon believed England was resolved to restrict France to the possession of thirty sail of the line, lord Aberdeen replied that it was not true.

Secret Diplo-  
matic Cor-  
respondence,  
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This conference had place at the emperor of Austria's headquarters on the 10th of November, and lord Aberdeen enclosed the account of it in a despatch dated at Smalcalde the 16th of November. He had objected verbally to the passage relating to the maritime question with England, nevertheless he permitted it to remain in St. Aignan's minutes. It was

decided also that the military operations should go on notwithstanding the negotiation, and in truth the allies had not the slightest design to make peace. They thought Napoleon would refuse the basis proposed, which would give them an opportunity to denounce him as opposed to all reasonable modes of putting an end to the war and thus work upon the French people. This was proved by what followed. For when contrary to their expectations it was signified, on the 16th of November, that he accepted the propositions, observing that the independence of all nations at sea as well as by land had been always his object, Metternich in reply, on the 25th of November, pretended to consider this answer as avoiding the acceptance of the basis. Napoleon however put that obstacle aside on the 2nd of December by accepting explicitly the basis generally and summarily, such as it had been presented to him, adding, that France would make great sacrifices, content if by like sacrifices on the part of England that general peace which was the declared object of the allies could be obtained. Metternich thus driven from his subterfuge required Napoleon to send a like declaration to each of the allies separately, when negotiations might, he said, commence.

Meanwhile lord Aberdeen, who had permitted St. Aignan to retain the article relating to maritime rights in his minutes of conference, presented to Metternich on the 27th of November a note declaring that England would not admit the turn given by France to her share of the negotiation; that she was ready to yield all the rights of commerce and navigation which France had a right to pretend to, but the question would turn upon what that right was. England would never permit her navigation laws to be discussed at a congress, it was a matter essentially foreign to the object of such an assembly, and England would never depart from the great principle thereby announced as to her maritime rights. Metternich approved of these views, saying they were his own and those of his court, thus proving that the negotiation had been a deceit from the beginning. This fact was however placed beyond doubt by lord Castlereagh's simultaneous proceedings in London.

In a note dated 30th November, that minister told lord Aberdeen, England admitted as a basis the Alps the Rhine and the Pyrenees as the frontier of France, subject to such modifications as might be necessary to give a secure frontier to Holland; and to Switzerland also, although the latter had not been mentioned in the proposals given by St. Aignan. He applauded the resolution to pursue military operations notwithstanding the negotiations, and he approved of demanding nothing but what they were resolved to have. Nevertheless he said that any sacrifice to be made by England was only to secure the independence of Holland and Switzerland, and the former having already declared for the house of Nassau was now out of the pale of discussion. Finally he recommended that any unnecessary delay or equivocation on the part of the enemy should be considered as tantamount to a rejection of the basis, and that the allies *should then put forward the offer of peace to show that it was not they but France that opposed an honourable termination of the war.* Having thus thrown fresh obstacles in the way of that peace the allies pretended to have so much at heart, he, on the 21st December sent notes to the different ambassadors of the allied powers then in London demanding explicit answers about the intentions of their courts as to England's maritime code. To this they all responded that their cabinets would not suffer any question relative to that code to be entertained at a congress in which England was represented, and this on the express ground that it would mar the great object of peace.

Lord Castlereagh provided with these documents declared that France should be informed of their resolutions before negotiations commenced. But twenty days before this Napoleon having decreed a fresh levy of three hundred thousand conscripts, the allies had published a manifesto treating this measure, so essentially a defensive one since they would not suspend their military operations, as a fresh provocation on his part; because the motives assigned for the conscription contained a just and powerful description of their past deceits and violence with a view to rouse the national spirit of France. Thus having first by a pretended desire for peace and a pre-



tended willingness on the part of England to consent to an arrangement about her maritime code, inveigled the French emperor into negotiations, thereby ascertaining that the maritime question was uppermost in his mind and the only obstacle to peace, they declared that vital question should not even be discussed. And when by this subtlety peace was rendered impossible they proclaimed that Napoleon alone resisted the desire of the world for tranquillity! Yet at that moment Austria was secretly endeavouring to obtain England's consent to her seizing upon Alsace, a project only stopped by Wellington, who forcibly pointed out the danger of rousing France to a general insurrection by such a proceeding.

The contrast between these wiles to gain a momentary advantage, and the manly vigorous policy of lord Wellington must make honest men of all nations blush for the cunning which diplomatists call policy. On one side the arts of guileful negotiation masked with fair protestations but accompanied by a savage and revolting system of warfare; on the other a broad open hostility declared on manly and just grounds followed up with a strict regard to humanity and good faith; nothing put forward with an equivocal meaning and the actions true to the word. On the eastern frontier the Cossack let loose to ravage with all the barbarity of Asiatic warfare; on the western frontier the Spaniards turned back into their own country for daring to pass the bounds of discipline prescribed by the wise and generous policy of their commander. Terror and desolation, and the insurrection of a people rendered frantic by the cruelty of the invaders, marked the progress of the ferocious multitudes who crossed the Rhine. Order and tranquillity, profound even on the very edge of the battle-field, attended the march of the civilized army which passed the Bidassoa. And what were the military actions? Napoleon, rising even above himself, hurtled against the armed myriads opposed to him with such a terrible energy, that though ten times his number they were rolled back on every side in confusion and dismay. Wellington advanced without a check, victorious in every battle, although one half of the veterans opposed to him would have decided the cam-



paign on the eastern frontier. Nor can this be gainsaid, since Napoleon's career in this campaign was only stayed by the defection of his brother-in-law Murat, and by the sickening treachery of two marshals to whom he had been prodigal of benefits. It is undeniable that Wellington with sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese effected in the south more than half a million of the allies could effect on the opposite side of France; and yet Soult's army on the 10th of November was stronger than that with which Napoleon fought the battle of Brienne.

That great man was never deceived by the simulated negotiation of the allied powers. He joined issue with them to satisfy the French people that he was not averse to peace, but his instructions to Caulaincourt the 4th of January prove at once his sagacity and firmness. 'I think,' he said, 'that the allies' good faith and the wish of England to make peace are doubtful; for my part I desire peace, but it must be solid and honourable. I have accepted the basis proposed at Frankfort, yet it is more than probable the allies have other notions. These propositions are but a mask, the negotiations are placed under the influence of the military operations, and it is easy to foresee what the consequences of such a system must be: it is necessary therefore to listen to and observe everything. It is not certain even that you will be admitted to the head-quarters of the allies; the Russians and the English watch to prevent any opening for explanation and reconciliation with the emperor of Austria. You must therefore endeavour to ascertain the real views of the allies; and let me know day by day what you learn that I may frame instructions for which at present I have no sure grounds.'

The internal state of France was more disquieting to his mind than foreign negotiations or the number of invaders. The republicans were averse to him as the restorer of monarchy; yet they should have felt that the sovereign whose ruin was so eagerly sought by the legitimate kings and nobles of Europe could not be really opposed to liberty. The advocates of legitimacy shrunk from him as an usurper; and all those tired of war, and they were a majority of the nation, judging from the stupendous power of his genius that he had

only to will peace to attain it with security, blamed his tardiness in negotiation. An unexpected opposition to his wishes was also displayed in the legislative body, and the partisans of the Bourbons were endeavouring to form a great conspiracy in favour of that family. There were many traitors likewise to him and to their country, men devoid of principle patriotism or honour, who with extinctive hatred of a failing cause plotted to thwart his projects for the defence of the nation,—in fine, the men of action and the men of theories were alike combined for mischief. Nor is this outbreak of passion to be wondered at, when it is considered how recently Napoleon had stopped the anarchy of revolution and rebuilt the social and political structure in France. But of all who by their untimely opposition to the emperor hurt their country, the most pernicious were those silly politicians, whom he so felicitously described as ‘*discussing abstract systems of government when the battering-ram was at the gates.*’

Such however has been in all ages the conduct of excited and disturbed nations, and it seems to be inherent in human nature; because a saving policy can only be understood and worked to good by master-spirits, and they are few and far between, their time on earth short, their task immense. They have not time to teach, they must command, although they know that pride and ignorance and even honesty will carp at the despotism which brings general safety. It was this vain short-sighted impatience that drove Hannibal into exile, caused the assassination of Cæsar, strewed thorns beneath the gigantic footsteps of Cromwell. It raged fiercely in Spain against Wellington, in France against Napoleon, and always with the most grievous injury to the several nations. Time only hallows human institutions. Under that guarantee men will yield implicit obedience and respect to the wildest caprices of the most stupid tyrant that ever disgraced a throne; and wanting it they will cavil at and reject the wisest measures of the most sublime genius. The painful notion is thus excited, that if governments have just the degree of stability and tranquillity which they deserve, the people of all nations, much as they may be oppressed, enjoy upon an average of years precisely the degree of liberty they are fitted for. National

discontents mark, according to their bitterness and constancy, not so much the oppression of the rulers as the real progress of the ruled in civilization and its attendant political knowledge. When from peculiar circumstances those discontents explode in violent revolutions, shattering the fabric of society and giving free vent and activity to all the passions and follies of mankind, fortunate is the nation which possesses a Napoleon or an Oliver Cromwell *'to step into their state of dominion with spirit to control and capacity to subdue the factions of the hour and reconstruct the frame of reasonable government.'*

Great as those two wonderful men were in the field of battle, they were infinitely greater when they placed themselves in the seat of power, ruling with the might and despotism of genius essential to the completion of their holy work. Washington cannot be justly deemed comparable to either of those men; his situation was of infinitely less difficulty; and there is no reason to believe his capacity would have been equal to the emergencies of a more formidable crisis than he had to deal with. Washington could not have made himself master, had it been necessary and he so inclined, for he was neither the foremost general nor the foremost statesman of his nation. His forbearance was a matter of necessity, and his love of liberty did not prevent him from bequeathing his black slaves to his widow.

Such was Napoleon's situation: and as he read the signs of the times truly he knew that in his military skill and the rage of the peasants at the ravages of the enemy he must find the means to extricate himself from his difficulties, or rather to extricate his country—for self had no place in his policy save as his personal glory was identified with France and her prosperity. Never before did the world see a man soaring so high so devoid of all selfish ambition. Let those who, honestly seeking truth, doubt this, study Napoleon carefully; let them read the record of his second abdication published by his brother Lucien, that stern republican who refused kingdoms as the price of his principles, and they will doubt no longer. It is not however with these matters that this History has to deal, but with the emperor's measures affecting his lieutenants on the Spanish frontier of France. There dis-

affection to his government was extensive from local causes. The conscription was peculiarly hateful to the wild mountaineers, who like most borderers cherish very independent notions; the war with England had ruined the foreign commerce of the great towns, and the advantage of increased traffic by land on the east was less directly felt in the south—there also the recollection of the Vendean struggle still lingered and the partisans of the Bourbons had many connexions. But the chief danger arose from the politic conduct of Wellington which, offering no cause of anger and much of private advantage to the people, gave no hope of insurrection from sufferings.

While France was in this state England presented a scene of universal exultation. Tory politics were triumphant, opposition in parliament was nearly crushed by events, the press was subdued by persecution or in the pay of the ministers; and the latter with undisguised joy hailed the coming moment when aristocratic tyranny was to be firmly established in England. The most enormous subsidies and military supplies were poured into the continent, and an act was passed to enable three-fourths of the militia to serve abroad. They were not however very forward to volunteer, and a new army, which ought to have reinforced Wellington, was sent under the command of Graham to support the insurrection of Holland. It was there only engaged in trifling or unsuccessful operations in no manner affecting the great objects of the war, and meanwhile the importance of Wellington's army and views was overlooked or misunderstood. The ministers still pressed his removing to another quarter of Europe; and at the same time, instigated by the ambassadors of the allied sovereigns, were continually urging him to push his operations with more vigour in France! as if he was the man who had done least!

His letters were therefore filled with strong well-founded complaints that his army was neglected. He had, with a political view and to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns backed by the importunities of his own government, placed himself in a confined and difficult district of France, where his operations were cramped by rivers and fortresses, and by



a strong army occupying strong positions on his front and flanks. Unable to act at all in wet weather, he was dependent upon the ocean for supplies and reinforcements, and upon the Spanish authorities for hospitals *dépôts* and communications. Numbers were requisite to balance the advantages the enemy had in the conformation of the country and in the fortresses; money also was wanted for supplies; which he could not carry with him and must pay for exactly to avoid insurrection and ruin to the political object in view. He had undertaken the invasion of France at the express desire of the government, yet the latter were alike ignorant of its importance and of the means to accomplish it; at one moment urging progress beyond reason, at another ready to change lightly what they had proposed ignorantly; they could not comprehend the nature of the great tide of events on which they floated rather than sailed. Wellington was forced day by day to teach them the value of their own schemes, and the true bearing of the political and military affairs they pretended to direct!

‘Assure,’ he wrote on the 21st of December to lord Bathurst in reply to one of their ill-founded remonstrances—‘assure the Russian ambassador there is nothing I can do to forward the general interest that I will not do? What do they require? I am already further advanced on the French territory than any of the allied powers; and better prepared to take advantage of any opportunities which might offer as a consequence of my own situation or of their proceedings.’—‘In military operations there are some things which can not be done, and one is to move troops in this country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain. To attempt it will be to lose more men than can be replaced, a guilty waste of life.’

‘The proper scene of action for the army was undoubtedly a question for the government to decide; but with thirty thousand men in the Peninsula, he had for five years held two hundred thousand of Napoleon’s best soldiers in check, since it was ridiculous to suppose that the Spaniards and Portuguese could have resisted for a moment if the British troops had been withdrawn. The French armies actually employed against him could not be less than one hundred thousand men, more if he included garrisons, and the French news-



papers spoke of orders to form a fresh reserve of one hundred thousand at Bordeaux. Was there any man weak enough to suppose one-third of the number first mentioned would be employed against the Spaniards and Portuguese if the British were withdrawn? They would, if it were an object with Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula, and he would in that case succeed; but he was more likely to give peace to the Peninsula, and turn against the allied sovereigns his two hundred thousand men, of which one hundred thousand were such troops as their armies had not yet dealt with. The war every day offered a crisis the result of which might affect the world for ages, and to change the scene of operations for the British army would render it incapable of fighting for four months, even if the scene were Holland: and it would even then be a deteriorated machine.'

'The ministers might reasonably ask how by remaining where he was he could induce Napoleon to make peace. The answer was ready. He held a commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier of France, probably the only vulnerable one; and if he could put twenty thousand Spaniards in activity, and he could do it if he had money and was properly supported by the fleet, Bayonne the only fortress on the frontier, if it could be called a fortress, would fall to him in a short time. If he could put forty thousand Spaniards in motion his posts would soon be on the Garonne; and did any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position more than he would feel thirty or forty thousand British troops laying siege to one of his fortresses in Holland? The resources in men and money of which the emperor would be thus deprived, and the loss of reputation, would do ten times more to procure peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders. But if he was right in believing a strong Bourbon party existed in France and preponderated in the south, what mischief would not an advance to the Garonne do Napoleon! What sacrifices would he not make to get rid of the danger!'

'It was for the government not for him to dispose of the nation's resources, he had no right to give an opinion upon the subject; but military operations in Holland and in the Peninsula could not be maintained at the same time with British troops, one or other must be given up; the British

military establishment was not equal to maintain two armies in the field. He had begun the recent campaign with seventy thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and if the men got from the English militia and the Portuguese recruits which he expected had been added to his force, even though the Germans were removed from his army according to the ministers' plan, he might have taken the field early in 1814 with eighty thousand men. That was now impossible. The formation of a Hanoverian army was the most reasonable plan of acting on the continent, but the withdrawal of the Germans would reduce his force to fifty thousand men, unless he received real and efficient assistance to bring up the Portuguese recruits. This would increase his numbers to fifty-five or even sixty thousand if his own wounded recovered well and he had no more battles, but he would even then be twenty thousand less than he had calculated upon, and it was certain that if the government extended their operations to other countries new means must be put in activity or the war must be stinted on the old stage. He did not desire to complain, but every branch in the service of the Peninsula was already stinted, especially in what concerned the navy and the supplies which came directly from England!

While thus combating the false views of the English cabinet as to the general state of affairs he had also to struggle with its negligence and even opposition to his measures in details. The clothing of the Spanish troops and the great coats of the British soldiers for 1813 were not ready in January 1814, because the inferior departments could not comprehend that new scenes of exertion required new means; and the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first on the snowy mountains, then in the more chilling damps of the low country about Bayonne. The clothing of the British soldiers for 1814 should have arrived in the end of 1813, when the army lying inactive near the coast by reason of the bad weather could have received and fitted it without difficulty. It did not arrive until the troops were in progress towards the interior of France; and then, no means of transport existing, many of the best regiments were compelled to return to the coast to receive it, and the army, as will be seen, had to fight a great battle without them.

Wellington had on entering France issued a proclamation promising protection to persons and property; this was construed by the French to cover their vessels in the Nivelle when the battle of that name gave the allies St. Jean de Luz. Sacrificing personal profit to the good of the service, he admitted this claim as tending to render the people amicable; but it clashed with the prize-money pretensions of lord Keith who commanded the fleet of which Collier's squadron formed a detached portion; and though the serious evils springing from default of naval assistance had been treated as of slight importance, a trifling personal gain for the navy excited a marvellous activity and vigorous interference on the part of the government. Upon these subjects, and others of a like vexatious nature affecting his operations, he repeatedly and forcibly declared his discontent during the months of December, January and February.

'As to the naval affairs,' he said, 'the reports of the number of ships on the stations, striking off those coming out and going home, would show whether he had just ground of complaint; and, whatever their numbers, there remained the right of complaint because they did not perform the service required. The French had recommenced their coast navigation from Bordeaux to Bayonne, and if the blockade of Santona had been maintained the place would have been forced to surrender at an early period. The proclamation of protection which he had issued, and the licences which he had granted to French vessels, every act of that description, and two-thirds of the acts which he performed every day could not he knew be considered of any avail as affecting the king's government, unless approved of and confirmed by the prince regent; and he knew that no power short of the regent's could save the property of French subjects on the seas from the British navy. For that reason he had requested the sanction of the government to the sea passports which he had granted. His proclamation of protection had been construed, whether rightfully or wrongfully, to protect the French ships in the rivers; his personal interest, greater than others, would lead him to deny this, but he sacrificed his profit to the general good.

'Were lord Keith and sir George Collier, because the latter

happened to have a brig or two cruizing off the coast, to claim as prizes all the vessels lying in every river which the army might pass in its operations? and this to the detriment of the cause which required the strictest respect for private property. For the last five years he had been acting in the confidence that his conduct would be approved of and supported, and he concluded it would be so still; but he was placed in a novel situation and asked for legal advice to determine whether lord Keith and the channel fleet were to be considered as engaged in a conjoint expedition with the army under his command against the subjects of France, neither having any specific instructions from government and the fleet having nothing to do with the operations by land. He only required that fleet to give him a free communication with the coast of Spain, and prevent the enemy's sea communication between the Garonne and the Adour, and this last was a part of its duty before the army arrived. Was his proclamation of protection to hold good as regarded the ships in the rivers? He desired to have it sanctioned by the prince regent, or that he might be permitted to issue another declaring that it was of no value.'

This remonstrance caused lord Keith to relinquish his claims, and admiral Penrose was sent to command upon the station instead of Collier. The immediate intercourse with the navy was thus ameliorated by the superior power of this officer, who was remarkable for his suavity; yet the licences given to French vessels were strongly condemned by the government, and rendered null; for we find Wellington again complaining that 'he had granted them only in hopes of drawing money and supplies from France, and of interesting the French mercantile men to aid the army; but he feared the government were not aware of, and did not feel the difficulties in which he was placed at all times for want of money, and judged his measures without adverting to the necessity which occasioned them; hence their frequent disapprobation of what he did.'

Strange all this may sound to those who seeing the great duke in the fulness of his glory have been accustomed to regard him as the star of England's greatness; but those who at that period frequented the society of ministers knew well that



he was then looked upon by those self-sufficient men as a person whose views were wild and visionary, requiring the corroboration of older and wiser heads before they could be assented to. Yea! even at the eleventh hour was the giant Wellington thus measured by the political dwarfs.

He gained something by making San Jean de Luz a free port for all nations not at war with France, but his financial situation was nearly intolerable; and at the moment of greatest pressure, colonel Bunbury, under secretary of state, was sent out to urge amongst other matters the difficulty of providing specie, and the expense of conveying forage for his cavalry from England and Ireland. One hundred thousand pounds a month was to be the maximum of specie supplied, when he was so overwhelmed with debt he could scarcely quit his house for the multitude of creditors besieging his door. In reply he thus described his position.

Wellington's  
Despatches.      ' Some of his muleteers were twenty-six months in arrears, and recently, instigated by British merchants, they had become so clamorous that rather than lose their services he had given them bills on the Treasury for a part of their claims; though he knew they would sell these bills at a discount to the *sharks*, who had urged them to be thus so importunate, and who were waiting at the ports to take advantage of the public distresses: this very dangerous measure he desired not to repeat. It might be true, that the supply of one hundred thousand pounds a month had been even exceeded for some time past, but it was incontestable that the English army and all its departments, and the Spanish and Portuguese armies were at the moment paralyzed for want of money. The arrears of pay to the soldiers was entering the seventh month, the debt was immense, and the king's engagements with the Spanish and Portuguese governments were not fulfilled. Indebted in every part of Spain he was becoming so in France; the price of all commodities increasing in proportion to the delay of payment, to the difficulty of getting food at all, and to the want of credit into which all the departments of the army had fallen. Of two hundred thousand dollars given to Beresford for the pay of his troops on account of the Portuguese subsidy he had been forced to



take back fifty thousand to keep the Spaniards together, and was even then forced to withhold ten thousand to prevent the British cavalry from perishing. Money to pay the Spaniards had sailed from Cadiz, but the vessel conveying it, and another containing the soldiers' great-coats, were by the Admiralty arrangements obliged to go first to Coruña, and neither had arrived there in January although the money had been ready in October. But the ship of war designed to carry it did not arrive at Cadiz until the end of December. Sixteen thousand Spanish troops were thus rendered useless because without pay they could not be trusted in France.'

'The commissary-in-chief in England had been regularly informed of the state of the supplies of the military chest and of the wants and prospects of the army, but those wants were not attended to. The monthly hundred thousand pounds spoken of as the maximum, even if it had been given regularly, would not cover the ordinary expenses of the troops; and there were besides the subsidies other outlays requiring ready money, such as meat for the soldiers, hospital expenses, commissariat labourers, and a variety of minor engagements. The Portuguese government had been reduced to a monthly sum of two hundred thousand dollars out of a subsidy of two millions sterling. The Spanish government got what they could out of a subsidy of one million. And when money was obtained for the government in the markets of Lisbon and Cadiz, it came not in due time, because, such were the Admiralty arrangements, there were no ships to convey the treasure to the north coast of Spain. The whole sum which had passed through the military chest during the past year was scarcely more than two millions four hundred thousand pounds, out of which part of the subsidies had been paid. This was quite inadequate; the government had desired him to push his operations to the Garonne during the winter; he was prepared to do so in every point excepting money, and he knew the greatest advantages would accrue from such a movement, but he could not stir. His posts were already so distant from the coast that his means of transport were daily destroyed by the journeys, he had not a shilling to pay for anything in the country and his credit was gone. He had been obliged privately to borrow the expense of a single

courier sent to general Clinton. It was not his duty to suggest the fitting measures for relief, but it was obvious that an immediate and large supply from England was necessary, and that ships should be provided to convey that which was obtained at Lisbon and Cadiz to the army.'

Such was the denuded state of the victorious Wellington at a time when millions, and the worth of more millions were being poured by the English ministers into the continent; when every petty German sovereign, partisan, or robber who raised a band or a cry against Napoleon, was supplied to satiety. And all this time there was not in England one public salary reduced, one contract checked, one abuse corrected, one public servant rebuked for negligence; not a writer dared to expose the mischief lest he should be crushed by persecution; no minister ceased to claim and to receive the boasting congratulations of the tories; no whig had sense to discover or spirit to denounce the iniquitous system—the voice of reprehension was never heard from that selfish faction unless it were in sneering contempt of the general whose mighty genius sustained England under this load of folly.

Nor were these difficulties all that he had to contend with. While the Portuguese regency withheld his reinforcements the duke of York insisted upon withdrawing his provisional battalions, which, being all composed of old soldiers the remains of regiments reduced by the casualties of war, were of more value in a winter campaign than three times their numbers of new men. For the services of the English militia regiments he had no desire; they possessed, he said, all the worst faults of the regulars and some peculiar to themselves besides; what he desired was that eight or ten thousand men should be drafted from them to fill up his ranks; he could then without much injury let his foreign battalions be taken away to re-form a Hanoverian army on the continent. And this plan he was inclined to, because the Germans, brave and strong soldiers, were yet addicted to desertion and in that particular set a bad example to the British: this suggestion was however disregarded, and other reinforcements were promised to him.

But the most serious of all the secondary vexations sprung

from the conduct of the Spanish authorities. His hospitals and dépôts were for the most part in the Spanish territories, principally at Santander. To avoid inconvenience to the inhabitants he had wooden houses brought from England in which to shelter his sick and wounded men; and he paid extravagantly and regularly for every aid demanded from the natives. Nevertheless after much underhand and irritating conduct, the municipality, resolute to drive the hospitals from their town, suddenly, and under the false pretext that there was a contagious fever, placed all the British hospitals with their officers and attendants under quarantine. This was in the middle of January. Thirty thousand men had been wounded since June in the service of Spain, and the return was to make those wounded men close prisoners and drive their general to the necessity of fixing his hospitals in England! Vessels coming from Santander were thus rendered objects of dread, and the municipalities of the other ports, really fearing or pretending to fear the contagion, would not suffer them to enter their waters. And such a height did this cowardice and villany attain, that the political chief of Guipuscoa, shut without notice all the ports of that province against vessels coming from Santander; and the alcalde of Fuenterrabia endeavoured to prevent a Portuguese military officer from assisting an English vessel, which was about to be and was afterwards actually cast away, because she came from Santander.

But from the danger of navigating the Bay of Biscay in winter, and the badness of the ports near the positions of the army, all the stores and provisions coming by sea went in the first instance to Santander, the only good port, there to wait until favourable opportunities occurred for reaching the more eastern harbours. All the provision magazines of the Spanish army were there, and this blow cut all off; the army was reduced to the smaller magazines at Passages which could only last for a few days, and when that supply was expended Wellington would have had no resource but to withdraw across the Pyrenees! *'Here,' he exclaimed, 'here are the consequences of the system by which these provinces are governed! Duties of the highest description, military operations, political*

*interests, and the salvation of the state, are made to depend upon the caprices of a few ignorant individuals, who have adopted a measure unnecessary and harsh without adverting to its objects or consequences, and merely with a view to their personal interests and convenience.'*

They carried it into execution also with the utmost hardness caprice and injustice, regardless of the loss of ships and lives which must follow; and finally desired him to relinquish the harbour and town of Santander altogether as a dépôt! However his vigorous remonstrances stopped this nefarious proceeding in time to avert the danger which it menaced. Be it remembered now, that these dangers and difficulties, and vexations, although related in succession, happened, not one after another, but altogether; that it was when crossing the Bidassoa, breaking through the mountain fortifications of Soult, passing the Nive, fighting the battles in front of Bayonne, and when still greater and more intricate combinations were to be arranged, that all these vials of folly and enmity were poured upon his head. Who then shall refuse to admire the undaunted firmness, the unwearied temper and vigilance, the piercing judgment with which he steered his gallant vessel with a flowing sail unhurt through this howling storm of passion, this tumultuous sea of folly.



## CHAPTER VI.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EASTERN PARTS  
OF SPAIN.

WHEN general Clinton succeeded lord William Bentinck, his whole force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians, Whittingham's and Sarsfield's Spaniards, and two battalions of Roche's division, did not furnish quite nineteen thousand men under arms. Copons, blockading Mequinenza, Appendix 1. Lerida and Monzon, and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seu d'Urgel, the only places in his possession, could not bring more than nine thousand men into the field. Elio had nominally twenty-five thousand, but this included Sarsfield's and Roche's troops, the greater part of which were with Clinton. It included likewise the bands of Villa Campa, Duran and the Empecinado, scattered in Castille, Aragon and Valencia, and acting according to the caprices of their chiefs. His force, daily diminishing also from the extreme unhealthiness of the country about Tortosa, was scarcely sufficient to maintain the blockades of the French fortresses beyond the Ebro.

Copons' army having no base but the mountains about Vich and Monserrat, having no magazines or dépôts or place of arms, having very little artillery and scarcely any cavalry, lived as it could from day to day; in like manner lived Sarsfield's and Whittingham's troops, and Clinton's army was chiefly fed on salt provisions from the ships; the two former having no means of transport were unable to make even one day's march with ease, they were continually upon the point of starvation and could never be reckoned as a moveable force. Nor indeed could the Anglo-Sicilians, owing to their scanty means of transport, make above two or three marches



from the sea; and they were at this time more than usually hampered, being without pay and shut out from their principal dépôts at Gibraltar and Malta: by plague at the first, yellow fever at the second. The courage and discipline of the British and Germans set aside, it would be difficult to find armies less efficient for an offensive campaign than those of the allies in Catalonia. Clinton's command over the Spaniards was restricted to Whittingham's and Sarsfield's troops; and though he strove to conciliate Copons, that general's indolence and incapacity impeded or baffled all useful measures.

This analysis shows that Elio being entirely engaged in Valencia, and Sarsfield and Whittingham unprovided with the means of movement, the army of Copons and the Anglo-Sicilians, together furnishing when the posts and escorts and the labourers employed on the fortifications of Taragona were deducted not more than eighteen thousand men, were the only troops to oppose Suchet, who without drawing a man from his garrisons could attack them with thirty thousand. Copons and Clinton had also different bases and lines of retreat; the first depended upon the mountains and the interior for security and subsistence, the second on Taragona and the fleet. The only mode of combining on a single line was to make Valencia a common base, and throwing bridges over the Ebro construct works to defend them. This was recommended by Wellington to lord William and to Clinton; but the former had several times lost his bridges, partly from the rapidity of the stream, partly from the activity of the garrison of Tortosa; and for Clinton the difficulty was enhanced by distance; because Taragona, where all his materials were deposited, was sixty miles from Amposta, and all his artificers were required to restore the defences of the former place. The blockade of Tortosa was therefore always liable to be raised, and the troops employed there exposed to a sudden and fatal attack, since Suchet, sure to separate the Anglo-Sicilians from Copons when he advanced, could penetrate between them; and while the former rallied at Taragona and the latter at Igualada his march would be direct upon Tortosa. He could thus either carry off his strong garrison, or passing

the Ebro by the bridge of the fortress, move without let or hindrance upon Peniscola, Saguntum, and Valencia, drive Elio back to Alicante, collect his garrisons and return too powerful to be meddled with.

This state of affairs led Wellington to recommend that the blockade of Tortoza should be given up, and the two armies acting on their own peculiar lines should harass the enemy's flanks and rear alternately if he attacked either, but together if he moved upon Tortoza. To besiege or blockade that place with safety it was necessary to throw two bridges over the Ebro below, to enable the armies to avoid Suchet by either bank when he should succour the place, as he was sure to do; but as it was essential Copons should not abandon Catalonia, it would be advisable to make Taragona the point of retreat for both armies in the first instance, after which they could separate and infest the French rear.

Thinking the difficulty of besieging Tortoza insuperable, he desired it should be well considered beforehand, and, if invested, that the troops should be entrenched. All his instructions tended towards defence, and were founded upon his conviction of the weak and dangerous position of the allies; yet he believed them to have more resources than they really had, and to be superior in number to the French: a great error as already shown. Nothing therefore could be more preposterous than Suchet's alarm for the frontier of France at this time; his personal reluctance was the only bar to aiding Soult either indirectly by marching on Tortoza and Valencia, or directly by adopting that marshal's great project of uniting the two armies in Aragon. Indeed Clinton felt the difficulties of his own situation so strongly that he only retained the command from a strong sense of duty; and Wellington even recommended that the Anglo-Sicilian army should be broken up and employed in other places. Suchet's inactivity was also the more injurious to the interests of his sovereign, because any reverse or appearance of reverse to the allies would at this time have gone nigh to destroy the alliance between Spain and England; but personal jealousy, and the preference given to local momentary interests before general considerations, hurt the French cause at all periods in the Peninsula and enabled the allies to conquer,

Clinton had no thoughts of besieging Tortosa, his efforts were directed to the obtaining a secure place of arms; yet despite of his intrinsic weakness he resolved to show a confident front, hoping thus to keep Suchet at arm's length. In this view he endeavoured to render Taragona once more defensible notwithstanding the nineteen breaches which had been broken in its walls; but this work was tedious, because he depended for materials upon the Spanish authorities. Thus immersed in difficulties he could make little change in his positions, which were generally about the Campo, Sarsfield's division only being pushed to Villa Franca; Suchet meanwhile held the Llobregat, and apparently to colour his assertion as to the strength of the allies, suffered Clinton to remain in tranquillity.

Towards the end of October reports that the French were  
concentrating, for what purpose was not known,  
October. caused the English general, although Taragona was still indefensible, to make a forward movement. He dared not provoke a battle, but unwilling to yield the resources of Villa Franca and other districts pushed an advanced guard to the former place. He even fixed his head-quarters there, appearing ready to fight; yet his troops were so disposed in succession at Arbos, Vendrills, and Torredembarra, that he could retreat without dishonour if the French advanced in force; or could concentrate at Villa Franca in time to harass their flank and rear if they attempted to carry off their garrisons on the Segre. Suchet then made several demonstrations, sometimes against Copons sometimes against Clinton, but the latter maintained his offensive attitude with firmness, and even in opposition to Wellington's implied opinion that the line of the Ebro was the most suitable to his weakness; for he liked not to abandon Taragona, the repairs of which were now advancing though slowly to completion. His perseverance was crowned with success; he preserved the few resources left for the support of the Spanish troops, and furnished Suchet with that semblance of excuse which he desired for keeping aloof from Soult.

In this manner October and November were passed, but on  
the 1st of December the French general attempted  
December. to surprise the allies' cantonments at Villa Franca,

as he had before surprised them at Ordal. He moved in the same order. One column marched by San Sadurni on his right, another by Bejer and Avionet on his left, the main body keeping the great road. He did not however find colonel Adam there. Clinton had blocked the Ordal so as to render a night surprise impossible, and the natural difficulties of the other roads delayed the flanking columns. Hence, when the French reached Villa Franca Sarsfield was in full march for Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians, who had only three men wounded at one of the advanced posts, were on the strong ground about Arbos, where, being joined by the supporting divisions, they offered battle. Suchet then retired to the Llobregat, apparently so mortified by his failure that he has not even mentioned it in his Memoirs.

Clinton resumed his former ground, yet his embarrassments increased, and though he transferred two of Whittingham's regiments to Copons and sent Roche's battalions back to Valencia, the country was so exhausted that the enduring constancy of the Spanish soldiers under privations alone enabled Sarsfield to remain in the field: more than once he was upon the point of re-crossing the Ebro to save his soldiers from perishing of famine. Here, as in other parts, the Spanish government not only starved their troops but would not even provide a piece of ordnance or any stores for the defence of Taragona. And when admiral Hallowell, in conjunction with Quesada the Spanish commodore at Port Mahon, brought some ship-guns from that place, the minister of war, O'Donoju, expressed his disapprobation; observing with a sneer that the English might provide the guns wanting from the Spanish ordnance moved into Gibraltar by general Campbell when he destroyed the lines of San Roque!

On the 9th Suchet pushed a small corps by Bejer, between the Ordal and Sitjes, and on the 10th surprised at the Ostel of Ordal an officer and thirty men of the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry. This disaster was the result of negligence; the detachment had dismounted without examining the buildings of the inn, and some French troopers concealed within seized the horses and captured the whole party.

On the 17th, French troops appeared at Martorel, Ordal,



and Bejer, with a view to mask the march of a large convoy coming from Upper Catalonia to Barcelona: they then resumed their former positions, and at the same time Soult's and Wellington's letters announcing the defection of the Nassau battalions arrived. Wellington's came first, and enclosed a communication from colonel Kruse to his countryman colonel Meder, who was serving in Barcelona and as Kruse supposed willing to abandon the French. But when Clinton by the aid of Manso transmitted the letter to Meder, that officer handed it to Habert who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the command of the city. All the German regiments, principally cavalry, were immediately disarmed and sent to France; Severoli's Italians were at the same time recalled to Italy and a number of French soldiers, selected to fill the wasted ranks of the imperial guards, marched with them. Two thousand officers and soldiers were likewise detached to the dépôts of the interior to organize the conscripts of the new levy destined to reinforce the army of Catalonia; and besides these drafts a thousand gens-d'armes hitherto employed on the Spanish frontier in aid of the regular troops were withdrawn. Suchet thus lost seven thousand veterans, yet he had still an overwhelming power compared to the allies.

It was in this state of affairs that the duke of San Carlos arrived secretly at the French head-quarters on his way to Madrid with the treaty of Valençay. Copons knew this, and was only deterred from openly acceding to the views of the French emperor and concluding a military convention, by the decided conduct of the Cortes, and the ascendancy which Wellington had obtained over him in common with the other Spanish officers; an ascendancy which had not escaped Soult's sagacity; for he early warned the French minister that nothing could be expected from them while under the powerful spell of the English general. Clinton, getting information that the French troops were diminished in numbers, especially in front of Barcelona and on the Llobregat, proposed to pass that river and invest Barcelona, if Copons, who was in the mountains, would undertake to provision Sarsfield's division and keep the French troops between Barcelona and Gerona in check. For this purpose he offered the aid of a Spanish regiment of cavalry



which Elio had lent for the operations in Catalonia; but Copons, influenced by San Carlos' mission or knowing the enemy were really stronger than Clinton imagined, declared he was unable to hold the French troops between Gerona and Barcelona in check, and could not provision either Sarsfield's division or the regiment of cavalry. He suggested instead, a combined attack upon some of Suchet's posts on the Llobregat, promising to send Manso to Villa Franca to confer upon the execution. Clinton's proposal was made early in January yet it was the middle of that month before Copons replied; and then he only sent Manso to offer the aid of his brigade in a combined attack upon two thousand French who were at Molino del Rey. It was however at last arranged that Manso should at daybreak on the 16th seize the high ground above Molino on the left of the Llobregat, to intercept the enemy's retreat upon Barcelona while the Anglo-Sicilians fell upon them from the right bank.

Success depended upon Clinton's remaining quiet until the moment of execution, and he could only use the troops immediately in hand about Villa Franca, in all six thousand men with three pieces of artillery; but with these he made a night march of eighteen miles, and was close to the ford of San Vicente two miles below the fortified bridge of Molino del Rey before daylight. The French were tranquil and unsuspecting, and he anxiously but vainly awaited the signal of Manso's arrival. When the day broke, the French piquets at San Vicente desecring his troops commenced a skirmish, and at the same time a column with a piece of artillery, coming from Molino, advanced to attack him thinking there was only a patrolling detachment to deal with, for he had concealed his main body. Thus pressed he opened his guns per force and crippled the French piece, whereupon the reinforcements retired hastily to the entrenchments at Molino; he could then easily have forced the passage at the ford and attacked the enemy's works in the rear; but this would not have ensured the capture of their troops, wherefore he still awaited Manso's arrival, relying on that partisan's zeal and knowledge of the country. He appeared at last, not as agreed upon at St. Filieu, between Molino and Barcelona, but at Papiol above

Molino, and the French immediately retreated by San Filieu. Sarsfield and the cavalry, which Clinton now detached across the Llobregat, followed them hard, but the country was difficult, the distance short, and they soon gained a second entrenched camp above San Filieu. A small garrison remained in the masonry-works at Molino; Clinton endeavoured to reduce it, but his guns were not of a calibre to break the walls and the enemy was strongly reinforced towards evening from Barcelona: Manso then went to the mountains, and Clinton returned to Villa Franca having killed and wounded about one hundred and eighty French, and lost only sixty-four men, all Spaniards.

Manso's failure surprised the English general, because, unlike the generality of his countrymen, he was zealous, skilful, vigilant, modest and humane, and a sincere co-operator with the British officers. He however soon cleared himself of blame, assuring Clinton that Copons, contrary to his previous declarations, had joined him with four thousand men, and taking the control of his troops not only commenced the march two hours too late, but without any reason halted for three hours on the way. Nor did Copons offer any excuse or explanation of his conduct, merely observing, that the plan having failed he must return to his mountains about Vich. A man of any other nation would have been accused of treachery, but with the Spaniards there is no limit to absurdity, and from their actions no conclusion can be drawn as to their motives.

The great events of the war began now to affect the struggle in Catalonia. Suchet finding Copons dared not agree to the military convention dependent upon the treaty of Valençay, resigned all thoughts of carrying off his garrisons beyond the Ebro, and secretly instructed the governor of Tortosa, that when his provisions, calculated to last until April, were exhausted, he should march upon Mequinenza and Lerida, unite the garrisons there to his own, and make way by Venasque into France. He then increased the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men and prepared to take the line of the Fluvia; for the allied sovereigns were in France, and Napoleon had recalled ten thousand men with eighty pieces of

artillery from Catalonia, desiring they should march as soon as the results expected from the mission of San Carlos were felt by the allies. Suchet prepared the troops but proposed that instead of waiting for the uncertain result of San Carlos' mission, Ferdinand should himself be sent to Spain through Catalonia and be trusted on his faith to restore the garrisons in Valencia. Then he said he could march with his whole army to Lyons which would be more efficacious than sending detachments. The restoration of Ferdinand was indeed the emperor's object, but this plausible proposition was only a colourable counter-project to Soult's plan for a junction of the two armies in Bearn, since the emperor was undoubtedly the best judge of what was required for the warfare immediately under his own direction.

It was in the midst of these affairs Clinton attacked Molino del Rey and would but for the interference of Copons have stricken a great blow, which was however soon inflicted in another manner.

There was at this time in the French service, a Spaniard of Flemish descent called Van Halen, a handsome person, and with a natural genius for desperate treasons. He was at first attached to Joseph's court, and after that monarch's retreat from Spain was placed by the duke of Feltre on Suchet's staff; but the French party was now a failing one and Van Halen only sought by some notable treachery to make his peace with his country. Through the medium of a young widow, who followed him without suffering their connexion to appear, he informed Eroles of his object, and transmitted returns of Suchet's force and other matters of interest. At last having secretly opened Suchet's portfollio he copied the key of his cipher, and transmitted that also, with an intimation that he would soon pass over and endeavour to perform some other service at the same time. The opportunity soon offered. Suchet went to Gerona to meet San Carlos, leaving Van Halen at Barcelona, and the latter immediately taking an escort of three hussars went to Granollers where the cuirassiers were quartered. Using the marshal's name he ordered them to escort him to the Spanish outposts, which being in

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the mountains could only be approached by a long and narrow pass where cavalry would be helpless; in this pass he ordered the troops to bivouac for the night, and when their colonel expressed his uneasiness, Van Halen quieted him and made a solitary mill their common quarters. He had before this, however, sent the widow to give Eroles information of the situation into which he would bring the troops and with anxiety awaited his attack; the Spanish general failed to come, and at daybreak Van Halen still pretending he carried a flag of truce from Suchet, rode off with his first escort of hussars and a trumpeter to the Spanish lines. There he ascertained that the widow had been detained by the outposts; whereupon he delivered over his hussars to their enemies, and gave notice of the situation of the cuirassiers with a view to their destruction, but they escaped the danger.

Van Halen and Eroles then forged Suchet's signature, and the former addressed letters in cipher to the governors of Tortosa, Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon; telling them that the emperor, in consequence of his reverses, required large drafts of men from Catalonia, and had given Suchet orders to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons south of the Llobregat were to join the army with arms baggage and followers. The result was uncertain, but if the convention could not be effected the governors were to join the army by force, and they were therefore immediately to mine their principal bastions and be prepared to sally forth at an appointed time. The marches and points of junction were all given in detail; yet they were told that if the convention took place the marshal would immediately send an officer of his staff to them, with such verbal instructions as might be necessary; the document finished with deploring the necessity which called for the sacrifice of conquests achieved by the valour of the troops.

Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are common in all wars, but in the Peninsula so many pretended to serve the French and were yet true to the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal, Suchet used to place a very small piece of light-coloured hair in the ciphered paper, the latter was then inclosed in a quill, sealed and wrapped in lead. When received,



the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper and if the hair was discovered the communication was good; if not, the treachery was apparent because the hair would escape the vigilance of uninitiated persons and be lost by any intermediate examination. Van Halen knew this secret also, and when his emissaries had returned after delivering the preparatory communication, he proceeded in person with a forged convention first to Tortosa; for Suchet has erroneously stated in his Memoirs that the primary attempts were made at Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by several Spanish officers and by some French deserters dressed in the uniforms of the hussars he had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The governor Robert, though a vigilant officer, was deceived and prepared to evacuate the place. During the night however a true emissary arrived with a letter from Suchet of a later date than the forged convention. Robert then endeavoured to entice Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was too wary and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and Lerida where he completely overreached the governors and then went to Monzon.

This small fortress had now been besieged since the 28th of September, 1813, by detachments from the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon. Its means of defence were slight, but there was within a man of resolution and genius called St. Jacques; a Piedmontese by birth, he was only a private soldier of engineers, but the commandant appreciating his worth was so modest and prudent as to yield the direction of the defence entirely to him. Abounding in resources, he met, and at every point baffled the besiegers who worked principally by mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious always led the numerous counter-attacks with which he contrived to check the approaches above and below ground. The siege continued until the 18th of February when the subtle Van Halen arrived, and by his Spanish wiles obtained in a few hours what Spanish courage and perseverance had vainly strived to gain for one hundred and forty days. The commandant was suspicious at first; but when Van Halen suffered him to send an officer to ascertain that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated, he was beguiled like the others and



marched to join the garrisons of those places. Clinton had been informed of this project by Eroles as early as the 22nd of January; and though he did not expect any French general would be so egregiously misled readily promised the assistance of his army to capture the garrisons on their march.

Suchet was then falling back upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing the fortified line of the Llobregat weakened and being uncertain of Suchet's real strength and designs, renewed his former proposal to Copons for a combined attack which should force the French general to discover his real situation and projects. Ere he could obtain an answer the want of forage compelled him to refuse the Spanish cavalry lent to him by Elio, and Sarsfield's division was reduced to its last ration. The French thus made their retreat unmolested, for Clinton's project necessarily involved the investment of Barcelona after passing the Llobregat; and the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry, mounted on small Egyptian animals the greatest part of which were foundered or unserviceable from sand-cracks, a disease very common amongst the horses of that country, were too weak to act without the aid of Elio's horsemen. Moreover, as a division of infantry was left at Taragona awaiting the effect of Van Halen's wiles against Tortoza the aid of Sarsfield's troops was indispensable.

Copons accepted the proposition towards the end of the month; the Spanish cavalry was then in the rear, but Sarsfield having obtained some provisions the army was put in movement the 3rd of February; and as Suchet was near Gerona, it passed the Llobregat at the bridge of Molino del Rey without resistance. On the 5th Sarsfield's piquets were vigorously attacked at San Filieu by the garrison of Barcelona, but he supported them with his whole division, and being reinforced with some cavalry repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls. On the 7th the city was invested on the land side by Copons aided by Manso, and on the sea-board by Hallowell, who, following the movements of the army, blockaded the harbour with the *Castor* frigate and anchored the *Fame* off Mataro. On the 8th intelligence arrived of Van Halen's failure at Tortoza, yet the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted until the 16th, when Clinton was informed by

Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon. The garrisons he said would march upon Igualada, and Eroles who, under pretence of causing the convention to be observed by the somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to undeceive and disarm them at that place. On the 17th he sent notice that Martorel had been fixed upon in preference to Igualada; and as the French would be at the former place that evening Clinton was desired to send some of his troops there to ensure the success of the project.

This change of plan and the short warning, for Martorel was a long march from Barcelona, together with the doubts and embarrassments which Copons' conduct always caused, inclined the English general to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet fearing it would fail in the Spaniard's hands he finally drafted a strong division of troops and marched in person to Martorel. There he met Copons who told him the French would not pass Esparaguera that night, that Eroles was close in their rear, and another division of the Catalan army at Bispal blocking the bridge at Martorel. Clinton immediately undertook to pass the Llobregat, meet the French column, and block the road of San Sadurni; and he arranged with Copons the necessary precautions and signals.

About nine o'clock Isidore la Marque arrived with the garrisons at Martorel, followed at a short distance by Eroles. No other troops were to be seen, and after a short halt the French continued their march on the right bank of the Llobregat where the Barcelona road enters a narrow pass between the river and a precipitous hill. When they were completely entangled Clinton sent an officer to forbid their further progress, and referred them to Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation; then giving the signal all the heights around were instantly covered with armed men. It was in vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having two thousand six hundred men, four guns, and a rich military chest, capitulated; but upon conditions, which were granted and immediately violated with circumstances of great harshness and insult to the prisoners. The odium of this baseness, which was quite gratuitous, since the French helpless in the defile must have submitted to any terms, attaches entirely to the Spaniards

Clinton refused to meddle in any manner with the convention. He had not been a party to Van Halen's deceit, he appeared only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in the field which the Spaniards could not have subdued without his aid; he refused even to be present at any consultation previous to the capitulation; and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in Suchet's Memoirs, no appeal on the subject from that marshal ever reached him.

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During the whole of these transactions the infatuation of the French leaders was extreme. The chief of one of the battalions, more sagacious than his general, told Lamarque in the night of the 16th at Igualada that he was betrayed; at the same time he urged him to abandon his artillery and baggage, and march in the direction of Vich to which place they could force their way in despite of the Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert, when he had detected the imposture and failed to entice Van Halen into Tortosa, did not make a sudden sally upon him and the Spanish officers who were with him, all close to the works. And still more notable is it that the other governors, more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner, did not insist upon the bearer of such a convention remaining to accompany their march: it was well observed by Suchet that Van Halen's refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to prove his treachery.

The troops recalled by Napoleon now moved into France, and in March a second column of equal force was directed upon Lyons, but the arrival of Wellington on the Gironne caused, as we shall hereafter find, a change in its destination. An order of the minister at war then caused Suchet to open a fresh negotiation with Copons, to deliver up all the fortresses held by his troops except Figueras and Rosas, provided the garrisons were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish commander assented and the authorities generally were anxious to adopt the proposal, but the regency referred the matter to Wellington who rejected it without hesitation, as tending to increase the force immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and over-reached at all points, Suchet destroyed the works of Olot, Besalu, Bascara and Palamos, dismantled Gerona and

Rosas, and concentrated his forces at Figueras. He was followed by Copons, but though he still had twelve thousand veterans besides the national guards and dépôts of the French departments he obstinately refused aid to Soult, and yet remained inactive himself. The blockade of Barcelona was therefore maintained by the allies without difficulty or danger save what arose from their commissariat embarrassments and the efforts of the garrison.

On the 23rd of February Habert made a sally with six battalions, thinking to surprise Sarsfield; but he was beaten and Meder the Nassau officer was killed. The blockade was thus continued until the 12th of March when Clinton received orders from Wellington to break up his army, to send the foreign troops to Sicily, and march with the British battalions by Tudela to join the great army in France. He wished to obey, but Suchet was still in strength and Copons appeared to be provoking a collision though he was quite unable to oppose the French in the field, and to maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition after the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite impossible. The latter therefore remained, and on the 19th of March Ferdinand reached the French frontier.

This event, which, happening five or even three months before, would probably have changed the fate of the war, was now of little consequence. Suchet proposed to Copons to escort Ferdinand with the French army to Barcelona and put him in possession of that place; but this the Spanish general dared not assent to; for he feared Wellington and his own regency, and was closely watched by colonel Coffin who had been placed near him by Clinton. The French general then proposed to the king a convention for the recovery of his garrisons, to which Ferdinand agreed with the facility of a false heart; for his great anxiety was to reach Valencia, because the determination of the Cortes to bind him to conditions before he recovered his throne was evident; the Spanish generals were apparently faithful to the Cortes, and the British influence was sure to be opposed to him while he was burthened with French engagements.

Suchet was to demand securities for the restoration of his garrisons previous to Ferdinand's entry into Spain, but time



was precious and he escorted him at once with the whole French army to the Fluvia, having received his promise to restore the garrisons; he also retained Don Carlos as a hostage; yet even this security he relinquished when the king writing from Gerona confirmed his first promise. On the 24th, in presence of the Catalan and French armies, ranged in order of battle on either bank of the Fluvia, Ferdinand passed that river and became once more king of Spain. He had been a rebellious son in the palace, a plotting traitor at Aranjuez, a dastard at Bayonne, an effeminate superstitious fawning slave at Valençay; and now after six years' captivity he returned to his own country an ungrateful and cruel tyrant; he would have been the most odious and contemptible of princes if his favourite brother Don Carlos had not existed. Reaching Clinton's camp the 30th he reviewed the troops, and then proceeded to Zaragoza and finally to Valencia. Suchet says the honours of war were paid to him by all the French garrisons, but this was not the case at Barcelona, no man appeared even on the walls.

Suchet's  
Memoirs.

Memoirs by  
sir William  
Clinton,  
MSS.

After this event the French marshal having repassed the Pyrenees, leaving only a division at Figueras, Clinton designed to break up his army, but was again stopped by the vexatious conduct of Copons who would not relieve the Anglo-Sicilians at the blockade, nor notice any communications on the subject before the 11th of April. On the 14th however the troops marched, part to embark at Taragona, part to join Wellington. Copons then became terrified lest Robert, abandoning Tortosa, should come to Barcelona, and enclose him between them and the division at Figueras, wherefore Clinton once more halted. There was reason. For Habert had transmitted to Robert the emperor's order to break out of Tortosa and gain Barcelona instead of passing by the valley of Venasque as Suchet had prescribed, and the twelve thousand men thus united were then to push into France. This letter was intercepted, copied and sent on to Robert, whose answer being likewise intercepted showed he had no inclination for the enterprise; Clinton therefore continued his embarkation and completed his honourable but difficult task. With a force weak in num-

bers, and nearly destitute of what constitutes strength in the field, he had maintained a dangerous position for eight months; and though Copons' incapacity and ill-will, and other circumstances beyond control, did not permit any brilliant actions, he occupied the attention of a superior army, suffered no disaster and gained some advantages.

While his troops were embarking, Habert, in furtherance of the emperor's project, made a vigorous sally, and though repulsed with loss he killed or wounded eight hundred Spaniards. This was a lamentable combat. The war had terminated long before, yet intelligence of the cessation of hostilities only arrived four days later. Habert was now repeatedly ordered by Suchet and the duke of Feltre to give up Barcelona; but warned by the breach of former conventions he held it until he was assured that the

Lafaille.

French garrisons in Valencia had returned to France, which did not happen until the 28th of May, when he marched to his own country. This event, the last operation of the whole war, released the duchess of Bourbon. She and the old prince of Conti had been retained prisoners in the city during the Spanish struggle, the prince died early in 1814, the duchess survived, and now returned to France.

How little the Spaniards were able of their own strength to shake Napoleon off, was now apparent to all the world. For notwithstanding Wellington's victories, notwithstanding the invasion of France, six fortresses, Figueras, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia were recovered, not by arms but by the general peace. And but for the deceits of Van Halen there would have been three others similarly situated in the eastern parts alone; while in the north Santona was recovered in the same manner; for neither the long blockade nor the active operations against that place, of which some account shall now be given, caused it to surrender.

Santona stands on one of those promontories so frequent on the coast of Spain, which connected by low sandy necks with the main land offer good harbours. Its waters deep and capacious furnished two bays; the outer one or roadstead was commanded by the works of Santona itself, and by those of

Laredo, a considerable town lying at the foot of a mountain on the opposite point of the harbour. A narrow entrance to the inner port was between a spit of land called the Puntal, and the low isthmus on which the town of Santona is built. The natural strength of the ground was very great, but the importance of Santona arose from its peculiar situation as a harbour and fort of support in the Montaña de Santander; by holding it the French shut out the British shipping from the only place which being defensible on the land side furnished a good harbour between San Sebastian and Coruña. Thus they protected the sea-flank of their long line of invasion, obtained a port of refuge for their own coasting vessels, and a post of support for the moveable columns sent to chase the partidas, who abounded in that rough district. And when the battle of Vitoria placed the allies on the Bidassoa, there issued from Santona a number of privateers to intercept Wellington's supplies and interrupt his communication with Coruña, Oporto, Lisbon, and even with England.

To obtain Santona was an object of early interest with both parties. The French seized it at once, and although the Spaniards recovered possession of it in 1810 they were driven out again immediately. The English ministers then commenced deliberating and concocting extensive, and for that reason injudicious and impracticable plans of offensive operations, to be based upon the possession of the place, but Napoleon fortified it and kept it to the end of the war. In August, 1812, its importance was better understood by the Spaniards, and it was continually menaced by the numerous bands of Biscay, the Asturias and the Montaña. Fourteen hundred men, including the crew of a corvette, then formed its garrison, the works were not very strong and only forty pieces of artillery were mounted. Napoleon however, foreseeing the disasters which Marmont was provoking, sent general Lameth to take charge of the defence; he augmented the works and constructed advanced redoubts on two hills, called the Gromo and the Brusco, which like San Bartolomeo at San Sebastian closed the isthmus inland. He also erected a strong redoubt and blockhouse on the Puntal to command

the straits, and sweep the roadstead in conjunction with the fort of Laredo which he repaired; minor batteries also he made, and having cast a chain to secure the narrow entrance to the inner harbour, he covered the rocky promontory of Santona itself with defensive works.

Some dismounted guns remained in the arsenal, others which had been thrown into the sea by the Spaniards when they took the place in 1810 were fished up, and the garrison, felling trees in the vicinity, made carriages for them; by these means a hundred and twenty guns were finally placed in battery and there was abundance of ammunition. The corvette was not sea-worthy, but Lameth established a flotilla of gun-boats and other small craft, which sallied forth whenever the signal-posts on the headland gave notice of the approach of vessels liable to attack, or of French coasters bringing provisions and stores. The garrison had previously lost many men, killed in a barbarous manner by the partidas, and in revenge they never gave quarter to their enemies. Lameth, shocked at this inhumanity, forbade under pain of death any further reprisals, rewarded those men who brought in prisoners, and treated the latter with gentleness; the Spaniards, perceiving this, also changed their system and civilization resumed its rights. From this time military operations were incessant, the garrison sometimes made sallies, sometimes sustained partial attacks, sometimes aided the moveable columns employed by the different generals of the army of the north to put down the partisan warfare, which seldom was even lulled in the Montaña.

After the battle of Vitoria, Santona was invested on the land side by a part of the troops composing the fourth Spanish army. It was blockaded also on the sea-board by the English ships of war; but only nominally, for the garrison received supplies, and Lameth's flotilla took many store-ships and other vessels and delayed convoys; the land blockade thus became a nullity and the Spanish officers complained with reason that they suffered privations and endured hardships without an object. These complaints and his own embarrassments, caused by lord Melville's neglect, induced Wellington in October 1813, when he could ill spare troops. to think of



employing a brigade under lord Aylmer in the attack of Santona; that project, as already mentioned, was laid aside; but an English engineer, captain Wells, was sent with some sappers and miners to quicken the operations of the Spanish officers, and his small detachment has been by a French writer magnified into a whole battalion.

Wells remained six months, for the Spanish generals though brave and willing were tainted with the national defect of procrastination. The siege therefore made no progress, languishing until the 13th of February, 1814, when Barco the Spanish commander carried the fort of Puntal in the night by escalade, killing thirty men and taking twenty-three prisoners; yet the fort, being under the fire of the Santona works, was necessarily dismantled and abandoned the next morning. A piquet was left there, but Lameth embarked a detachment and recovered his fort. In the night of the 21st Barco ordered an attack to be made with a part of his force upon the outposts of El Grumo and Brusco on the Santona side of the harbour, and led the remainder of his troops in person to storm the fort and town of Laredo. He carried the latter and some other defences of the fort, which being on a rock was only to be approached by an isthmus so narrow as to be closed by a single fortified house; in this assault he was killed and the attack ceased; yet the troops retained what they had won and established themselves at the foot of the rock where they were covered from fire. The attack on the other side, conducted by colonel Llorente, was successful; he carried the smallest of the two outworks on the Brusco, and closely invested the largest after an ineffectual attempt by mine and assault to take it. A large breach was however made and the commandant seeing he could no longer defend his post, valiantly broke through the investment and saved himself in the Grumo; but next day the Grumo itself was abandoned by the French.

Wells, who had been wounded at the Puntal escalade, now strenuously urged the Spaniards to crown the counter-scarp of the fort at Laredo and attack vigorously; they preferred establishing four field-pieces to batter it in form at the distance

of six hundred yards, but their guns were dismounted the moment they began to fire, and thus corrected, the Spanish generals committed the direction of the attack to Wells. He opened a heavy musketry fire on the fort to stifle the noise of his workmen, pushed trenches up the hill close to the counter-scarp in the night, and was proceeding to burst open the gate with a few field-pieces and cut down the palisades, when the Italian garrison, whose muskets from constant use were so injured that few would go off, mutinied against their commander and making him a prisoner surrendered the place. This event gave the Spaniards the command of the entrance to the harbour, and Lameth offered to capitulate in April upon condition of returning to France with his garrison: Wellington refused this proposal, and Santona remained a French fortress until the general cessation of hostilities.

Having now terminated the narrative of all military and political events which happened in the Peninsula, the reader will henceforth be enabled to follow without interruption the events of the war in the south of France which shall be continued in the next book.

## BOOK THE TWENTY-FOURTH.

## CHAPTER I.

WELLINGTON'S difficulties were great. Those of his adversary were even more embarrassing, because the evil was at the root; it was not misapplication of power but the want of power itself which paralysed Soult's operations. Napoleon trusted much to the effect of his treaty with Ferdinand, but the intrigues to retard his journey continued; and though the emperor, after the refusal of the treaty by the Spanish government, permitted him to return without conditions, as thinking his presence would alone embarrass and perhaps break the English alliance with Spain, he did not as before shown arrive until March. How Napoleon's views were frustrated by his secret enemies is one of the obscure parts of French history which time may possibly clear, but probably only with a feeble and uncertain light; for truth can never be expected in the memoirs, if any should appear, of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other politicians of their stamp, whose plots rendered his supernatural efforts to rescue France from her invaders abortive: meanwhile there is nothing to check or expose the political and literary empirics who never fail on such occasions to poison the sources of history.

Relying on Ferdinand's journey, and pressed by the necessity of augmenting his own weak army, Napoleon now told Soult he must ultimately take from him two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The undecided nature of his first battle at Brienne caused him to enforce this notice in the beginning of February; but he had previously sent imperial commissaries to the different departments of France,

with instructions to hasten the new conscription, to form national and urban guards, to draw forth the resources of the country, and aid the operations of the armies by the action of the people. These measures failed generally in the south. The urban cohorts were readily formed as a means of police, and the conscription was successful, but the people remained sullen and apathetic; and the civil commissaries are said to have been, with some exceptions, pompous, declamatory, and affecting great state and dignity without energy and activity. Ill-will was also produced by the vexatious and corrupt conduct of the subordinate government agents; who, seeing in the general distress and confusion a good opportunity to forward their personal interests, oppressed the people for their own profit. This it was easy to do, because the extreme want of money rendered requisitions unavoidable; and under the confused direction of civilians, partly ignorant and unused to difficult times, partly corrupt and partly disaffected to the emperor, the abuses inevitably attendant upon such a system were numerous; and to the people so offensive, that numbers to avoid them passed with their carts and utensils into the lines of the allies. An official letter written from Bayonne at this period run thus: 'The English general's policy and the good discipline he maintains does us more harm than ten battles; every peasant wishes to be under his protection.'

Another source of anger was Soult's works near Bayonne, where the richer inhabitants could not bear to have their country villas and gardens destroyed by the engineer, he who spares not for beauty or for pleasure. The merchants, a class nearly alike in all nations, with whom profit stands for country, had been with a few exceptions long averse to Napoleon's policy, which from necessity interfered with their commerce. And this feeling must have been very strong in Bayonne and Bordeaux; for one Batbedat, a banker of the former place, having obtained leave to go to St. Jean de Luz under pretence of settling the accounts of English officers, prisoners of war, to whom he had advanced money, offered Wellington to supply his army with various commodities and even provide money for bills on the English treasury. In



return he demanded licences for twenty vessels to go from Bordeaux, Rochelle and Mants, to St. Jean de Luz; and they were given on condition that he should not carry back colonial produce; but as the English navy would not respect them, the banker and his coadjutors hesitated, and thus saved their ships, for the English ministers refused to sanction the licences and rebuked Wellington!

During these events the partisans of the Bourbons, coming from Brittany and La Vendée, spread themselves all over the south of France, and one of the heroic family of La Roche Jacquelin arrived at head-quarters. Bernadotte also sent an agent to those parts, and the count of Grammont, a captain in the British cavalry, was at the desire of the marquis de Mailhos, another of the malcontents, sent to England to call the princes of the house of Bourbon forward. Finally the duke of Angoulême arrived at head-quarters and was received with respect in private, though not suffered to attend the army. The English general indeed, persuaded that the great body of the French people, especially in the south, were inimical to Napoleon's government, was sanguine as to the utility of encouraging a Bourbon party; yet he held his judgment in abeyance, sagaciously observing he could not come to a safe conclusion merely from the feelings of some people in one corner of France. And as the allied sovereigns seemed backward to take the matter in hand unless some positive general movement in favour of the Bourbons was made, and there were negotiations for peace actually going on, it would be, he said, unwise and ungenerous to precipitate the partisans of the fallen house into a premature outbreak and then leave them to the vengeance of the enemy.

That Wellington should think public opinion was against Napoleon is not surprising, it seemed to be so, and a very strong Bourbon party, and one still stronger, averse to the continuation of war, existed: but nothing is more dangerous, more deceitful, than the outward show and declarations on such occasions. The great mass of men are only endowed with moderate capacity and spirit; their thoughts are for the preservation of their families and property, they bend to circumstances; fear and suspicion, ignorance baseness and

good feeling, all combine to urge men in troubled times to put on the mask of enthusiasm, for the most powerful and selfish knaves ever shout with the loudest. Let the scene change and the multitude will turn with the facility of a weathercock. Wellington soon discovered that Viel Chastel, Bernadotte's agent, while pretending to aid the Bourbons was playing a double part. And one year after this period Napoleon returned from Elba, when neither the presence of the duke of Angoulême, nor the energy of the duchess, nor all the activity of their partisans, could raise in this very country more than the semblance of an opposition to him—the tricolor was everywhere hoisted and the Bourbon party vanished. This was the true test of national feeling. For in 1814 the white colours were supported by foreign armies, and misfortune had bowed the great democratic chief to the earth; but when rising again in his wondrous might he came back alone from Elba, the poorer people, with whom only patriotism is ever really to be found, and that because they are poor and therefore unsophisticated, crowded to meet and hail him as a father. Not because they held him entirely blameless. Who born of woman is? They demanded redress of grievances even while they clung instinctively to him as their stay and protection against the locust tyranny of aristocracy.

There was however at this period in France enough of discontent, of passion and intrigue, enough of treason, and enough of grovelling spirit in adversity, added to the natural desire of escaping the ravages of war, a desire carefully fostered by the admirable policy of the English general, to render the French general's position extremely dangerous. Nor is it the least remarkable circumstance of this remarkable period, that while Soult expected relief from Spanish aversion to the English alliance, Wellington received from the French secret and earnest warnings to beware of some great act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards. It was at this period also that the Spanish generals encouraged their soldiers' licentiousness, and displayed their own ill-will by sullen discontent and captious complaints, while the civil authorities disturbed the communications and made war in their fashion against the hospitals and magazines.

Wellington's apprehensions are plainly to be traced in his correspondence. Writing about Copons he says, 'his conduct is quite unjustifiable both in concealing what he knew of the duke de San Carlos' arrival and the nature of his mission.' In another letter he observes, that the Spanish military people about himself desired peace with Napoleon according to the treaty of Valençay; that they all had some notion of what had occurred and yet had been quite silent about it; that he had repeated intelligence from the French of some act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards; that several persons of that nation had come from Bayonne to circulate reports of peace, and charges against the British which he knew would be well received on that frontier; that he had arrested a man calling himself an agent of and actually bearing a letter of credence from Ferdinand. But the most striking proof of alarm was his great satisfaction at the conduct of the Spanish government in rejecting the treaty brought by San Carlos and Palafox. Sacrificing all his former great and just resentment he changed at once from an enemy to a friend of the regency, supported the members of it against the serviles, spoke of the matter as the most important that had engaged his attention, and when O'Donnel proposed some violent and decided action of hostility against the regency, which a few weeks before would have been received with pleasure, he checked and softened him, saying, the conduct of that body about the treaty should content every Spaniard: it was not possible to act with more frankness and loyalty, and they had procured honour for themselves and for their nation not only in England but all over Europe. Such is the light mode in which words are applied by public men, even by the noblest and greatest, when their wishes are fulfilled. This glorious and honourable conduct of the regency was simply a resolution to uphold their personal power and that of their faction, both of which would have been destroyed by the arrival of the king.

Napoleon hoping much from the effect of these machinations, not only intimated to Soult that he would require ten thousand of his infantry immediately, but that twice that number with a division of cavalry would be called away if the Spaniards fell off from the English alliance. The duke of

Dalmatia then foreseeing the ultimate result of his own operations against Wellington, conceived a vast general plan of action which evinced his capacity to treat the greatest questions of military policy.

‘Neither his numbers nor means of supply after Wellington had gained the banks of the Adour above Bayonne would, he said, suffice to maintain his positions covering that fortress and menacing the allies’ right flank; the time approached when he must, even without a reduction of force, abandon Bayonne to its own resources and fight on the numerous rivers which run with concentric courses from the Pyrenees to the Adour. Leval’s and Boyer’s divisions of infantry were to join the grand army on the eastern frontier; Abbé’s division was to raise the garrison of Bayonne and its camp to fourteen thousand men, but, considering this force too great for a simple general of division he wished to give it to Reille whose corps would be broken up by the departure of the detachments. That officer was however altogether averse, and as an unwilling commander would be half beaten before the battle commenced he desired D’Erlon should take Reille’s place.’

‘The active army could not then fight pitched battles, and he recommended the throwing it as a great partisan corps on the left, touching always upon the Pyrenees and ready to fall upon Wellington’s flank and rear if he should penetrate into France. Clausel a native of those parts and speaking the country language, was by his military qualities and knowledge the most suitable person to command. Reille could march with the troops called to the great army; and as there would be nothing left for him, Soult, to do in these parts he desired to be employed where he could aid the emperor with more effect. This he pressed urgently, because, notwithstanding the refusal of the Cortes to receive the treaty of Valençay, it was probable the war on the eastern frontier would compel the emperor to recal all the troops designated. It would then become imperative to change from a regular to an irregular warfare; in which a numerous corps of partisans would be more valuable than the shadow of a regular army without value or confidence and likely to be destroyed in the first great battle. For these partisans it was necessary to have a



central power and director, and Clausel was the man most fitted for the task. He ought to have under him the generals who commanded in the military departments between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, with power to force the inhabitants to take arms and act under his directions.

‘I am sensible,’ he continued, ‘that this system, one of the least unhappy consequences of which would be to leave the enemy apparently master of all the country between the mountains and the Garonne, can only be justified by the necessity of forming an army in the centre of France sufficiently powerful to fend off the multitude of enemies from the capital; but if Paris falls all will be lost, whereas if it be saved the loss of a few large towns in the south can be repaired. I propose then to form a great army in front of Paris by a union of all the disposable troops on the different frontiers, and to spread what remains as partisans wherever the enemy threatens to penetrate. All the marshals of France the generals and other officers, in activity or in retirement, who shall not be attached to the great central army, should organize the partisan corps and bring those not actively useful as such, up to the great point of union; and they should have military power to make all men able to bear arms find them at their own expense.’—‘This measure is revolutionary but will produce important results, while none or a very feeble effect will be caused by the majority of the imperial commissioners already sent to the military divisions. They are grand persons, they temporize, make proclamations and treat everything as civilians instead of acting with vigour to obtain promptly a result which would astonish the world; for notwithstanding the cry to the contrary the resources of France are not exhausted—what is wanted is to make those who possess resources use them for the defence of the throne and the emperor.’ Having thus explained his views, he again requested to serve near the emperor, but declared himself ready to obey any order and serve in any manner; all he demanded was clear instructions with reference to the events that might occur. 1°. What he should do if the treaty with Ferdinand had no effect and the Spanish troops remained with Wellington. 2°. If those troops retired and the British seeing the French

weakened by detachments should alone penetrate into France. 3°. If the changes in Spain should cause the allies to retire altogether.

This great project was not adopted and the emperor's reasons for neglecting it have not been made known. Nor can the workings of that capacious mind be judged of without a knowledge of all the objects and conditions of his combinations. Yet it is probable that at this period he did not despair of rejecting the allies beyond the Rhine either by force of arms, by negotiation, or by working upon the family pride of the emperor of Austria. With this hope he would be averse to risk civil war by placing France under martial law; averse to revive the devouring fire of revolution which it had been his object for so many years to quell—and it seems nearly certain, that one of his reasons for replacing Ferdinand on the Spanish throne was his fear lest the republican doctrines which had gained ground in Spain should spread to France. Was he wrong? The fierce democrat will answer yes! Those who think real liberty was never attained under a single unmixed form of government giving no natural vent to the swelling pride of honour birth or riches—those who measure the weakness of pure republicanism by the miserable state of France at home and abroad when Napoleon first assumed power to save her;—those who saw America with her militia and licentious liberty, unable to prevent three thousand British soldiers from passing three thousand miles of ocean and burning their capital—those persons will hesitate to condemn him. And this without detriment to the democratic principle which in substance may and should always govern under judicious forms. Napoleon early judged, and the event has proved he judged truly, that the democratic spirit of France was then unable to overbear the aristocratic and monarchic tendencies of Europe; wisely therefore while he preserved the essence of the first by fostering equality, he endeavoured to blend it with the other two; thus satisfying as far as human institutions would permit the conditions of the great problem he had undertaken to solve. His object was the reconstruction of the social fabric which had been shattered by the French revolution, mixing with the new materials what remained of

the old sufficiently unbroken to build with again ; if he failed to render his structure stable it was because his design was misunderstood, and the terrible passions let loose by the previous stupendous explosion were too mighty even for him to compress.

To have accepted Soult's project would have been to save himself at the expense of his system, and probably to plunge France into the anarchy from which he had with so much care and labour drawn her. But Napoleon's ambition was for the greatness and prosperity of France, for the regeneration of Europe, for the stability of the system which he had formed with that end, never for himself personally. Hence it is that multitudes of many nations instinctively revere his memory ; and neither the monarch nor the aristocrat, dominant though they be by his fall, feel themselves so easy in their high places as to rejoice much in their victory.

Soult's project was not adopted, and in February two divisions of infantry and Trielhard's cavalry, with many batteries, were withdrawn ; two thousand of the best soldiers were also selected to join the imperial guards, and all the gens-d'armes were sent to the interior. The total number of old soldiers left, did not, including the division of Paris, exceed forty thousand exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other posts ; the conscripts, beardless youths, were generally unfit to enter the line, nor were there enough of muskets to arm them. It is remarkable also, as showing how easily military operations may be affected by distant combinations ; that Soult expected and dreaded at this time the descent of a great English army upon the coast of La Vendée, led thereto by hearing of an expedition, preparing in England under Graham, really to aid the Dutch revolt.

While his power was thus diminishing, Wellington's situation was as suddenly ameliorated. First by the arrival of reinforcements, next by the security he felt from the rejection of the treaty of Valençay ; lastly by the approach of better weather and the acquisition of a very large sum in gold ; which enabled him to put his Anglo-Portuguese in activity, and to bring the Spaniards again into line with less danger of their plundering the country. During the cessation of operations

he had prepared the means to enter France with power and security, sending before him the fame of a just discipline and a wise consideration for the people who were likely to fall under his power; for there was nothing he so much dreaded as the partisan and insurgent warfare proposed by Soult. The peasants of Baygorry and Bidarray had done him more mischief than the French army, and his terrible menace of destroying their villages, and hanging all the population he could lay his hands upon if they ceased not their hostility, marks his apprehensions in the strongest manner. Yet he left all the local authorities free to carry on the internal government, to draw their salaries, and raise the necessary taxes in the same mode and with as much tranquillity as if perfect peace prevailed. He opened the ports also and drew a large commerce, which served to support his own army and engage the mercantile interests in his favour; he established many sure channels for intelligence political and military, and would have extended his policy further and to more advantage if the English ministers had not so ignorantly interfered with his proceedings. Finally, foreseeing that the money he might receive would, being in foreign coin, create embarrassment, he adopted an expedient which he had before practised in India.

Knowing that in a British army a wonderful variety of knowledge and vocations, good and bad, may be found, he secretly caused the coiners and die-sinkers amongst the soldiers to be sought out; and once assured that no mischief was intended them, it was not difficult to persuade them to acknowledge their peculiar talents. With these men he established a secret mint and coined gold Napoleons, marking them with a private stamp and carefully preserving their just fineness and weight to enable the French government when peace should be established to call them in again. He thus avoided all the difficulties of exchange, and removed a fruitful graft of quarrels and ill-will between the troops and the shopkeepers; for the latter are always fastidious in taking and desirous of abating the current worth of strange coin, and the former attribute to fraud any declination from the value at which they receive their money. This sudden increase of the



current coin tended also to diminish the pressure necessarily attendant upon troubled times.

Nor was his provident sagacity less manifest in purely military matters than in administrative and political operations. During the bad weather he had formed large magazines at the ports, examined the course of the Adour, and carefully meditated upon his future plans. To enter France and rally a great Bourbon party was his wish. This last point depended upon the political proceedings and successes of the allied sovereigns; yet the military operations most suitable at the moment did not clash with it; to drive the French from Bayonne and blockade or besiege that place was the first step in either case. But this required extensive and daring combinations. The fortress and its citadel, comprising in their circuit the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, could not be safely invested with less than three times the number necessary to resist the garrison at any one point; because the latter's communications were short, internal and secure, those of the investors external difficult and unsafe, and each division should be able to resist a sally of the whole garrison. The forces operating towards the interior would thus be seriously reduced.

How and where to cross the Adour with a view to the investment was also a subject of solicitude. It was a great river with a strong current and well guarded by troops and gun-boats above Bayonne; still greater was it below the town; there the ebb tide run seven miles an hour; there also there were gun-boats, a sloop of war, and merchant-vessels which could be armed and employed to interrupt the passage. The number of pontoons or other boats required to bridge the stream across either above or below, and the carriage of them would inevitably give notice of the design and render it abortive unless the French army was first driven away, and then the troops at Bayonne, fifteen thousand, might baffle the attempt. Nevertheless he resolved to pass, the means adopted being proportionate to the greatness of the design.

To throw his bridge above Bayonne involved the carrying of his materials across the Nive and through the deep country on each side, and the driving of Soult entirely from the

Adour and all its confluent ; but his own convoys between the bridge and the sea-port magazines would then be unsafe and uncertain, having to lend their flank to Bayonne and cross several rivers liable to floods—moreover, his means of transport were unequal to the wear and tear of the deep roads. To throw the bridge below Bayonne would give him the lower Adour for a harbour, and his land convoys could use the royal causeway which led close to that river and was not affected by rain ; his line of retreat also would be more secure if unforeseen misfortune forced him to relinquish the investment. But the rapidity and breadth of the river below Bayonne denied the use of common pontoons, and the mouth, six miles from the town, was so barred with sands, so beaten with surges, so difficult of navigation even with land-marks, some of which the French had removed, that it seemed impossible for vessels fit for a bridge to enter from the sea ; and a strong defensive force would inevitably bar the construction if they could. These difficulties however Wellington with admirable judgment rendered subservient to his purpose. For judging they would appear insuperable to the French, he thought Soult would readily abandon the care of the lower Adour to defend the rivers beyond the Nive if his left was attacked, and thus the lower Adour would be laid open for his enterprise. Nor did he fear that the French marshal, in retiring before the troops destined to force the rivers near the roots of the Pyrenees, would gain the boundary road and come down on the investing force at Bayonne ; because to do so he must enter the sandy wilderness of the Landes, and might be prevented from getting out again. The natural obstacles remained, and to surmount them he made the following arrangements.

Having collected forty large sailing-boats of from fifteen to twenty tons burthen, as if for the commissariat service, he secretly loaded them with planks and other materials for his bridge ; designing that they should be joined by some gun-boats and run up the Adour to a fixed point, on which he would previously direct the troops and artillery, meaning with hawsers and pontoons to form rafts, and pass a force to destroy a small battery near the mouth of the river and cover the operation. At this time the French trading-vessels in the

Adour had privately offered to come out upon licences and serve the commissariat, and their aid would have greatly facilitated his project; but he was compelled to forego the advantage, because of the English ministers' previous folly in refusing to ratify his former passports; and was therefore forced to treat as enemies men willing to be friends, and prepare additional means to burn those vessels which he might have used for his project!

While the English general was secretly arranging this great offensive operation, Soult was diligently increasing his defensive means and fortified all the principal passages of the rivers crossing the main roads leading against his left; but the diminution of his force in January compelled him to withdraw his outposts from Anglet in front of Bayonne, which enabled Wellington closely to examine the lower Adour and prepare with more certainty for the passage. Soult however, in pursuance of Napoleon's maxim of covering physical weakness by moral audacity, concentrated troops on his left, renewing the partisan warfare against the allies' right, and endeavoured to keep them entirely on the defensive. In the course of these operations, finding that Morillo had assumed a forward post, he, with a view to test the Spanish feeling towards the English, directed Harispe, under pretence of remonstrating, to sound him as to a defection; he did not respond and Harispe then drove him back with a sharp fight. This warfare however could not ultimately check the allies, and the French marshal seeing Wellington was resolved to gain the line of the Garonne, and that his own retreat must ultimately be parallel to the Pyrenees, proceeded to organize a strong defensive system, to cover Bordeaux irrespective of his own operations. In this view he sent Daricau, a native of the Landes, to prepare an insurgent levy in that wilderness, and directed Maransin to the higher Pyrenees to extend the insurrection begun by Harispe in the lower valleys. Jaca was still held by eight hundred men, but they were starving, and a convoy collected for their relief at Navarrens was stopped by snow in the pass. It was an error to retain the place, for though the partidas would have descended on the French side to the very rear of the army, and perhaps have ravaged part

of the frontier if the garrison had been withdrawn, they could have done no essential harm, and their excesses would have disposed the people of those parts to insurrection.

At Bordeaux there was a small reserve commanded by general L'Huillier, and Soult urged the minister of war to increase it with conscripts from the interior. Meanwhile he sent artillerymen from Bayonne to aid fifteen hundred national guards as a garrison for the citadel of Blaye, and desired that the Médoc and Paté forts and the batteries along the banks of the Garonne should be put in a state of defence. All vessels fit for the purpose he desired might be armed, and a flotilla of fifty gun-boats established below Bordeaux, with a like number to navigate the river as far as Toulouse. But these orders were feebly executed or entirely neglected, for there was no public spirit, and treason and disaffection were rife in the city.

On the side of the lower Pyrenees he improved the works of Navarrens and designed an entrenched camp in front of it; the castle of Lourdes in the high Pyrenees was already defensible, and he gave orders to fortify the castle of Pau; thus providing supporting points for the retreat which he foresaw. At Mauleon he put on foot some partisan corps, and the imperial commissary Caffarelli gave him hopes of a reserve of seven or eight thousand national guards, *gens-d'armes*, and artillerymen, at Tarbes. Dax, containing his principal dépôts, was being fortified, and the communication with it was maintained across the rivers by fortified bridges at Port de Landes, Hastings, Pereyhorade, and Sauveterre; but the floods in the beginning of February carried away his permanent bridge at the Port de Landes, and the communication between Bayonne and the left of the army was thus interrupted until he established a flying-bridge.

All these preparations were made in the supposition that Wellington had one hundred and twenty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, for Soult knew not of the political and financial crosses which had reduced that general's power. His emissaries told him Clinton's force was actually broken up, and the British part in march to join Wellington; that the garrisons of Carthage, Cadiz, and Ceuta, were on the point



of arriving, and reinforcements coming from England and Portugal. Inferring from this that the war in Catalonia would cease and all the troops be united to march against him, he again urged that Suchet should join him; that their united forces might form a 'dike against the torrent' which threatened to overwhelm the south of France. The real power opposed to him was however much below his calculations. The twenty thousand British and Portuguese reinforcements promised, had not arrived, Clinton's army was still in Catalonia; and though the exact numbers of the Spaniards cannot be stated, their forces available, and that only partially and with great caution on account of their licentious conduct, did not exceed the following approximation.

Freyre had, including España's division, twelve thousand men, Morillo four thousand, O'Donnel six thousand, and the prince of Anglona eight thousand. The Anglo-Portuguese present under arms were by the morning states on the day the advance commenced, seventy thousand of all arms, ten thousand being cavalry. The whole force, exclusive of Mina's bands which were spread from Navarre to the borders of Catalonia, was therefore one hundred thousand with one hundred guns, ninety-five being Anglo-Portuguese. The French numbers opposed it is difficult to fix with precision, because the imperial muster-rolls, owing to the troubled state of the emperor's affairs, were not continued beyond December 1813 or have been lost. But from Soult's correspondence and other documents it would appear that exclusive of his garrisons, his reserves, and detachments at Bordeaux and in the department of the high Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts of the second levy which were now beginning to arrive, he could place in line thirty-five thousand soldiers of all arms, three thousand being cavalry, with forty pieces of artillery. But Bayonne alone, without reckoning the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarrens, occupied twenty-eight thousand of the allies; and by this and other drains Wellington's superiority in the field was so reduced, that his penetrating into France, that France, which had made all Europe tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a surprising example of courage and fine conduct.

## PASSAGE OF THE GAVES.

In the second week of February the weather set with a strong frost, the roads became practicable, and the English general seized the opportunity to advance; but the clothing so long delayed in England had just then arrived, and the British regiments being without carriage were compelled to go for it to the stores in succession. Hence the first operations were merely to turn the rivers beyond the Nive at their sources with Hill's corps, while Beresford held the French centre in check lower down. This it was hoped would draw Soult's attention from the Adour below Bayonne, where the passage was to be made; but Wellington, uncertain if he could force the tributary rivers with his right, designed in that case, if his bridge was happily thrown, to operate on that line and turn the French army by the right of the Adour—a fine conception by which he would seize Dax and the Port de Landes, and cut off Soult from Bourdeaux.

On the 12th and 13th Hill, having twenty thousand combatants with sixteen guns, was relieved by the sixth and seventh divisions at Mousserolles and on the Adour, and took post about Urcurray and Hasparen. The 14th he marched in two columns; one by Bonloc to drive the French Plan 10, posts beyond the Joyeuse, another by the great Vol.V. p.387. road of St. Jean Pied de Port to dislodge Harispe, who was at Hellette; this column had the Ursouia on the right, and Morillo marched on the other side of that mountain against the same point. Harispe who had only three brigades, principally conscripts, retired skirmishing in the direction of St. Palais and took a position for the night at Meharin; the Joyeuse was thus turned, the direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port cut, and that place was immediately invested by Mina's battalions.

On the 15th Hill, leaving the fifty-seventh regiment at Hellette to observe the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, marched through Meharin upon Garris, eleven miles distant; but that road being impracticable for artillery the guns moved by Armendaritz more to the right. Harispe's rear-guard was overtaken and pushed back fighting, and meanwhile Beresford

was directed to send a brigade of the seventh division from the heights of La Costa across the Gamboury to the Bastide de Clerence. The line being thus extended from Urt, by Briscons, the Bastide and Isturitz, towards Garris, a distance of more than twenty miles, was too attenuated, and the fourth division occupied La Costa in support of the troops at the Bastide. At the same time the French weakened their force at Mousserolles, and Wellington thinking it might be to concentrate on the heights of Anglet, which would have frustrated the casting of his bridge over the Adour, directed Hope secretly to occupy the back of those heights in force and prevent any intercourse between Bayonne and the country.

Soult knew of the intended operations against his left on the 12th, but hearing the allies had collected boats, had constructed a fresh battery near Urt, and that their pontoons had reached Urcurray, he thought Wellington designed to turn his left with Hill's corps, to press him on the Bidouze with Beresford's, and keep the garrison of Bayonne in check with the Spaniards while Hope crossed the Adour above that fortress. Wherefore, on the 14th he was near the Bastide de Clerence making dispositions to dispute the Bidouze and the Gave of Mauleon first, and then the Gave of Oleron. He had four divisions in hand with which he occupied a position on the 15th along the Bidouze. General Paris, who

Soult, MSS. was then in movement with the convoy to relieve Jaca, was recalled to watch Mina between St. Palais and St. Jean Pied de Port and Jaca capitulated on the 17th, the garrison to return to France and not serve till exchanged. This condition was broken by the French, but the recent Spanish violation of the convention made with the deluded garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, furnished a reply. Harispe, having Paris under his command and being supported by Pierre Soult with a brigade of light cavalry, now covered the road from St. Jean Pied de Port with his left, and the upper line of the Bidouze with his right; lower down, Villatte occupied Ilharre, Taupin was on the heights of Bergoney below Villatte, and Foy guarded the river from Came to its confluence with the Adour. The rest of the army remained under D'Erlon on the right of the Adour.

*Combat of Garris.*—Harispe had just taken a position in advance of the Bidouze on a height called the Garris mountain, which stretched to St. Palais, when his rear-guard came plunging into a deep ravine in his front closely followed by the light troops of the second division. Upon the parallel counter-ridge thus gained by the allies, Hill's corps was immediately established; and though the evening was beginning to close his skirmishers descended into the ravine, and two guns played over it upon the French, who to the number of four thousand were drawn up on the opposite mountain. In this state of affairs Wellington arrived. He was anxious to turn the line of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen himself there, and seeing the communication with Paris by St. Palais was not well maintained, sent Morillo by a flank march along the ridge now occupied by the allies towards that place; then menacing the enemy's centre with Le Cor's Portuguese division, he directed Pringle to attack with the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments, saying with a concise energy, '*you must take the hill before dark.*'

This expression caught the attention of the troops and was repeated by colonel O'Callaghan, as he and Pringle placed themselves at the head of the thirty-ninth, which, followed by the twenty-eighth, rushed with loud and prolonged shouts into the ravine. The French fire was violent, Pringle fell wounded and most of the mounted officers had their horses killed; yet the troops, covered by the thick wood, gained with little loss the summit of the Garris mountain on the right of the enemy, who thought from the shouting that a larger force was coming against them and retreated. The thirty-ninth then wheeled to their right intending to sweep the summit, but the French having discovered their error came back at a charging pace, sustained a volley without flinching and tried the bayonet. O'Callaghan, distinguished for strength and courage, received two strokes of that weapon, and repaid them with fatal power in each instance; then the French, nearly all conscripts, were beaten off. Twice they came back and fought until the fire of the twenty-eighth was beginning to be felt, when Harispe, seeing the remainder of the second division ready to support the attack, Le Cor's Portuguese advancing against the



centre, and the Spaniards in march towards St. Palais, retreated to that town and calling in Paris from the side of Mauleon immediately broke down the bridges over the Bidouze. He lost nearly five hundred men, of whom two hundred were prisoners, and he would hardly have escaped if Morillo had not been slow. The allies lost one hundred and sixty, of whom not more than fifty fell at Garris, and these chiefly in the bayonet contest, for the trees and the darkness screened them at first.

During these operations at Garris, Picton moved from Bonloc to Oreque on Hill's left, menacing Villatte; but though Beresford's scouting parties acting on the left of Picton approached the Bidouze, facing Taupin and Foy, his principal force remained on the Gamboury, the pivot upon which Wellington's line hinged, while the right swept round the French positions. Foy however, in retreating saw the fourth and seventh divisions on the heights between the Nive and the Adour pointing their march as he thought towards the French left, and his reports to that effect reached Soult just as he received notice of the investment of St. Jean Pied de Port. Being thus convinced that the design was not to pass the Adour above Bayonne, but to gain the line of that river by constantly turning the French left, he made new dispositions.

His line on the Bidouze was strong if he could have supported Harispe at St. Palais, and guarded the passage of the Soissons at Mauleon; but this would have extended his front, already too wide; wherefore he resolved to abandon the Bidouze and Soissons, to take the line of the Gave d'Oleron, placing his right at Peyrehorade and his left at Navarrens. In this view D'Erlon was ordered to pass the Adour by the flying bridge at the Port de Landes, and take post on the left bank of that river, while Harispe, having Paris' infantry still attached to his division, defended the Soissons and pushed

Soult, MSS. parties on his left towards Mauleon. Villatte occupied Sauveterre, where the bridge was fortified on the left bank, and from thence Taupin lined the right bank to Sordes near the confluence of the Gave de Pau. Foy occupied the works at the bridges of Peyrehorade and Hastingues, and guarded the Gave to its confluence with the Adour; his

line was prolonged by D'Erlon towards Dax; yet Soult still kept advanced parties on the lower Bidouze at the different entrenched passages of that river. One brigade of cavalry was in reserve at Sauveterre and another was distributed on the line; head-quarters were transported to Orthes, the parc of artillery went to Aire. The principal magazines of ammunition were at Bayonne, Navarrens, and Dax; and the French general seeing his communications with those places likely to be intercepted before he could remove his stores, anticipated distress and wrote to the minister of war to form new dépôts.

On the 16th Wellington repaired the broken bridges of St. Palais, after a skirmish in which a few men were wounded. Hill then crossed the Bidouze, the cavalry and artillery by the repaired bridge, the infantry by the fords; but the day being spent in the operation the head of the column only marched beyond St. Palais. Meanwhile the fourth and part of the seventh divisions occupied the Bastide de Clerence on the right of the Joyeuse, and the light division came up in support to La Costa on the left bank of that river. The 17th Hill, marching at eight o'clock, passed through Domenzain towards the Soissons, while the third division advanced on his left by Masparraute to the heights of Somberraute; both corps converged upon Paris, who was at Arriveriete to defend the Soissons above its confluence with the Gave of Oleron. The French outposts were immediately driven across the Gave and Paris attempted to destroy the bridge of Arriveriete; Wellington was too quick; the ninety-second regiment, covered by the fire of some guns, crossed at a ford above the bridge and beating two French battalions from the village secured the passage. The allies then halted for the day near Arriveriete, having marched only five miles and lost one man killed with twenty-three wounded. Paris relinquished the Soissons, yet did not retire until the morning of the 18th, and the allies then seized the great road running from Sauveterre to Navarrens up the left bank of the Oleron Gave.

Harispe, Villatte, and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were now at Sauveterre occupying the bridge-head on the left bank; Taupin was opposite

the Bastide de Bearn lower down on the right; Foy on the right of Taupin; D'Erlon on the left of the Adour above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. In this state the fourth division advanced to Bidache on the Bidouze, the light division followed in support to the Bastide de Clerence, the seventh division remained in that vicinity, its left being extended to the Adour. The cavalry of the centre under Cotton arrived also on the banks of the Bidouze, connecting the fourth with the third division at Somberraute. Hill sent Morillo up the Soissons to guard the fords as high as Nabas; and then spreading Fane's cavalry and the British and Portuguese infantry between that river and the Gave of Oleron, occupied all the villages along the road to Navarrens and cannonaded the bridge-head of Sauveterre.

Soult, thrown by the first movement upon the defensive, was now at a loss to discover his adversary's object. The situation of the seventh and the march of the fourth and light divisions, led him to think his works at Hastingues and Peyrehorade would be assailed; and the weakness of his line, having only Taupin's division to guard the river between Sauveterre and Sordes, a distance of ten miles, made him fear the passage of the Gave would be forced near the Bastide de Bearn, to which post there was a good road from Came and Bidache. On the other hand the prolongation of Hill's line towards Navarrens indicated a design to march on Pau; or it might be to keep him in check on the Gaves while the camp at Bayonne was assaulted. In this uncertainty he sent Pierre Soult with a cavalry brigade and two battalions of infantry to act between Oleron and Pau, and keep open a communication with the partisan corps forming at Mauleon. That done he decided to hold the Gaves as long as he could, but when they were forced to abandon the defensive, concentrate his whole force at Orthes and fall suddenly upon the first of the allies' converging columns that approached him.

## CHAPTER II.

SOULT's conjectures embraced every project but the true one. Wellington did indeed design to keep him in check upon the rivers, not to obtain an opportunity of assaulting the camp of Bayonne but to throw his stupendous bridge over the Adour; and that failing he could still pursue his operations on the Gaves. Wherefore when he had established his offensive line strongly beyond the Soissons and the Bidouze, and his pontoon-train was well advanced towards Garris, he returned rapidly to St. Jean de Luz. Everything there depending on man was ready, but the weather was boisterous with snow for two days, and, fearful of letting Soult strengthen himself on the Gave of Oleron, he returned the 21st to Garris; this delay having decided him to make that his principal operation, leaving the bridge to Hope and admiral Penrose.

## PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR.

[Plan 10, Vol. V., page 387.]

On the 15th, the heights of Anglet had been occupied by the guards and Germans, small parties were cautiously pushed towards the river through the pine-forest called the wood of Bayonne, and the fifth division, now under Colville, occupied Bussussary and the bridge of Urdains. On the 21st Colville relieved the sixth division in front of Mousserolles, and Freyre was called over the Bidassoa to replace him at Bussussary. The other Spaniards and the heavy cavalry remained in Spain. Hope had therefore only two British and two Spanish divisions, three independent brigades of Anglo-Portuguese infantry, and Vandeleur's brigade of light cavalry, altogether twenty-eight thousand, with twenty pieces of artillery. Two regiments which had been sent to the rear sick and several others expected from England were however destined to join him.

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In the night of the 22nd the first division, six eighteen-pounders, and the rocket battery, were cautiously filed from the causeway near Anglet towards the Adour; but the road was deep and heavy, and one of the guns falling into a ditch seriously delayed the march: nevertheless at daybreak the whole force reached some sand-downs which extended behind the pine-forest to the river. The French piquets were then driven into the entrenched camp at Beyris, the pontoon-train and field artillery were brought down to the Adour opposite to the village of Boucaut, and the eighteen-pounders placed in battery on the bank. The light troops closed to the edge of the marsh which covered the right of the French camp, and España's division, taking post on the heights of Anglet, in concert with the independent brigades, which were at Arcangues and the bridge of Urdains, attracted the enemy's attention by false attacks which were prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth division.

It was intended that the arrival of the gun-boats and chasse-marées at the mouth of the Adour should have been simultaneous with that of the troops, but the wind continued contrary, none were to be seen, and Hope, whose firmness no untoward event could ever shake, resolved to attempt the passage with the army alone. The French flotilla opened its fire about nine o'clock; Hope's artillery and rockets retorted so fiercely that three gun-boats were destroyed, and the sloop so hardly handled that the whole took refuge higher up the river; meanwhile sixty men of the guards were rowed in a pontoon across the mouth of the river in the face of a French piquet, which, seemingly bewildered, retired without firing. A raft being then formed with the remainder of the pontoons, a hawser was stretched across, and six hundred of the guards and the sixtieth regiment, with a part of the rocket battery, the whole under colonel Stopford, passed; yet slowly and at slack water only, for the tide run strongly and the waters were wide.

During this operation general Thouvenot, deceived by spies and prisoners, thought the light division was with Hope as well as the first division, and that fifteen thousand men were embarked at St. Jean de Luz

to land between Cape Breton and the Adour. Wherefore, fearing to endanger his garrison by sending a strong force to any distance down the river, when he heard Stopford's detachment was on the right bank he detached only two battalions under general Maucombe to ascertain the state of affairs; for the pine-forest and a great bending of the river prevented him from obtaining any view from Bayonne. Maucombe made a show of attacking Stopford, but the latter, flanked by the field-artillery from the left bank, received him with a discharge of rockets; projectiles which, like the elephants in ancient warfare, often turn upon their own side. This time however, amenable to their directors, they smote the French column and it fled amazed, and with a loss of thirty wounded. If Thouvenot had kept strong guards with a field-battery on the right bank of the Adour, Hope could not have passed over the troops, nor could any vessels have crossed the bar; no resource save that of disembarking between the river and Cape Breton would then have remained. This error was fatal to the French. The British continued to pass all night and until twelve o'clock on the 24th, when the flotilla was seen under a press of sail making with a strong breeze for the mouth of the river.

To enter the Adour is from the flatness of the coast never an easy task; it was now most difficult; because the high winds of the preceding days had raised a great sea and the enemy had removed one of the guiding flag-staves by which the navigation was ordinarily directed. In front came the boats of the men-of-war, and a-head of all, the naval captain O'Reilly run his craft, a chosen Spanish vessel, into the midst of the breakers which rolling in a frightful manner over the bar dashed her on to the beach. That brave officer stretched senseless on the shore would have perished with his crew but for the ready succour of the soldiers; however a few only were drowned and the remainder with an intrepid spirit launched their boat again to aid the passage of the troops which was still going on. O'Reilly was followed successfully by lieutenant Debenham in a six-oared cutter; but the tide was falling and the remainder of the boats, the impossibility of passing until the next high water being evident, drew off, and a

pilot was landed to direct the line of navigation by concerted signals.

When the water rose again the crews were promised rewards in proportion to their successful daring, and the whole flotilla approached in close order; but with it came black clouds and a driving gale which covered the whole line of coast with a rough tumbling sea, dashing and foaming without an interval of dark water to mark the entrance of the river. The men-of-war's boats first drew near this terrible line of surge, and Mr. Bloye of the *Lyra*, having the chief pilot with him, heroically led into it; but in an instant his barge was engulfed and he and all with him were drowned. The *Lyra's* boat being thus swallowed up, the following vessels swerved in their course and shooting up to the right and left kept hovering undecided on the edge of the tormented waters. Suddenly lieutenant Cheyne of the *Woodlark* pulled a-head and striking the right line, with courage and fortune combined safely passed the bar. The wind then lulled, the waves as if conquered abated somewhat of their rage, and the *chasse-marées*, manned with Spanish seamen and having an engineer officer with a party of sappers in each who compelled them to follow the men-of-war's boats, came plunging one after another through the huge breakers and reached the point designed for the bridge. Thus was achieved this perilous and glorious exploit. In effecting it captain Elliot of the *Martial* with his launch and crew and three transports' boats perished close to the shore in despite of the most violent efforts made by the troops to save them; three other vessels cast on the beach lost part of their crews; and one large *chasse-marée* full of men, after passing the line of surf safely was overtaken by a swift bellying wave which breaking on her deck dashed her to pieces.

All the first division and Bradford's Portuguese, eight thousand men, being now on the right bank took post for the night. Next day, sweeping in a half circle round the citadel and its entrenchments, they placed their left on the *Adour* above the fortress, and their right on the same river below it; for the water here made such a bend in their favour that their front was little more than two miles wide, and for the most part

covered by a marshy ravine. This nice operation was effected without opposition, because the entrenched camps, menaced by the troops on the other side of the Adour, were so wide that Thouvenot's force was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. The bridge was then constructed three miles below Bayonne, where the river was contracted to eight hundred feet by retaining walls, built with the view of sweeping away the bar by increasing the force of the current. The plan of bridge and boom were the conception of colonel Sturgeon and major Todd; but the execution was confided entirely to the latter, who, with a mind less brilliant than Sturgeon's but more indefatigable, very ably served his country throughout this war. Batteries were immediately constructed to fire hot shot, and so drive the sloop and gun-boats lying in the river away from the bridge, which was thus constructed. Twenty-six *chasse-marées* moored head and stern at distances of forty feet, reckoning from centre to centre, were first bound together with ropes; two thick cables were then carried loosely across their decks; and the ends being cast over the walls on each bank were strained and fastened in various modes to the sands. They were sufficiently slack to meet the spring-tides, which rose fourteen feet; and planks were laid upon them without any supporting beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and below, was a double line of masts connected with chains and cables, so as to form a series of squares; hence, if a vessel broke through the outside, the shock would turn her round in the square and she would become entangled with the floating wrecks through which she had broken. Gun-boats, with aiding batteries on the banks, were then stationed to protect the boom, and row-boats were furnished with grappling-irons to tow off fire-vessels. By the united labour of seamen and soldiers all was finished on the 26th; and, contrary to the general opinion on such matters, major Todd assured the author of this History that he found the soldiers, with minds quickened by the wider range and variety of knowledge attendant on their service, more ready of resource, and their efforts, combined by a more regular discipline, of more avail and with less loss of time, than the irregular activity of the seamen.



The agitation of the river from the force of the tides was generally so great that to maintain a pontoon-bridge on it was impossible; a knowledge of this had rendered the French officers too careless of watch and defence; and this year the shifting sands had given the Adour such a slanting direction towards the west that it run for some distance almost parallel to the shore; the outer bank thus acting as a breakwater lessened the agitation within, and enabled the large two-masted boats employed to ride safely and support the heaviest artillery and carriages. Nevertheless this fortune, the errors of the enemy, the matchless skill and daring of the British seamen, the discipline and intrepidity of the British soldiers, all combined by the genius of Wellington, were necessary to the success of this stupendous undertaking, which must always rank amongst the prodigies of war.

When the bridge was finished Hope resolved to contract his line of investment round the citadel. This was a serious affair, for the French position outside was exceedingly strong. The flanks rested on ravines covered with fortified villas, and in the centre a ridge, along which the great roads from Bordeaux and Peyrehorade led into Bayonne, was occupied by the village and church of St. Etienne, both situated on rising points of ground strongly entrenched and under the fire of the citadel guns. Advancing in three converging columns, covered by skirmishers, the wings of the allies easily attained the edges of the ravines at either side, resting their flanks on the Adour above and below the town, at about nine hundred yards from the enemy's works; but a severe action took place in the centre. There the Germans and a brigade of guards should have attacked simultaneously in three masses, the guards on the left, the light battalions of Germans on the right, their heavy infantry in the centre; but an accident retarded the wings, and the centre first attacked the heights of St. Etienne. The skirmishing was sharp, the guns from the citadel opened, the church and village were stormed, an entrenched line of houses was carried and a gun was taken. When the wings came up, the action ceased for a time, but the people of Bayonne were in such consternation that Thouvenot to re-assure them sallied, and charging the Germans

twice was wounded and lost the position of St. Etienne. The loss of the allies could not have been less than five hundred, four-fifths being Germans, and the latter were dissatisfied at being unnoticed in the despatch—an omission somewhat remarkable because Hope had openly commended their valour.

This new position had the ravines on each flank, and the centre being close to the enemy's works on the ridge of St. Etienne was entrenched. Preparations for besieging the citadel were then commenced under the direction of the German colonel Hartmann, a code of signals was established, and infinite pains taken to protect the bridge and secure a unity of action between the three investing bodies. The communications however required complicated arrangements; for the right bank of the Adour being low was overflowed every tide, and would have occasioned great difficulty but for the retaining wall, which being four feet thick was made use of as a carriage-road.

While these events happened at Bayonne Wellington pushed his operations on the Gaves with great vigour. On the 21st his pontoons had reached Garris, and the 23rd were carried beyond the Gave de Mauleon. During his absence the sixth and light divisions had come up, and thus six divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry were concentrated beyond that river on the Gave d'Oleron, between Sauveterre and Navarrens. Beresford still held the line of the Ridouze down to its confluence with the Adour; and to distract the enemy threw a battalion over the latter near Urt, and collected boats as if to form a bridge. In the evening he recalled his detachment, yet continued the preparations for a bridge until late in the 23rd; then he moved forward and drove Foy's posts from the works at Oeyergave and Hastingues, on the lower parts of the Oleron Gave, into the entrenchments at Peyrehorade. The allies lost fifty men, principally Portuguese, but Soult's right and centre were thus held in check; for Beresford had the fourth and seventh divisions, and Vivian's cavalry was strong enough for Foy at Peyrehorade and for Taupin at the Bastide of Bearn. The rest of the French army was distributed at Orthes and Sauveterre, feeling towards Navarrens, and on the 24th Wellington put his troops in motion to pass the Gave

d'Oleron. His movements and the arrival of his reinforcements again deceived Soult, who seems to have known nothing of the light division, and imagined the first division was at Came on the 22nd as well as the fourth and seventh divisions. However his dispositions would have been the same, he did not expect to hold the Gave and looked to a final concentration at Orthes.

On the 24th Morillo, reinforced with cavalry, moved to the Laussette, a small river running in front of Navarrens, where rough ground concealed his real force. His scouts beat back the French outposts, and a battalion marching higher up menaced the fords of the Gave at Doguen, to draw the attention of the garrison of Navarrens from the ford of Ville Nave three miles below Doguen; for there Wellington designed to pass, and a great concentric movement was now in progress towards it. Le Cor's Portuguese marched from Gestas; the light division from Aroue, crossing the Soissons at Nabas; the second division, three batteries of artillery, the pontoons, and four regiments of cavalry moved from other points. Favoured by the hilly nature of the country the columns were well concealed from the enemy; and the sixth division advanced towards the fords of Montfort three miles below that of Ville Nave. A battalion of the second division was sent to menace the ford of Barraute below Monfort; but the third division, reinforced with a brigade of hussars and the batteries of the second division, marched by Osserain and Arriveriette against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, with orders to make a feint of forcing a passage there. The bulk of the light cavalry remained in reserve under Cotton, but Vivian's hussars, coming up from Beresford's right, threatened all the fords between Picton's left and the Bastide of Bearn. Below that Bastide some detachments were directed upon the fords of Sindos, Castagnhede, and Hauterive. During this movement Beresford kept Foy in check at Peyrehorade with the seventh division, and sent the fourth towards Sordes and Leren, above the confluence of the Gaves, to seek a fit place for a bridge: thus the French front was menaced on a line of twenty-five miles, yet the great force was above Sauveterre.

These operations were not very happily executed. The

columns directed on the side of Sindos missed the fords; and when Picton, opening a cannonade against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, made four companies of Keane's brigade and some cavalry pass the Gave in the vicinity of the bridge, the first were immediately beaten back with a loss of ninety men and officers: some were drowned and thirty made prisoners, whereupon the cavalry returned to the left bank and the cannonade ceased. Nevertheless the diversion was complete and the general operations were successful. Soult on the first alarm drew Harispe from Sauveterre to Monstrueig on the Orthes road, where a range of hills running parallel to the Gave of Oleron separates it from that of Pau; thus only a division of infantry and Berton's cavalry remained under Villatte at Sauveterre; and that general, notwithstanding his success against the four companies, was so alarmed by Picton's demonstrations, that he abandoned his works on the left bank and destroyed the bridge. The sixth division had passed without opposition at Montfort above Sauveterre, and the other troops, coming down upon the ford of Villenave, met only with a small cavalry piquet and crossed with a loss of but two men drowned—a happy circumstance, for the waters were deep and rapid, the cold intense, and the ford so narrow that the passage was not completed before dark. To have forced it in the face of an enemy would have been exceedingly difficult and dangerous; and it is strange that Soult, who was with Harispe, only five miles from Montfort and seven from Villenave, should not have opposed the passage. The heads of the allies' columns immediately seized the range of hills before spoken of, the right near Loubeing; the left towards Sauveterre, from whence Villatte and Berton had been withdrawn by Clausel, who seems to have kept bad watch when Clinton passed at Montfort.

Soult now took a position to give time for Taupin to retire from the lower parts of the Gave of Oleron towards the bridge of Berenx on the Gave of Pau; for both he and Foy had received orders to march upon Orthes and break down all the bridges as they passed. When the night fell, Harispe's division also passed the bridge of Orthes, and D'Erlon was already established in that town; Clausel remained until the morning



at Orion to cover the movement. Pierre Soult, posted beyond Navarrens with his cavalry and two battalions of infantry to watch the road to Pau, had been pressed by Morillo, and being now cut off by the passage of the allies at Villenave was forced to retreat by Monein.

The 25th Wellington, taking some cavalry and guns, pushed Clausel's rear-guard from Magret into the suburb of Orthes, which covered the bridge of that place on the left bank; he also cannonaded the French beyond the river; but the Portuguese of the light division, skirmishing amongst the houses to prevent the destruction of the bridge, lost twenty-five men. The second, sixth and light divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese, five regiments of cavalry, and three batteries were then massed in front of Orthes; the third division and a brigade of cavalry was in front of the broken bridge of Berenx five miles lower down the Gave; the fourth and seventh divisions with Vivian's cavalry were in front of Peyrehorade, from whence Foy retired by the great Bayonne road to Orthes. Morillo was directed to invest Navarrens; and as Mina was no sure guarantee against the combined efforts of the garrison of St. Jean Pied de Port and the warlike inhabitants of Baygorry, five British regiments, which had gone for clothing and were now coming up separately, were ordered to halt at St Palais in observation, relieving each other in succession as they arrived at that place.

On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding Foy had abandoned the works at Peyrehorade, passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon-bridge, partly by a ford where the current run so strong that a column of the seventh division was like to have been carried away bodily. He had previously detached the eighteenth hussars to find another ford higher up, and that being effected under the guidance of a miller, the hussars gained the high road, half-way between Peyrehorade and Orthes, and drove some French cavalry through Puyoo and

Ramous. They rallied on their reserves and beat back the foremost of the pursuers, but would not await the shock of the main body now reinforced by Vivian's brigade and commanded by Beresford in person. In this affair major Sewell, an officer

Notes by  
colonel  
Hughes,  
eighteenth  
hussars,  
MSS.

of the staff who had frequently distinguished himself by his personal prowess, happening to be without a sword, pulled a large stake from a hedge and with that weapon overthrew two hussars in succession, and only relinquished the combat when a third had cut his club in twain.

Beresford now threw out a detachment to Habas on his left, to intercept the enemy's communication with Dax; and Wellington at the same time caused lord Edward Somerset's cavalry and the third division to cross the Gave by fords below the broken bridge of Berenx. Then directing Beresford to take a position for the night on some heights near the village of Baights he proceeded to cast a pontoon-bridge at Berenx, and thus after a circuitous march of more than fifty miles his right wing was again united with his centre and a direct communication with Hope secured. During the 25th and 26th he had carefully examined Soult's position. He found the ancient and beautiful bridge of Orthes, consisting of several arches, could not be easily forced, because of a tower in the centre the gateway of which was built up. The principal arch in front of this tower was mined, the houses on both sides occupied, and the river near the bridge was deep and full of pointed rocks. Above the town however it spread wide with flat banks, presenting means for crossing, and the first design was to do so with Hill's troops and the light division; but when it became known that Beresford had crossed the Gave below, the third division passed at Berenx and the bridge was laid there. This operation was covered by Beresford, while Soult's attention was diverted by the continual skirmish at the suburbs of Orthes, by the appearance of Hill's columns above, and by Wellington's taking cognizance of the position near the bridge so openly as to draw a cannonade. It was not however thought that Soult, when he found Beresford and Picton were over the Gave, would await a battle, and the emissaries said he was already in retreat; a circumstance to be borne in mind because the next day's operation required success to justify it.



Hope's happy passage of the Adour being now reported he was directed to establish a line of communication to the port of Landes, where a permanent bridge was to be formed

with boats brought up from Urt. A direct line of intercourse would thus be secured with the army at Bayonne; yet Wellington felt he was pushing his operations beyond his intrinsic strength if Suchet should send reinforcements to Soult; wherefore he directed Freyre to cross the Adour below Bayonne with two Spanish divisions and a brigade of Portuguese nine-pounders, and join him by the port of Landes. O'Donnell's Andalusians and the prince of Anglona's troops were also warned to be in readiness to enter France, but these orders were given with the greatest reluctance. The feeble resistance made by the French in the difficult country already passed, left him without much uneasiness as to the power of Soult's army in the field; but his disquietude was extreme about the danger of an insurgent warfare. 'Maintain the strictest discipline, *without that we are lost*,' was his expression to Freyre; and he issued a proclamation authorizing the people of the districts he had overrun to arm themselves for the preservation of order under the direction of their mayors. He invited them to arrest all straggling soldiers and followers of the army, all plunderers and evil-doers, and convey them to head-quarters with proof of their crimes, promising to punish the culpable and pay for all damages; and he confirmed all the local authorities who chose to retain their offices, on the sole condition of having no political or military intercourse with the countries still possessed by the French army. Nor was this proclamation a dead letter. In the night of the 25th the inhabitants of a village, situated near the road leading from Sauveterre to Orthes, shot one English soldier dead and wounded a second who had come with others to plunder; the wounded man was hanged as an example; and an English colonel was compelled to quit the army for suffering his soldiers to destroy the municipal archives of a small town.

Soult had no thought of retreating. His previous retrograde movements had been effected with order, his army was concentrated with its front to the Gave; and every bridge, except the noble structure at Orthes the ancient masonry of which resisted his mines, had been destroyed. One regiment of cavalry was detached on the right to watch the fords as far







as Peyrehorade, three others with two battalions of infantry under Pierre Soult watched those between Orthes and Pau, and a body of horsemen and gens-d'armes covered the latter town from Morillo. Two regiments of cavalry remained with the army, and the design was to fall upon the head of the first column which should cross the Gave; but the negligence of the officer stationed at Puyoo, who had suffered Vivian's hussars to pass on the 26th without opposition and without reporting the event, enabled Beresford to move in safety when otherwise he would have been assailed by at least two-thirds of the French army. It was not until three o'clock in the evening that Soult received intelligence of his march; the allied columns being then near Baigts on the right flank of the French army, and their scouts on the Dax road in its rear; at the same time the sixth and light divisions were seen descending by different roads from the heights beyond the river pointing towards Berenx.

In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether to fall upon Beresford and Picton while the latter was still passing the river, or to take a defensive position. Finally he decided upon the latter. Wherefore, under cover of a skirmish near Baigts which his cavalry, coming from Puyoo, sustained against a body of infantry coming from the bridge of Berenx, he hastily threw D'Erlon's and Reille's divisions on a new line across the road from Peyrehorade. The right extended to the heights of San Boes, along which run the road from Orthes to Dax; and the line was prolonged by Clausel to Casteltarbe a village close to the Gave. Having thus opposed a temporary front to Beresford, he made his dispositions to receive battle next morning, and brought Villatte's infantry and Pierre Soult's cavalry from the other side of Orthes through that town: it was this movement which led Wellington's emissaries to report that the army was retiring.

Soult's new line was on a ridge of hills partly wooded, partly naked. An open rounded hill was in the centre, from whence one long narrow tongue was pushed out on the left

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de faits par  
general  
Reille et  
colonel de  
la Chasse,  
MS.

Soult's  
Official  
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MSS.

towards the high road of Peyrehorade, another on the right by St. Boës towards the high church of Baights, the whole presenting a concave to the allies. The front was generally covered by a marshy ravine, broken by two short tongues jutting from the principal hill; behind which the road from Orthes to Dax run so far as the village of St. Boës, and thence along the ridge forming the right flank.

Behind the centre a succession of undulating bare heathy hills trended for several miles to the rear; but behind the right the country was low and deep. The town of Orthes, receding from the river up the slope of a steep hill and terminating with an ancient tower, was behind the left wing.

Reille, having Taupin, Roguet and Paris under him, commanded on the right and occupied all the ground from the village of St. Boës to the centre of the position. D'Erlon, having Foy and D'Armagnac, was on the left of Reille. He placed the first along a ridge extending towards the road of Peyrehorade, the second in reserve. In rear of this last, Villatte's division and the cavalry were posted above the village of Rontun; that is to say, on the open hills behind the main position: in this situation, his right overlooking Soult, MSS. the low country beyond St. Boës, his left extended towards Orthes, he furnished a reserve to D'Erlon and Reille.

Harispe and Villatte were under Clausel, who occupied Orthes and the bridge, having a regiment near the ford of Souars above the town. Thus the French army extended from St. Boës to Orthes, but the great mass was disposed towards the centre. Twelve guns were attached to Harispe's troops, and twelve were on the round hill in the centre, sweeping in their range the ground beyond St. Boës, sixteen were in reserve on the Dax road.

On the 27th, at daybreak, the sixth and light divisions passed the Gave near Berenx by the pontoon-bridge thrown in the night, and wound up a narrow way between high rocks to the great road of Peyrehorade. The third division and Lord Edward Somerset's cavalry were already established there in columns of march, having skirmishers pushed forwards to the edge of the wooded height occupied by D'Erlon's left.



Beresford with the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian's cavalry had then gained the ridge of St. Boës and approached the Dax road beyond. Hill remained with the second British division and Le Cor's Portuguese menacing the bridge of Orthes and the ford of Souars. Between Beresford and Picton, a distance of a mile and a half, there were no troops; but half-way, exactly in front of the French centre, was a Roman camp, crowning an isolated peering hill nearly as lofty as the centre of Soult's position.

On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but then open and grassy with a few trees, Wellington, after viewing the country on Beresford's left, stopped for an hour or more to examine the enemy's disposition for battle. During this time the two divisions were coming up from the river, but so hemmed in by rocks that only a few men could march abreast; and their point of union with the third division was little more than cannon-shot from the enemy. Picton did not conceal his disquietude. Wellington, calm as the deepest sea, continued his observations without seeming to notice the dangerous position of his troops; and when they had reached the main road he reinforced Picton with the sixth, and drew the light division by cross roads behind the Roman camp, thus connecting his wings and forming a central reserve. From this point bye-ways led; one on the left to the high church of Baigts and the Dax road; another on the right to the Peyrehorade road; and two went straight across the marsh to the French position.

This marsh, the open hill about which Soult's guns and reserves were principally gathered, the nature of the ridges on the flanks, all combined to forbid an attack in front; and the flanks were scarcely more promising. The extremity of the French left sunk indeed to a gentle undulation in crossing the Peyrehorade road; yet it would have been useless to push troops on that line towards Orthes, between D'Erlon and Castel tarbe; for the town was strongly occupied by Harispe and was covered by an ancient wall and the bed of a torrent. It was equally difficult to turn the St. Boës flank, as the troops would have to enter the low marshy country beyond the Dax road; and the hills trending backwards from the centre of the French



position would have enabled Soult to oppose a new and formidable front at right angles to his actual position. The allied army must therefore have made a circuitous flank movement in mass, within gun-shot, through a difficult country, or Beresford's left must have been dangerously extended and the whole line weakened. Nor could the movement be hidden, because the hills although only moderately high were abrupt on that side, affording a full view of the low country, and Soult's cavalry detachments were in observation on every brow.

It only remained to assail the French flanks along the ridges, making the principal efforts on the side of St. Boës, with intent to overlap the French right beyond and seize the road of St. Sever while Hill passed the Gave at Souars and cut off the road to Pau, thus enclosing the beaten army in Orthes. This was no slight affair. On Picton's side it was easy to obtain a footing on the flank ridge near the high road; but beyond that the ground rose rapidly, and the French were gathered thickly with a narrow front and plenty of guns. On Beresford's side they could only be assailed along the summit of the St. Boës ridge, advancing from the high church of Baights and the Dax road. But the village of St. Boës was strongly occupied, the ground immediately behind it strangled to a narrow pass by the ravine; and the French reserve of sixteen guns, placed on the Dax road behind the centre of Soult's line and well covered from counter-fire, was in readiness to crush the head of any column which should emerge from the gorge of St. Boës.

#### BATTLE OF ORTHES.

During the whole morning a slight skirmish with now and then a cannon-shot had been going on with the third division on the right; and the French cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each flank; but at nine o'clock Wellington commenced the real attack. The third and sixth divisions won without difficulty the lower part of the ridges opposed to them, and endeavoured to extend their left along the French front with a sharp fire of musketry; yet the main battle was on the other flank. There Cole, keeping Anson's brigade of

the fourth division in reserve, assailed St. Boës with Ross's British brigade and Vasconcellos' Portuguese; his object was to get on to the open ground behind it, but fierce and slaughtering was the struggle: five times breaking through the scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the wider space beyond; yet ever as the troops issued forth the French guns from the open hill smote them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them with grape from flank to flank. And then Taupin's supporting masses rushed forward with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, forced the shattered columns back into the village; it was in vain that with desperate valour the allies, time after time, broke through the narrow way and struggled to spread a front beyond; Ross fell dangerously wounded, and Taupin, whose troops were clustered thickly and well supported, defied every effort. Nor was Soult less happy on the other side. The nature of the ground would not permit the third and sixth divisions to engage many men at once, so that no progress was made; and one small detachment which Picton extended to his left, having made an attempt to gain the smaller tongue jutting out from the central hill, was suddenly charged as it neared the summit, by Foy, and driven down in confusion, losing several prisoners.

When the combat had thus continued on the side of St. Boës for three hours, Wellington sent a caçadore regiment of the light division from the Roman camp to protect the right flank of Ross's brigade against the French skirmishers; but this was of no avail; for Vasconcellos' Portuguese, unable to sustain the violence of the enemy any longer gave way in disorder; the French then poured on, and the British troops retreated through St. Boës with difficulty. This happened just as the detachment on Picton's left was repulsed and victory seemed to declare for the French. Soult, who stood on the round open hill which was the knot of his position, seeing his enemies broken and rolled back on each side, put all his reserves in movement to complete the success, and it is said, that in the exultation of the moment he smote his thigh exclaiming, '*At last I have him.*' Whether this beso or not it was

no vain-glorious speech, for his battle was then very strong. There was however a small black cloud rising just beneath him. Amidst the thundering din and tumult that shook the field it was at first unheeded, but soon burst with irresistible violence.

Wellington, seeing St. Boës was inexpugnable, had suddenly changed his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson's brigade, which had not hitherto been engaged, he backed both with the seventh division and Vivian's cavalry, now forming one heavy body towards the Dax road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions to be thrown in mass upon Foy's left flank, and sent the fifty-second regiment down from the Roman camp with instructions to cross the marsh in front, mount the French ridge, and fall on the flank and rear of the troops engaged with the fourth division at St. Boës. This was the cloud. Colborne, so often mentioned, led the fifty-second across the marsh under fire, the men sinking at every step above the knees, in some places to the middle, yet still pressing forward with that stern resolution and order to be expected from the veterans of the light division, soldiers who had never yet met their match in the field. They soon obtained firm footing, and ascended the heights in line at the moment when Taupin was pushing vigorously through St. Boës; and when Foy and D'Armagnac, hitherto more than masters of their positions, were being assailed on the other flank by the third and sixth divisions. With a mighty shout and a rolling fire the fifty-second soldiers dashed forwards between Foy and Taupin, beating down a French battalion in their course and throwing everything before them into disorder. General Bechaud was killed; Foy dangerously wounded; and his troops, discouraged by his fall and by this sudden burst from a quarter where no enemy was expected, for the march of the fifty-second had been hardly perceived

save by the skirmishers, got into confusion; the  
Soult, MSS.

disorder then spreading to Reille's wing he also was forced to fall back and take a new position to restore his line of battle. The narrow pass behind St. Boës was thus opened, and Wellington seized the moment to thrust the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's cavalry, and two batteries of artillery through and spread a front beyond.

Meanwhile the third and sixth divisions won D'Armagnac's position and established a battery of guns on a knoll, from whence their shot ploughed through the French masses from one flank to another. Suddenly a squadron of French chasseurs came at a hard gallop down the main road of Orthes to charge these guns, and sweeping to their right rode over some of the sixth division which had advanced too far; but this charge was pushed madly, they got into a hollow lane and were nearly all destroyed. The third and seventh divisions then continued to advance and the wings of the army were united. Soult rallied his forces on the open hills beyond the Dax road; and with Taupin's, Roguet's, Paris', and D'Armagnac's divisions made strong battle to cover the reformation of Foy's disordered troops. His foes were however not all in front, this part of the battle was fought with only two-thirds of the allied army. Hill had remained with twelve thousand combatants, cavalry and infantry, before the bridge of Orthes; and when the first plan of attack was changed had orders to force the passage of the Gave, partly to prevent Harispe falling upon the flank of the sixth division, partly in hope of a successful issue: the last happened. Although unable to force the bridge he forded the river above at Souars, drove back the troops posted there, seized the heights above, cut off the French from the road to Pau, and turned the town of Orthes. He thus menaced Soult's line of retreat by Salespice on the road to St. Sever, at the moment when the junction of the allies' wings was effected on the French position.

Clausel ordered Harispe to abandon Orthes and close towards Villatte on the heights above Rontun, leaving however some conscript battalions on a rising point beyond the road of St. Sever called the '*Motte de Turenne*.' Then he endeavoured to keep Hill in check by the menacing action of two cavalry regiments and a brigade of infantry; but Soult arrived at the moment and seeing the loss of Souars had rendered his whole position untenable, gave orders for a general retreat. This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills upon which he was now fighting, although for a short distance they furnished a succession of parallel positions favourable enough for defence, soon resolved themselves into a low ridge running



to the rear on a line parallel with the road of St. Sever; and on the opposite side of that road, about cannon-shot distance, was a corresponding ridge along which Hill, judging by the firing how matters went, was now rapidly advancing. Five miles distant was the *Luy de Bearn*, and four miles beyond that the *Luy de France*, two rivers deep and with difficult banks; and behind these the Lutz, the Gabas, and the Adour crossed the line.

Once over the wooden bridge of Sault de Navailles on the *Luy de Bearn*, those streams would cover the retreat; but to carry off by one road and one bridge a defeated army still closely engaged in front seemed impossible. Nevertheless Soult did so. Paris sustained the fight on his right until Foy and Taupin's troops rallied; and when the impetuous assault of the fifty-second and the rush of the fourth and seventh divisions drove Paris back, D'Armagnac interposed to cover him until the union of the allies' wings was completed; then both retiring were covered in turn by Villatte. In this manner the French yielded step by step and without confusion, the allies advancing with an incessant deafening musketry and cannonade, yet losing many men especially on the right where the third division were very strongly opposed. But as the danger of being cut off at Salespice by Hill became more imminent the retrograde movements were more hurried and confused, and Hill seeing this, quickened his pace; at last both sides began to run violently, and so many men broke from the French ranks making across the fields towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily made by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the whole country was covered with scattered bands. Then Cotton, broke with lord Edward Somerset's cavalry through a small covering body opposed to him by Harispe and sabred two or three hundred men; and the seventh hussars cut off two thousand, who threw down their arms in an enclosed field, yet some mismanagement occurred and the greatest part recovering their weapons escaped.

The pursuit ceased at the *Luy de Bearn*, and the French army appeared to be entirely dispersed; but it was more disordered in appearance than reality; for Soult passed the

Luy of Bearn and destroyed the bridge with the loss of only six guns and less than four thousand men killed wounded and prisoners. Many thousands of conscripts however threw away their arms, and one month afterwards the stragglers still amounted to three thousand; nor would the passage of the river have been effected so happily if Wellington had not been struck by a musket-ball just above the thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty, whereby the vigour and unity of the pursuit was necessarily abated. The loss of the allies was two thousand three hundred, fifty being taken with three officers. Among the wounded were Wellington, Walker, Ross, and the duke of Richmond, then called lord March. The last had served on Wellington's staff during the whole war without a hurt, but being made a captain in the fifty-second, like a good soldier joined his regiment the night before the battle; shot through the chest a few hours afterwards, he learned by experience the difference between the labours and dangers of staff and regimental officers, which are generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions.

Berton's cavalry, stationed between Pau and Orthes during the battle, had been cut off by Hill's movement; yet skirting that general's march they retreated by Mant and Samadet, picking up two battalions of conscripts on the road; while Soult, having no position to rally on, continued his retreat at night to St. Sever, breaking down all the bridges behind him. Wellington pursued at daylight in three columns, the right by Lacadée and St. Medard to Samadet, the centre by the main road, the left by St. Cricq. At St. Sever he hoped to find the enemy still in confusion, but he was too late; the French were across the river, the bridge was broken, and the army halted. The result of the battle was however soon made known far and wide. Daricau who with a few hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent levy at Dax, the works of which were incomplete and still unarmed, immediately destroyed all the stores not removed to Mont Marsan, and retreated through the Landes to Langon on the Garonne. St. Sever offered no position, and Soult turning short to the right moved upon Barcelonne higher up the Adour; but he left D'Erlon with two

Memoir  
by general  
Berton,  
MSS.

divisions of infantry some cavalry and four guns at Caceres on the right bank, and sent Clausel to occupy Aire on the other side of the river. He thus abandoned his magazines at Mont Marsan and left open the direct road to Bordeaux; but holding Caceres with his right he commanded another road by Rocquefort to that city; while his left, being at Aire, protected the magazines and artillery parc at that place and covered the road to Pau. The main body at Barcelonne equally supported Clausel and D'Erlon, and covered the great roads leading to Agen and Toulouse on the Garonne, and to the mountains by Tarbes.

In this situation it was difficult to judge what line of operations he meant to adopt. Wellington however passed the Adour about one o'clock, partly by the repaired bridge of St. Sever, partly by a deep ford below, and immediately detached Beresford with the light division and Vivian's cavalry to seize the magazines at Mont Marsan; at the same time he pushed the head of a column towards Caceres, where a cannonade and charge of cavalry had place and a few men and officers were hurt on both sides. Next day Hill, marching from Samadet, reached the Adour between St. Sever and Aire, and D'Erlon was again assailed on the right bank and driven back skirmishing to Barcelonne. This event proved that Soult had relinquished Bordeaux; yet the pursuit could not be pushed more vigorously, because every bridge was broken; and a violent storm on the evening of the 1st had filled the smaller rivers and torrents, carried away the pontoon-bridges, and cut off all communication between the troops and their supplies.

On the right bank of the Adour the main body halted until the bridges could be repaired, but Hill who was on the left bank marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies on the 2nd, he reached his destination about three o'clock with two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery; he expected no serious opposition; but Clausel had arrived a few hours before, and was in order of battle, covering the town with Villatte's and Harispe's divisions and some guns. The French occupied a steep ridge in front of Aire, high and

wooded on the right where it overlooked the river, yet merging on the left into a wide table-land over which the great road lead to Pau. Strong for battle was this position, yet it could be readily outflanked on their left by the table-land, and was uneasy for retreat on the right, for the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind steep and rugged with a mill-stream at the bottom: a branch of the Adour also flowed behind Aire and cut it off from Barcelonne, while behind the left wing was the greater Lees, a river with steep banks and only one bridge.

#### COMBAT OF AIRE.

Hill attacked without hesitation. William Stewart with two British brigades fell on the French right, a Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the other brigades followed in columns of march; but the action was very sudden, the Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by Da Costa, a man of no ability, and Harispe met them on the flat summit of the height with so rough a charge that they gave way in flight. The rear of the allies being still in march the battle was like to be lost, when Stewart, having by this time won the heights on the French right, where Villatte fearing to be enclosed made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached Barnes with the fiftieth and ninety-second regiments to the aid of the Portuguese. The vehement charge of these troops turned the stream of fight, the French were broken in turn and thrown back on their reserves; yet they rallied with great courage, fighting obstinately until Byng's British brigade came up; then Harispe was driven towards the river Lees, and Villatte quite through the town of Aire into the space between the two branches of the Adour behind.

Reille who was at Barcelonne when the action began, brought up Roguet's division to support Villatte, and the combat was continued until night at that point while Harispe crossed the Lees and broke the bridge, but the French lost many men. Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, a hundred prisoners were taken; many of Harispe's conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their homes, and the magazines fell into the conqueror's



hands. The loss of the British was one hundred and fifty, Barnes was wounded and colonel Hood killed; the loss of the Portuguese was never stated, yet it could not have been less than the British, and the vigour of the action proved the French courage to be little abated by the battle of Orthes. Soult immediately retreated up the Adour by both banks towards Maubourget and Marciaq, and he was not followed, for new combinations were now opened on both sides.

## OBSERVATIONS.

1°. On the 14th of February the passage of the Gaves was commenced, by Hill's attack on Harispe at Hellette. On the 2nd of March the first series of operations was terminated by the combat at Aire. In these sixteen days Wellington traversed with his right wing eighty miles, passed five large and several small rivers, forced the enemy to abandon two fortified bridge-heads and many minor works, gained one great battle and two combats, captured six guns and a thousand prisoners, seized the magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne, and also cut him off from Bordeaux. And in this time he threw his stupendous bridge below Bayonne, and closely invested that fortress after a sharp and bloody action. Success in war like charity in religion covers a multitude of sins; but success often belongs to fortune as much as skill; and the combinations of Wellington, profound and sagacious, might in this manner be confounded with the lucky operations of the allies on the other side of France, where the presumption and the vacillation of ignorance alternately predominated.

2°. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the action of superior forces. Is this well founded? His own numbers cannot be determined exactly; but after all his losses in December, after the detachments made by the emperor's order in January, and after completing the garrison of Bayonne to fourteen thousand men, he informed the minister of war that thirty thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry and forty pieces of artillery were in line. This did not include the conscripts of

the new levy; all youths indeed and hastily sent to the army by battalions as they could be armed, yet brave; and eight thousand of them might have joined before the battle of Orthes. Wherefore, deducting the detachments of cavalry and infantry under Berton on the side of Pau and under Daricau on the side of Dax, it may be said that forty thousand combatants of all arms were engaged in the battle. Thirty-five thousand were very excellent soldiers; the conscripts of the old levy, who joined before the battle of the Nivelle, were stout men, and their vigorous fighting at Garris and Aire proved it; for of them was Harispe's division composed. Wellington's force is known. He commenced operations with the second third fourth and seventh British divisions, the independent Portuguese division of Le Cor Morillo's Spaniards, and forty-eight pieces of artillery; but with only four brigades of horse, for Vandeleur remained with Hope and all the heavy cavalry and the Portuguese were left in Spain. Following the morning states of the army, this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo's Spaniards, something more than forty thousand fighting men of all arms, four thousand being horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, and amongst them two of the strongest British regiments of the light division, were absent to receive their clothing; deduct these, and thirty-seven thousand Anglo-Portuguese combatants remain. It is true that Mina and Morillo aided in the commencement of the operations; but the first immediately invested St. Jean Pied de Port and the latter invested Navarrens. Wellington was therefore in the battle superior by a thousand horsemen and eight guns; but Soult outnumbered him in infantry by four or five thousand, conscripts it is true, yet useful. Why then was the passage of the Gaves so feebly disputed? Because the French general remained entirely on the defensive in positions too extended for his numbers.

3°. *Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive system.* Let Soult's operations be tried by this rule. On the 12th he knew that the allies were in motion for some great operation, and he judged rightly that it was to drive him from the Gaves. From the 14th to the 18th his left

was continually assailed by very superior numbers; but during part of that time Beresford could only oppose to his right and centre, the fourth and a portion of the seventh divisions with some cavalry; and those not in a body and at once, but parcelled and extended; for it was not until the 16th that the fourth seventh and light divisions were able to act in mass. On the 15th Wellington's troops were too extended, Villatte's, Taupin's, and Foy's divisions were never menaced until the 18th; and there was nothing to prevent D'Erlon's divisions, which only crossed the Adour on the 17th, from being on the Bidouze on the 15th. Soult might therefore by well digested combinations have united four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford on the 15th or 16th between the Nive and the Adour. If successful, the defeated troops, pushed back upon the sixth division, must have fought for life, with the rivers on their flanks, Soult in front, and the garrison of Bayonne issuing from the works of Mousseroles on their rear: if unsuccessful the French retreat behind the Gave of Oleron could not have been prevented.

Soult was however not exactly informed of the numbers and situation of his opponents. He thought  
Soult, MSS. Beresford had the first division also on the lower Bidouze; he knew Wellington had large reserves to employ; and the design of passing the Adour below Bayonne being unknown to him, he naturally supposed they would be used to support the operations on the Gaves: he therefore remained on the defensive. It might possibly also have been difficult to bring D'Erlon across the Adour by the Port de Landes before the 17th; because the regular bridge had been carried away and the communications interrupted a few days before by the floods. In fine there are many matters of detail in war known only to a general-in-chief which forbid the best combinations, and this it is that makes the art so difficult and uncertain. Great captains worship fortune.

4°. On the 24th the passage of the Gave of Oleron was effected; Soult then recognised his error and concentrated his troops at Orthes to retake the offensive by a fine movement and effected with ability; yet he suffered another

favourable opportunity of giving a counter-blow to escape him. The infantry under Villatte, Harispe and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre; that is to say, four miles from Montfort and only seven from Villenave, where the principal passage was effected, where the ford was deep, the stream rapid, the left bank not entirely commanding the right. How then did it happen that the operation was effected without opposition? Amongst the allies it was rumoured that Soult complained of the negligence of a general who had orders to march against the passing troops; and the position of Harispe at Monstrueig, equidistant from Sauveterre and Villenave, would seem to have been adopted with that view; but there is no confirmation of the report in Soult's correspondence, and it is certain he thought Picton's demonstration at Sauveterre was a real attack.

5°. The position adopted at Orthes was excellent for offence; it was not so for defence when Beresford and Picton had crossed the Gave below in force. Wellington could then throw his whole army on that side and secure his communication with Hope; after which, out-flanking the right of the French, he could seize the defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from their magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan and Aire, and force them to retreat by the Pau road leaving open the way to Bordeaux. To await this attack was therefore an error; but Soult's original design was to assail the head of the first column which should

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come near him, and Beresford's approach to Baigts on the 26th furnished the opportunity. It is true the French light cavalry gave intelligence of that general's march too late and marred the combination; yet there was still time to fall on the head of the column while the third division was in the act of passing the river and entangled in the narrow way leading from the ford to the Peyrehorade road:

it is said Soult appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally took a defensive position in which to receive battle. And when morning came he neglected another opportunity. For two hours

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general Reille  
and colonel  
de la Chasse,  
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the third division and the hussars were close to him, covering



the march of the sixth and light divisions through the narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up to the main road; the infantry had no defined position, the cavalry had no room to extend; and there were no troops between them and Beresford, who was then in march by the heights of Baights to the Dax road. If Soult had pushed a column across the marsh to seize the Roman camp he would have separated the wings of the allies; and then by pouring down the Peyrehorade road with Foy's, D'Armagnac's and Villatte's divisions, he would probably have overwhelmed the third division before the other two could have extricated themselves from the defiles. Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness, but he showed it too openly.

6°. With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of battle at Orthes; fiercely and strongly did he fight, and wonderfully did he effect his retreat across the Luy of Bearn; but twice in twenty-four hours he neglected those happy occasions which in war take birth and flight at the same instant: and as the value of his position, essentially an offensive one, was thereby lost, a slowness to strike may be objected to his generalship. Yet there is no commander, unless a Hannibal or a Napoleon, surpassing human proportions, but will abate something of his confidence and hesitate after repeated defeats: Soult in this campaign as in many others proved himself a hardy captain full of resources. Wellington, with a vastness of conception and a capacity for arrangement and combination equal to his opponent, possessed in a high degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole campaigns with which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. It is this which especially constitutes military genius. For so vast so complicated are the combinations of war, so easily and by such slight causes are they affected, that the best generals do but grope in the dark, and they acknowledge the humiliating truth. By the number and extent of their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, the merit of commanders is to be measured.

7°. Wellington designed to force Soult over the Garonne and if possible upon Bordeaux; because it was the direct line

the citizens inimical to the emperor, and the town, lying on the left bank of the river not to be defended; because a junction with Suchet would thus be prevented; and if he could throw the French into the Landes, where his own superior cavalry could act, they would probably be destroyed. To operate against Soult's left towards Pau was the obvious method of preventing a junction with Suchet, and rendering the fortified positions on the Gaves useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a large force; which was yet weak against an outer attack, because separated in three parts by the rivers; hence a wide movement on Pau would have let Soult place the Adour between himself and Wellington while he fell upon Hope. This rendered it necessary to cross all the Gaves on a contracted line of operations, and to collect the principal mass of troops on the right by the help of the great road leading to St. Jean Pied de Port. Rapid marches and reiterated attacks then forced the passage of the rivers above the points which Soult had fortified for defence, and so turned that general's left with the view of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving him into the wilderness of the Landes. During these marches Beresford remained on the lower parts of the rivers to occupy the enemy's attention and cover the troops blockading Mousserolles; and by collecting boats at Urt and other demonstrations, indicating a design of throwing a bridge over the Adour above Bayonne, diverted attention from the point chosen below the fortress for that operation; and at the same time he provided the means of throwing another bridge at the Port de Landes, to secure the communication with Hope by the right bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon the Gaves. These were fine combinations.

8°. It has been shown Beresford was so weak at first that Soult might have struck a counter-blow. Wellington admitted the error. Writing on the 15th he says, 'If the enemy stand upon the Bidouze I am not so strong as I ought to be,' and he ordered up the fourth and light divisions; yet, this excepted, his movements were conformable to the principles of war. He chose the best strategic line of operations, his main attack was made with heavy masses against the enemy's weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and daring. His

conduct was conformable also to his peculiar situation. He had two distinct operations in hand, namely, to throw his bridge below Bayonne and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required to obtain these objects, but dared not use them lest he should bring the Spanish troops in collision with the French people; yet he could not entirely dispense with them, and therefore brought Freyre up to Bayonne, Morillo to Navarrens, and Mina to St. Jean Pied de Port; thus seeming to put his whole army in motion and gaining the appearance of military strength with as little political danger as possible. Nevertheless so terrible had the Spaniards already made themselves by their cruel lawless habits, that their mere return across the frontier threw the whole country into consternation.

9°. When in front of Orthes it would at first sight appear as if Wellington had changed his plan of driving the enemy upon the Landes: but it was not so, he did not expect a battle on the 27th. This is proved by his letter to Hope in which he tells him he anticipated no difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau; that on the evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring; and that he designed to visit the position at Bayonne. To pass the Gave in the quickest and surest manner, to re-establish the direct communications with Hope and unite with Beresford, were his immediate objects; if he finally worked by his left it was a sudden act and extraneous to the general design, which was certainly to operate with Hill's corps and the light division by the right.

10°. On the morning of the 27th Wellington, after passing the Gave, first discovered Soult's intention to fight, and that he was himself in a false position. Had he shown any hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured to take a defensive position with either Beresford's or Picton's troops, he would inevitably have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous situation. Instead of this, judging Soult would not on the instant change from the defensive to the offensive, he confidently pushed Picton's skirmishers forward as if to assail the left of the French position, putting Beresford also in movement against their right; and this with all imaginable coolness. The success was complete. Soult, who supposed the

allies stronger than they really were, naturally imagined the wings would not be so bold unless well supported in the centre, where the Roman camp could hide a multitude. He therefore held fast to his position until the movement was more developed, and in two hours the sixth and light divisions were up and the battle commenced. It was well fought on both sides, but the crisis was decided by the fifty-second; and when that regiment was put in movement only a single Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the Roman camp: upon such nice combinations of time and place does the fate of battles turn.

11°. Soult should not have accepted battle at Orthes, and it has been said Wellington's wound at the most critical period of the retreat alone saved the hostile army. Nevertheless the clear manner in which the French got away, the prompt judgment shown in suddenly changing the line of retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which fight was made at Caçeres, Barcelonne, and Aire, were all proofs of great ability. It was Wellington's aim to drive the French on to the Landes. Soult's to avoid this, and he therefore shifted from the Bordeaux line to that of the Toulouse, not in confusion, but with the resolution of a man ready to dispute every foot of ground. The loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault of his; he had given orders for transporting them towards the Toulouse side fifteen days before, but the matter, depending upon the civil authorities, was neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers for fighting at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover the magazines there, and essential to his design of keeping up the courage of the soldiers under the adverse circumstances which he anticipated: here the palm of generalship remained with him, for the battle of Orthes was less decisive than it should have been. I speak not of the pursuit to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day's march upon St. Sever, but of Hill's march on the right. That general halted near Samade the 28th, reached St. Savin on the Adour the 1st, fought the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2nd of March. But from Samadet to Aire is not longer than from Samadet to St. Savin where he was on the 1st. He could therefore, if his orders had prescribed it so, have seized Aire



on the 1st. before Clausel arrived, and thus spared the obstinate combat at that place. It may also be observed that his attack was not well directed; it should have been towards the French left; because they were more weakly posted there; and the ridge held by their right was so difficult to retire from, that no troops would stay on it if any progress was made on the left. This was an accident of war. Hill had no time to inspect the ground, his orders were to attack; and to fall without hesitation upon a retiring enemy after such a defeat was right; but it cannot be said Wellington pushed the pursuit with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm on the evening of the 1st he could have reinforced Hill and should not have given the French army time to recover from their recent defeat. 'The secret of war,' says Napoleon, 'is to march twelve leagues, fight a battle and march twelve more in pursuit.'



## CHAPTER III.

EXTREMELY perilous now and disheartening was the situation of the French marshal. His army reduced by losses in battle and by desertion of conscripts, had also three thousand stragglers, old soldiers; collected by the generals into whose districts they wandered, they were employed to strengthen detached corps instead of being restored. All his magazines were taken; discontent, the natural offspring of misfortune, prevailed amongst his officers; a powerful enemy was in front; no certain resources of men or money behind, and his efforts were ill-seconded by the civil authorities. The troops, indignant at the people's apathy, behaved with so much violence and insolence, especially during the retreat from St. Sever, that Soult, who wanted officers very badly, proposed to fill the vacancies from the national guards, that he might have 'men who would respect property.' On the other hand the people, comparing the conduct of their own army with the discipline of the Anglo-Portuguese; and contrasting the requisitions necessarily imposed by their countrymen with the ready and copious disbursements in gold made by their enemies,—for now one commissary preceded each division to order rations for the troops and another followed to arrange and pay on the spot—were become so absolutely averse to the French army that Soult writing to the minister of war thus expressed himself. 'If the population of the departments of the Landes, of Gers and the Lower Pyrenees, were animated with a good spirit, this is the moment to make the enemy suffer by carrying off his convoys and prisoners; but they appear more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the army. It is scarcely possible to obtain a carriage for transport, and I shall not be surprised to find in a short time these inhabitants taking arms against us.'

Soult was however a man formed by nature and by experience to struggle against difficulties, always appearing greater when in a desperate condition than when more happily circumstanced. At Genoa under Massena, at Oporto and in Andalusia, he had been inured to military distress; and probably for that reason the emperor selected him to sustain this dangerous contest in preference to others accounted more ready tacticians. On the 3rd and 4th he retreated by Plaisance and Madiran to Rabastens, Marciac, and Maubourget, where he halted, covering Tarbes, for his design was to keep in mass and await the development of the allies' plans. In this view he called in the detachments of cavalry and infantry left on the side of Pau before the battle of Orthes; and hearing that Daricau was at Langon with a thousand men he ordered him to march by Agen and join the army immediately. He likewise put the national guards and *gens-d'armes* in activity on the side of the Pyrenees, and directed the commanders of the military districts in his rear to keep their old soldiers, of which there were many scattered through the country, in readiness to aid the army.

While thus acting he received a note dictated by the emperor.

'Fortresses,' said Napoleon, 'are nothing in themselves when the enemy having the command of the sea can collect as many shells and bullets and guns as he pleases to crush them. Leave therefore only a few troops in Bayonne, the way to prevent the siege is to keep the army close to the place. Resume the offensive, fall upon one or other of the enemy's wings, and though you should have but twenty thousand men, if you seize the proper moment and attack hardily you ought to gain some advantage. You have enough talent to understand my meaning.'

This note came fourteen days too late. But what if it had come before? Wellington after winning the battle of St. Pierre the 13th of December was firmly established on the Adour above Bayonne, and able to interrupt the French convoys as they descended from the Port de Landes. It was evident then that when dry weather enabled the allies to move, Soult must abandon Bayonne to defend the passage of

the Gaves; or risk being turned and driven upon the Landes from whence it would be difficult for him to escape. Napoleon however desired him to leave only a few men in Bayonne, another division would thus have been added to his field army; and this diminution of the garrison would not have increased Wellington's active forces, because the investment of Bayonne would still have required three separate corps: moreover until the bridge-head at Peyrehorade was abandoned to concentrate at Orthes, Bayonne was not, rigorously speaking, left to its own defence.

To the emperor's observations Soult replied, that several months before he had told the minister of war Bayonne was incapable of sustaining fifteen days open trenches unless the entrenched camp was well occupied, and he had been by the minister authorized so to occupy it. Taking that as his base he had left a garrison of thirteen thousand five hundred men, and now he knew the emperor's wishes it was no longer in his power to withdraw them. With respect to keeping close to the place he had done so as long as he could without endangering the safety of the army; but Wellington's operations had forced him to abandon it; and he had only changed his line of operations at St. Sever when he was being pushed back upon Bordeaux with little prospect of being able to pass the Garonne in time. He had for several months thought of establishing a pivot of support for his movements at Dax in the design of still holding by Bayonne; and with that view had ordered the old works of the former place to be repaired and a camp to be fortified; but from poverty of means even the body of the place was not completed or armed at the moment when the battle of Orthes forced him to relinquish it. Moreover the insurgent levy of the Landes upon which he depended to man the works had failed: not more than two hundred men had come forward. Neither was he very confident of the advantage of such a position, because Wellington with superior numbers would probably have turned his left and forced him to retire precipitately towards Bordeaux by the desert of the greater Landes.

The emperor ordered him to take the offensive were it only with twenty thousand men. He would obey with this obser-



vation; that from the 14th of February to that moment he had had no power to take the initiatory movement, having been constantly attacked by infinitely superior numbers. He had defended himself as he could, but had not expected to succeed against the enormous disproportion of force. It being thus impossible, even though he sacrificed his last man in the attempt, to stop the enemy, he now sought only to prolong the war as much as he could on the frontier; and by defending every position to keep the invaders in check and prevent them from attacking Bordeaux or Toulouse, save by detachments. He had taken his line of operations by the road of Tarbes, St. Gaudens, and Toulouse, that is to say, by the roots of the Pyrenees; calculating that if Wellington sent small detachments against Bordeaux or Toulouse, the generals commanding at those places would be able if the national guards would fight for their country to defend them.

If the English made large detachments, an attack in front while thus weakened would certainly bring them back; if they marched in mass upon Bordeaux they could be followed and forced to face about; if they attempted to march by Auch against Toulouse they might be stopped by an attack in flank; if they remained stationary they could be provoked by an advance to develop their objects. But if, as was to be expected, the French army was itself attacked it would defend its position vigorously; and then retreating by St. Gaudens draw the allies into a difficult mountain country; there the ground might be disputed step by step, the war be kept still on the frontier, and the passage of the Garonne be delayed. He had meditated deeply upon his task and could find no better mode; but his army was weakened by combats, still more by desertion—the conscripts went off so fast that of five battalions lately called up from Toulouse two-thirds were already gone without having seen an enemy.

Soult, though in error as to the real force of the allies, here displayed clear views, and quickly re-organized his army in six divisions. Calling in his detachments he urged the imperial commissioners and local authorities to hasten the levies and restore deserters, while he formed a plan of action for the partisans who had been organized in the mountains.

But the new conscripts were for the most part unarmed, and he had no arms to give them; the imperial commissary Cornudet and the prefect of the Gironde quitted Bordeaux; and when L'Huillier attempted to remove the military stores belonging to the army, from Langon, Podensac, and Bordeaux, the inferior authorities opposed him; there was no money they said to pay the expense: but in truth Bordeaux was the focus of Bourbon conspiracy, and the mayor, count Lynch, was eager to betray his sovereign.

Nor was Wellington without embarrassments. The weather had prevented him following up his victory while the French army was in confusion; now it was re-organized on a new line and could retreat for many days in a direction parallel to the Pyrenees with strong defensive positions. Should he press it closely? His army, weakened at every step, would have to move between the mountains and the Garonne, exposing its flanks and rear to the operations of any force which the French might be able to collect on those boundaries; that is to say all the power of France beyond the Garonne. It was essential to find some counterpoise and increase his field army. To establish a Bourbon party at Bordeaux was an obvious mode of attaining the first object. Should he then seize that city by a detachment? He must employ twelve thousand men and remain with twenty-six thousand to oppose Soult, who he erroneously believed was being joined by the ten thousand men which Suchet had sent to Lyons. Five regiments which had been detached for clothing had rejoined the army, and all the reserves of cavalry and artillery were now called up; but the reinforcements from England and Portugal, amounting to twenty thousand men, upon which he had calculated, were detained by the respective governments. Wherefore, driven by necessity, he directed Freyre to join him by the Port de Landes with two divisions of the Gallician army; a measure which was instantly followed by innumerable complaints of outrages and excesses, although the Spaniards were entirely provided from the English military chest. It was at this time also Clinton had orders to send the British and Germans of the Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de Luz.

Resolving however to seize Bordeaux he repaired the broken

bridges, brought up one of Morillo's brigades from Navarrens to the vicinity of Aire, sent Campbell's Portuguese dragoons to Rocquefort, Fane with two regiments of cavalry and a brigade of infantry to Pau, and pushed posts towards Tarbes and Vic Bigorre. Meanwhile Soult, fearing the general apathy and ill-will would become fatal to him, endeavoured to arouse the energies of the people and the army by the following proclamation which has been unreasonably railed at by several English writers, for it was a judicious well-timed and powerful address.

‘Soldiers, at the battle of Orthes you did your duty, the enemy's losses surpassed yours, his blood moistened all the ground he gained. You may consider that feat of arms as an advantage. Other combats are at hand; no repose for us until his army, formed of such extraordinary elements, shall evacuate the French territory or be annihilated. Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand are unexpected perils; time will teach the enemy's general that French honour is not to be outraged with impunity.

‘Soldiers, he has had the indecency to provoke you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition, he speaks of peace but firebrands of discord follow him! He speaks of peace and excites the French to a civil war! Thanks be to him for making known his projects; our forces are thereby centupled; and he himself rallies round the imperial eagles all those who deceived by appearances believed our enemies would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal and perfidious nation! no peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they quit the French territory! they have dared to insult the national honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the emperor. Revenge the offence in blood. To arms! Let this cry resound through the south of France, the Frenchman that hesitates abjures his country and belongs to her enemies.

‘Yet a few days and those who believe in English delicacy and sincerity will learn to their cost that cunning promises are made to abate their courage, to subjugate them. They will learn also that if the English pay to-day and are generous, they will to-morrow retake, and with interest, in contributions

what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country remember that the English have in view to reduce Frenchmen to the same servitude as the Spaniards, Portuguese and Sicilians who groan under their domination. Past history will recal to those unworthy Frenchmen who prefer momentary enjoyment to the safety of the great family, how the English made Frenchmen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon; it will show them at the head of all conspiracies, all odious political intrigues, plots and assassinations, aiming to overthrow all principles, to destroy all grand establishments of trade to satisfy their immeasurable ambition, their insatiable cupidity. Does there exist upon the face of the globe a point known to the English where they have not destroyed by seditions and violence all manufactures which could rival their own? Thus they will do to the French establishments if they prevail.

‘Devote then to opprobrium and execration all Frenchmen who favour their insidious projects, ay! even those who are under his power if they seek not to hurt him. Devote to opprobrium and reject as Frenchmen those who think under specious pretexts to avoid serving their country; and those also who from corruption or indolence hide deserters instead of driving them back to their colours. With such men we have nothing in common, and history will pass their names with execrations to posterity. As to us soldiers our duty is clear. Honour and fidelity. This is our motto and we will fight to the last the enemies of our emperor and France. Respect persons and property. Grieve for those who have momentarily fallen under the enemy’s yoke, hasten the moment of their deliverance. Be obedient and disciplined, and bear implacable hatred towards traitors and enemies of the French name! War to death against those who would divide us to destroy; and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to range themselves under another banner. Remember always that fifteen ages of glory, triumphs innumerable, have illustrated our country. Contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great sovereign, his signal victories which immortalize the French name. Be worthy of him and we can then bequeath without a taint to our posterity the inheritance we hold from



our fathers. Be in fine Frenchmen and die arms in hand sooner than survive dishonour.'

Let the time and the occasion of this proclamation be considered. Let it be remembered that no English writer orator or politician, had for many years used milder terms than robbers, murderers, atheists, and tyrant, when speaking of Frenchmen and their sovereign—that Wellington even at this time refused that sovereign his title of emperor, calling him *Buonaparte*—that on entering France he had published an order of the day accusing the French commanders of authorizing and encouraging the cruelties of their soldiers in Spain—that for six years the Spanish, Portuguese and English state papers were filled with most offensive ribald abuse of Napoleon his ministers and commanders. Let all this be remembered and the acrimony of Soult's proclamation cannot be justly blamed; while the noble energy, the loyalty of the sentiments, the exciting, passionate feeling of patriotism which pervades it must be admired. Was he, sprung from the ranks, a soldier of the republic, a general of the empire, after fighting thirty years under the tricolor to be tame and measured to squeamishness in his phrases when he saw his country invaded by foreigners; and a pretender to the throne stalking behind their bayonets beckoning his soldiers to desert their eagles, inviting his countrymen to betray their sovereign and dishonour their nation! Why the man was surrounded by traitors, and proud and scornful of danger was his spirit to strive so mightily against defeat and treason combined.

It has been said in condemnation of him that the English general did not encourage the Bourbon party. Is that true? Did it so appear to the French general? Had not the duke of Angoulême come to the English head-quarters with mystery, following the invading army, and, protected by its arms, assembling round him all the ancient partisans of his house, sending forth agents, scattering proclamations even in Soult's camp, endeavouring to debauch his soldiers and to aid strangers to subjugate France. Soult not only knew this but was suffering under the effects. On every side he met with opposition and discontent from the civil authorities, his movements were made known to the enemy, his measures thwarted in all directions.

At Bordeaux a party was vehemently calling upon the invaders for aid. At Tarbes the fear of provoking an action near the town had caused the dispersion of the insurrectional levy organized by the imperial commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau the aristocracy had secretly assembled to offer homage to the duke of Angoulême, and it was rumoured he was to be crowned at the castle of Henry the Fourth. Was Soult to disregard all these facts all these signs because his opponent had avoided any public declaration in favour of the Bourbon family? Wellington would have been the first to laugh at his simplicity if he had.

What was the reason that the English general did not openly call upon the Bourbon partisans to raise the standard of revolt? Simply that Napoleon's astounding genius had so baffled the banded sovereigns and their innumerable hordes that a peace seemed inevitable to avoid fatal disasters; Wellington had instructions from his government not to embarrass negotiations for peace by pledges to a Bourbon party. Hence as an honest statesman and commander he could not excite men to their ruin for a momentary advantage; but so far from discouraging treason to Napoleon on other grounds he avowed his anxious desire for it, and his readiness to encourage every enemy of that monarch. He consulted with La Roche Jacquelin, with De Mailhos, and other vehement partisans for an immediate insurrection; and also with Viel Castel, an agent of Bernadotte's, until he found him intriguing against the Bourbons. He advised the duke of Angoulême to form regular battalions, promised him arms, and actually collected eighty thousand stand to arm the insurgents. Finally he rebuked the timid policy of the English ministers, who having such an opportunity of assailing Napoleon refrained from doing it. Before Soult's proclamation appeared he thus wrote to lord Bathurst.

Secret  
instructions  
from lord  
Bathurst,  
MSS.

‘I find the sentiment as we advance in the country still more strong against the Buonaparte dynasty and in favour of the Bourbons, but I am quite certain there will be no declaration on the part of the people if the allies do not in some manner declare themselves.’ ‘*I cannot discover the policy of*

*not hitting one's enemy as hard as one can and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that he would not so act by us, he would certainly overturn the British authority in Ireland if it were in his power.'*

Soult and Wellington, acted and wrote, each in the manner most suitable to their situation, but it was not a little remarkable that Ireland should so readily occur to the latter as a parallel case.

In this state of affairs Beresford was detached with twelve thousand men against Bordeaux, having instructions to occupy that city and acquire the Garonne as a port for the allies; but the French authorities were to declare whether they would or would not exercise their functions under the conditions announced by proclamation. For hitherto Wellington had governed as he advanced in this public manner to nullify the misrepresentations of political intriguers, obviate false reports and rumours, and make his justice and moderation known to the poorest peasant; thus securing the French local authorities who continued to act under him from false representation of their conduct to the imperial government if peace should be made with Napoleon. This expedition, however, involved political interests. Beresford was instructed that, as there were many partisans of the Bourbons in that city who might wish to hoist the white standard and proclaim Louis the Eighteenth under protection of the troops, they were to be told the British nation and its allies wished well to their cause; and while public tranquillity was maintained in the districts occupied by the troops there would be no hindrance to their political proceedings: they or any party opposed to Napoleon would receive assistance. Nevertheless, as the allied sovereigns were negotiating with the French emperor, however well inclined the English general might be to support a party against the latter during war, he could give no help if peace were concluded, and this they must weigh well before they revolted. Beresford was therefore not to meddle with any declaration in favour of Louis the Eighteenth; but he was not to oppose it; and if revolt took place he was to supply the revolted with the arms and ammunition collected at Dax.

On the 8th Beresford marched towards Langon with the



fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's horsemen, and some guns; he was joined on the road by some of Vandeleur's cavalry from Bayonne; and he had orders to observe the enemy's movements towards Agen; for Soult could by a forced march cross the Garonne there, and enter Bordeaux before him. La Roche Jacquelin preceded the troops, and the duke of Angoulême followed closely; his partisans in the city, frightened at the danger of their enterprise, now besought Beresford to delay his march; but La Roche Jacquelin vehemently condemned this hesitation; and his influence supported by the consternation which the battle of Orthes had created amongst the Napoleonists decided the question in favour of revolt.

It has been shown that Soult had previously given orders in detail for organizing the defence of Bordeaux, and he had urged it again when the imperial commissioner Cornudet arrived; but following the custom of all civilians who meddle with military matters, everything was promised and nothing done. Cornudet and the prefect quitted the city as early as the 4th, first burning with a silly affectation of vigour some ships of war upon the stocks. L'Huillier, unable to oppose the allies, then destroyed the fort of Medoc on the left bank of the Garonne, disarmed some of the river batteries, and passing in the night of the 11th to the right bank occupied the fortress of Blaye, the Paté, and other points. Beresford reached Langon the 10th, left lord Dalhousie there with the bulk of the forces, and advancing with eight hundred cavalry entered Bordeaux the 12th. The municipality and a great body of Bourbonists met him, and at their head was the mayor, count Lynch, decorated with the scarf of his office and the legion of honour, both conferred upon him, probably at his own solicitation, by the sovereign he was then going to betray. Beresford made known his instructions, and Lynch very justly tore the tricolor, the emblem of his country's glory, from his own shoulders; the white flag was then displayed and the allies took possession of the city. The duke of Angoulême arrived the same day, and Louis the Eighteenth was proclaimed. This was not generally approved, and the mayor, conscious of weakness, issued with the connivance of Angoulême a proclamation, declaring that 'the British, Portu-



guese and Spanish armies were united in the south, as the other nations were united in the north, solely to destroy Napoleon and replace him by a Bourbon king, who was conducted thither by these generous allies: and only by accepting that king could the French appease the resentment of the Spaniards.' Then, as if master of the country, the duke appointed prefects and other authorities in districts beyond the limits of Bordeaux.

Both duke and mayor soon repented of their precipitancy. The English fleet which should have acted simultaneously with the troops had not arrived; the *Regulus*, French seventy-four, with several inferior vessels of war were anchored below Blaye, and Beresford was recalled with the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry. Lord Dalhousie remained with the seventh division and three squadrons to oppose L'Huillier's troops and other French corps now on the Garonne; he could not guard the river below Bordeaux, and some French troops again took possession of the fort of Grave near the mouth; a new army was forming under Decaen beyond the Garonne; the Napoleonists began to stir themselves, and a partisan officer coming down to St. Macaire on the 18th, surprised fifty men sent by lord Dalhousie across the Garonne to seize a French magazine. In the Landes the peasants burned the houses of the gentlemen who had joined the white standard, and in Bordeaux a counter-insurrection was prepared to aid Decaen.

Frightened at these symptoms of reaction the prince desired lord Dalhousie to bring his troops into Bordeaux to awe the Napoleonists, and each party strove to outvie the other in idle rumours. Victories and defeats were invented or exaggerated. Napoleon was dead from illness, had committed suicide, was poisoned, stabbed; and all were related with most circumstantial details. Wellington, writing to the duke of Angoulême, denied the veracity of the mayor's proclamation, and expressed his trust that the prince was not a party to such a mendacious document; but the latter, with some excuses about hurry and confusion, avowed his participation in its publication and defended the mayor's conduct. He also stated the danger and demanded men and money; supporting his application by a note of council, which argued, that as civil

government could not be conducted without executive power, and Wellington had suffered the duke to assume the civil government at Bordeaux, he was bound to supply troops and furnish money until taxes could be levied under the protection of the soldiers!

Holding such sophistry in excuse for a breach of faith to be intolerable, Wellington replied, that he was sorry to find the principle by which he regulated his conduct towards the Bourbon party, though often stated, had made so little impression that the duke could not perceive how inconsistent it was with the mayor's proclamation; most cautious therefore must be his future conduct, seeing that as the chief of an army and the confidential agent of three independent nations, he could not permit his views to be misrepresented upon such an important question. He had occupied Bordeaux as a military point, but certain persons contrary to his advice and opinion thought proper to proclaim Louis the Eighteenth. Those persons made no exertions, subscribed no money, raised not a soldier; yet because he would not extend the posts of his army beyond what was proper and convenient, merely to protect their families and property; exposed to danger, not on account of their exertions for they had made none, but on account of their premature declaration contrary to his advice, they took him to task in a document delivered to lord Dalhousie by the prince himself. The writer of that paper and all such persons however might be assured that nothing should make him swerve from what he thought his duty to the sovereigns who employed him; he would not risk even a company of infantry to save properties and families placed in a state of danger contrary to his advice. The duke then had better conduct his policy and compose his manifestoes in such a manner as not to force a public contradiction of them. His royal highness was free to act as he pleased for himself; but he was not free to adduce the name and authority of the allied governments in support of his measures when they had not been consulted; nor of their general when he had been consulted and had given his opinion against those measures.

He had told him that if any great town or extensive district declared in favour of the Bourbons, he would not inter-

fere with the government of that town or district; and if there was a general declaration in favour of his house he would deliver the civil government of all the country overrun by the army into his hands; but the fact was that even at Bordeaux the movement in favour of the Bourbons was not unanimous. The spirit had not spread elsewhere, not even to La Vendée, nor in any part occupied by the army. The events contemplated had not therefore occurred, and it would be a great breach of duty towards the allied sovereigns, and cruel to the inhabitants, if he were to deliver them over to his royal highness prematurely or against their inclinations: he advised him therefore to withdraw his prefects and confine his government to Bordeaux. He could give him no money, and after what had passed he was doubtful if he should afford him any countenance or protection; the argument of the note of council, affirming that he was bound to support the civil government of his royal highness, only rendered it more incumbent upon him to beware how he gave farther encouragement, or to speak plainly, *permission* to the Bourbonists to declare themselves. It was disagreeable to take any step which should publicly mark a want of good understanding between himself and the duke, but count Lynch had not treated him with common fairness or with truth; wherefore as he could not allow the character of the allied sovereigns or his own to be doubted, if his royal highness did not within ten days contradict the objectionable parts of the mayor's proclamation he would do so himself.

Thus it appeared that with the French as with the Spaniards and Portuguese, neither enthusiastic declarations nor actual insurrection offered any guarantee for sense, truth or exertion; and most surely all generals and politicians of every country who trust to sudden popular commotions will find that noisy declamations, vehement demonstrations of feeling, idle rumours and boasting, the life-blood of such affairs, are essentially opposed to useful public exertions.

When Beresford marched to rejoin the army the line of occupation was too extensive for Dalhousie, and Wellington ordered him to avoid the city and hold his troops together; observing that his own projected operations on the upper

Garonne would keep matters quiet on the lower part of that river. But if the war had continued for a month that officer's situation would have been critical; for when Napoleon heard Bordeaux had fallen he sent Decaen by post to Libourne to form the '*army of the Gironde*;' general Despeaux, acting under Soult's orders, had already collected a body of gens-d'armes custom-house officers and national guards on the upper Garonne, between Agen and La Reolle, and it was one of his detachments that surprised Dalhousie's men at St. Macaire. Eight guns were sent down from Narbonne, other batteries were despatched from Paris to arrive at Perigeaux on the 11th of April, and three or four hundred cavalry, coming from the side of Rochelle, joined L'Huillier, who with a thousand infantry was in position at St. André de Cubsac beyond the Dordogne. Behind these troops, all the national guards custom-house officers and gens-d'armes of five departments were ordered to assemble, and march to the Dordogne; but the formidable part of the intended army was a body of Suchet's veterans, six thousand in number, under general Beurman, who had been turned from the road of Lyons and directed upon Libourne.

Official Cor-  
respondence  
of general  
Decaen.  
MSS.

Decaen entered Mucidan the 1st of April, Beurman's troops had not then reached Perigeaux, Dalhousie's cavalry were in Libourne between him and L'Huillier; the power of concentration was thus denied to the French and meanwhile admiral Penrose secured command of the Garonne. Wellington thought him dilatory, but on the 27th he arrived with a seventy-four and two frigates; whereupon the *Regulus* and other French vessels, then at Royan, made sail up the river, and though chased to the shoal of Talmont escaped through the narrow channel on the north side and cast anchor under some batteries. Previous to this event Mr Ogilvie, a commissary, being on the river in a boat manned with Frenchmen, discovered the *Requin* sloop, half French half American, pierced for twenty-two guns, lying at Anchor below Bordeaux, and seeing a sailor leap hastily into a boat and row for the vessel seized him; he was the armourer of the *Requin*, and said there were not

Official  
Report by  
Mr. Ogilvie,  
MSS.



many men on board. Whereupon Ogilvie observing his alarm thought the crew would also be fearful, and resolutely bearing down upon the *Requin*, boarded and took her without opposition from her crew, or his own, although she had fourteen guns mounted and eleven men with two officers on board!

When the naval co-operation was assured, Dalhousie crossed the Garonne above the city, drove the French posts beyond the Dordogne, and sending his cavalry over intercepted Decaen's and L'Huillier's communications; the former had then to remain at Mucidan with two hundred and fifty *gens-d'armes*, awaiting the arrival of Beurman, and he found neither arms nor ammunition nor a willing spirit for organizing the national guards. The English horsemen repassed the Dordogne, but Dalhousie crossed it again lower down near St. André de Cubzac, with three thousand men, and hearing L'Huillier was at Etauliers turned suddenly upon him. The French formed line on an open common, occupying a wood in front with detachments; overmatched in infantry, they had three hundred cavalry opposed to one weak squadron, yet none would stand the shock of battle. The wood was cleared in a moment, the artillery opened, and the main body retired in disorder, horsemen and infantry together, through Etauliers; leaving behind scattered masses upon which the British cavalry galloped and made two or three hundred men and thirty officers prisoners. If the six thousand old troops under Beurman had, following Napoleon's orders, arrived at this time in Dalhousie's rear, his position would have been embarrassing, but they were delayed on the road until the 10th.

During these operations admiral Penrose, having on the 2nd observed the French flotilla, consisting of fifteen armed vessels and gun-boats, coming down from Blaye to join the *Regulus* at Talmont, sent his boats to attack them; whereupon the French vessels run on shore, and the crews aided by two hundred soldiers from Blaye lined the beach to protect them; but Lieutenant Dunlop landing the seamen and marines from the boats, beat the troops and carried off or destroyed the whole flotilla with a loss of only six men wounded and missing. This operation completed, and the action at Etauliers known, the admiral, reinforced with a second ship of the

line, resolved to attack the squadron and the shore batteries, but in the night of the 6th the French set fire to their vessels; whereupon captain Harris of the *Belle Poule* frigate landed six hundred seamen and marines, and destroyed the batteries and forts on the right bank from Talmont to the Courbe point. Blaye still held out, but at Paris treason had done its work, Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity known for good, was overthrown to make room for despots, who with minds enlarged only to cruelty, avarice and dissoluteness, were at the very moment of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whose strength and suffering they had conquered, of the only reward they demanded, *just government*. The war was virtually over, yet on the side of Toulouse, Bayonne, and Barcelona, the armies ignorant of this great event were still battling with unabated fury.

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## CHAPTER IV.

WHILE Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux, Soult and Wellington remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than himself. The latter, hearing of Beurman's march, thought he was to reinforce Soult and had actually joined. That marshal, hearing nothing of Beresford's march until the 13th, concluded Wellington still had the twelve thousand men thus detached to Bordeaux. The numbers on each side were however nearly equal. On the French side were thirty-one thousand infantry and cavalry, three thousand being however stragglers detained by the generals of the military districts; hence, exclusive of conscripts without arms, only twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets with thirty-eight pieces of artillery were in line. On the allies' side twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets were under arms, with forty-two guns; but this included detachments sent to Pau on one side, Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry scouts pushed into the Landes and to the upper Garonne.

Official  
Report,  
MSS.

Wellington, expecting Soult would retreat upon Auch and designing to follow him, had caused Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops towards the upper Garonne that he might the sooner rejoin the army; but Soult, having early fixed his line of retreat by St. Guadens, would have retaken the offensive on the 9th or 10th, if the loss of his magazines had not compelled him first to organize a system of requisition for subsistence. His equality of force soon ceased, for on the 13th Freyre came up with eight thousand Spanish infantry, and the next day Ponsonby's heavy cavalry arrived; Wellington was then the strongest, yet he still awaited Beresford, and was uneasy about his own situation. He dreaded the junction of Suchet's army; for it was at this time the Spanish

regency referred the convention, proposed by that marshal for the evacuation of the fortresses, to his decision. He gave a peremptory negative, observing that it would furnish twenty thousand veterans for Soult, while the retention of Rosas and Figueras would bar the action of the Spanish armies of Catalonia in his favour; yet his anxiety was great, because he foresaw Ferdinand's return and his engagement with Suchet, already related, together with the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons should be admitted to a convention, would finally render that measure inevitable. His own army was likely to decrease. The English cabinet, less considerate even than the Spanish government, had sent the militia, permitted by the recent act of parliament to volunteer for foreign service, to Holland; and with them the other reinforcements originally promised for the army in France: two or three regiments of militia only came to the Garonne when the war was over. To make amends the ministers proposed that lord William Bentinck should send four thousand men from Sicily to land at Rosas, or some point in France, and so join Wellington; who was thus expected to extend his weakened force from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean in order to cover the junction of this uncertain reinforcement! Experience had taught the English statesmen so little, that we find their general thus addressing them only one week previous to the termination of the war.

Having before declared that he should be, contrary to his wishes, forced to bring more Spaniards into France, he says:—

‘There are limits to the numbers with which this army can contend, and I am convinced your lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour of this handful of brave men depend upon the doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish troops.’—‘The service in Holland may doubtless be more important to the national interest than that in this country, but I hope it will be considered that that which is most important of all is not *to lose the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for nearly six years.*’

Soult's infantry was now re-organized in six divisions



under Daricau, D'Armagnac, Taupin, Maransin, Soult, MSS. Villatte and Harispe. Paris' troops hitherto acting as an unattached body were thus absorbed, the cavalry composed of Berton's and Vial's brigades was under Pierre Soult, and there was a reserve of seven thousand conscript infantry under Travot. The division of wings and a centre, each under a lieutenant-general, continued, but was not heeded in the movements; for Reille though commanding the right wing was at Maubourget on the left of the line of battle; D'Erlon, commanding the centre, was at Marsiac on the right covering the road to Auch; Clausel was at Rabastens forming a reserve to both. The advanced guards were towards Plaisance on the right, Madiran in the centre, Lembege on the left: Soult thus covered Tarbes, and could move on a direct line by good roads either to Auch or Pau.

Wellington, driven by necessity, now called Giron and Anglona from the Bastan, although Freyre's soldiers had by their outrages already created a wide-spread consternation. His head-quarters were fixed at Aire, his army was in position on each side of the Adour, he had repaired all the bridges behind him, restored that over the Lees in his front, and dispersed some small bands upon his left flank and rear: but a partisan system was organized on his right flank in the mountains, and only wanted money. The main bodies of the two armies were a long day's march asunder, yet their advanced posts were not very distant. The regular cavalry had frequent encounters, and in the night of the 7th, Soult, thinking Pau was weakly protected sent a strong detachment to arrest the nobles who had assembled to welcome the duke of Angoulême. Fane however got there before the French with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, and the stroke failed. The French in returning captured an officer and four or five English dragoons, and a second detachment penetrating between Pau and Aire carried off a post of correspondence. Two days after, when Fane had quitted Pau, a French officer accompanied by only four hussars captured there thirty-four Portuguese, with their commander and ten loaded mules. By these excursions Soult procured intelligence of Beresford's march to Bordeaux and resolved to

attack, the more readily that Napoleon had recently directed him to draw the war to the side of Pau, keeping his left resting on the Pyrenees, which accorded with his own designs.

Wellington's main body was then concentrated round Aire and Barcelonne, but divided by the Adour, and the advanced guards were at Garlin, Conchez, Viella, Riscle and Pouydraguien, on a semicircle, and half a march in advance. Soult therefore thought to strike a good blow. Gathering his divisions on the side of Maubourget the 12th, he marched the 13th, designing to throw himself upon the high tabular land between Pau and Aire, and then act according to circumstances. The country was suited for the action of all arms, offering long and nearly parallel ridges of moderate height, the sides of which were sometimes covered with vineyards, but the summits commonly so open that troops could move along them without much difficulty; and between these undulations small rivers with muddy bottoms descended from the Pyrenees to the Adour. This conformation determined the order of march, which followed the courses of these rivers. One regiment of cavalry being left to watch the valley of the Adour, the rest of the French army moved by Lembege upon Conchez down the smaller Lees. Clausel then seized the high land of Daisse and pushed troops to Portet; Reille supported him at Conchez, D'Erlon remained behind that place in reserve. The heads of the columns pointing direct upon Aire intercepted the line between Viella and Garlin, where Hill's right was, and menaced his posts on the great Lees. Meanwhile Pierre Soult, marching with three regiments of cavalry along the high land between the two Lees, reached Mascaras and the castle of Sault, where he covered the French left, and pushed Fane's cavalry posts back with the loss of two officers and a few men. Berton, advancing from Madiran with two regiments of cavalry towards Viella, on the right flank of the French army, endeavoured to cross the Saye river at a difficult muddy ford near the broken bridge, but sir John Campbell with a squadron of Portuguese cavalry overthrew the head of his column. However the Portuguese were too few to dispute the passage, and Berton, finally getting a regiment over higher up,

Plan 2, p. 1.

Memoir by  
general  
Berton,  
MSS.

Note by  
sir John  
Campbell,  
MSS.

gained the table-land above, and charging the rear of the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to the Aire road killed several and took some prisoners, amongst them Bernardo de Sà, since known as count of Bandeira.

This terminated Soult's operations for the day, and Wellington imagining the arrival of Suchet's troops had made him thus bold, resolved to keep on the defensive until his reinforcements and detachments could come up. Hill however passed the greater Lees, partly to support his posts partly to make out the force and true direction of the French movement; but he recrossed that river during the night and finally occupied the strong platform between Aire and Garlin which Soult had designed to seize. Wellington then brought the third and sixth division and the heavy cavalry over the Adour to his support, leaving the light division with the hussar brigade still on the right bank. The bulk of the army thus occupied a strong position parallel with the Pau road; the right at Garlin, the left at Aire, the front covered by the greater Lees, a river difficult to pass; Fane's cavalry was extended on the Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the Adour the hussars pushed the French cavalry regiment left there back upon Plaisance.

On the morning of the 14th Soult, intending to fall on Hill, whose columns he had seen in the evening before on the right of the Lees, drove in the advanced posts covering the retrograde movement, and examined the new position; but these operations wasted the day, and towards evening he disposed his army on the heights between the two Lees; placing Clausel and D'Erlon at Castle Pugon opposite Garlin, Reille in reserve at Portet. At the same time Pierre Soult moved with three cavalry regiments to Clarac on the Pau road, to intercept the communications with that town and menace the allies' right flank, against which the whole French army was now pointing. Fane's outposts retired with some loss at first, but they were soon supported and drove the French horsemen in disorder clear off the Pau road to Carere. Then Soult, seeing the strength of the position above Aire, and hearing from the peasants that forty or fifty thousand men were concentrated there, feared to attack. Changing his plan he

resolved to hover about the right flank of the allies in the hopes of enticing them from their vantage-ground; but Wellington only drew his cavalry posts down the valley of the Adour, and massed his forces on the right in expectation of an attack. Each general acting upon false intelligence of the other's strength was afraid to strike. The English error as to the junction of Suchet's troops was encouraged by Soult, who had formed his battalions upon two ranks instead of three to give himself an appearance of strength; and in the same view had caused the reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of battle. But he also judged the allies' strength by what it might have been not what it was; for though Freyre's Spaniards and Ponsonby's dragoons were now up, the whole force did not exceed thirty-six thousand men, including the light division and the hussars on the right bank of the Adour. This number was however increasing every hour by the arrival of detachments and reserves; and it behoved Soult, who was entangled in a country extremely difficult if rain should fall, to watch that Wellington, while holding him in check with his right wing, did not strike with his left by Maubourget and Tarbes, and thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdes.

Morning  
States,  
MSS.

This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of the fall of Bordeaux, induced him to retire before day on the 16th to Lembege and Simacourbe, where he occupied both sides of the two branches of the Lees and the heights between them; his outposts remained at Conchez; and Pierre Soult again getting upon the Pau road detached a hundred chosen troopers under captain Dania against the allies' communication with Orthes. They made a forced march, reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers and eight medical men with their baggage, took a number of other prisoners and returned on the evening of the 18th. This enterprise at such a distance from the army was supposed to be executed by the bands, and seemed to indicate a disposition for insurrection; wherefore Wellington seized the civil authorities at Hagetnau, and declared he would hang all the peasants caught in arms and burn their villages. But Soult's offensive movement was now exhausted, he sent his conscripts to Toulouse and prepared for



a retreat on that place; he had acted tardily, he should have been on the Lees the 10th or 11th when only twenty thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry could oppose him between Aire and Garlin. Wellington's passive state, too much prolonged, was now also at an end; his reinforcements and detachments were either up or close at hand; and he could put in motion six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions, furnishing forty thousand bayonets, with six thousand cavalry, and from fifty to sixty pieces of artillery.

On the evening of the 17th, the English hussars were pushed up the valley of the Adour, towards Plaisance; the light division supported them, and was followed by the fourth division, coming from the side of Roquefort on its return from Langon. Next morning the whole army was in movement. The hussars with the light and fourth divisions forming together the left wing marched upon Plaisance; Hill commanding the right marched from Garlin to Conchez, keeping a detachment on the road to Pau in observation of Pierr Soult's cavalry. The centre, under Wellington in person, moved on Viella by the high road leading from Aire to Maubourget. The French right was thus turned by the valley of the Adour, while Hill with a sharp skirmish, in which eighty British were killed and wounded, drove back their outposts upon Lembege.

Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge, having a small river with rugged banks, called the Laiza, in his front; but his right under D'Erlon was extended towards Vic Bigorre

Berton's  
Memoir,  
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on the great road of Tarbes. Berton's cavalry, one regiment of which, in retreating from Viella the 16th, disengaged itself with some difficulty and loss, reached Maubourget and took post in column behind that place, the road being confined on each side by deep and wide ditches. In this situation, being pressed by Bock's German cavalry, which preceded the centre column of the allies, the French horsemen suddenly charged and took an officer and some men, but were ultimately beaten and retreated through Vic Bigorre. Soult, thinking a flanking column only was in the valley of the Adour, resolved to fall upon it with his

whole army; but he recognised the skill of his opponent when he found the whole of the allies' centre had been thrown by Madiran on to the Tarbes road while he was retiring from Lembege. This heavy mass was Soult, MSS. approaching Vic Bigorre, the light division, coming from Plaisance up the right bank of the Adour, was already near Auriebat, pointing to Rabastens; on which place the hussars had driven the French cavalry left in observation when the army first advanced. Vic Bigorre was thus turned, Berton's horsemen had passed it in retreat and the danger was imminent. Soult immediately ordered Berton to support the cavalry regiment at Rabastens and cover that road to Tarbes; D'Erlon to take post at Vic Bigorre and check the allies on the main road, while he hastily marched in person with Clausel's and Reille's divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous road leading through Ger-sur-landes. D'Erlon, not comprehending the crisis, moved slowly with his baggage in front; and having the river Lechez to cross rode on before his troops expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre, but he met the German cavalry there; then indeed he hurried his march; yet he had only time to place Daricau's division, now under Paris, amongst some vineyards two miles in front of Vic Bigorre, when hither came Picton to the support of the cavalry and fell upon him.

*Combat of Vic Bigorre.*—The French left was secured by the Lechez river, but their right towards the Adour was loose, and menaced by the German cavalry while the front was attacked by Picton, who drove Paris back in disorder. But then D'Armagnac entered the line and extending to the Adour renewed the fight, which lasted until D'Erlon saw his right turned beyond the Adour by the light division and the hussars, who were now close to Rabastens, whereupon he retired behind Vic Bigorre and took post for the night. The action was vigorous; two hundred and fifty Anglo-Portuguese, men and officers, fell, and amongst them died colonel Henry Sturgeon so often mentioned in this History. Skilled to excellence in almost every branch of war, and possessing a variety of accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently for himself and so usefully for the service that envy offered no bar to admiration, and the whole army felt painfully mortified that his merits were passed unnoticed in the public despatches.

Soult's march through the sandy plain of Ger was harassing, and would have been dangerous if Wellington had sent Hill's cavalry, now reinforced by two regiments of heavy dragoons, in pursuit; but the country was unfavourable for quick observation, and the French covered their movements with rear-guards whose real numbers it was difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a hill the end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being clothed with trees and defended by skirmishers; it was essential to know whether a small or a large force thus barred the way, but all who endeavoured to ascertain the fact were stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last captain William Light, distinguished by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman, and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward as if he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but in the wood dropt his reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy's light troops, and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill where there were no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit above galloped along the French main line, counting their regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged; but he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed in front, and reaching the spot where Wellington stood told him there were but five battalions on the hill.

Soult now felt that a rapid retreat on Toulouse by St. Gaudens was inevitable: yet being determined to dispute every position which offered the least advantage, his army was on the morning of the 20th again in line of battle on the heights of Oleac, two or three miles behind Tarbes and covering Tournay on the road to St. Gaudens—he however still held Tarbes with Clausel's corps, which was extended on the right towards Trie, as if to retain a power of retreat by that road to Toulouse. The plain of Tarbes, apparently open, was full of deep ditches which forbad the action of horsemen. wherefore

he sent his brother with five regiments of cavalry to the Trie road, with orders to cover the right flank and observe the route to Auch. He feared lest Wellington should intercept his retreat by that line, but at daybreak the allies' right wing under Hill advanced by the high road, while the left under Wellington moved by the road from Rabastens. Vivian's cavalry followed from Beaumarchez and La Deveze, sending detachments to watch Pierre Soult on the side of Trie, and Cole was bringing the fourth division up by forced marches.

*Combat of Tarbes.*—The Adour separated Hill from Wellington, and the latter approaching Tarbes made the light division and hussars fall on Harispe's centre, which occupied the heights of Orliex with two guns looking down the Rabastens road. Under cover of this attack Clinton made a flank movement to his left through the village of Dours, cannonaded Harispe's right; and endeavoured to get between him and Soult's main position at Oleac, while Hill, moving by the other bank of the Adour, assailed the town and bridge of Tarbes, which was defended by Villatte's division. These operations were designed to crush Clausel's two divisions, which seemed easy, because there appeared only a fine plain between him and Soult; the latter however, having sent his baggage and encumbrances off during the night, saw the movement without alarm, being better acquainted with the nature of the plain and having made roads to facilitate a retreat upon the second position without passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless Clausel was in some danger, for while Hill menaced his left at Tarbes, the light division supported with cavalry and guns fell upon his centre at Orliex; and Clinton passing with a brisk cannonade through Oleat and Boulin, penetrated between Harispe and Pierre Soult and cut the latter off from the army.

About twelve o'clock the fight began, Hill's artillery thundered on the right, Clinton's answered it on the left, and Alten threw the light division in mass upon the centre. Harispe's left brigade posted on a strong hill was suddenly assailed by the three rifle battalions, and the fight was wonderfully fierce and violent; for the French, probably thinking their oppo-

Plan 2,  
page 152.



nents Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged with great hardiness; and being encountered by men not accustomed to yield, they fought muzzle to muzzle, and it was difficult to judge at first who would win. At last the French gave way, and Harispe's centre being thus suddenly overthrown he retired rapidly through the fields, by the ways previously opened, before Clinton could get into his rear; Hill soon forced the passage of the Adour at Tarbes, then Villatte retreated along the high road to Tournay, under a continued cannonade, and then the flat country was covered with confused masses of pursuers and pursued, all moving precipitately with an eager musketry. The French guns replied as they could to the allies' artillery but the situation of the retiring troops seemed desperate; yet, as Soult had foreseen, the deep ditches, enclosures, the small copses villages and farm-houses prevented the British cavalry from acting. Clausel therefore, extricating his troops with great ability from their dangerous situation, finally gained the main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle and immediately opened all their batteries on the allies; the pursuit was thus checked, and before Wellington could organize a new attack darkness came on: he halted on the banks of the Larret and Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown, that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and twenty, twelve officers and eighty men being of the rifle battalions.

Official Report, MSS.	During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on different hills as points of direction. Next day he reached St. Gaudens with
Clausel's Orders, MSS.	D'Erlon's and Reille's corps, while Clausel, who had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejean and was there rejoined by Pierre

Soult's cavalry. This march of thirty miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner. For Soult had seen Wellington's infantry, his five thousand horsemen, and knew the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry were pointing towards Mielan on his right; hence he had to fear the allies would by Trie and Castlenau gain the plains of

Muret and cut him off from Toulouse, the knot of his future combinations, the only position where he could hope to make a successful stand.

The allies pursued in three columns by St. Gaudens, Galan, and Trie, but their marches were short. On the 21st Beresford having the left column was at Castlenau; Hill in the vicinity of Lannemezan; Wellington at Tournay. The 22nd Beresford was at Castlenau, Wellington at Galan, Hill at Monrejean. Fane's horsemen pushed forwards to St. Gaudens, where four squadrons of French cavalry were drawn up in front of the town, but overthrown by two squadrons of the thirteenth dragoons at one shock, they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens; they rallied on the other side yet were again broken and pursued for two miles, many being sabred and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the veteran major Dogherty of the thirteenth was seen charging between his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.

On the 23rd Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puy-mauren, Wellington at Boulogne. The 24th Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at Isle en Dodon. The 25th Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, and Wellington was at Samatan. The 26th Beresford entered St. Lys and marching in order of battle by his left, while his cavalry skirmished on the right, took post on the Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream facing the French army, which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march what Soult had done in four.

This tardiness, idly characterized by French military writers as the sign of timidity and indecision of character, has been by English writers excused on the score of wet weather and the encumbrance of a large train of artillery and pontoons; but the rain equally affected the French; and the pontoons might have been as usefully waited for on the Garonne after the French army had been pressed in its retreat of ninety miles. It is more probable that, not exactly informed of Soult's numbers, nor of his true line of retreat, nor perfectly acquainted with the country, Wellington was cautious; because being then in acrimonious dispute with the duke of Angoulême he was also uneasy as to the state of the country behind him and

on his flanks. The partisans were beginning to stir, the reinforcements from England and Portugal were stopped, admiral Penrose had not then entered the Garonne; on the other hand Ferdinand had entered Spain and formed his engagement with Suchet about the garrisons. In fine, he found himself with forty-five thousand men of different nations, the Spaniards almost as dangerous as useful to him, opposed to an obstinate enemy, on a line of operations running a hundred and fifty miles along the French frontier. His right flank might be vexed by partisans in the Pyrenees, his left by those behind the Garonne, on the right bank of which a considerable regular force was also collecting; the generals commanding the military districts beyond Toulouse were forming corps of volunteers, national guards, and old soldiers of the regular *dépôts*—and ever he expected Suchet to arrive on his front and overmatch him in numbers. He was careful therefore to keep his troops well in hand, sparing them fatigue that the hospitals might not increase. In battle their bravery would bring him through any crisis, but if he wore them down by forced marches and covered the country with small posts and hospital stations, the French people would be tempted to rise against him: so little therefore was his caution allied to timidity that it was no slight indication of daring to have advanced at all. It does however seem that with his strong cavalry and superior artillery he should not have let the French so entirely slip from his hands.

Soult proved himself an able commander. His halting on the Adour, his success in reviving the courage of his army, and the front he showed to prevent his adversary detaching troops against Bordeaux, evinced an unyielding temper and a ready judgment. For though Wellington did send Beresford against Bordeaux, it was not on military grounds but because treason was there; and it compelled him to remain for fifteen days passive in face of an army he had just defeated. In that time his adversary restored the discipline and courage of his troops, rallied the dispersed conscripts, prepared a partisan warfare, sent his encumbrances to Toulouse, and began fortifying that city as a final and secure retreat. Soult was even the first to retake the offensive after Orthes, too late

indeed, and he struck no important blow, but twice placed his army in dangerous situations; yet his delay was a matter of necessity arising from the loss of his magazines; and if he got into difficulties that were inseparable from his operations, he soon extricated himself again. That he gained no advantages in fight is rather argument for Wellington than against Soult; the latter sought but found no opportunity to strike; yet he insulted the allied army with an inferior force, which, coupled with his energetic proclamation, encouraged the Napoleonists and alarmed the Bourbonists: lastly, his retreat from Tarbes gained two days for establishing his grand position at Toulouse. And certainly he deceived his adversary: for so little did Wellington expect him to make a determined stand there that in a letter written on the 26th to Hope, he says, 'I fear the Garonne is too full and large for our bridge, if not we shall be in Toulouse I hope immediately.'

Soult cannot however be judged by merely considering his movements in the field. Having early proved the power of his adversary, he had never deceived himself about the ultimate course of the campaign, and therefore struggled without hope, a hard task; yet he showed no faintness, fighting continually, and always for delay, as thinking Suchet would finally discard personal feelings to strike for his country. Previous disappointments did not hinder his writing again on the 9th of February, urging the imminent danger, the certainty that the allies' greatest efforts would be on the western frontier, and praying him to abandon Catalonia and come to Besançon: in the same strain he wrote to the minister of war, and his letters reached their destinations on the 13th. Suchet, having no orders to the contrary, could therefore have joined him with thirteen thousand men before the battle of Orthes; but giving a deceptive statement of his force in reply he coldly observed, that if he marched anywhere it would be to join the emperor, not the duke of Dalmatia. The latter continued notwithstanding to inform him of all his battles and his movements, and his accumulating distresses, yet in vain; Suchet's apathy would be incredible but for the unequivocal proofs of it furnished in the work of the French engineer Choumara.




## CHAPTER V.

THE two armies being now once more in presence, with resolution to fight, it is fitting to show upon what the generals' combinations rested. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country, and chose Toulouse as a strategic post because that ancient capital contained fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. Here he could easily feed his troops, arm and discipline the conscripts, control and urge the civil authorities, counteract the discontented. At Toulouse also he was master of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassone, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could take a new position behind the Tarn and prolong the contest by defending successively that river and the Lot. He could from thence retreat upon Decaen's army of the Gironde, and thus draw the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank; well assured that Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces, as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.

His first care was to place a considerable body of troops, collected from the dépôts and other parts of the interior at Montauban, under the command of general Loverdo, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that river, and a strong point of retreat and assembly for all the detachments sent to observe the Garonne below Toulouse, were thus secured; and withal the command of many great roads leading to the interior of France, consequently the power of making fresh combinations. To maintain Toulouse was however a great political object. It was the last point which connected him at once with Suchet and Decaen; and





while he held it, the latter general and the partisans in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against the long lines of communications maintained by Wellington with Bordeaux and Bayonne. Suchet also could do the same by marching with his whole force, or sending a detachment through the Arriege department to the upper Garonne, where general Lafitte having seven or eight hundred men, national guards and other troops, was already in activity. These operations Soult urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated the proposition, as he had done all those before made from the same quarter, with contempt.

Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle. The Garonne on the west presented to the allies a deep loop, at the bottom of which was the bridge, completely covered by the suburb of St. Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers: these defences Soult had improved and added a line of exterior entrenchments. Beyond the bridge was the city, surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to admit sixteen and twenty-four pound guns. The great and celebrated canal of Languedoc, which joined the river Garonne a few miles below the town, wound for the most part within point-blank shot of the walls, covering them on the north and east as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west; and the suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie, between which the canal run, furnished outworks on the east; for they were entrenched and connected with the fortified hills of Sacarin and Cambon, which covered the suburbs and flanked the approaches to the canal above and below.

Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong ridge, called the Mont Rave, run parallel with the canal, its outer slope, exceedingly rugged, overlooked a marshy plain through which the Ers river flowed.

On the south the town opened on a plain, but the suburb of St. Michel lying there, between the Garonne and the canal, furnished another advanced defence; and at some distance beyond the heights called the Pech David commenced, trending up the Garonne.

In this position Soult calculated, that as Wellington could



not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse; and leave a sufficient force to blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having the French army issue on that side against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross that river also, which could not be effected nearer than Cintegabelle, one march higher up; then he must come down by the right of the Arriege, an operation not to be feared in a country which the recent rains had rendered impracticable for guns. If he passed the Garonne below the confluence of the Arriege, Soult could from the Pech David and its continuation, overlook the movement, and would be in position to fall upon the head of the column while passing the river. If he failed in that he had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont Rave to retire upon, where he could fight again, his retreat being secure upon Montauban. For these reasons the passage of the Garonne above Toulouse would lead to no decisive result and he did not fear it; but a passage below the city was a different matter. Wellington could then cut him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and eastern quarters; and if the French lost the battle they must retreat by Carcassonne to form a junction with Suchet in Roussillon; where having their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and France they could not exist. Soult therefore lined the left of the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, and called up his troops from Agen in the view of confining the allies to the space between the Tarn and the Garonne: for his first design was to attack them there rather than lose his communication with Montauban.

Wellington having suffered the French army to gain three days' march in the retreat from Tarbes, had now little choice of operations. He could not halt until the Spaniards should join him from the Bastan, without giving Soult time to strengthen himself and organize his plan of defence; nor without appearing fearful and weak in the eyes of the French people, which would have been most dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the

offensive and could not resume the defensive with safety, the invasion of France once begun it was imperative to push it to a conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers his business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible; and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse.

In a strategic view the passage should be below the town, but, seeing the south side was the most open to attack, the English general resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse; designing to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St.

Notes by the  
Duke of  
Wellington,  
MSS.

Cyprien. With this object, at eight o'clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill's brigades marched up from Muret, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced, the remainder of that general's troops being to pass at midnight. But when the river was measured the width was found too great for the pontoons, and there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed some considerable advantage would probably have been gained; for Soult did not know of the attempt until two days later and then only by his emissaries, not by his scouts.

Wellington, changing his project, drove the enemy from the Touch river the 28th, collected the infantry of his left and centre about Portet and masked the movement with his cavalry. In this operation a squadron of the eighteenth hussars, under major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by Vivian across the bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came upon a whole regiment of French cavalry, and the rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British; for the enemy, thinking a strong support must be at hand, discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the speed of both sides increased, and as the nature of the road did not admit of any egress to the sides, this great body of French horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under

Colonel  
Hughes,  
MSS.

the batteries of St. Cyprien. During these movements Hill's troops were withdrawn to St. Roques, and in the night of the 30th, a new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, he passed the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, Morillo's Spaniards, Gardiner's and Maxwell's artillery, and Fane's cavalry, in all thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition by the great road, having orders to seize the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, fifteen miles up the Arriege, and secure a ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the troops followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege river hastily at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south while Wellington assailed St. Cyprien.

This march was to have been made privily in the night, but the bridge, though ordered for the evening of the 30th, was not finished until five o'clock in the morning of the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the enterprise in time to observe from the heights the strength of the column, and ascertain that the bulk of the army remained in front of St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the country on the right of the Arriege was known to him; and the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in a state to resist a partial attack he thought this a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne passed below

Official Cor-  
respondence,  
MSS.

the city. In this persuasion he kept his infantry in hand, and sent his cavalry up the right bank of the Arriege to observe the march of the allies;

but he directed Lafitte, who had collected some regular horsemen and the national guards of the department, to hang upon their skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet's army. He was however disquieted, because the allies' baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had been sent up the Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being seen by his scouts, was reported to be a second column increasing Hill's force to eighteen thousand men.

In this uncertainty he heard of the measurement of the river made at Portet on the night of the 27th, and that many guns were still collected there; wherefore, being ignorant of

the cause why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a design to cross there also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger, he put four divisions under Clausel, with orders to fall upon the head of the allies if they attempted the passage before Hill came down; resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont Rave, because the positions on the right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was soon relieved from anxiety. Hill effected the passage of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry towards Villefranche and Nailloux; but his artillery were quite unable to move in the deep country there; and as success and safety alike depended on rapidity he returned during the night to Pinsaguel, recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons left only a flying-bridge with a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank. He was followed by Lafitte's horsemen who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult remained well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important days.

He was now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, yet he relinquished the design of marching down the Garonne to fight between that river and the Tarn; because he would then lose his communications with Montauban, and having now fortified the bridges over the canal and completed his works of defence for Toulouse and its suburbs, concluded not to abandon that city under any circumstances. In this resolution he set his whole army and all the working population to entrench the Mont Rave also, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let it come on which side it would. Meanwhile as the Garonne continued full, Wellington was forced to remain inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the 3rd, when the waters fell. Then the pontoons being carried in the night to Grenade fifteen miles below Toulouse, the bridge was thrown there and thirty guns were placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The third, fourth, and sixth divisions and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, immediately passed, and the cavalry being pushed out two leagues on the front and flanks captured a large herd



of bullocks destined for the French army. But now the river again swelled so fast, that the light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got damaged and the pontoons were taken up. This passage was made known to Soult immediately by his cavalry scouts, yet he knew not the exact force which had crossed; and as Morillo's Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre's, had relieved the outposts in front of St. Cyprien, he imagined Hill also had moved to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the Garonne. In this error, merely observing Beresford with his cavalry, he continued to strengthen his field of battle about Toulouse; his resolution to keep that city being confirmed by hearing on the 7th that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.

On the 8th the waters subsided, the bridge was again laid down, Freyre's Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery crossed, and Wellington in person advanced to the heights of Fenoulhiet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of the Ers his columns were separated by that river, which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure as soon as possible one of the stone bridges; hence when his left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, Vivian's horsemen drove Berton's cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended towards that of Croix d'Orade. The latter was defended by Vial's dragoons, and after some skirmishing the eighteenth was suddenly menaced by a regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite bank of the river being lined with dismounted carbineers; the two parties stood facing each other hesitatingly until the approach of some British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge at the same moment; but the English horses were so quick the French were in an instant jammed up on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and the rear went off in disorder, leaving many killed and wounded and a hundred prisoners behind. They were pursued through the village of Croix d'Orade, yet rallied beyond it on the rest of their brigade and advanced again; the hussars then re-crossed the bridge, which was now defended by the British infantry, whose fire

stopped the French cavalry. The credit of this brilliant action which secured the communication of the separated columns was incorrectly given to Vivian in the despatch; that officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge, which was conceived and executed by major Hughes of the eighteenth.

Wellington from the heights of Kirie Eleison carefully examined the French position and resolved to attack on the 9th. He shortened his communications with Hill, he directed the pontoons to be removed from Grenade and relaid higher up at Seilh, where the light division was to cross at daylight; but the bridge was not formed until late in the day, to his great discontent, as it forced him to defer his battle until the 10th. Soult's combinations were now crowned with success. He had by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained seventeen days for preparation, had brought the allies to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted for defence, well fortified, and where one-third of their force was separated by a great river from the rest—they could derive no advantage from their numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in artillery notwithstanding their previous superiority in that arm.

His position covered three sides of Toulouse. Defending St. Cyprien on the west with his left, he guarded the canal on the north with his centre, and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east; his conscript reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards, while maintaining tranquillity, aided to transport the artillery and ammunition to different posts. His left, well fortified at St. Cyprien, had short and direct communication with the centre by the great bridge of Toulouse; but Hill who remained in front of the former could only communicate with Wellington by the pontoon-bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve miles.

The allies advanced from the north, yet with intent to

assail on the south as weakest of defence; and the country left of the Ers had been carefully examined, in the view of making, under cover of that river, a flank march round the eastern front to gain the open ground which had formerly been aimed at by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again the deep country impeded the march, and the Ers could not be passed in force because all the bridges with the exception of that at Croix d'Orade were mined or destroyed by Soult, and the pontoons were on the Garonne. There was then no choice save to attack from the north and east. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence, because the canal, the bridges being protected by works, was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse and for the most part within musket-shot; here then, as at St. Cyprien, a fortress not a position was opposed, and the field of battle was necessarily confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.

This ridge, naturally strong and rugged and covered by the Ers river, which was not fordable, presented two distinct platforms, called the Calvinet and St. Sypiere. On the latter the extreme right of the French was posted, and between them, where the ground dipped a little, two roads led from Lavaur and Caraman to Toulouse, passing the canal behind the ridge at the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne.

The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme left with a species of horn-work, consisting of several open retrenchments and small works supported by two large redoubts, one of which flanked the approaches to the canal on the north: a range of abbatis was also formed there by felling the trees on the Alby road. Continuing this line to the right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet and the Colombette redoubts, terminated the works on this platform. On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. Sypiere, the other without a name nearer to road of Caraman.

The whole occupation was about two miles long, and an army attacking in front would have to cross the Ers under fire, to advance through ground, steep marshy and rendered almost impassable by means of artificial inundations, to the

assault of the ridge and the works on the summit; and if the assailants should force between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come upon the works of Cambon and Saccarin. If these fell, the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of the town would still have to be carried in succession. But it was not practicable to pass the Ers except by the bridge of Croix d'Orade, which had been seized so happily on the 8th; Wellington was therefore reduced to make a flank march under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and then to force the latter, with a view of crossing the canal above the suburb of Guillemerie and establishing his army on the south side of Toulouse, where only the city could be assailed with any hope of success.

Notes by the  
Duke of  
Wellington,  
MSS.

To impose this march upon him all Soult's dispositions had been directed. For this he had mined all the bridges on the Ers, save only that of Croix d'Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the Ers and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond that river by sending half his cavalry over to dispute the numerous streams on the right bank. His army was disposed in the following order. Reille defended the suburb of St. Cyprien with Taupin's and Maransin's divisions. Daricau lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to the road of Alby; defending with his left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge with his right. Harispe was posted in the works on the Mont Rave; his right was at St. Sypiere looking towards the bridge of Bordes; his centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which Vial's horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby towards the bridge of Croix d'Orade. On that side a detached eminence within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was occupied by St. Pol's brigade, drawn from Villatte's division; the two remaining divisions of infantry were formed in columns at certain points behind the Mont Rave, and Travot's reserve manned the walls of Toulouse. This line of battle presented an angle towards the Croix d'Orade, each side about two miles in length and the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.



Wellington having examined the ground on the 8th and 9th made the following disposition of attack for the 10th. Hill to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to draw the enemy's attention according to the progress of the battle on the right of the Garonne, which he could easily discern. The third and light divisions and Freyre's Spaniards, already on the left of the Ers, were to advance against the northern front of Toulouse; the two first supported by Bock's German cavalry to make demonstrations against the canal defended by Daricau. That is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux and the convent of the Minimes while Alten maintained the communication between him and Freyre, who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover Beresford's column on march. This last, composed of the fourth and sixth divisions with three batteries, was, after passing the bridge of Croix d'Orade, to move round the left of the Pugade and along the low ground between the French heights and the Ers until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur, when the two divisions were to wheel into line and attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was then to assail Calvinet, and Ponsonby's dragoons were to connect his left with Beresford. Lord Edward Somerset's hussars were to move up the left of the Ers, while Vivian's cavalry moved up the right of that river; both destined to observe Berton's cavalry, which having possession of the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran, higher up, could pass from the right bank to the left, destroy the bridge, and fall upon Beresford while in march.

#### BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

[Plan 2, page 153]

On the 10th of April at two o'clock in the morning the light division passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and at six o'clock the whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced posts behind the works of the bridges on the canal. Freyre, marching along the Alby road, was cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns until he passed a small stream by the help of some temporary bridges,

when the French general following his instructions retired to the horn-work on Calvinet. Freyre was thus established on the Pugade, from whence major Arentschild's Portuguese guns opened a heavy cannonade. Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d'Orade in three columns abreast; passing behind the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, he entered the marshy ground between the Ers river and Mont Rave, but left his artillery at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and difficult country under the fire of the enemy. Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian's cavalry, now under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton's horsemen with loss over the bridge of Bordes, which the French destroyed with difficulty at the last moment. However the hussars gained the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded and defended by a detachment of cavalry sent there by Berton, who remained himself in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.

General  
Berton,  
MSS.

Colonel  
Hughes,  
MSS.

While these operations were in progress, Freyre who had asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, either from error or impatience assailed the horn-work on that platform while Beresford was still in march. His Spaniards, nine thousand strong, advanced with great resolution at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill, and though the French musketry and great guns thinned the ranks at every step they still ascended the hill; but the formidable fire they were exposed to increased in violence; and their right wing, which was raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment, wavered, and the leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep in parts, which covered this front of the French entrenchments. The left wing and the second line run back in disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers under colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining their ground under cover of a bank which sheltered them. Then the French came leaping out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulph below; while the battery from Matabiau, constructed to rake this

hollow, sent its bullets from flank to flank hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.

Rallying their fugitive troops, the Spanish generals led them back again to the brink of the fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage below, and the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror. Again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches pursued, while several battalions sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from behind the Calvint followed hard along the road of Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives whose headlong flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers whose numbers and vehemence increased, until Wellington covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby's cavalry and the reserve artillery, which opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, also menaced the flank of the victorious French who retired to their entrenchments on Calvint: but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded and their defeat was not the only misfortune.

Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such occasions being known, were given to him verbally and in writing, had turned his false attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux; but the enemy, fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders and approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly four hundred men and officers: amongst the latter colonel Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and general Brisbane who commanded the brigade was wounded. Thus from the hill of the Pugade to the Garonne the French had completely vindicated their position; the allies had suffered enormously; and beyond the Garonne, although Hill had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering St. Cyprien and was menacing the second line, the latter, more contracted and very strongly fortified, could not be stormed. The musketry battle therefore subsided for a time, yet a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line, and on the allies' side from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on

the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the Calvinet; injudiciously however, because the ammunition thus used for a secondary object was afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might have been gained.

It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford, and yet from Picton's error Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry only remained in hand, and these troops were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards and protect the artillery. The crisis therefore approached with all happy promise to the French general. For the repulse of Picton, the dispersion of the Spaniards, the strength of the second line at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first Taupin's whole division, and then one of Maransin's brigades from that quarter to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three divisions and his cavalry, nearly fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement, without in any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way for two miles through a deep marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses. Sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musketry, always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented so much at every step, from the difficulty of the way, that frequent halts were necessary to close up the ranks.

Morning  
States,  
MSS.

Between the river and the heights the miry ground became narrower and deeper as the troops advanced, Berton's cavalry was ahead, an impassable river was on the left, three French divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right flank! But Fortune rules in war! Soult, always eyeing their march, had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin's division to St. Sypiere, and supporting it with a brigade of D'Armagnac's division disposed the whole about the redoubts; from thence after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury,



at the same time directing a regiment of Vial's cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavaur road and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton's horsemen assailed the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. This was not half of the force which he might have employed, and Taupin's artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets of Toulouse: that general also, instead of attacking at once took ground to his right, giving Beresford full time to complete his flank march and wheel into lines at the foot of the heights.

Taupin's infantry, unskilfully arranged for action it is said, at last poured down the hill; but some rockets discharged in good time ravaged the ranks, and with their noise and terrible appearance, unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers; then the British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire; and Lambert's brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson's and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack, Lambert's brigade rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French fled back to the upper ground. Vial's horsemen, trotting down the Lavaur road, now charged on the right flank, but the seventy-ninth regiment being thrown into square repulsed them; and on the other flank Cole had been so sudden in his advance up the heights that Berton's cavalry had no opportunity to charge. Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit on the reverse slope. And at the St. Sypiere redoubt a French regiment, seeing its commanding officer killed by a soldier of the sixty-first regiment, fled in a panic. Cole then established himself on the summit, and so great was the rout that the two forts were abandoned, and the French sought shelter at Sacarin and Cambon.

Soult, astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing his success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal. Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with the remainder of Vial's cavalry, he hastily led

D'Armagnac's reserve brigade to the works of Sacarin, and thus checking the foremost British skirmishers rallied the fugitives; Taupin's guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being stayed, a part of Travot's reserve moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized; yet the indomitable courage of the British soldiers had decided the first great crisis of the fight.

Lambert's brigade now wheeled to its right across the platform on the line of the Lavour road, menacing the flank of the French on the Calvinet, while Pack's Scotch brigade and Douglas's Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed on the right with a view to march against the Colombette redoubts on the original front of the enemy. And now also the eighteenth and German hussars, having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the south end of the Mont Rave, where, in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division, they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from whence and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin the enemy's guns played incessantly. The aspect and form of the battle were thus changed, and the French were thrown entirely on the defensive, occupying three sides of a square; their right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the redoubts of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypiere, while the redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French left, thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau awaited a renewed attack by the Spaniards and the position was strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on each side; the angles were defended by formidable works, the canal and city walls and entrenched suburbs offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, and the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured retreat.

In this contracted space were concentrated Vial's cavalry, the whole of Villatte's division, one brigade of Maransin's, another of D'Armagnac's; and, with exception of the regiment driven from the St. Sypiere redoubt, the whole of Harispe's division. On the allies' side therefore defeat had been staved

off, but victory was still to be contended for; and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton, successfully opposed by Daricau, was paralysed; the Spaniards rallying slowly were not to be depended upon for another attack; there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light division, which Wellington dared not thrust into action under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made on the left, and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert and Cole had to keep in check the French at the bridge of the Demoiselles, at Cambon and Sacarin. This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot's reserve, half of D'Armagnac's division, and all Taupin's, together with Harispe's regiment which had abandoned the fort of St. Sypiere—was under Clausel, and he disposed the greater part in advance of the entrenchments as if to retake the offensive.

Such was the state of affairs about half-past two o'clock, when Beresford renewed the action with Pack's Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the sixth division under Douglas. These troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavaur road on Lambert's right, had been hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works; and now scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their left by wings of regiments as they could get out. Ascending the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musketry they carried all the French breast-works, and the forty-second and seventy-ninth took the Colombette and Calvinet redoubts; it was a surprising action when the loose disorderly nature of the attack imposed by the difficulty of the ground is considered; but the French, although they yielded at first to the thronging rush of the British troops, soon rallied and came back with a reflux; their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. Harispe, who commanded in person at this part, and under him the French seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude, recovered the Calvinet by storm, with great slaughter of the forty-second, which fell back in disorder on the seventy-ninth forcing that regiment to abandon the Colombette also.

Still the whole clung to the brow of the hill with wonderful obstinacy, though they were reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some British horsemen now rode up from the low ground to their aid, but were stopped by a hollow road, and some of the foremost tumbling in, perished. The French had then the best of the fight; but when two fresh British regiments, the eleventh and ninety-first, came up, when two generals, Harispe and Burot, had been carried off dangerously wounded, the battle turned, and the French abandoned the platform, falling back on their right to Sacarin, and on their left towards Matabiau and the houses on the canal.

It was now four o'clock, the Spaniards had once more partially attacked, and were again put to flight, and the French remained masters of their entrenchments in that quarter; for the sixth division had been hardly handled, and Beresford halted to reform his order of battle and receive his artillery: it came to him indeed about this time; yet with great difficulty and with little ammunition, in consequence of the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished from Montblanc. However Soult, seeing the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time, that Picton still menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit, deemed farther resistance useless; he relinquished the northern end of the Calvint platform also, and about five o'clock withdrew his whole army behind the canal, still holding Sacarin and Cambon: Wellington then established the Spaniards in the abandoned works, and so became master of the Mont Rave in all its extent. The French had five generals and perhaps three thousand men killed or wounded, and they lost one piece of artillery. The allies lost four generals and four thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men and officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards. A lamentable spilling of blood, and a useless, for before this period Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France and a provisional government was constituted at Paris.

During the night Soult, defeated but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended in the action, re-organized and augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and



made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Yet looking to the final necessity of a retreat he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the result of the contest, and proposed a combined plan of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his temper. 'March,' said he, 'with the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne, I will meet you there with my army; we can then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the upper Garonne, and, holding on by the mountains, compel the enemy to recal his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city and make a diversion in our favour.'

On the morning of the 11th he was again ready to fight, but the English general was not. The French position, within musket-shot of the walls was still inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles, and other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon; for Wellington still meant to throw his army as originally designed to the south of the town: but that was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, and a fresh supply of ammunition, only to be obtained from the parc on the other side of the Garonne. Wherefore, to accelerate the preparations, ascertain Hill's state, and give that general farther instructions, Wellington repaired on the 11th to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications by removing the pontoon-bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition arrived and the final arrangements for the passage of the canal could be completed. The attack was therefore deferred until daylight on the 12th.

Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet and menace Soult's retreat by the road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together with the preparations in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay if he would not be shut up in Toulouse; wherefore, having terminated all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals, the gallant Harispe being one, and sixteen hundred men whose wounds

were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; then filing out of the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the upper Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same day Hill's troops were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the French with the loss of twenty-five men, and cut off a like number of gens-d'armes on the side of Revel.

Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon colours; but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had retired with the French army. The British general, true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk. But in the afternoon two officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris, charged to make known to the armies the abdication of Napoleon. They had been detained near Blois by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the empress Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence: nor did their arrival immediately put an end to the war. When St. Simon in pursuance of his mission reached Soult's quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers of the emperor; then sending all his encumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnau-dary and awaited the progress of events. Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, and as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban had acknowledged the authority of the provisional government and readily concluded an armistice, he judged Soult designed to make a civil war and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were on the point of engaging, when the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official information from the chief of the emperor's staff, notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France,—and with this honourable distinction that he had


faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch until the very last moment.

A convention which included Suchet's army was immediately agreed upon; but that marshal had previously adopted the white colours of his own motion, and Wellington instantly transmitted the intelligence to Clinton in Catalonia and to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both and useless battles were fought; that at Barcelonne has been already described, but at Bayonne misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of the British army.

#### SALLY FROM BAYONNE.

During the progress of the main army in the interior, Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne with the unremitting vigilance and activity which the operation required. He had gathered stores of gabions and fascines and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him; yet indirectly, and without any official character to warrant a formal communication to the garrison without Wellington's authority. These rumours were however made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled the vigilance of the besiegers; but to such irregular communications, which might be intended to deceive, the governor naturally paid little attention.

The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division; from thence to the extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also one company in St. Etienne itself. Hinuber's German brigade was encamped as a support to the left, the remainder of the first division was encamped in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state, about one o'clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter coming over to general Hay who commanded the outposts that night, gave an exact account of the projected sally; the general, unable to speak French, sent him to Hinuber, who immediately interpreted the man's story to Hay, assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to Hope. It would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man's story, took no additional pre-

cautions: and it is probable that neither the German brigade nor the reserves of the guards would have been put under arms but for the activity of Hinuber. However at three o'clock the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three thousand combatants; they surprised the piquets, and with loud shouts breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with one rush the church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne, with exception of a fortified house which was defended by captain Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment. Masters of every other part and overthrowing all who stood before them they drove the piquets and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed General Hay, took colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the whole line into confusion. Then Hinuber, having his Germans well in hand moved up  the side of St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of Bradford's Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and regained the village and church.

On the right the combat was at first even more disastrous than in the centre, neither the piquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the assault, and the battle was most confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the enclosures and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes friends encountered, sometimes foes: all was tumult and horror. The guns of the citadel, vaguely guided by the flashes of the musketry, sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of fight; and the gun-boats, dropping down the river, opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion by Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were in full play at once, and the shells having set fire to the fascine dépôts and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the striving masses.

Amidst this confusion Hope suddenly disappeared, none



knew how or wherefore at the time; but it afterwards appeared, that having brought up the reserves on the right to stem the torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led close behind the line of piquets, one of which had been improperly withdrawn by an officer of the guards, and the French thus lined both banks. A shot struck him in the arm, and his horse, a large one, as was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, received eight bullets and fell upon his leg; his followers had by this time escaped from the defile; yet two of them, captain Herries and Mr. Moore, a nephew of sir John Moore, seeing his helpless state turned back, and endeavoured amidst the heavy fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the horse. While thus engaged they were both struck down with dangerous wounds, the French carried them all off, and Hope was again severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel.

Day now broke and the allies were enabled to act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, being properly disposed by Howard, who had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a loud shout and running in upon the French drove them back into the works with such slaughter that their own writers admit a loss of one general and more than nine hundred men: on the British side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. More than two hundred were taken, besides the commander-in-chief; and it is generally acknowledged that Forster's firm defence of the fortified house first, and next the readiness and gallantry with which Hinuber retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a very terrible disaster.

A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult became known and hostilities ceased.

All the French troops in the south were now re-organized in one body under the command of Suchet; but they were so little inclined to acquiesce in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for the duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general Kennedy for a sum of money to quiet them. The Portuguese returned to Portugal. The

Spaniards to Spain: the generals being it is said inclined at first to declare for the Cortes against the king, but they were diverted from their purpose by the influence and authority of lord Wellington. The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England, and the cavalry marching through France took shipping at Boulogne.

Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veteran's services.

## CHAPTER VI.

## GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

SOULT and Thouvenot have been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of Napoleon's abdication. This charge, circulated originally by the Bourbon party, is utterly unfounded. The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce Hope to make a formal communication; and the governor could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defence by retarding his counter-operations while the works for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely, nay impossible, must it not have appeared, that the emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Mont-Mirail and Champaubert were known before the close investment of Bayonne, should have been deprived of his crown in the space of a few weeks, and the stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts without any relaxation in the preparations for the siege.

As false and unsubstantial is the charge against Soult.

The acute remark of an English military writer, that if the duke of Dalmatia had known of the peace before he fought, he would certainly have announced it after the battle, were it only to maintain himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable: but there are direct proofs of the falsehood of the accusation. How was the intelligence to reach him? It was not until the 7th that the provisional government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer could not have reached Toulouse under three days even by the most direct way, which was through Montauban. Now the allies were in possession of that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French army was actually invested. The intelli-

gence from Paris must therefore have reached the allies first, as in fact it did, and it was not Soult it was Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge would therefore bear more against the English general, who would yet have been the most insane as well as the wickedest of men to have risked his army and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles seemed to deny success. He also was the person of all others called upon, by honour, gratitude, justice and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter of his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the punishment of his inhuman adversary.

Did he ever by word or deed countenance the calumny?

Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English reform bill, repeated the accusation in the house of lords and reviled the minister for being on amicable political terms with a man capable of such a crime. The duke of Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically declared that marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know of the emperor's abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable distinction of sporting with men's lives by wholesale attaches to no general on the records of history save the Orange William, the murderer of Glencoe. And though Soult had known of the emperor's abdication he could not for that have been justly placed beside that cold-blooded prince; who fought at St. Denis with the peace of Nimeguen in his pocket, because *'he would not deny himself a safe lesson in his trade.'* The French marshal was at the head of a brave army, and it was impossible to know whether Napoleon had abdicated voluntarily or been constrained. The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other intriguers, forming a provisional government self-instituted and under the protection of foreign bayonets, demanded no respect from Soult. He had even the right of denying the emperor's legal power to abdicate. He had the right, if he thought himself strong enough, to declare, that he would not suffer the throne to become the plaything of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine it was a question of patriotism and of calculation, a national question which the general of an army had a right to decide



for himself, having reference always to the real will and desire of the people at large.

It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter even after the battle and when he had seen colonel St. Simon. Writing

to Talleyrand on the 22nd, he says, 'The circumstances which preceded my act of adhesion are so extraordinary as to create astonishment. The

7th the provisional government informed me of the events which had happened since the 1st of April. The 6th and 7th, count Dupont wrote to me on the same subject. On the 8th the duke of Feltre, in his quality of war minister, gave me notice, that having left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately forward to me another. The 9th the prince Berthier vice-constable and major-general, wrote to me from Fontainebleau, transmitting the copy of a convention and armistice which had been arranged at Paris with the allied powers; he demanded at the same time a state of the force and condition of my army; but neither the prince nor the duke of Feltre mentioned events, we had then only knowledge of a proclamation of the empress, dated the 3rd, *which forbade us to recognise anything coming from Paris.*

'The 10th I was attacked near Toulouse by the whole allied army under the orders of lord Wellington. This vigorous action, where the French army, the weakest by half, showed all its worth, cost the allies from eight to ten thousand men: lord Wellington might perhaps have dispensed with it. The 12th I received through the English the first hint of the events at Paris. I proposed an armistice, it was refused; I renewed the demand, it was again refused. At last I sent count Gazan to Toulouse, and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms was accepted and signed the 18th, the armies being then in presence of each other. The 19th I ratified this convention and gave my adhesion to the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject I ought to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension of arms before I manifested my sentiments, in order that my will and that of the army should be free. *That neither France nor posterity should have power to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To follow only the will of the nation was a homage I owed to my country.*'

In this letter, certain assertions, relative to the numbers of the contending armies and the loss of the allies, are at variance with the statements in this History; and this loose but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse force has been the ground-work for great exaggeration by some French writers; who strangely enough claim a victory for the French army although the French general himself made no such claim at the time, and so far as appears has not done so since.

*Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences.* By this test we shall know who won the battle of Toulouse. Now all persons, French and English, who have treated the subject, including the generals on both sides, are agreed, that Soult fortified Toulouse the canal and the Mont Rave as positions of battle; that he was attacked, that Taupin's division was beaten, that the Mont Rave with all its redoubts and entrenchments fell into the allies' power. Finally that the French abandoned Toulouse, leaving there three wounded generals, sixteen hundred men, several guns and a quantity of stores at the discretion of their adversaries: and this without any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any remarkable event affecting the operations happening elsewhere.

Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment of it forced or voluntary? Let Soult speak! 'I have entrenched the suburb of St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head; the enemy will not I think attack me there unless he desires to lose a part of his army. Two nights ago he made a demonstration of passing the Garonne two leagues above the city; but he will probably try to pass it below; in which case I will attack him whatever his force may be, because it is of the utmost importance to me not to be cut off from Montauban where I have made a bridge-head.'—'I think the enemy will not move on your side *unless I move that way first, and I am determined to avoid that as long as I can.*'—'If I could remain a month on the Garonne I should be able to put six or eight thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarrass me, and who want arms which I expect with great impatience from Perpignan.'—'I am resolved to deliver battle near Toulouse whatever

Soult to  
Suchet,  
29th March.

Soult to  
Suchet,  
7th April.

may be the superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified a *position*, which, *supported by the town and the canal*, furnishes me with a retrenched camp susceptible of defence.'—'I have received the unhappy news of the enemy's entrance into Paris; this misfortune strengthens my determination to defend Toulouse whatever may happen. The preservation of the place which contains establishments of all kinds is of the utmost importance to us; but if unhappily I am forced to quit it my movements will naturally bring me nearer to you. In that case you cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because the enemy will inevitably follow me.'—'The enemy appears astonished at the determination I have taken to defend Toulouse; four days ago he passed the Garonne and has done nothing since, perhaps the bad weather is the cause.'

From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved if possible not to fall back upon Suchet, and was determined even to fight for the preservation of his communications with Montauban; yet he finally resigned this important object for the more important one of defending Toulouse. And so intent upon its preservation was he, that having on the 25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery not of immediate utility to be sent away, he on the 2nd of April forbade further progress in that work and even had those things already

removed brought back: moreover he very clearly marks that to abandon the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the signs and consequences of defeat.

These points being fixed, we find him on the evening of the 10th writing again to Suchet thus:

'The battle which I announced to you took place to-day, the enemy has been horribly maltreated, yet he succeeded in *establishing himself upon a position which I occupied to the right of Toulouse*. The general of division Taupin has been killed, Harispe has lost his foot by a cannon-ball, and three generals of brigade are wounded. I am prepared to recommence to-morrow if the enemy attacks, but *I do not believe I can stay in Toulouse; it might even happen that I shall be forced to open a passage to get out.*'

On the 11th of April he writes again:

‘As I told you in my letter of yesterday I am in the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear being obliged to fight my way at Baziege whither the enemy is directing a column to cut my communications. To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche, because I have good hope that this obstacle will not prevent my passing.’

To the minister of war he writes on the 10th:

‘To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks me I will defend myself. I have great need to replenish my means before I put the army in march; yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be forced to abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I shall direct my movements so as to rally upon the troops of the duke of Albufera.’

Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits that all the events previously indicated by him as the consequences of defeat were fulfilled to the letter; that is to say, the loss of the position of battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and the march to join Suchet. On the other hand Wellington clearly obtained all that he sought. He desired to pass the Garonne and he did pass it; he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave and he did win them; he desired to enter Toulouse and he did enter it as a conqueror at the head of his troops.

Amongst the French writers who without denying these facts lay claim to a victory, Choumara is most deserving of notice. This gentleman, known as an able engineer, with a praiseworthy desire to render justice to the great capacity of Soult, shows very clearly that his genius would have shone in this campaign with far greater lustre if Suchet had adopted his plans and supported him in a cordial manner. But Mr. Choumara, heated by his subject, completes the picture with a crowning victory at Toulouse which the marshal himself appears not to recognise. The work is a very valuable historical document with respect to the disputes between Soult and Suchet; but with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains grave errors as to facts, and the inferences are untenable though the premises were admitted.

The substance of the argument is, that the position of Toulouse was of the nature of a fortress; that the canal



was the real position of battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of which weighed little in the balance; because the French army was victorious at Calvinet against the Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes against the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against Picton, at St. Cyprien against Hill. Finally that the French general certainly won the victory because he offered battle the next day and did not retreat from Toulouse until the following night.

Now admitting all these facts, the fortress was still taken.

But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For first Soult himself tells Suchet the Mont Rave was his *position of battle*, and that the town and canal only *supported it*. Nothing could be more accurate than this description; for when he lost the Mont Rave, the town and the canal enabled him to rally his army and take measures for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered the canal untenable: why else was Toulouse abandoned? That the line of the canal was a more formidable one to attack in front than the Mont Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it a position; it was not necessary to attack it, except partially at Sacarin and Cambon and the bridge of the Demoiselles; those points forced, the canal would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have helped to keep the French in Toulouse as it had before helped to keep the allies out. Wellington once established on the south side of the city and holding the Pech David could have removed the bridge from Seilh to Portet, above Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication with Hill; the French army must then have surrendered, or broken out, no easy matter in such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont Rave was therefore the position of battle, and also the key of the position behind the canal, and Mr. de Choumara is placed in a dilemma. He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess the main position was so badly chosen that a slight reverse at an outwork was sufficient to make the French army abandon it at every other point.

But were the French victorious at every other point? Against the Spaniards they were, and Picton also was repulsed. The order of movements for the battle

Appendix 4. proves indeed that this general's attack was in-

deed to be a false one; he disobeyed his orders however, and one of his brigades was repulsed; yet to check one brigade with a loss of three or four hundred men, is a small matter in a battle where more than eighty thousand combatants were engaged. The light division made a demonstration against the convent of the Minimes and nothing more.

Its loss on the whole day was only fifty-six men and officers; and no French veteran of the Peninsula but would laugh at the notion that a real attack by that matchless division could be so stopped.

Official  
Returns.

It is said the exterior line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien was only occupied with a view to offensive movements, and to prevent the allies from establishing batteries to rake the line of the canal from that side of the Garonne; whatever may have been the object Hill got possession of it and was so far victorious. He was ordered not to assail the second line seriously and he did not, for his whole loss scarcely exceeded eighty men and officers; his corps covered the parc and the communications, and it would have been folly to endanger them by a serious attack upon such strong works before the Mont Rave was carried.

From these undeniable facts, it is clear the French gained an advantage against Picton, and a marked success against the Spaniards; yet Beresford's attack was so decisive as to counterbalance these failures and even to put the defeated Spaniards in possession of the height they had originally contended for in vain.

Choumara attributes Beresford's success to Taupin's errors and to a vast superiority of numbers on the side of the allies. 'Fifty-three thousand infantry, more than eight thousand cavalry, and a reserve of eighteen thousand men of all arms, opposed to twenty-five thousand French infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a reserve of seven thousand conscripts three thousand of which were unarmed.' Such is the enormous disproportion assumed on the authority of general Vaudoncourt. The errors of Taupin may have been great, and his countrymen are the best judges of his demerit; but the numbers here assumed are most inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a later date than December, 1813;

Kock's  
Campaign  
of 1814.

yet an official table of the organization of Soult's army, published by a French military historian,

Kock, gives thirty-six thousand six hundred and thirty-five combatants on the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers, twenty-eight thousand six hundred were infantry, two thousand seven hundred cavalry, and five thousand seven hundred were artillerymen, engineers, miners, sappers, gens-d'armes, and military workmen. Nothing is said of the reserve division of conscripts commanded by Travot; but Vaudoncourt's table of the same army on the 1st of April, adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency. The conscripts are there set down seven thousand two hundred and sixty-seven; and this cipher being added to Kock's gives a total of forty-three thousand nine hundred fighting men. The loss in combats and marches from the 10th of March to the 1st of April must be deducted; but on the other hand we find Soult informing the minister of war, on the 7th of March, that three thousand soldiers dispersed by the battle of Orthes were still wandering behind the army—the greatest part must have joined before the battle of Toulouse. There was also the regular garrison of that city, composed of the dépôts of

Appendix 5. several regiments and the urban guards, all under

Travot. Thus little less than fifty thousand men were at Soult's disposal.

Let twelve thousand be deducted for, 1°. the urban guard which was only employed to maintain the police of the town; 2°. the unarmed conscripts; 3°. the military workmen not brought into action: 4°. the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate with Lafitte in the Arriege, and to reinforce Loverdo at Montauban: there will remain thirty-eight thousand fighting men of all arms. And with a very powerful artillery; for we find Soult after the action directing seven field-batteries of eight pieces each to attend the army; and the French writers mention, besides this field-train, 1°. Fifteen pieces which were transferred during the battle from the exterior line of St. Cyprien to the northern and eastern fronts. 2°. Four twenty-four pounders and several sixteen-pounders mounted on the walls of the city. 3°. The armaments of the bridge-heads, the works on Calvinet and

those at Sacarin and Cambon. Wherefore not less than eighty, or perhaps ninety, pieces of French artillery were engaged.

An approximation to the strength of the French army being thus made it remains to show the number of the allies, which for the Anglo-Portuguese troops can be done exactly from Wellington's morning states. On the 10th of April those states showed forty-three thousand seven hundred and forty-four British and Germans in line and twenty thousand seven hundred and ninety-three Portuguese; in all, sixty-four thousand five hundred and thirty-seven soldiers and officers present under arms, exclusive of artillerymen. Of this number nearly ten thousand were cavalry, eleven hundred and eighty-eight being Portuguese.

The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina's bands investing St. Jean Pied de Port, were 1°. Giron's Andalusians and the third army under O'Donnel, fifteen thousand. 2°. The Gallicians under Freyre, fourteen thousand. 3°. Three thousand Gallicians under Morillo and as many more under Longa; making with the Anglo-Portuguese a total of ninety thousand combatants with somewhat more than a hundred pieces of field-artillery. Of this force, O'Donnel's troops were in the valley of the Bastan, Longa's on the upper Ebro; one division of Freyre's Gallicians was under Carlos D'España in front of Bayonne; one half of Morillo's division was blockading Navarrens, the other half, and the nine thousand Gallicians remaining under Freyre, were in front of Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese, the first and fifth divisions and three unattached brigades of infantry with one brigade of cavalry were with Hope at Bayonne; the seventh division was at Bordeaux; the household brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march from the Ebro, where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese horsemen were partly employed on the communications in the rear; partly near Agen, where sir John Campbell with the fourth regiment had an engagement on the 11th with the celebrated partisan Florian. The second, third, fourth, sixth, and light divisions of infantry, and Le Cor's Portuguese, called the unattached division, were with Wellington; who had also Bock's, Pon-



sonby's, Fane's, Vivian's, and lord E. Somerset's brigades of cavalry.

These troops on the morning of the 10th mustered under arms, in round numbers, thirty-one thousand infantry, of which four thousand three hundred were officers sergeants and drummers, leaving twenty-six thousand and six hundred bayonets. Add twelve thousand Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, and we have a total of forty-three thousand five hundred infantry: the cavalry amounted to seven thousand, and there were sixty-four pieces of artillery. Hence about fifty-two thousand of all ranks and arms were in line to fight thirty-eight thousand French with more than eighty pieces of artillery, some being of the largest calibre.

But of the allies only twenty-four thousand men with fifty-two guns can be said to have been seriously engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets with eighteen guns were on the left of the Garonne under Hill: neither the light division nor Ponsonby's heavy cavalry, nor Bock's Germans were really engaged. Wherefore twelve thousand six hundred sabres and bayonets under Beresford, nine thousand bayonets under Freyre, and two thousand five hundred under Picton really fought the battle. Thus the enormous disproportion assumed by the French writers disappears entirely; for if the allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in cavalry, and horsemen were of little avail against the entrenched position and preponderating artillery of the French.

Soult's claim to the admiration of his countrymen is well-founded and requires no vain assumption to prop it up. Vast combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment, unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country, are what no man can justly deny him. In this celebrated campaign of nine months, although counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of his countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works of five strong places and entrenched five great camps with such works as Marius himself would not have disdained; once he changed his line of operations and either attacking or defending delivered twenty-four battles and combats. Defeated in all, he fought the last as fiercely

as the first; remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent upon renewing the struggle when peace came to put a stop to his prodigious efforts. Those efforts were fruitless because Suchet renounced him, because the people of the south were apathetic and fortune was adverse; because he was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world at the head of unconquerable troops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannæ, Cæsar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's guards at Austerlitz, such were Wellington's British soldiers at this period. The same men who had fought at Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthes and Toulouse; and six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and fierceness a confidence which rendered them invincible. It is by this Soult's firmness and the constancy of his army are to be valued; and the equality to which he reduced his great adversary at Toulouse is a proof of ability which a judicious friend would put forward rather than suppress.

Was he not a great general, who being originally opposed on the Adour by nearly double his own numbers,—such was the proportion after the detachments were withdrawn by the emperor in January—did yet by the aid of his fortresses, by his marches and combinations, compel his adversary to employ so many troops for blockades sieges and detached posts, that at Toulouse the latter was scarcely more numerous than the French? Was it nothing to have drawn Wellington from such a distance along the frontier, and force him at last, either to fight a battle under the most astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour: and this not because the English general had committed any fault, but by the force of combinations which embracing all the advantages offered by the country left him no option.

That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps the most important was that which the emperor warned him against, though too late, the leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so he says, because the place could not hold out fifteen days without the entrenched camp, and the latter required men; yet the result proved Napoleon's sagacity; for the allies made no attempt to try the strength of the camp, and on the

18th of March Wellington knew not the real force of the garrison. Up to that period Hope was inclined to blockade the place only; and from the difficulty of gathering the necessary stores and ammunition on the right bank of the Adour, the siege though resolved upon, was not even commenced on the 14th of April, when that bloody and most lamentable sally was made. Hence the citadel could not even with a weaker garrison have been taken before the end of April; and Soult might have had Abbé's division of six thousand good troops in the battles of Orthes and Toulouse: had Suchet joined him, his army would have been numerous enough to bar Wellington's progress altogether. Here let the sagacity of the English general be noticed; for from the first he was averse to entering France and only did so for a political object, under the promise of great reinforcements and in the expectation that he should be allowed to organize a Bourbon army: what could he have done if Soult had retained the twenty thousand men drafted in January, or if Suchet had joined, or the people had taken arms?

How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse, how confidently he trusted that his adversary would eventually pass the Garonne below and not above the city, with what foresight he constructed the bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties Wellington had to encounter, have been already touched upon. But Choumara has assumed that the English general's reason for relinquishing the passage of the Garonne at Portet on the night of the 27th, was not the want of pontoons but the fear of being attacked during the operation; adducing in proof Soult's orders to assail the heads of his columns. Those orders are however dated the 31st, three days after the attempt of which Soult appears to have known nothing at the time: they were given in the supposition that Wellington wished to effect a second passage at that point to aid Hill while descending the Arriege. And what reason has any man to suppose that the same general and troops who passed the Nive and defeated a like counter-attack near Bayonne, would be deterred by the fear of a battle from attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the Nive was clearly more dangerous, because the communication with the

rest of the army was more difficult, Soult's disposable force larger, his counter-movements more easily hidden until the moment of execution. At Portet, the passage being designed for the night season would have been a surprise; and the whole army, which was drawn close to that side, could have been thrown over in three or four hours, with the exception of the divisions destined to keep the French in check at St. Cyprien. Soult's orders did not embrace such an operation, they directed Clausel to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them while in the disorder of a later passage, which was expected and watched for.

Clausel having four divisions in hand was no doubt a formidable enemy, and Soult's notion of defending the river by a counter-attack was excellent in principle; but to conceive is one thing, to execute is another. His orders were, as I have said, only issued the 31st, when Hill was across both the Garonne and the Arriege. Wellington's design was not then to force a passage at Portet, but to menace that point and really attack St. Cyprien when Hill should have descended the Arriege. Nor did Soult himself much expect Clausel would have any opportunity to attack; for in his letter to the minister of war he said, the position between the Arriege and the canal were all disadvantageous to the French, and his intention was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached from the south; yet he still believed Hill's movement to be only a blind, and that Wellington would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse.

Soult's measures were profoundly reasoned but yet extremely simple. His first care on arriving at Toulouse was to secure the only bridge over the Garonne by completing the works of St. Cyprien, which he had begun while the army was still at Tarbes. He thus gained time, and as he felt sure the allies could not act in the Arriege district, he next directed his attention to the bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat behind the Tarn and the power of establishing a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile, contrary to his expectation Wellington did attempt to act on the Arriege, and the French general, turning of necessity in observation to that side, entrenched a position on the south; soon however he had proof that his



first notion was well-founded, that his adversary after losing much time must at last pass below Toulouse; wherefore he proceeded with prodigious activity to fortify the Mont Rave as a field of battle on the northern and eastern fronts of the city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the wet weather by keeping the rivers flooded reduced Wellington to inactivity, that Soult became confident in their strength, and being influenced also by the news from Paris, relinquished his first design of opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving the line of operations by Montauban. To hold Toulouse then became his great object, nor was he diverted from this by the accident which befel Wellington's bridge at Grenade. Most writers, French and English, have blamed him for letting slip

General Berton, MSS. that opportunity of attacking Beresford. It is said Reille first informed him of the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him to attack the troops on the right bank; but Choumara has well defended him on that point; the distance was fifteen miles, the event uncertain, the works on the Mont Rave would have stood still, and the allies might perhaps have stormed St. Cyprien.

Wellington was under no alarm for Beresford, or rather for himself, as each day he passed the river in a boat and remained on that side. His force was not less than twenty thousand, principally British; his position was on a gentle range, the flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne; he had eighteen guns in battery on his front, which was likewise flanked by thirty other pieces placed on the left of the Garonne. Nor was he without retreat. He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not have followed to any distance lest the river should subside and the rest of the army pass on his rear; unless, reverting to his original design of operating by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now matured plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore he continued to strengthen his position round that city, his combinations being all directed to force the allies to attack him between the Ers and the Mont Rave, where it seemed scarcely possible to succeed. Some French officers hold that he should have endeavoured to crush

Morning  
State,  
4th of April,  
MSS.

Hill, and seize the parc; but this was difficult; Hill had thirteen thousand men in order of battle upon a contracted space ready to break the heads of the French columns as they emerged from St. Cyprien; the light division was at hand until mid-day on the 9th; and when the Croix d'Orade bridge was taken it was impossible to have attacked Hill without losing the Mont Rave and the line of retreat.

He has been also charged with this fault, that he did not entrench the Pugade. Choumara says that troops placed there would have been endangered without adequate advantage: this does not seem conclusive. The hill was under the shot of the main height and might have been entrenched with works open to the rear; St. Pol's brigade would thus have incurred no more danger than when placed there without entrenchments. Beresford could not have moved up the left bank of the Ers until these works were carried, and this would have cost men; it is therefore probable want of time caused Soult to neglect this advantage. He committed a graver error during the battle by falling upon Beresford with Taupin's division only, when he could have employed D'Armagnac's and Villatte's likewise in that attack; he should have fallen on him also while in the deep country below, and before he had formed his lines at the foot of the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed, Freyre defeated, the light division employed to protect the fugitives; and one of Marausin's brigades withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvignet platform. Beresford's column, entangled in the marshy ground, without artillery, and menaced both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted such an overwhelming mass: Wellington can scarcely escape criticism for placing him in that predicament.

A commander is not indeed to refrain from high attempts because of their perilous nature, the greatest have ever been the most daring; the English general could not remain inactive before Toulouse, and he was not to be deterred by danger or difficulty; twice he passed the broad and rapid Garonne and worked his way to a crowning victory: this was hardihood, greatness. But in Beresford's particular attack he did not overstep the

rules of art, he hurtled against them; and that he was not damaged by the shock is owing to his good fortune the fierceness of his soldiers and the errors of his adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the Garonne, happy if by rapidity he could reunite in time with Hill on the left bank: Beresford's failure would have been absolute ruin, and that alone refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there no other mode of attack? That can hardly be said. Beresford passed the Lavour road to assail the platform of St. Sypiere, and he was probably so ordered to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavour road; and because the platform of Calvinet on the side of the Ers river was more strongly entrenched than that of St. Sypiere. But for this gain it was too much to throw his column into the deep ground without guns; and separated from the rest of the army, seeing the cavalry, intended to maintain the connexion, were unable to act in that miry labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were judged capable of carrying the strongest part of the Calvinet platform, Beresford's fine Anglo-Portuguese divisions were surely equal to attacking this same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards; and an advanced guard would have sufficed to protect the left flank. The assault would then have been made with unity, by a great mass, and on the most important point: for the conquest of St. Sypiere was but a step towards that of Calvinet, but the conquest of Calvinet would have rendered St. Sypiere untenable. It is however to be observed that the Spaniards attacked too soon, and their dispersion exceeded all reasonable calculation: so panic-stricken they were as to draw from Wellington at the time the bitter observation, that he had seen many curious spectacles but never before saw ten thousand men running a race.

Soult's retreat from Toulouse, a model of order and regularity, was made in the night, which proves the difficulty of his situation. Nevertheless it was not desperate; nor was it owing to his adversary's generous forbearance that he passed unmolested under the allies' guns, as an English writer has erroneously assumed; for those guns had no ammunition, and that was one reason why Wellington, though eager to fall upon him

the 11th could not do so. On the 12th Soult was gone, and his march covered by the great canal could scarcely have been molested, because the nearest point occupied by the allies was more than a mile and a half distant; nor is it credible that Soult, as some other writers have imagined, ever designed to hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an avowal of military insolvency to which his proposal, that Suchet should join him at Carcassone and retake the offensive, written on the night of the 11th, is quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of French warfare; the impetuous valour and susceptibility of that people are ill-suited for stern Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of war before the French soldier and he will make supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing he becomes proportionately discouraged; let some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded energy, the fear of death never checks him, he will attempt anything: but the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance wears his fury out. It was so proved in the Peninsula, where the sudden deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle with a more full and terrible sound than that of any other nation, and always followed by the strong unwavering charge, startled and appalled those French columns before whose fierce and vehement assault all other troops had given way.

Napoleon's system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and augment the military excellence and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. His discipline, severe, but appealing to the feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the French soldiers to patience under hardships, and strong endurance under fire; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to dare everything even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of France might have full play: hence the violence of their attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired and the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine spirit; certain that they would



then renew the battle with the same confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier; yet so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations, the Romans not excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered.

Look at their amazing toils in the Peninsular war alone, which though so great and important was but an episode in their military history. '*In Spain large armies will starve and small armies will be beaten,*' was the saying of Henry IV of France, and it was not the light phrase of an indolent king, but the profound conclusion of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon's enormous armies were so wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six years, and without cessation; for to them winters and summers were alike; they endured incredible toils and privations, yet were not starved out, nor were their small armies beaten by the Spaniards. And for their daring and resource a single fact recorded by Wellington will suffice. They captured more than one strong place in Spain without any provision of bullets save those fired at them by their enemies, having trusted to that chance when they formed the siege! Before the British troops they fell; but how terrible was the struggle, how many defeats they recovered from, how many brave men they slew; what changes and interpositions of fortune occurred before they could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and hers only were capable of overthrowing them in equal battle. I seek not to defraud the Portuguese of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard the merit of his constancy; but what battle except Baylen did the Peninsulars win? What fortress did they take by siege? What place defend? Sir Arthur Wellesley twice delivered Portugal. Sir John Moore's march to Sahagun saved Andalusia and Lisbon from invasion at a critical moment. Sir Arthur's march to Talavera delivered Galicia. Graham saved Cadiz. Smith saved Tarifa. Wellington recaptured Ciudad and Badajos, rescued Andalusia

from Soult, and Valencia from Suchet; the Anglo-Sicilian army preserved Alicant, and finally recovered Taragona and Barcelona under the influence of the northern operations, which at the same time reduced Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. England indeed could not alone have triumphed in the struggle, but for her share let this brief summary speak.

She expended more than one hundred millions sterling on her own operations, she subsidised both Spain and Portugal, and with her supplies of clothing arms and ammunition maintained the armies of each even to the guerillas. From thirty up to seventy thousand British troops were employed by her; and while her naval squadrons harassed the French with descents upon the coasts, and supplied the Spaniards with arms and stores and money after every defeat, her land forces fought and won nineteen pitched battles and innumerable combats, made or sustained ten sieges, took four great fortresses, twice expelled the French from Portugal, preserved Alicant, Carthagena, Tarifa, Cadiz, Lisbon; they killed wounded and took two hundred thousand enemies, and the bones of forty thousand British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and mountains of the Peninsula. For Portugal she re-organized a native army and supplied officers who led it to victory; and to the whole Peninsula she gave a general whose like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all this and more was necessary to redeem that land from France!

Wellington's campaigns furnish lessons for generals of all nations, but they must always be especial models for British commanders in future continental wars; because he modified and reconciled the great principles of art with the peculiar difficulties which attend generals controlled by politicians who prefer parliamentary intrigue to national interests. An English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk much, however conscious he may be of personal resources, when one disaster will be his ruin at home; his measures must be subordinate to this primary consideration. Wellington's caution, springing from that source, has led friends and foes alike into wrong conclusions as to his system of war; the French call it want of enterprise, timidity; the English

have denominated it the Fabian system. These are mere phrases. His system was the same as that of all great generals. He held his army in hand, keeping it with unmitigated labour always in a fit state to march or to fight, and acted indifferently as occasion offered on the offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete mastery of his art. Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, sometimes to his natural genius, always to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically a painstaking man.

That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon, must be admitted; and being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed he learned something of the art from that greatest of all masters. Yet something besides the difference of genius must be allowed for the difference of situation; Napoleon was never, even in his first campaign of Italy, so harassed by the French as Wellington was by the English Spanish and Portuguese governments: their systems of war were however alike in principle, their operations being only modified by their different political positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to protect their flanks and communications without scattering their forces; these were common to both; in defence firm, cool, enduring, in attack fierce and obstinate; daring when daring was politic, yet always operating by the flanks in preference to the front; in these things they were alike: in following up a victory the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins; the battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave before which the barrier yielded and the roaring flood poured onwards covering all.

But there was nothing of timidity or natural want of enterprise to be discerned in the English general's campaigns. Neither was he of the Fabian school. He recommended that commander's system to the Spaniards, he did not follow it himself; his military policy more resembled that of Scipio Africanus. Fabius, dreading Hannibal's veterans, red with the blood of four consular armies, hovered on the mountains,

refused battle, and to the unmatched skill and valour of the great Carthaginian opposed the almost inexhaustible military resources of Rome. Wellington was never loath to fight when there was any equality of numbers; he landed in Portugal with only nine thousand men, with intent to attack Junot who had twenty-four thousand; at Rorica he was the assailant; at Vimiera he was assailed, but he would have changed to the offensive during the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto he was again the daring and successful assailant; in the Talavera campaign he took the initiatory movements, although in the battle itself he sustained the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was entirely defensive, because the Portuguese army was young and untried; but his pursuit of Massena in 1811 was entirely aggressive although cautiously so, as well knowing that in mountain warfare those who attack labour at a disadvantage. The operations of the following campaign, including the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera, the first siege of Badajos and the combat of Guinaldo, were of a mixed character; so was the campaign of Salamanca; but the campaign of Vitoria and that in the south of France were entirely and eminently offensive.

Slight therefore is the resemblance to the Fabian warfare. And for the Englishman's hardiness and enterprise, bear witness the passage of the Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the storming of Badajos, the surprise of the forts at Mirabete, the march to Vitoria, the passage of the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthes, the crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he committed faults is only to say that he made war; to deny him the qualities of a great commander is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want of light. How few of his combinations failed. How many battles he fought, victorious in all! Iron hardihood of body, a quick and sure vision, a grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the habit of laborious minute investigation and arrangement; all these qualities he possessed, and with them that most rare faculty of coming to prompt and sure conclusions in sudden emergencies. This is the certain mark of a master-spirit in



war; without it a commander may be distinguished, he may be a great man, he cannot be a great captain: where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge are opposed, the battle generally turns upon the decision of the moment.

At the Somosierra, Napoleon sent the Polish cavalry successfully charging up the mountain when more studied arrangements with ten times that force might have failed. At Talavera, if Joseph had not yielded to the imprudent heat of Victor the fate of the allies would have been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun's refusal to charge with his cavalry saved Craufurd's division, the loss of which would have gone far towards producing the evacuation of Portugal. At Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the first day, and thus lost the only favourable opportunity for assailing that formidable position. At Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly suspended his attack when a powerful effort would probably have been decisive. At Albuera, Soult's column of attack, instead of pushing forward halted to fire from the first height they had gained on Beresford's right, which saved that general from an early and total defeat; again at a later period of that battle the unpremeditated attack of the fusileers decided the contest. At Barosa with a wonderful promptitude Graham snatched the victory at the moment when a terrible defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even the astonishing fighting of the light division could have saved it, if Reynier had possessed this essential quality of a general. At El Bodon, Marmont failed to seize the most favourable opportunity which occurred during the whole war for crushing the allies. At Orthes, Soult let slip two opportunities of falling upon the allies with advantage, and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford.

At Vimiera, Wellington was debarred by Burrard from giving a signal illustration of this intuitive generalship; but at Busaco and the heights of San Christoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished. On the other hand he has furnished many examples of that successful improvisation in which Napoleon seems to have surpassed all mankind. His sudden retreat

from Oropesa across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; his passage of the Douro in 1809, his halt at Guinaldo in the face of Marmont's overwhelming numbers; the battle of Salamanca, his sudden rush with the third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vitoria, his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren; his battle of the 30th two days afterwards; his sudden passage of the Gave below Orthes. Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the proofs are complete that he possesses in an eminent degree that intuitive perception which distinguishes the greatest generals.

Fortune however always asserts her supremacy in war, and often from a slight mistake such disastrous consequences flow, that in every age and every nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial. Napoleon's march upon Madrid in 1808 before he knew the exact situation of the British army is an example. By that march he lent his flank to his enemy, sir John Moore seized the advantage, and though the French emperor repaired the error for the moment by his astonishing march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula was then decided. If he had not been forced to turn against Moore, Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could not have been organized for resistance, and the jealousy of the Spaniards would never have suffered Wellington to establish a solid base at Cadiz: that general's after-successes would then have been with the things that are unborn. It was not so ordained, Wellington was victorious, the great conqueror was overthrown, England stood the most triumphant nation of the world. But with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms! And it is a stirring sound! War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect all are at strife, and the glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honour, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the brave man's patriotism and is a chastening corrective for the rich man's pride. It is yet no security for power. Napoleon, the greatest man of whom history makes

mention—Napoleon, the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms, Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and France. Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him, and without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean.

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## NOTE.

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A REFERENCE to my text will show, that I disputed the correctness of general Vandoncourt's return of the French numbers at the battle of Toulouse, as set down by the engineer Choumara in his elaborate and able account of that action. I had no authentic documents, but from a comparison of statements in several French authors and deductions from the authentic numbers of a previous period, allowing for losses during the intermediate operations, I obtained what I thought a nearer approximation to accuracy than general Vandoncourt. Since this edition went to press, an authentic document has been placed in my hands, which proves that I did very nearly indeed attain the true figures in my approximate calculation. This document, viz., a return of the French troops disposable before the battle, of those actually engaged, and of the loss sustained, was, when the French army evacuated Toulouse, left by marshal Soult's secretary in the house of Monsieur Courtois, a banker of Toulouse, who allowed Robert J. Graves, M.D., F.R.S., the eminent Dublin physician, to copy it, but with an injunction not to make it public for a certain number of years.

The time having elapsed, Dr. Graves has placed it at my disposal, and I give it below in juxtaposition with the numbers attained by myself.

<i>In the Document.</i>		<i>In the History.</i>	
Force avant la bataille ...	54,000		
Desquelles il y avaient aux hôpitaux ...	5,000		
Reste sous Mar. Soult ...	49,000	50,000	disposable
Desquelles ils étaient Actuellement engagées, Officiers 1427, soldats	39,166	38,000	fighting men
Chevaux de cavalerie	2699		
Do. de trains ...	3937		
Perte à la bataille ... Tués	3,199 hommes 40 officiers	3,000	killed and wounded
Blessés	179 officiers 1,526 soldats		



This statement requires explanation. The French not unfrequently put down all their loss as *tués*, and it must have been so here; because the *blessés* evidently bear no proportion to the killed, if *tués* be taken literally. But taking *blessés* to mean the wounded left to the generosity of the victors in the abandoned city, the amount tallies most accurately with the number of 1600 which lord Wellington says, in his despatch, he found in the hospitals when he entered Toulouse, because some must have died in the interim.

W. NAPIER, 1850.

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## APPENDIX.

### No. I.

No. 1.—*Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by lieutenant-general sir John Murray, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men
British and German cavalry ..	739	12	6	733	..	757
British, Portuguese and Sicilian artillery .. ..	783	8	199	362	604	990
British engineers and staff corps .. ..	78	5	36	..	..	119
British and German infantry	7,226	830	637	..	..	8,693
Whittingham's infantry ..	4,370	503	316	..	..	5,189
Sicilian infantry .. ..	985	121	272	..	..	1,378
General Total ..	14,181	1479	1466	1095	604	17,126

No. 2.—*Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian force, commanded by lieutenant-general sir William Clinton. Head-quarters, Taragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses	Mules.	Total men
Cavalry .. ..	663	61	215	875	40	939
Artillery, engineers, and staff corps .. ..	997	67	58	507	896	1,122
Infantry .. ..	9,124	1390	1019	115	429	11,533
General Total ..	10,784	1518	1292	1497	1465	13,594

No. 3.—*Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division (Whittingham's). Taragona, 15th of December, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men
Infantry .. ..	4014	100	627	110	21	5041

No. 4.—*Extract from the original state of the first army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Copons et Navia. Head-quarters, Vich, 1st of August, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Infantry disposable .. ..	10,219	1535	2207	586	„	13,961
In Cardona .. ..	1,182	115	398	„	„	1,695
Seo d'Urgel .. ..	984	172	144	„	„	1,300
Artillery, &c. .. ..	877	7	59	6	„	1,070
Grand Total .. ..	13,262	1829	2808	592	„	18,026

No. 5.—*Extract from the original state of the second army commanded by the camp-marshal, Don Francisco Xavier Elio. Vinaros, 19th September, 1813.*

	Present under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Total men.	Horses.
Total of all arms .. ..	26,835	3181	7454	37,470	4073

*Note.*—This state includes Villa Campa's, Sarsfield's, Duran's, the Empecinado's, and Roche's divisions, besides the troops immediately under Elio himself.

## No. II.

No. 1.—*Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the marquis of Wellington's command. Extracted from the original morning state for the 24th of July, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & file.	Men.	Total. Horses.
British and German cavalry } present under arms .. ..	916	5,834	6,750	5834
Ditto infantry .. ..	4665	29,926	34,581	„
Portuguese cavalry .. ..	251	1,241	1,492	1178
Ditto infantry .. ..	2894	20,565	23,459	„
Grand Total, exclusive of sick } and absent on command .. ..	8726	57,566	66,282	7012 { Infantry and cavalry.

The artillerymen, &c. were about 4000.

No. 2.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 15th of October, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry .. ..	4,251	37,230	43,109
Portuguese ditto .. ..	4,253	21,274	25,527
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, absent on command, &c. &c. }	10,112	58,524	68,636

The artillerymen and drivers about .. 4,000

Total .. 72,636

No. 3.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 9th November, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry .. .. .	5,356	39,687	45,043
Portuguese ditto .. .. .	2,990	22,237	25,227
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, } absent on command, &c. .. }	8,346	61,924	70,270

The artillerymen, &c. &c., about .. 4,000

Total .. 74,270

No. 4.—*Sir Rowland Hill's force at the battle of St. Pierre. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th December, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.
Second division { British .. .. .	802	5,371	6,173
{ Portuguese .. .. .	277	2,331	2,608
Le Cor's Portuguese division .. .. .	507	4,163	4,670
Total under arms, exclusive of artillerymen	1,586	11,865	13,451

No. 5.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 13th February, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & file.	Total.	Cavalry.
British and German cavalry .. .. .	1,093	7,315	8,408	9,898
Portuguese cavalry .. .. .	280	1,210	1,490	
British and German infantry .. .. .	4,853	29,714	34,567	56,306
Portuguese infantry .. .. .	2,828	18,911	21,739	
General Total, present under arms .. .. .				66,204
Artillerymen, &c., about .. .. .				4,000

No. 6.—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank & file.	Total.	
British and German cavalry .. .. .	1,159	7,640	8,799	9,987
Portuguese cavalry .. .. .	228	958	1,188	
British and German infantry .. .. .	4,940	29,999	34,945	54,550
Portuguese infantry .. .. .	2,622	16,983	19,605	
General Total, present under arms .. .. .				64,537
The artillerymen, &c., about .. .. .				4,000



No. 7.—*Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the battle of Toulouse. Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.*

Infantry, present under arms.		Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Second division, British..	..	715	4,123	6940	Grand Total, infantry, officers and soldiers, pre- sent under arms.
Ditto Portuguese	..	235	1,867		
Third division, British..	..	529	2,741	4679	
Ditto Portuguese	..	226	1,183		
Fourth division, British..	..	531	3,025	5383	
Ditto Portuguese	..	239	1,585		
Sixth division, British..	..	558	3,233	5681	
Ditto Portuguese	..	246	1,644		
Light division, British..	..	378	2,469	4318	
Ditto Portuguese	..	231	1,240		
Le Cor's Portuguese division	..	455	3,507	3962	
		4343	26,620		30,963

Note.—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of April, out on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows :—

Cavalry, present under arms.	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and file.	
Bock's brigade of Germans .. ..	112	694	Total cavalry, present under arms. 6954
Ponsonby's brigade of British .. ..	188	1221	
Fane's brigade of British .. ..	240	1506	
Vivian's brigade of British .. ..	128	960	
Lord Edw. Somerset's brigade of British	214	1691	
	<u>882</u>	<u>6072</u>	

Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, present under arms ..	37,917
Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, together said to be ..	14,000
	<u>51,917</u>
Artillerymen, &c. .. .. .	1,500
Grand Total ..	<u>53,417</u>

Note.—My authority for the number of guns employed during this campaign are copies of the returns given to me by sir Alexander Dickson, who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not borne on the morning states; but in the original weekly state of the 15th of May, 1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and waggon-train, amounted to four thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, with five thousand and thirty horses and mules. This may be taken as the average strength during the campaign; and as more than half were with sir John Hope and some with lord Dalhousie, the number at the battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded fifteen hundred, making a total of all ranks and arms of fifty-three thousand combatants.

## No. III.

No. 1.—*General state of the French armies under Soult and Suchet. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July, 1813*  
*The armies of the north, centre and south being by an imperial decree re-organized in one body, taking the title of the army of Spain.*

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain ..	97,983	12,676	2110	392	14,074	114,167	13,028
Aragon ..	32,362	4,919	3621	551	3,201	39,184	5,470
Catalonia ..	25,910	1,869	168	„	1,379	27,457	1,744
General Total ..	156,255	19,464	5899	943	18,654	180,808	20,242

## No. 2.—15th of September, 1813.

					Men.	Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain ..	81,351	11,159	4004	1438	22,488	107,843	11,272
Aragon ..	32,476	4,447	2721	320	3,616	38,813	6,305
Catalonia ..	24,026	1,670	120	„	2,137	26,283	2,497
General Total ..	137,853	17,276	6845	1758	28,241	172,939	20,074

*Note.*—The garrison of San Sebastian though captive is borne on this state.

This is the last general state of the French army in my possession, but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls.

'Army of Spain, 16th November, 1813.—102 battalions. 74 squadrons, without garrisons. 74,152 men present under arms. 100,212 effectives. 17,206 horses.

18,230 Hospital.  
 8,555 Troop horses.  
 1,809 Officers' horses.  
 5,384 Horses of draft.

'Army of Spain, 1st December.—93 battalions. 74 squadrons. 17,989 horses.'

No. 3.—*Detailed state of the army of Spain, July, 1813, when Soult took the command.*

Right wing.—Lieutenant-general Reille.				Effective and non-effective.			
	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Total.		
First division, Foy, 9 battalions ..	5,922	189	} Present under arms.	6784	} 21,366		
Seventh ditto, Maucune, 7 ditto ..	4,186	110		450		5676	
Ninth ditto, La Martiniere, 11 ditto	7,127	151		men. horses.		8906	
Centre.—Drouet, Count D'Erlon.							
Second division, D'Armagnac, 8 batt.	6,961	116	} 20,957	624	{	8580	
Third ditto, Abbé, 9 ditto	8,030	285				men. horses.	8728
Sixth ditto, Daricau, 8 ditto	5,966	223				6627	8906
Left wing.—Lieut.-general Clausel.							
Fourth division, Conroux, 9 battals.	7,056	150	} 17,218	432	{	7477	
Fifth ditto, Vandermaesen, 7 ditto	4,181	141				men. horses.	5201
Eighth ditto, Taupin, 10 ditto	5,981	141				7587	8906
Reserve.—General Villatte.							
French .. .. .	14,959	2091					
Foreign .. .. .	4 battalions of the Rhine, strength not given.						
	4 ditto Italians, general St. Pol, ditto.						
	4 ditto Spaniards, general Casabianca, ditto.						

		Men.	Horses.		Effective and non-effective.	
					Men.	Total.
Cavalry.—Pierre Soult.	22 squadrons	4723	4416	Present under arms.	5098	7,621
Ditto.—Trielhard		2358	2275	7081 men, 6691 horses.	2523	
Total according to the organization, but exclusive of the foreign battalions..				77,450	91,086	

				Men under arms.	
Troops not in the organization				14,938	16,946
Generals {	Garrison of St. Sebastian, 1st July			2,731	3,086
Rey {	forming part of this number..				
Cassan.—Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July				2,951	3,121
Lameth.—Ditto of Santona, 1st May..				1,465	1,674
Second reserve, not in the above				5,595	6,105

		Effective and non-effective.	
		Men.	Horses.
General Total..	97,983	12,676.	Present under arms.. 114,167
			13,028

No. 4.—*Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813.*

				Men.	Effective and non-effective.	
Right wing {				5002	14,875 present under arms.	Men.
{				4166		
{				5707		
Centre .. {				4353	15,098	ditto
{				5903		
{				4842		
Left wing .. {				4736	15,789	ditto
{				5982		
{				5071		
Reserve ..	Villatte ..			8256	The Italian brigade, about 2000 ordered to Milan.	10,424
Provisional troops of the right wing, destined to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne				2168		

				Men.	Horses.	Total.
				Men.		Men
Cavalry.—Pierre Soult				4456	4617	8,325
Ditto	Trielhard			2368	2583	
Gend'armes {				291	247	
{				1210	"	1,399
Parc ..				895	885	
Engineers ..				504	127	
{				3805	191	15,164
{				2366	prisoners of war	
{				1633		
Garrisons {				4631	137	15,164
{				1786		
{				842		
Castle of Lourdes				107		

	81,064
Deduct garrison of San Sebastian..	2,366
Total, present under arms..	78,698

## No. IV.

*Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the attack of the enemy's fortified position in front of Toulouse for to-morrow, 1st April, 1814. Published in the United Service Journal, October, 1838.*

(Extract.)

*'St. Jorij, 9th April, 1814.*

'The front attack of the third division is to extend from the river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban) inclusive of that road.

'The light division will be immediately on the left of the third division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road above-mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of the Spanish troops.

'The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, more as diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened chiefly at the bridges and at the locks or any other points where the form of the ground, or other circumstances most favour the advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the third and of the light divisions must be kept in reserve.'

## No. V.

*Note.*—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, given in Appendix II., sections 6 and 7, has been very carefully made and faithfully set down; but as the real number of the allies has lately become a point of dispute between French and English writers, I here give the morning State of the whole army, accurately printed from the original document delivered by the adjutant-general to lord Wellington on the morning of the 10th of April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled, with the help of my text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain its true numbers.



# MORNING STATE OF THE FORCES IN THE PENINSULA, UNDER THE COMMAND

Head Quarters, St. Jory,

Date of last State received.	DIVISIONS.	OFFICERS.								Quarter-Masters of Cavalry.	SERGEANTS.						TRUM-DRUM.		
		Colonels.	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets or Ensigns.	Staff.	Present.		Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War & Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.		
											Present.	Absent.					Present.	Absent.	
BRITISH.																			
7th Apr.	Cavalry .. ..	1	13	17	106	189	25	94	25	581	9	17	68	7	682	108	..	8	
" Do.	1st Dn. Infantry	3	16	6	64	53	56	48	..	433	13	40	38	4	528	142	4	3	
9th Do.	2nd .. ..	2	2	10	45	123	29	41	..	320	5	89	68	18	500	143	1	23	
" Do.	3rd .. ..	2	3	10	38	69	30	32	..	231	3	82	47	5	368	114	..	20	
6th Do.	4th .. ..	..	3	9	42	86	27	30	..	232	3	76	56	4	371	102	1	15	
7th Do.	5th .. ..	1	3	6	35	82	39	38	..	245	28	63	30	10	376	99	10	10	
8th Do.	6th .. ..	..	4	9	41	102	41	25	..	236	4	59	41	1	341	101	1	19	
5th Do.	7th .. ..	1	4	6	38	74	31	31	..	187	5	62	42	16	312	92	2	8	
9th Do.	Lt. .. ..	2	2	4	24	68	13	19	..	182	2	39	21	1	245	66	1	3	
7th Do.	Ld. Aylmer's Bde.	..	6	7	37	74	19	26	..	188	7	7	8	..	210	72	1	4	
TOTAL ..																			
PORTUGUESE.																			
7th Apr.	Cavalry .. ..	2	4	4	17	39	15	41	4	64	2	..	28	..	94	40	..	..	
9th Do.	2nd Dn. Infantry	..	2	2	16	16	28	10	..	122	..	19	32	..	173	39	..	1	
" Do.	3rd .. ..	2	..	2	9	17	23	14	..	101	5	20	39	..	165	58	2	5	
6th Do.	4th .. ..	1	1	1	10	12	24	51	..	103	..	27	23	..	153	36	..	6	
7th Do.	5th .. ..	1	2	3	13	12	22	49	..	105	3	25	18	..	151	34	1	3	
8th Do.	6th .. ..	1	2	3	12	13	16	47	..	119	3	12	20	..	154	33	1	5	
5th Do.	7th .. ..	2	3	4	17	18	27	43	..	110	4	12	23	..	149	33	..	3	
9th Do.	Lt. .. ..	..	2	3	13	11	26	29	..	101	3	6	27	..	137	51	3	2	
7th Do.	Unattached Dvn.	2	4	7	25	22	51	80	..	197	7	47	26	1	278	67	3	6	
8th Do.	1st Brigade ..	1	1	6	9	12	27	16	..	137	1	10	20	..	168	64	..	2	
" Do.	10th .. ..	..	4	4	18	14	23	38	..	124	7	7	15	..	153	31	..	8	
Total Portuguese																			
Total British ..																			
Grand Total ..																			

3 Men deserted 2nd Line Bn. K.G.L.

The Men transferred are Invalids sent home.

1 Do. .. 1st Line Do.

1 Do. .. 47th Foot.

1 Do. .. 4th Do.

OF HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

10th April, 1814.

PETERS OR MERS.			RANK AND FILE.						HORSES.				ALTERATIONS.								Effective Rank and File, Portuguese included.
Command.	I rs. of War & Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs of War & Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Total.	Men.								
				Present.	Absent.								Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transf rred.	Promoted.	Reduced.		
4	2	122	7640	106	406	1071	233	9456	7289	611	602	8502	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	8144
...	3	152	5894	244	632	200	185	7155	...	...	...	...	4	6	...	4	10	3	4	5894	
3	8	178	4123	112	2251	474	716	7676	...	...	...	...	...	11	...	...	4	...	...	5990	
7	4	145	2741	75	1352	297	229	4694	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	...	*	3924	
5	6	129	3028	44	1700	279	201	5252	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	*	...	1	4613	
8	8	130	3277	363	1075	224	315	5254	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	2	17	1	...	4438	
3	...	124	3233	51	1223	309	103	4922	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4877	
...	11	117	2738	114	1074	391	673	4990	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	*	4474	
...	3	73	2469	77	696	131	146	3519	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	1	3709	
...	...	77	2496	212	312	92	...	3112	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	2	...	...	2496	
			37639	1401	10721	3468	2801	56030	7289	611	602	8502	5	24	...	6	33	4	6	...	
10	...	50	958	5	73	598	16	1650	855	114	404	1373	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
4	...	44	1867	71	472	101	...	2511	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	
5	...	71	1183	105	598	333	...	2269	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	
5	...	47	1535	30	635	199	...	2449	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
2	...	40	1161	13	550	176	...	1900	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	...	2	1	...	...	
3	...	42	1644	44	469	151	...	2308	...	...	...	...	69	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
2	...	38	1736	48	228	211	48	2271	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
7	...	63	1240	54	237	394	11	1936	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
6	3	85	3507	215	835	219	76	4852	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3507	
2	4	72	1510	68	328	146	213	2265	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	1510	
5	...	39	1550	115	351	82	4	2102	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1550	
			17941	768	4776	2660	368	26513	855	114	404	1373	70	5	1	...	2	1	...	...	

Note.—The figures belonging to the grand total are wanting in the original.



CONTROVERSIAL PIECES.





TO HER GRACE THE DUCHESS OF ABRANTES.

September 11, 1833.

MADAM,—In the eighth volume of your *Mémoires* I find the following passages :—

‘Toutefois, pourquoi donc m’étonner de la conduite des Portugais? N’ai-je pas vu *ici, en France*, un des frères d’armes de Junot souffrir qu’on imprimât, dans un ouvrage traduit de l’Anglais, des choses revoltantes de fausseté sur lui et sur le maréchal Ney? . . . . Cet ouvrage, fait par un colonel Napier, et qui a trouvé grâce devant le ministère de la guerre, parcequ’il dit du bien du ministre, m’a été donné à moi, à moi, la veuve de Junot, comme renfermant des documents *authentiques*. J’ai du y lire une indécente attaque contre la vie privée d’un homme dont on ne pouvait dire aucun mal comme militaire dans cette admirable affaire de la Convention de Cintra, puisque les Anglais ont fait passer à une commission militaire ceux qui l’avaient signée pour l’Angleterre; et les beaux vers de Childe Harold suffisent seuls à la gloire de Junot, quand l’original de cette convention ne serait pas là pour la prouver. Heureusement que je le possède, moi, cet original, et même dans les deux langues. Il n’est pas dans M. Napier;’—

It is not permitted to a man to discover ill-humour at the expressions of a lady; yet when those expressions are dishonouring to him, and reputation and wit joined to beauty give them a wide circulation, it would indicate insensibility to leave them unnoticed.

To judge of the talents of a general by his conduct in the field has always been the undisputed right of every military writer. I will not therefore enter upon that subject, because

I am persuaded that your grace could not mean to apply the words '*revolting falsehoods*' to a simple judgment of the military genius of the duke of Abrantes. Indeed you intimate that the offensive passages are those directed against his private life, and touching the Convention of Cintra. I think, however, your grace has not perused my work with much attention, or you would scarcely have failed to perceive that I have given the Convention of Cintra at length in the Appendix.

But in truth I have only alluded to general Junot's private qualities when they bore directly upon his government of Portugal, and with a fresh reference to my work you will find I have affirmed nothing of my own knowledge. The character of the late duke of Abrantes, given by me, is that ascribed to him by the emperor Napoleon, (see *Las Cases*), and the authority of that great man is expressly quoted. It is against Napoleon therefore, and not against me, who but repeat his uncontradicted observations, that your resentment should be directed.

If your grace should deign to dispose of any further thought upon me or my work, I would venture to suggest a perusal of the Portuguese, and English, and Spanish, and German histories of the invasion of Portugal; or even a slight examination of only a small part of the innumerable, some of them very celebrated periodicals which treat of that event. You will be then convinced, that so far from having wantonly assailed the character of general Junot I have made no slight effort to stem the torrent of abuse with which he has been unjustly overwhelmed; and believe me, madam, that the estimation in which an eminent man will be held by the world is more surely to be found in the literature of different countries than in the fond recollections of his own family. I admired general Junot's daring character, and having enough of the soldier in me to like a brave enemy, I have, wherever the truth of history would permit, expressed that feeling towards him and towards other French generals whose characters and whose acts have been alike maligned by party writers in this country: such indeed has been my regard for justice on this point, that I have thereby incurred the charge of writing with a French rather than a national bias, as your grace will discover by referring to my lord Mahon's '*History of the War of the Succession*;' in which his lordship has done me the honour to observe that I have written '*by far the best FRENCH account yet published of the Peninsula War.*'

For my own part I still think that to refrain from vulgar

abuse of a gallant enemy will not be deemed un-English, although lord Mahon considers it wholly French; but his lordship's observation incontestibly proves that I have discovered no undue eagerness to malign any of the French generals. And with respect to the duke of Abrantes, I could show that all the offensive passages in my work rest upon the published authority of his own countrymen, especially the emperor Napoleon; and that they are milder in expression than those authorities would have warranted. It is however so natural and so amiable in a lady to defend the reputation of her deceased husband, that rather than appear to detract in any manner from the grace of such a proceeding I choose to be silent under the unmitigated severity of your observations.

Not so with respect to that part of your remarks which relate to marshal Ney. After carefully re-examining every sentence I have written, I am quite unable to discover the slightest grounds for your grace's accusations. In all parts of my work the name of Ney is mentioned with praise. I have not indeed made myself a partisan of marshal Ney in relating his disputes with marshals Soult and Massena, because I honestly believed that he was mistaken; neither have I attributed to him unbounded talents for the higher parts of war; but this is only matter of opinion which the world is quite capable of appreciating at its true value: upon all other points I have expressed admiration of marshal Ney's extraordinary qualities, his matchless valour, his heroic energy!

In the hope that your grace will now think it reasonable to soften the asperity of your feelings towards my work, I take my leave, with more of admiration for your generous warmth in defence of a person so dear to you, than of resentment for the harsh terms which you have employed towards myself.

I remain, madam, your very obedient servant,

WILLIAM NAPIER, *Colonel.*

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IN an article on the *Duke of Wellington's Despatches*, the *British and Foreign Quarterly Review*, after describing colonel Gurwood's proceedings to procure the publication of the despatches, says—

'We here distinctly state, that no other person ever had access to any documents of the duke, by his grace's permission,



for any historical or other purpose, and that all inferential pretensions to such privilege are not founded in fact.'

This assertion, which if not wholly directed against my history certainly includes it with others, *I distinctly state to be untrue.*

The duke of Wellington gave me the original morning states of his army for the use of my History.

The duke of Wellington voluntarily directed me to apply to sir George Murray for the '*orders of movements.*' That is to say the orders of battle issued by him to the different generals previous to every great action. Sir George Murray thought proper, as the reader will see in the justificatory pieces belonging to this volume, to deny all knowledge of these '*orders of movements.*' I have since obtained some of them from others; but the permission to get all of them was given at Strath fieldsaye in the presence of lord Fitzroy Somerset, who was directed to lend me the morning states also, and he did do so.

Lord Fitzroy Somerset, with the consent of the duke of Wellington, put into my hands king Joseph's portfolio, taken at Vitoria and containing that monarch's correspondence with the emperor, with the French minister of war, and with the marshals and generals who at different periods were employed in the Peninsula. All these were documents of no slight importance for a history of the war.

Before I commenced this History, I applied verbally to the duke of Wellington to give me papers in aid of my undertaking. His answer was in substance, that he had arranged all his papers with a view to publication himself—that he had not decided in what form they should be given to the world, or when, probably not during his lifetime, but he thought his plan would be to '*write a plain didactic history*' to be published after his death—that he was resolved never to publish anything unless he could tell the whole truth; but at that time he could not tell the whole truth without wounding the feelings of many worthy men—without doing mischief—adding in a laughing way, '*I should do as much mischief as Buonaparte.*' Then he related many anecdotes illustrative of errors committed by generals and others acting with him, or under him, especially at Waterloo; errors so affecting his operations that he could not do justice to himself if he suppressed them; yet by publicity he would ungraciously affect the fame of many worthy men whose only fault was dulness.

For these reasons he would not give me his private papers, but he did give me the documents I have already noticed, and told me he would then, and always, answer any questions as

to facts which I might in the course of my work think necessary to put. And he has fulfilled that promise rigidly, for I put questions to him and took notes of his answers, and many of the facts in my History cavilled at and denied by would-be critics have been related solely upon his authority. Moreover I have at various times sent to the duke questions in writing, and always they have been carefully answered without delay, though often this must have been done when his attention was deeply occupied by public affairs.

But though the duke of Wellington denied access to his own peculiar documents, the greatest part of those documents existed in duplicate; they were in other persons' hands, and in two instances were voluntarily transferred with other interesting papers to mine. Of this truth the reader may easily satisfy himself by referring to my early volumes, some of which were published years before colonel Gurwood's compilation appeared. He will find in them frequent allusions to the substance of the duke's private communications with the governments he served; and in the Appendix a number of his letters, printed precisely as they have since been given by colonel Gurwood: and I could have augmented the number if I had been disposed so to swell my work. Another proof will be found further on, in my Justificatory Note in reply to colonel Gurwood, where I have restored the whole reading of a remarkable letter of the duke's relative to Almaraz. It is garbled in colonel Gurwood's compilation. Not from any unworthy desire to promulgate what the duke of Wellington desired to suppress have I restored it, but having long before attributed, on the strength of that passage, certain strong opinions to his grace, I was bound in defence of my own probity as an historian to reproduce my authority.

W. F. P. NAPIER.

*March 28th. 1840.*

THE following controversial pieces are all I think fit to publish in reply to assailants. Most of them have been published as pamphlets: one of them in the *London and Westminster Review*. They will be found to sustain the accuracy of a work, which, written honestly from good materials, cost sixteen years of unremitted labour. The account of the Austrian Prussian and Russian secret policy in 1809, given in one of the replies to the *Quarterly Review*, was drawn from original secret diplomatic despatches placed at my disposal.

W. N

## JUSTIFICATORY NOTES.

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### ALISON.

SOME extracts from Alison's *History of the French Revolution* reflecting upon the conduct of sir John Moore have been shown to me by a friend ; in one of them I find, with reference to the magazines at Lugo, a wilful misquotation from my work, to support a censure on that general ; and also the following specimen of disingenuous writing which shall not pass with impunity.

Speaking of the prevalent opinion that England could not succeed militarily on the continent, Mr. Alison says :—

‘In sir John Moore’s case this universal and perhaps unavoidable error was greatly enhanced by his connexion with the opposition party, by whom the military strength of England had been always underrated, the system of continental operations uniformly decried, and the power and capacity of the French emperor, great as they were, unworthily magnified.’

Mr. Alison here proves himself to be one of those enemies to sir John Moore who draw upon their imaginations for facts and upon their malice for conclusions. Sir John Moore never had any connexion with any political party, though during the short time he was in parliament in early life, he voted with the Tory government. He may in society have met with some of the leading men of opposition thus grossly assailed by Mr. Alison, yet it is doubtful if he ever conversed with any of them ; unless perhaps Mr. Wyndham, with whom, when the latter was secretary at war, he had a dispute upon a military subject. He was however the intimate friend of Mr. Pitt and of Mr. Pitt’s family. It is untrue that he entertained or even leaned towards exaggerated notions of French prowess ; his experience and his natural spirit and greatness



of mind swayed him the other way. In his journal he thus speaks of the relative merits of the French and British troops after the battle of Maida.

‘No action for the numbers engaged was ever more brilliant, and when coupled with the Egyptian campaign is a proof that if our armies were equally large, our superiority over the French would be as apparent on shore as it is at sea.’ How indeed could the man who stormed the forts of Fiorenza and the breach of Calvi in Corsica, he who led the disembarkation at Aboukir Bay, the advance to Alexandria on the 13th, and defended the ruins of the camp of Cæsar on the 21st of March, he who had never been personally foiled in any military exploit, feel otherwise than confident in arms? Mr. Alison may calumniate but he cannot hurt sir John Moore.

### SIR WALTER SCOTT.

In the last volume of sir Walter Scott’s *Life* by Mr. Lockhart, page 143, the following passage from sir Walter’s diary occurs:—

‘He (Napier) has however given a bad sample of accuracy in the case of lord Strangford, *where* his pointed affirmation has been as pointedly repelled.’

This peremptory decision is false in respect of grammar, of logic, and of fact.

Of grammar because *where*, an adverb of place, has no proper antecedent. Of logic, because a truth may be pointedly repelled without ceasing to be a truth. Of fact, because lord Strangford did not repel but admitted the essential parts of my affirmation; namely, that he had falsified the date and place of writing his despatch, and attributed to himself the chief merit of causing the royal emigration from Lisbon. Lord Strangford, indeed, published two pamphlets to prove that the merit really attached to him; but the hollowness of his pretensions are exposed in my reply to his *first pamphlet*, and the accuracy of my statement was supported by the testimony of disinterested persons; moreover many writers, professing to know the facts, did, at the time, in the newspapers, contradict lord Strangford’s statements.

Vide Times,  
Morning  
Chronicle,  
Sun, &c.  
1828.

The chief point of his *second pamphlet* was the reiterated assertion that he accompanied the prince regent over the bar of Lisbon.

To this I could have replied, 1°. That I had seen a letter, written at the time by Mr. Smith, the naval officer commanding the boat which conveyed lord Strangford from Lisbon to the prince's ship; in which letter it was distinctly stated, *that they did not reach that vessel until after she had passed the bar.* 2°. That I possessed letters from other persons present at the emigration, of the same tenor, and that between the writers of those letters and the writer of the Bruton-street despatch, to decide which were the better testimony offered no difficulty.

Why did I not so reply? For a reason twice before published, namely, that Mr. Justice Bayley had done it for me. Sir Walter takes no notice of the judge's answer, neither does Mr. Lockhart; and yet it was the most important point of the case. Let the reader judge.

The editor of the *Sun* newspaper, after quoting an article from the *Times* upon the subject of the controversy with lord Strangford, remarked, that his lordship '*would hardly be believed upon his oath, certainly not upon his honour at the Old Bailey.*'

Vide *Sun*  
newspaper,  
28th Nov.  
1828.

Lord Strangford obtained a rule to show cause why a criminal information should not be filed against the editor for a libel. The present lord Brougham appeared for the defence, and justified the offensive passage by references to lord Strangford's own admissions in the controversy: and the judges thinking the justification good, discharged the rule by the mouth of lord Tenterden!

During the proceedings in court the attorney-general, on the part of lord Strangford, referring to that nobleman's despatch, which though purporting to be written on the 29th November from H.M.S. *Hibernia* off the Tagus was really written the 29th of December in Bruton-street, said,

Everybody knew that in diplomacy there were two copies prepared of all documents, No. 1 for the minister's inspection, No. 2 for the public.'

Report in  
the *Sun*  
newspaper.

Mr. Justice Bayley shook his head in disapprobation.

Attorney-general—'Well, my lord, it is the practice of these departments and may be justified by necessity.'

Mr. Justice Bayley—'*I like honesty in all places,* Master Attorney-general.'

And so do I, wherefore I recommend this pointed repeller to Mr. Lockhart when he publishes another edition of his father-in-law's life.

## COLONEL GURWOOD.

IN the eighth volume of the *Duke of Wellington's Despatches*, colonel Gurwood has inserted the following as a note:—

‘Lieutenant Gurwood, fifty-second regiment, led the ‘forlorn hope’ of the light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards took the French governor general Barrié in the citadel; and from the hands of lord Wellington on the breach by which he had entered, he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by the duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless been one of the distinguished consequences resulting from this service, and lieutenant Gurwood feels pride as a soldier of fortune in here offering himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in future wars.’—‘The detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the lesser breach is of too little importance except to those who served in it to become a matter of history. The compiler however takes this opportunity of observing that colonel William Napier has been misinformed respecting the conduct of the ‘forlorn hope,’ in the account given of it by him as it appears in the Appendix to that volume of his History of the Peninsular War. A correct statement and proofs of it have been since furnished to colonel William Napier for any future edition of his book which will render any further notice of it *here* unnecessary.’—Page 531.

My account is not to be disposed of in so summary a manner; nor shall this note, though put forth as it were with the weight of the duke of Wellington’s name, by being inserted amongst his Despatches, remain without an answer.

Colonel Gurwood sent me a letter, containing what he calls ‘*a correct statement and proofs of it.*’ But I know of no *proofs*, and the correctness of his statement depends on his own recollections, which the wound he received in the head at the time seems to have rendered extremely confused; at least the following recollections of other officers are directly at variance with Colonel Gurwood. In his ‘*correct statement*’ he says, ‘When I first went up the breach there were still some of the enemy in it, it was very steep and on my arrival at the top of it under the gun I was knocked down either by a shot or stone thrown at me. I can assure you that not a lock was snapped as you describe; but finding it impossible that the breach from its steepness and narrowness could be carried by the bayonet, I ordered the men to load, certainly before the arrival of the storming party; and having

placed some of the men on each side of the breach I went up the middle with the remainder, and when in the act of climbing over the disabled gun at the top of the breach which you describe, I was wounded in the head by a musket shot fired so close to me that it blew my cap to pieces, and I was tumbled over senseless from the top to the bottom of the breach. When I recovered my senses I found myself close to George,\* who was sitting on a stone with his arm broken. I asked him how the thing was going on, &c. &c.†

Now to the above statement I oppose the following letters from the authors of the statement given in the Appendix relating to the storming of Badajos.

Major-general sir GEORGE NAPIER to colonel  
WILLIAM NAPIER.

‘I am sorry our gallant friend Gurwood is not satisfied with, and disputes the accuracy of your account of the assault of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo as detailed in your work. I can only say, that account was principally, if not wholly taken from colonel Fergusson’s (he being one of my storming captains) and my own narrative of that transaction up to the period when we were each of us wounded. *I adhere to the correctness of all I stated to you*, and beg further to say that my friend colonel Mitchell, who was also one of my captains in the storming party, told me the last time I saw him at the commander-in-chief’s levee, that my statement was *‘perfectly correct.’* And both he and colonel Fergusson recollected the circumstance of my not permitting the party to load; and also, that upon being checked when nearly two-thirds up the breach by the enemy’s fire, the men, forgetting their pieces were not loaded snapped them off, but I called to them and reminded them of my orders to force their way with the bayonet alone! It was at that moment I was wounded and fell, and I never either spoke to or saw Gurwood afterwards during that night, as he rushed on with the other officers of the party to the top of the breach. Upon looking over a small manuscript of the various events of my life as a soldier, written many years ago, I find all I stated to you corroborated in every particular. Of course as colonel Gurwood tells you he was *twice* at the top of the breach before any of the storming

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\* The present major-general Sir George Napier.



party entered it, I cannot take upon myself to contradict him, but I certainly do not conceive how it was possible, as he and myself jumped into the ditch together; I saw him wounded, and spoke to him *after* having mounted the fausse-braye with him, and *before* we rushed up the breach in the body of the place. I never saw him or spoke to him after I was struck down, the whole affair did not last above twenty-five or thirty minutes; but as I fell when about two-thirds up the breach I can only answer for the correctness of my account to that period; soon after I was assisted to get down the breach by the prince of Orange (who kindly gave his sash to tie up my shattered arm, and which sash is now in my possession) by the present duke of Richmond and lord Fitzroy Somerset, all three of whom I believe were actively engaged in the assault. Our friend Gurwood did his duty like a gallant and active soldier, but I cannot admit of his having been *twice in the breach before the other officers of the storming party and myself!*

I believe yourself and every man in the army with whom I have the honour to be acquainted will acquit me of any wish or intention to deprive a gallant comrade and brother-officer of the credit and honour due to his bravery; more particularly one with whom I have long been on terms of intimate friendship, and whose abilities I admire as much as I respect and esteem his conduct as a soldier; therefore this statement can or ought only to be attributed to my sense of *what is due* to the other gallant officers and soldiers who were under my command in the assault of the lesser breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, and not to any *wish* or *intention* on my part to detract from the distinguished services of, or the laurels gained by colonel Gurwood on that occasion. Of course you are at liberty to refer to me if necessary and to make what use you please of this letter privately or publicly either now or at any future period. *I steadily adhere to all I have ever stated to you or any one else, and I am,* &c. &c.

GEORGE NAPIER

Extract of a letter from colonel JAMES FERGUSSON, fifty-second regiment (formerly a captain of the forty-third and one of the storming party.) Addressed to sir GEORGE NAPIER.

‘I send you a memorandum I made some time back from memory and in consequence of having seen various accounts

respecting our assault. You are perfectly correct as to Gurwood, and your description of the way we carried the breach is accurate; and now I have seen your memorandum I recollect the circumstance of the men's arms not being loaded and the snapping of the firelocks.'—'I was not certain when you were wounded, but your description of the scene on the breach and the way in which it was carried is perfectly accurate.'

Extract of a letter from colonel FERGUSSON to colonel  
WILLIAM NAPIER.

'I think the account you give in your History, of the attack of the little breach at Ciudad Rodrigo is as favourable to Gurwood as he has any right to expect, and agrees perfectly both with your brother George's recollections of that attack and with mine. Our late friend Alexander Steele, who was one of my officers, declared he was with Gurwood the whole of the time, for a great part of the storming party of the forty-third joined Gurwood's party, who were placing the ladders against the work, and it was the engineer officer calling out that they were wrong and pointing out the way to the breach in the *fausse-braye* that directed our attention to it. Jonathan Wyld\* one of the forty-third was the first man that run up the *fausse-braye*, and we made directly for the little breach which was defended *exactly as you describe*. We were on the breach some little time, and when we collected about thirty men (some of the third battalion rifle brigade in the number) we made a simultaneous rush, cheered, and run in, so that positively no claim could be made as to the first who entered the breach. I do not want to dispute with Gurwood, but I again say (in which your brother agrees) that some of the storming party were *before* the forlorn hope. I do not dispute that Gurwood and some of his party were among the number that rushed in at the breach, but as to his having twice mounted the breach before us, *I cannot understand it, and Steele always positively denied it.*'

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Having thus justified myself from the charge of writing upon bad information about the assault of the little breach, I shall add something about that of the great breach.

Colonel Gurwood offers himself as an encouraging example

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\* A private—a splendid soldier.

for the subalterns of the British army in future wars; but the following extract from a statement of the late major Mackie, so well known for his bravery, worth and modesty, and who as a subaltern led the forlorn hope at the great breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, denies colonel Gurwood's claim to the particular merit upon which he seems inclined to found his good fortune in after life.

Extracts from a memoir addressed by the late major MACKIE to colonel NAPIER. October, 1838.

‘The troops being immediately ordered to advance were soon across the ditch and upon the breach at the same instant with the ninety-fourth who had advanced along the ditch. To mount under the fire of the defenders was the work of a moment, but when there difficulties of a formidable nature presented themselves; on each flank a deep trench was cut across the rampart isolating the breach, which was enfiladed with cannon and musketry; while in front, from the rampart into the streets of the town, was a perpendicular fall of ten or twelve feet; the whole preventing the soldiers from making that bold and rapid onset so effective in facilitating the success of such an enterprise. The great body of the fire of defence being from the houses and from an open space in front of the breach, in the first impulse of the moment I dropt from the rampart into the town. Finding myself here quite alone and no one following, I discovered that the trench upon the right of the breach was cut across the whole length of the rampart, thereby opening a free access to our troops and rendering what was intended by the enemy as a defence completely the reverse. By this opening I again mounted to the top of the breach and led the men down into the town. The enemy's fire, which I have stated had been, after we gained the summit of the wall, confined to the houses and open space alluded to, now began to slacken, and ultimately they abandoned the defence. Being at this time in advance of the whole of the third division, I led what men I could collect along the street, leading in a direct line from the great breach into the centre of the town, by which street the great body of the enemy were precipitately retiring. Having advanced considerably and passed across a street running to the left, a body of the enemy came suddenly from that street, rushed through our ranks and escaped. In pursuit of this body, which after passing us held their course to the right, I urged the party forwards in that direction until we reached the citadel, where

the governor and garrison had taken refuge. The outer gate of the enclosure being open, I entered at the head of the party composed of men of different regiments who by this time had joined the advance. Immediately on entering I was hailed by a French officer asking for an English general to whom he might surrender. Pointing to my epaulettes in token of their security, the door of the keep or stronghold of the place was opened, and a sword presented to me in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received. This I had scarcely done when two of their officers laid hold of me for protection, one on each arm, and *it was while I was thus situated that lieutenant Gurwood came up and obtained the sword of the governor.*

‘In this way, the governor, with lieutenant Gurwood and the two officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms, the whole party moved towards the rampart. Having found when there, that in the confusion incident to such a scene I had lost as it were by accident that prize which was actually within my reach, and which I had justly considered as my own, in the chagrin of the moment I turned upon my heel and left the spot. The following day, in company with captain Lindsay of the eighty-eighth regiment I waited upon colonel Pakenham, then assistant-adjutant-general to the third division, to know if my name had been mentioned by general Picton as having led the advance of the right brigade. He told me that it had, and I therefore took no further notice of the circumstance, feeling assured that I should be mentioned in the way of which all officers in similar circumstances must be so ambitious. My chagrin and disappointment may be easily imagined when lord Wellington’s despatches reached the army from England to find my name altogether omitted, and the right brigade deprived of their just meed of praise.’— ‘Sir, it is evident that the tendency of this note’ (colonel Gurwood’s note quoted from the Despatches) ‘is unavoidably, though I do him the justice to believe by no means intentionally upon colonel Gurwood’s part, to impress the public with the belief that he was himself the first British officer that entered the citadel of Ciudad Rodrigo, consequently the one to whom its garrison surrendered. This impression the language he employs is the more likely to convey, inasmuch as to his exertions and good fortune in this particular instance he refers the whole of his professional success, to which he points the attention of the future aspirant as a pledge of the rewards to be expected from similar efforts to deserve them. To obviate this impression, and in bare justice to the right



brigade of the third division, and, as a member of it, to myself, I feel called on to declare that though I do not claim for that brigade exclusively the credit of forcing the defences of the great breach, the left brigade having joined in it contrary to the intention of lord Wellington under the circumstances stated, yet I do declare on the word of a man of honour, that *I was the first individual who effected the descent from the main breach into the streets of the town, that I preceded the advance into the body of the place, that I was the first who entered the citadel, and that the enemy there assembled had surrendered to myself and party before lieutenant Gurwood came up.* Referring to the inference which colonel Gurwood has been pleased to draw from his own good fortune as to the certainty and value of the rewards awaiting the exertions of the British soldier, permit me, sir, in bare justice to myself to say that at the time I volunteered the forlorn hope on this occasion, I was senior lieutenant of my own regiment, consequently the first for promotion. Having as such succeeded so immediately after to a company, I could scarcely expect nor did I ask further promotion at the time, but after many years of additional service, I did still conceive and do still maintain, that I was entitled to bring forward my services on that day as a ground for asking that step of rank which every officer leading a forlorn hope had received with the exception of myself.

‘May I, sir, appeal to your sense of justice in lending me your aid to prevent my being deprived of the only reward I had hitherto enjoyed, in the satisfaction of thinking that the services which I am now compelled most reluctantly to bring in some way to the notice of the public, had during the period that has since elapsed, never once been called in question. It was certainly hard enough that a service of this nature should have been productive of no advantage to me in my military life. I feel it however infinitely more annoying that I should now find myself in danger of being stript of any credit to which it might entitle me, by the looseness of the manner in which colonel Gurwood words his statement. I need not say that this danger is only the more imminent from his statement appearing in a work which, as being published under the auspices of the duke of Wellington as well as of the Horse Guards, has at least the appearance of coming in the guise of an official authority.’—‘I agree most cordially with colonel Gurwood in the opinion he has expressed in his note, that he is himself an instance where reward and merit have gone hand in hand. I feel compelled however, for the reasons

given, to differ from him materially as to the precise ground on which he considers the honours and advantages that have followed his deserts to be, not only the distinguished but the just and natural consequences of his achievements on that day. *I allude to the claim advanced by colonel Gurwood to be considered the individual by whom the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo was made prisoner of war.* It could scarcely be expected that at such a moment I could be aware that the sword which I received was not the governor's, being in fact that of one of his aide-de-camps. I repeat however that before lieutenant Gurwood and his party came up, the enemy had expressed their wish to surrender, that a sword was presented by them in token of submission and received by me as a pledge, on the honour of a British officer, that according to the laws of war, I held myself responsible for their safety as prisoners under the protection of the British arms. Not a shadow of resistance was afterwards made, and I appeal to every impartial mind in the least degree acquainted with the rules of modern warfare if under these circumstances I am not justified in asserting, that before and at the time lieutenant Gurwood arrived, the whole of the enemy's garrison, within the walls of the citadel, governor included, were both *de jure* and *de facto* prisoners to myself. In so far, therefore, as he being the individual who made its owner captive, could give either of us a claim to receive that sword to which colonel Gurwood ascribes such magic influence in the furthering of his after fortunes, I do maintain that at the time it became *de facto* his, it was *de jure* mine.'

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Something still remains to set colonel Gurwood right upon matters which he has apparently touched upon without due consideration. In a note appended to that part of the duke of Wellington's *Despatches* which relate to the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo he says, that the late captain Dobbs of the fifty-second at Sabugal 'recovered the howitzer, taken by the forty-third regiment but retaken by the enemy.' This is totally incorrect. The howitzer was taken by the forty-third and retained by the forty-third. The fifty-second regiment never even knew of its capture until the action was over. Captain Dobbs was a brave officer and a very generous-minded man, he was more likely to keep his own just claims to distinction in the back-ground than to appropriate the merit of others to himself. I am therefore quite at a loss to know upon what authority colonel Gurwood has stated a fact inac-

curate and **unsupported** by the duke of Wellington's despatch, which distinctly says the howitzer was taken by the forty-third regiment.

Here I must state, that, treating of general Hill's enterprise against the French forts at Almaraz, I quoted the duke of Wellington as complaining to the ministers that his generals were so fearful of responsibility the slightest movements of the enemy deprived them of their judgment. Trusting that the Despatches then in progress of publication would bear me out, I did not give my authority at large in the Appendix; since then, the letter on which I relied has been published by colonel Gurwood in the Despatches, but purged of the passage to which I allude, and without any indication of its being so garbled. This omission might hereafter give a handle to accuse me of bad faith, wherefore I now give the letter in full, the *Italics* marking the restored passage:—

*From lord Wellington to the earl of Liverpool.*

*Fuente Guinaldo, May 28th, 1812.*

MY DEAR LORD,—You will be as well pleased as I am at general Hill's success, which certainly would have been still more satisfactory if he had taken the garrison of Mirabete; which he would have done if general Chowne had gone on a little better in the night of the 16th; and if sir William Erskine had not very unnecessarily alarmed him, by informing him that Soult's whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura. Sir Rowland therefore according to his instructions came back on the 21st, whereas if he had stayed a day or two he would have brought his heavy howitzers to bear on the castle, and he would either have stormed it under his fire or the garrison would have surrendered. *But notwithstanding all that has passed I cannot prevail upon the general officers to feel a little confidence in their situation. They take alarm at the least movement of the enemy and then spread the alarm, and interrupt everything, and the extraordinary circumstance is, that if they are not in command they are as stout as any private soldiers in the army.* Your lordship will observe that I have marked some passages in Hill's report not to be published. My opinion is that the enemy must evacuate the tower of Mirabete, and indeed it is useless to keep that post unless they have another bridge, which I doubt. But if they see that we entertain a favourable opinion of the strength of Mirabete, they will keep their garrison there, which might be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to establish there our own bridge. I enclose a Madrid Gazette in which you will



see a curious description of the state of king Joseph's authority and his affairs in general from the most authentic sources.

Ever, my dear lord, &c. &c.

WELLINGTON.

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### VILLA MURIEL.

THE following statement of the operations of the fifth division at the combat of Muriel, 25th October, 1812, is inserted at the desire of sir John Oswald. It proves that I have erroneously attributed to him the first and, as it appeared to me, unskilful disposition of the troops; but with respect to the other portions of his statement, without denying or admitting the accuracy of his recollections, I shall give the authority I chiefly followed, first printing his statement.

#### *Affair of Villa Muriel.*

On the morning 25th of October, 1812, major-general Oswald joined and assumed the command of the fifth division at Villa Muriel on the Carrion. Major-general Pringle had already posted the troops, and the greater portion of the division were admirably disposed of about the village, as also in the dry bed of a canal running in its rear in some places parallel to the Carrion. Certain of the corps were formed in columns of attack supported by reserves, ready to fall upon the enemy if in consequence of the mine failing he should venture to push a column along the narrow bridge. The river had at some points been reported fordable, but these were said to be at all times difficult and in the then rise of water, as they proved, hardly practicable. As the enemy closed towards the bridge, he opened a heavy fire of artillery on the village. At that moment lord Wellington entered it and passed the formed columns well sheltered both from fire and observation. His lordship approved of the manner the post was occupied and of the advantage taken of the *canal and village* to mask the troops. The French supported by a heavy and superior fire rushed gallantly on the bridge, the mine not exploding and destroying the arch till the leading section had almost reached the spot. Shortly after, the main body retired, leaving only a few light troops. Immediately previous to this an orderly officer announced to lord Wellington that Palencia and its bridges were gained by the foe. He ordered the main body of the division immediately to ascend the heights in its



rear, and along the plateau to move towards Palencia in order to meet an attack from that quarter. Whilst the division was in the act of ascending, a report was made by major Hill of the eighth caçadores, that the ford had been won, passed by a body of cavalry causing the caçadores to fall back on the broken ground. The enemy, it appears, were from the first acquainted with these fords, for his push to them was nearly simultaneous with his assault on the bridge. The division moved on the heights towards Palencia; it had not however proceeded far, before an order came directing it to retire and form on the right of the Spaniards, and when collected to remain on the heights till further orders. About this time the cavalry repassed the river, nor had either infantry or artillery passed by the ford to aid in the attack, but in consequence of the troops being withdrawn from the village and canal a partial repair was given to the bridge, and small bodies of infantry were passed over skirmishing with the Spaniards whose post on the heights was directly in front of Villa Muriel. No serious attack from that quarter was to be apprehended until an advance from Palencia. It was on that point therefore that attention was fixed. Day was closing when lord Wellington came upon the heights and said all was quiet at Palencia and that the enemy must now be driven from the right bank. General Oswald inquired if after clearing the village the division was to remain there for the night. His lordship replied, the village was to be occupied in force and held by the division till it was withdrawn, which would probably be very early in the morning. He directed the first brigade under brigadier-general Barnes to attack the enemy's flank, the second under Pringle to advance in support extending to the left so as to succour the Spaniards who were unsuccessfully contending with the enemy in their front. The casualties in the division were not numerous, especially when the fire it was exposed to is considered. The enemy sustained a comparative heavy loss. The troops were by a rapid advance of the first brigade cut off from the bridge and forced into the river, where many were drowned. The allies fell back in the morning unmolested.

JOHN OSWALD, &c. &c. &c.

*Memoir on the combat of Muriel by captain Hopkins, fourth regiment.*

As we approached Villa Muriel the face of the country upon our left flank as we were then retrograding appeared open; in our front ran the river Carrion, and immediately on the

opposite side of the river and parallel to it there was a broad deep dry canal. On our passing the bridge at Villa Muriel we had that village on our left, from the margin of the canal the ground sloped gradually up into heights, the summit forming a fine plateau. Villa Muriel was occupied by the brigadier Pringle with a *small* detachment of infantry, but at the time we considered that it required a larger force, as its maintenance appeared of the utmost importance to the army; we were aware that the enemy had passed the Carrion with cavalry and also that Hill's *caçadores* had given way at another part of the river. Our engineers had partly destroyed the bridge of Villa Muriel, the enemy attacked the village, (at the time the brigadier and his staff were there,\*) passing the ruins of the bridge by means of ladders, &c. The enemy in driving the detachment from the village made some prisoners. We retired to the plateau of the heights, under a fire of musketry and artillery, where we halted in close column; the enemy strengthened the village.

Lord Wellington arrived with his staff on the plateau, and immediately reconnoitred the enemy whose reinforcements had arrived and were forming strong columns on the other side of the river. Lord Wellington immediately ordered some artillery to be opened on the enemy. I happened to be close to the head-quarter staff and heard lord Wellington say to an aide-de-camp, 'Tell Oswald I want him.' On sir John Oswald arriving he said, 'Oswald, you will get the division under arms and drive the enemy from the village and retain possession of it.' He replied, 'My lord, if the village should be taken I do not consider it as tenable.' Wellington then said, 'It is my orders, general.' Oswald replied, 'My lord, as it is your orders they shall be obeyed.' Wellington then gave orders to him 'that he should take the second brigade of the division and attack in line, that the first brigade should in column first descend the heights on the right of the second, enter the canal and assist in clearing it of the enemy,' and saying, 'I will tell you what I will do, Oswald. I will give you the Spaniards and Alava into the bargain, headed by a company of the ninth regiment upon your left.' The attack was made accordingly, the second battalion of the fourth regiment being left in reserve in column on the slope of the hill exposed to a severe cannonade which for a short time caused them some confusion. The enemy were driven from

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\* A false stopping here misled me about the bridge. I made the allies pass by ladders instead of the French.

the canal and village, and the prisoners which they made in the morning were retaken. The enemy lost some men in this affair, but general Alava was wounded, the officer commanding the company of Brunswickers killed, and several of the division killed and wounded. During the attack lord Wellington sent the prince of Orange under a heavy fire for the purpose of preventing the troops exposing themselves at the canal, two companies defended the bridge with a detachment just arrived from England. The possession of the village proved of the utmost importance, as the retrograde movement we made that night could not have been effected with safety had the enemy been on our side of the river ; as it was we were enabled to pass along the river with all arms in the most perfect security.

A REPLY  
TO  
LORD STRANGFORD'S 'OBSERVATIONS,'

ETC. ETC.

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I AM told Lord Strangford's observations upon my work require an answer. I think not, but yield to advice.

I deny being instigated by party spirit. Lord Strangford will find in the Edinburgh Review, April, 1808, how party writers handle the subject. That article has never been controverted, and might be used as historical; but I rest my reply upon the analysis of his lordship's observations. He has admitted most of the essential points in my historical notice of the Portuguese emigration; and his apparent contradictions are so unskilfully, or rather so skilfully managed, as to avoid the object they seem to aim at.

Page 4, he says, his '*despatches* relating to the Portuguese emigration *were* originally written, as their date proclaims, on board the Hibernia,' and he adduces Mr. Elgar's letter as confirmatory of the fact; but my reference was not to *despatches*, but that *single despatch*, which being dated '29th of November, 1808, H.M.S. Hibernia, off the Tagus,' was nevertheless written in Mr. Canning's house, Bruton-street, on the 19th of December: hence neither Mr. Elgar's letter nor lord Strangford's assertion touch the question.

Lord Strangford says, '*no despatch was written at Salt Hill, nor in the presence of sir James Yeo;*' and '*it is absolutely untrue that, either there or at any other place, from the day he left the Tagus to that of his arrival in London, he ever wrote one line relating to public business.*' Mr. Sylvester's letter is, he says, conclusive on that head. Now, of these two assertions the latter may be strictly true, yet not conclusive, any more than is Mr. Sylvester's letter; because lord Strang-



ford arrived in London the same day\* that he arrived at Salt Hill, yet he wrote on that day and in Mr. Canning's house, the despatch dated '29th November, H.M.S. Hibernia, off the Tagus.'

'Sir James'† Yeo's presence during the writing at Salt Hill is explicitly denied by lord Strangford; but my words were '*confidently asserted*,' meaning thereby, confidently asserted by others, not by me. I repeat, the fact has been so asserted by many persons; a written assertion of it was before me at the time of penning the expression. I knew sir James Yeo was the original authority, and farther information to the same purport has reached me since (see Appendix A); nevertheless I considered as sir James Yeo was dead, some misconstruction of his words might have arisen, and it would be more just to leave that matter doubtful; hence the qualifying expression, 'it is confidently asserted.'

Lord Strangford's denial is however sufficient. I believe sir James was mistaken. I believe the letter written in his presence, and sent off by a king's messenger, related to private, not to public business: and if my work should reach a second edition, the text shall run thus: lord Strangford's despatch, dated the 29th November, H.M.S. Hibernia, off the Tagus, but really written the 19th December at Mr. Canning's house, Bruton-street, London.

Lord Strangford assures me that, with the exception of '*some passages tending to compromise the safety of individuals, to give notice to his Majesty's enemies of intended operations, or that might prove offensive to the government to which he was about to be re-accredited*,' a reasonable bill of exceptions truly! no essential fact contained in the original despatches was suppressed in the revised one. Perhaps not; but the question in discussion is, whether that despatch, or narrative, or composition, or whatever it may be called, did or did not faithfully relate the events which had taken place? Whether it gave a true or an erroneous *impression* of lord Strangford's exertions upon the occasion of the Portuguese emigration? A few extracts from the despatch itself, placed in juxtaposition with

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\* Lord Strangford says he arrived in Bruton-street on Saturday night. Captain Yeo thought it was Sunday morning that lord Strangford and himself were together at Salt Hill. Can his lordship have made a mistake of a day in this instance, such as he has evidently made in his despatch relative to his arrival in Lisbon the 27th of November?

† He was then only Captain Yeo. Lord Strangford weighs his words very nicely

the statement now put forth by his lordship, will set this matter in a fair light.

*Lord Strangford in  
Despatch.*

'I accordingly requested an audience of the Prince Regent, together with due assurances of protection and security; and upon receiving H.R. Highness's answer I proceeded to Lisbon on the 27th, in his Majesty's ship *Confiance*, bearing a flag of truce. I had immediately most interesting communications with the court of Lisbon, the particulars of which shall be fully detailed in a future despatch. It suffices to mention in this place that the Prince Regent wisely directed all his apprehensions to a French army, and all his hopes to an English fleet; that he received the most explicit assurances from me, that his Majesty would generously overlook those acts of unwilling and momentary hostility, &c. &c., and that the British squadron before the Tagus should be employed to protect his retreat from Lisbon, and his voyage to the Brazil.'

*Lord Strangford in Obser-  
vation.*

Page 22, paragraph 46. 'I arrived at Lisbon on the night of the 28th instant, and almost immediately saw Mr. A'Aranjo, who was already on board ship. I then proceeded to the vessel in which the Prince Regent was embarked, and notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary in colonel Napier's note, I had a long and most confidential interview with his Royal Highness. I had then, as colonel Napier truly states, no power either to advance or retard the emigration; but when did I ever assume that I had, or take any credit to myself for anything that passed at that interview with his Royal Highness.'

To lord Strangford's question I reply, that I never accused him of taking credit for his exertions at an interview had the night of the 28th, with the Prince Regent on board ship; but I did assert that his Bruton-street despatch conveyed an erroneous impression as to his personal proceedings. I assert it again. A despatch, stating that lord Strangford proceeded to Lisbon the 27th, and immediately had most interesting communications with the court of Lisbon, does not convey the idea that lord Strangford arrived in the night of the 28th, and saw the Prince Regent on board ship. This goes to the pith of the question, because the embarkation of the royal family took place on the 27th; which, coupled with the 'apprehensions directed to a French army,' the 'hopes to an English fleet,' and the explicit assurance that the British squadron

'*would protect*' the prince's '*retreat from Lisbon,*' inevitably led to the conclusion, that his lordship's '*immediate communications*' produced the resolution to embark: than which nothing could be more erroneous.

But it seems, notwithstanding my assertion to the contrary, lord Strangford had a long and most confidential interview with the prince regent on board ship on the night of the 28th. The expression 'any official interview,' taken singly, may be construed to mean, that lord Strangford had no interview whatever with the Portuguese prince; but taken with its context, plainly refers only to an interview demanded for the purpose of urging the emigration, and in that sense lord Strangford admits its truth.

Comparing the relative merits of lord Strangford and sir Sydney Smith, with reference to the emigration, I acknowledge that the words '*kept a naval force off Lisbon*' do imply greater activity and zeal by the English ministers than the facts, as stated by lord Strangford, will justify. I will substitute the word '*sent a naval force.*'

Lord Strangford rests his claim on a long series of previous negotiations. I do not deny his lordship's perseverance in these negotiations; but I deny that his perseverance was successful. All that can be said is, that in despite of the confiscation of English property, and the detainer of English subjects, and although he was himself driven, as it were ignominiously out of Lisbon and forced to join the fleet in an open boat; and although these insults were put forward by the Portuguese prince as a peace-offering to the French monarch, lord Strangford still *had hopes!*

The prince regent was timid and irresolute, and there was a powerful court faction opposed to the emigration; but lord Strangford thought fear would prevail over indolence, that the prince would finally emigrate, and he did emigrate! lord Strangford *guessed well!* In America this might be a positive merit, but there they have not red ribands. Let us, however, examine a little closer into the facts, as given by his lordship.

Early in August, the prince regent, speaking through his minister, solemnly assured lord Strangford he would not consent to the demand for confiscating British property in Portugal.

The 19th of August, the prince wrote an autograph letter to the king of England, in which he declared his fixed resolution to emigrate, rather than sacrifice his honour by consenting to the French and Spanish demands.

The 2nd of September, a council being held at *Maфра*, it



was agreed the emigration should take place in either of the following cases. 1st, If the French should attempt to compel the prince to violate the rights of British subjects in their persons or property. 2nd, If an overwhelming French force should cross the frontier and take possession of the Portuguese fortresses.

On the 2nd of November, Mr. de Limá, a Portuguese courtier, returned from Paris; he was adverse to the emigration, and the 8th of November *all British property was confiscated, and British subjects detained as prisoners*. Here then the first contingency on which the departure of the prince was to depend had taken place. Did the emigration follow? No! but the British minister was driven from Lisbon. Nevertheless the prince regent privately assured the latter he would emigrate *if the French army advanced*.

Meanwhile a state of war commenced, lord Strangford's functions ceased, and sir Sydney's came into full activity. Lisbon and St. Ubes were blockaded, and Portuguese ships detained for adjudication. The 20th of November Junot crossed the frontier, the 24th, a council was held by the prince regent; the second case had arrived, the emigration, says lord Strangford, was resolved upon, the prince's promise redeemed. Not so fast, my lord. A resolution taken in the council of Mafra, was to emigrate rather than sacrifice British subjects and their property; yet when the push came, the first were detained, the second was confiscated. The prince regent also promised the king of England that he would emigrate rather than accede to the demands of France and Spain; yet he drove the king's representative from his court, confiscated British property, and made British subjects prisoners to please the French. Thus, according to lord Strangford, he broke his public, solemn, voluntary promise to the sovereign of England, when he thought by so doing he could mollify the French monarch. Can it then be doubted that he would have broken his private promise to lord Strangford, if there had been only the advance of the French army to induce him to keep it?

Those causes were, 1°. The reception of a *Moniteur*, in which it was intimated by a man who rarely broke his political promises, that the *House of Braganza should not reign*. 2°. The '*solitary letter*' of sir Sydney Smith, which offered the assistance of the English fleet to forward the emigration, and menaced Lisbon with an attack if that measure was delayed.

Lord Strangford says, sir Sydney's letter had no influence on the prince regent's decision, but there is good ground for believing the resolution of the 24th was not final; the prince



desired to procrastinate; he would have accepted terms from Junot, if he could have got them, and it was not until the 26th that the resolution to emigrate was irrevocably fixed (See B.)

Lord Strangford asserts, that sir Sydney's letter was written under his authority; sir Sydney's story runs thus: 'The whole question of their departure, or remaining prisoners to Junot, turned on my opening the door again, on my *single judgment*, after it had been shut by the expulsion of lord Strangford from Lisbon, and the consequent beginning of a state of war, and my exercising my *single discretion* in not allowing that state to continue.'

Between conflicting authorities, we may choose. I follow sir Sydney's version. First, because lord Strangford had *no authority*, his functions *had ceased*. Sir Sydney, acting under an Admiralty warrant, founded on the order in council of November, 1807, was entitled to seize all Portuguese vessels, even the royal fleet, as prizes, without reference to lord Strangford, who, as I am informed, had actually applied to sir Sydney for a frigate to convey him to England, previous to this letter having been written. Second, because the letters marked (D. E. F.) said by lord Strangford to prove his having authorized the letter in question, relate, not to the letter conveying the threat of an attack on Lisbon, but one relating to the blockade of the Tagus and St. Ubes. Sir Sydney Smith may say whether his letter was not shown, *after signature*, by him to Lord Strangford, for the express purpose of proving to his lordship that his authority was at an end, and the admiral acting on his own responsibility.

Mr. Canning's speeches are triumphantly quoted by lord Strangford in proof of his merits. The testimony would be more valuable if the despatch had not been composed in Bruton-street. Mr. Canning's *spoken speeches* upon Portuguese affairs, have not always been considered good authority even by himself; witness the alteration in the printed version of his celebrated oration delivered in 1827.

What is the amount of Mr. Canning's testimony? That lord Strangford *had all along affirmed*, that he *had predicted* the emigration would take place; that he had been *employed to advise and to urge* that splendid and magnanimous emigration. Splendid and magnanimous! To abandon a brave and generous people is then splendid! To fly trembling from the face of an enemy is magnanimous! We often hear of a magnanimous death in defence of one's country—a magnanimous running away is nev

Lord Strangford predicted this magnanimous and splendid measure. So lord Liverpool once talked of a march to Paris, and in due time it happened. I believe lord Liverpool does not wear a Waterloo medal, and I believe lord Strangford's predictions would have failed, if the *Moniteur*, containing the intimation relative to the House of Braganza had not been received, and if sir Sydney Smith's '*solitary letter*' had not arrived to give full effect to the fear created by the *Moniteur*.

If the prince had really resolved to emigrate previously, why were his ships not prepared for the voyage? why all the confusion and distress to individuals from the want of previous arrangement when he did embark? why was the British property confiscated? why was the British minister driven from the court? why, if the prince was so friendly to the English, in such confidential intercourse with the British minister, why, I ask, did that minister leave him in ignorance of the fact, that very valuable property and many British subjects were still in Portugal when he signed the decree of confiscation?

It is clear as a Lisbon sun, and lord Strangford says as much in paragraph forty-five, that this weak prince would, between powerful contending factions have vacillated until Junot reached his palace, had not the *Moniteur* put an end to his hopes of mollifying the French, and sir Sydney's vigorous negotiation put an end to his indolence. If therefore the red riband was a reward for inducing the splendid and magnanimous running away of the prince regent, it should be cut into three parts, one for lord Strangford, one for sir Sydney, one for the writer of the *Moniteur*.

I do not ask lord Strangford if the prince expressed his *surprise*, that the Bruton-street despatch represented him as influenced to emigrate by lord Strangford's remonstrance; I do not ask if it be not a *mistake in his Bruton-street despatch* to say he accompanied the prince regent in his *passage over the bar of Lisbon*; I do not ask if the captain of the Hibernia was not the *first Englishman the prince met* from the time of his quitting Lisbon, until after he had cleared the mouth of the river. I know the prince said all this, when in the Brazils; but I am content to establish the general accuracy of my own historical note. I have asserted positively only three essential facts. 1st. Lord Strangford's Bruton-street despatch did not do justice to sir Sydney Smith. 2nd. It gave an erroneous impression of his lordship's own proceeding. 3rd. Lord Strangford got a red riband for it. I have shown it *did not* do justice to the admiral; lord Strangford's

own statements prove that *it did* give an erroneous account of his proceedings on the 27th; but it appears he got the red riband for his *predictions*.

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Lord Strangford has published a second Pamphlet in defence of himself. I would have answered it, had not his lordship caused criminal proceedings to be taken against Mr. Murdo Young, the editor of the *Sun*, for some peculiarly harsh and insulting observations upon lord Strangford in this matter. Lord Brougham, counsel for Mr. Young, maintained the justice of his client's observations, and the result saved me the trouble of writing. For when Mr. Tyndal, attorney-general, defended lord Strangford's proceedings on the ground that it was usual to make the public despatch false, Mr. Justice Bayley pithily observed, that '*he liked honesty in all places*,' and the court refusing his lordship a remedy, discharged the rule for a trial.

## APPENDIX.

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(A.)

*Letter from Mr. Smith to col. G. Napier*

Dawlish, June 16, 1828.

DEAR SIR,—In reply to your inquiry made on the part of your brother, I can safely say, that he is not the only person who has heard the report of a despatch having been written at Salt Hill; for I have heard it too, and my informant was captain Yeo (afterwards sir James Yeo).

He told me that he saw lord Strangford write at Salt Hill what he conceived to be a despatch, and that what was then written was sent off by a king's messenger. This impression (whether mistaken or not) was what was on sir James Yeo's mind, I am perfectly certain; but I can myself speak only to the fact of his having communicated it to me.

I remain, very sincerely yours,  
C. D. SMITH.

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(B.)

*Letter from vice-admiral sir Graham Moore, K.C.B., to  
lieut-col. Wm. Napier.*

Cobham, Surrey, June 4, 1828.

MY DEAR NAPIER,—I have a perfect recollection of having been informed by different Portuguese gentlemen amongst those who accompanied the late king of Portugal (at that time prince regent) to the Brazils, that his embarking on the 27th day of November, 1807, was a measure not resolved upon until the day previous to its taking place; that the prince had always entertained some hopes of being able to accommodate matters with the French; that he never would have ventured on the step he did, had the British squadron not appeared; and that a letter sent in by sir Sydney Smith turned the scale. He had long been wavering and changing, according to the news and reports of the day, and scarcely anybody at Lisbon thought that he would put his declared intention into execution, which, in a great degree,



accounts for the unprepared state the fleet was in when it run out of the Tagus, which for confusion, dirt, and disorder, exceeded any scene I ever beheld. From all that I learned in the Brazils, and from what passed off Lisbon and on the passage, my opinion has ever been, that the presence of the British squadron off Lisbon, the message sent in by sir Sydney Smith, and the rapid advance of the French army under Junot, thus placing him, as one might say, between the devil and the deep sea, were the real causes of the emigration of the prince regent and the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils. I have also a perfect recollection of the disgust which everybody at Rio de Janeiro felt when the despatch signed Strangford, and dated 'his Majesty's ship Hibernia, off the Tagus, Nov. 29, 1807,' appeared there. It seems to me of very little importance whether that despatch were written at Salt Hill or in Mr. Canning's apartments in London.

I am, &c. &c.

GRAHAM MOORE.

# REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,

WITH

OBSERVATIONS ILLUSTRATING SIR J. MOORE'S CAMPAIGNS

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ANONYMOUS periodical criticisms are like wasps, they sting and die; but elaborate writings, argumentative, and imputing inaccuracy, are different. I speak only of English works; to meet Spanish writers would be endless labour. Sir Hew Dalrymple's excellent Memoirs, published after my second volume had appeared, show I have not strained my authorities; and if they are not sufficient, I have no other justification as regards Spain.

The English publications which I propose to notice, are—

- 1°. Notes on the Campaign of 1808-9 in the North of Portugal. By Colonel Sorrel.
- 2°. Narrative of the Peninsular War. By Major Leith Hay.
- 3°. Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns. By the Author of Cyril Thornton.
- 4°. Strictures upon Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War. Anonymous.
- 5°. Life of the Duke of Wellington. By Major Moyle Sherer.

*Colonel Sorrel's Notes.*—These were dictated by sir David Baird in the notion that I and other authors, aimed to lower his reputation; a design not to be discovered in what I have said of that brave officer. But history would indeed be 'an old almanac,' if, out of respect to persons, errors influencing great events were suppressed: in this view only have I censured sir D. Baird, and I will now justify my censures, yet my own mistakes acknowledge, with a sincere wish that they were fewer.

1°. It is charged as a fault, that I said, '*the rear of sir D. Baird's column extended beyond Lugo on the 26th November, 1808.*'

The simple fact colonel Sorrel does not deny, but says that  
 Vide Moore's 'the column was well closed up to Astorga by  
 Narrative, the 29th of November.' Nevertheless, sir D.  
 p. 79. Baird informed sir John Moore that his troops  
*could not be concentrated at Astorga until the 4th of  
 December.*

2°. My work states, that, previously to his knowing of the fatal battle of Tudela, '*Sir J. Moore proposed in case he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to abandon all communication with Portugal, throw himself into the heart of Spain, and, drawing round him all he could of the Spanish forces, defend the southern provinces, trusting to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce.*'

Colonel Sorrel thinks this '*must be a mistake.*' But sir J. Moore's letter to Mr. Frere proves the fact.  
 Moore's 'Had this army been united and ready to act at  
 Narrative, the time of general Castaños' defeat, much as I  
 p. 156. think it would have been risking it, yet it was  
 my intention to have marched on Madrid, and to have shared  
 in the fortunes of the Spanish nation. If I could not have  
 sustained myself there, I thought by placing myself behind  
 the Tagus, I might give the broken armies and the people of  
 Spain, if they had any patriotism left, an opportunity to  
 assemble round me and to march to the relief of the capital.  
 That this was my intention is known to the officers with  
 me who are in my confidence; it is known also to lord  
 Castlereagh, to whom I had imparted it in one of my late  
 letters.'

3°. Colonel Sorrel corrects me for saying sir D. Baird  
*retreated to Villa Franca without orders; and that stores were  
 destroyed at Astorga.*

I admit the first to be an error. Nevertheless, a retrograde movement without orders from sir J. Moore was *commenced*. Craufurd's brigade had passed Astorga before the retreat was countermanded; and I can assure colonel Sorrel, I did myself walk ankle-deep in spirits poured into the streets.

4°. It is hinted I should not have censured sir D. Baird for sending an important despatch by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost it. '*It is doubtful also,*' colonel Sorrel complains, '*whether the expression, 'blameable irregularity,' is*

*applied to the inattention of the general, or the drunkenness of the dragoon.'*

He intimates also that to say sir J. Moore personally directed the movements of sir D. Baird's division in the battle, is derogatory of the latter's reputation. I cannot admit this. A general-in-chief must be somewhere; where he is he must direct. But touching the matter of the dragoon, I imputed '*blameable irregularity*' to the general; and justify it by the following statement of sir J. Moore's aide-de-camp who carried the despatch.

'On the night that the rear of the army passed through Villa Franca, and halted at a small village about two leagues and a half from that town, sir J. Moore sent captain George Napier, one of his *aides-de-camp*, about two o'clock in the morning, with despatches for sir D. Baird, enclosing orders to lieutenant-generals Hope and Fraser, the nature of which orders was to prevent lieut.-general Fraser's division proceeding on the road towards Vigo, and to make them halt at Lugo, as sir J. Moore had, owing to many circumstances, altered his intention of proceeding with the army to Vigo. When sir John delivered these despatches to captain Napier, he said, 'Have you a good horse, Napier? you must get to Nogales to sir D. Baird before five o'clock this morning, if possible, as otherwise sir David will have marched and then you must follow him.' Sir John also gave captain N. particular orders to be very careful of the despatches as they were of the greatest consequence; and to tell sir David '*to forward those which were enclosed to generals Hope and Fraser as quick as possible.*''

'When captain Napier arrived at Nogales, which he did a few minutes after five o'clock, he found sir David in bed, and delivered him *the despatches and orders*. Sir David asked, 'If he (captain N.) was to go on with those for generals Hope and Fraser?' 'No, sir, unless you have no other person to send; in that case, of course I will proceed, but I must first get a fresh horse.' Sir David then said, 'Were you ordered by sir J. Moore to proceed with these letters to general Hope?' Captain N. replied, 'My orders were to deliver the despatches to you, and you were to forward those for lieut.-generals Hope and Fraser, *with all care and despatch.*' On this he said, 'Very well;' and in about two hours after, or perhaps not quite so long, he sent the despatches off by an orderly dragoon of the fifteenth regiment. Sir David marched soon afterwards, with his division, to some heights on the road towards Lugo, about two or three short



leagues from Nogales; and towards the evening he came himself back to Nogales, and said to captain Napier, who was waiting there until sir J. Moore should arrive, '*By God, the rascal of a dragoon by whom I sent those despatches this morning, has got drunk, and lost them.*' Upon which captain N. immediately mounted his horse and went off to report the circumstance to sir J. Moore, whom he met on the hill coming down into Nogales. '*He seemed quite astonished and displeased with sir D. Baird for having sent despatches by an orderly dragoon, which were of such consequence that the commander of the forces thought it necessary to send one of his own aides-de-camp with them.*'

Two forced marches were thus imposed upon M'Kenzie Fraser's division, which occasioned great distress and loss. Here I must observe that I never meant, nor did attribute blame to that general, whose conduct was strictly in unison with his orders; yet I have heard that his friends were hurt; perhaps at the lightness of the expression, '*Pilgrimage to St. Jago,*' a trifling conceit, unsuitable to the occasion.

*Narrative of the Peninsular War.*—Major Leith Hay is pleased so to term a narrative of his personal adventures during about half the period that war lasted. He seems offended that I should have exposed the foolish conduct of the military agents employed at the commencement of the Spanish insurrection; yet he has not, and could not, disprove my statements, seeing they are supported by the letters of the agents themselves; the public voice has proclaimed their justice. He says, indeed, '*that to include the whole of the agents, with exception only of colonel Coxe and lord William Bentinck, in one sweeping and unqualified censure, appears as little worthy of history as it probably will be hereafter considered of notice;*' and that to answer me he has only to mention the names of '*colonels Paisley, Jones, Lefevre, and Birch.*' But I have not included the whole in one sweeping censure; and the last-named officers, whose talents I acknowledge, and one of whom, colonel Birch, I especially quoted as giving good intelligence, were not agents, but on the staff of an agent. Their just views place in disadvantageous light the errors of general Leith, under whom they acted.

Major Leith Hay decries my work, but says his own is founded on authentic documents, meaning, his own memoranda. They will scarcely guide posterity. For, treating of the battle of Busaco, he says, '*on the forenoon of the 26th Sept. I was directed to advance in front*

Narrative,  
vol. i. p. 18.

Ibid. p. 231.

with a squadron of Portuguese cavalry, and report the movements of the enemy on the roads close to the right bank of the Mondego, directly communicating with the valley of Larangeira. *In the execution of this service we proceeded two leagues without encountering an enemy.*—‘*As we rode forward a cannonade and fire of musketry was heard in the direction of St. Combadao, where the duke of Elchingen and general Reynier were forcing back upon the position the advance of the allied army.*’ Now St. Combadao is twenty miles from Busaco; the light division and Pack’s brigade formed ‘the advance of the army;’ the former never were within ten miles of Combadao, and Pack retired from thence, without an action, on the 22nd. Moreover, on the 26th of September, when major Hay heard this wonderful firing at Combadao, the duke of Elchingen and general Reynier were, and had been from one o’clock of the 25th, immediately in front of Busaco, and their light troops were actually skirmishing with the British in that position which the major had just left two leagues in his rear! It would appear that major Hay has trusted to very bad memoranda.

Napier’s  
History.

*Strictures upon Colonel Napier’s History.*—Although anonymous, I notice this pamphlet, written in defence of lord Beresford, because the writer would have it understood that he is lord Beresford, or that he writes from his lordship’s dictation. I, however, think, lord Beresford’s knowledge would reject the inaccuracy of this work, and his modesty shrink from dictating such gross praise of himself.

It is not credible, lord Beresford should describe himself ‘*As a wise firm and conciliatory person*’

Pp. 7, 8, 9.  
et passim.

—‘*A man whose qualifications eminently fitted him for high important trusts*’—‘*An officer of zeal, temper, discretion, and intelligence*’—‘*A distinguished commander capable of the greatest things*’—‘*A person evincing a knowledge of mankind, a skill in the various principles by which the human heart is actuated, and a facility in influencing and directing them, ranked amongst the exclusive characteristics of the highest class of mankind.*’

Pages 1 & 126.

This anonymous author gives me credit for ‘*very considerable qualities as an historian,*’ and believes ‘*my errors are unintentional,*’ arising from ‘*inaccurate information.*’ And he answers my statements ‘*lest a work of such pretensions to consideration should bias posterity.*’ Alas for posterity! He fears it will be biassed by ‘*an adopter and propagator of foolish and trumpery*

Pp. 5, 7, 8,  
et passim.

*reports' — 'A person of easy credulity' — 'Of extraordinary ignorance of facts and of topography' — 'Writing from ex parte and false information' — 'Presumptuous' — 'Inexperienced' — 'A caviller' — 'A mere soldier of theory, presuming to discuss the abilities, the opinions, and the conduct of so able and distinguished an officer as lord Beresford' — 'An historian without literary integrity or fairness' — 'A special pleader' — 'An illogical reasoner' — 'An intrepid assertor' — 'Excessively deficient in the most essential qualities' — one whose 'Intellectual vision is thickly affuscated by the mist of party prejudices.'*

As indications of 'galled withers' this may pass, but in the same vein I am told I '*know nothing of lord Beresford whatever*' — had '*given myself no trouble to inquire into his military services or his personal character*' — '*Did not know when, or where, or how, that distinguished officer had been employed,*' — and with '*a common and most senseless prejudice which is often found in connexion with a certain class of political opinions, took it for granted that because lord Beresford was highly allied, he must necessarily be deficient in professional skill; and because he possessed that family patronage which might bring his merits into notice, it must follow as an inevitable consequence, that he could not be in possession of the merit that might deserve it.*'

Being at least as nobly connected as lord Beresford, I leave his 'high alliances' to those whom they concern; his family patronage is more to the purpose, and for his military services I will give some tokens of inquiry about them. This pamphleteer calls me a 'mere soldier of theory,' yet I have seen more and harder campaigns than lord Beresford saw, before he attained the command of the Portuguese army. I begin with his lordship's expedition to Buenos Ayres, his first essay as a general-in-chief. Many curious details of that event have been related to me by eye-witnesses, but suffice it to say, lord Beresford was there completely beaten and laid down his arms.

His next appearance was as commandant of the island of Madeira, secretly delivered to England in trust by the prince of Portugal. The Portuguese declare, that, in violation of this trust, lord Beresford made the authorities swear allegiance to George III. I will not dwell on that. He governed the island well or ill for some months.

At Coruña he commanded the brigade covering the embarkation. There was nothing to do, but if a conversation, such as I have heard did really take place between him and an



eminent staff-officer, his lordship did not then rate the honour so high as his defender does now.

These indications that I am not entirely ignorant of lord Beresford's services, *before* he commanded the Portuguese forces, are only given in answer to the writer of this pamphlet; and for my knowledge of his services *after* he attained that command, let my work vouch. I may have seen them with a jaundiced eye. I may have been '*incapable from the circumstances of my military life, to form an adequate conception of the difficulties which the general of a large corps has to contend with.*' I may have had my '*intellectual vision affuscated by the mists of party prejudice,*' but my opinion still is, that marshal Beresford was not '*a distinguished commander,*'—not an '*enterprising general,*'—not '*capable of the greatest things.*' If I am wrong, his deeds are before the world to obviate my conclusions; great actions cannot be smothered with ink. The author of this pamphlet is however unjustifiable in saying I have '*hinted at professional backwardness.*' I have strictly confined myself to measuring marshal Beresford's military capacity by the standard of his exploits. Nor will it serve to cry out—political prejudice! I have nowhere attacked lord Wellington, lord Hill, lord Lynedoch, lord Stuart de Rothesay, sir Edward Paget, and others whose political opinions were the same as lord Beresford's. I proceed to examine my opponent's arguments.

I. Treating of lord Beresford's appointment, I said:—'The Portuguese regency, whether spontaneously, or brought thereto by previous negotiation, offered the command of all the native troops to an English general, with power to alter and amend the military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command of regiments, and to act without control in any measure he should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese army.'

'It is said, sir J. Doyle, sir J. Murray, general Beresford, and even the marquis of Hastings, then earl of Moira, sought for the appointment. The last was undoubtedly well fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his talents, in the cabinet and the field, for such an office; but powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, major-general Beresford was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior rank, who were displeased that a man without any visible claim to superiority should be placed over their heads.'

'*This short extract,*' says the pamphleteer, '*contains as many fallacies as lines.*' '*It would be difficult, perhaps, to find in any other historian a passage equally short, and*



*equally abounding in misstatements and mistakes.'* He then proceeds to show that marshal Beresford *never applied for the appointment*; doubts if the other officers named did so; is indignant it should be supposed *parliamentary interest* influenced the matter; and taking advantage of a piece of bad composition, endeavours to convict me of '*arguing upon a rumour as if it were a certainty, with a view to draw an unfair conclusion against lord Beresford.*'

Rigorously speaking, he is entitled to prefer this last charge, because the notice of lord Moira's qualifications separates the members of my sentence in a slovenly manner; take that away, or put it in a parenthesis, and the whole passage will, as intended, rest on the rumour. This writer, indeed, rebukes me for noticing rumour; but the fact being interesting and probable why should I have suppressed it? And what are the misstatements? What the fallacies of which I am accused?

1°. *Marshal Beresford never asked for the office, and therefore parliamentary interest could have had nothing to do with the affair.*

It is the essential business of a government, conducted on a system of patronage, to solicit men of powerful families to accept great offices; and who more powerful than the Beresfords? This system is now declared to be on its death-bed, but was it in its infancy in 1809?

2°. *The Portuguese Regency never offered lord Beresford full power.*

I confess my error here, and will explain how it arose. In lord Castlereagh's instructions to sir J. Cradock, I found the regency had applied for an 'English general to *organize and command their army.*' I knew that twelve days after lord Beresford arrived at Lisbon, he did in fact exercise a complete control over the Portuguese army. It appears, those twelve

days were devoted to difficult negotiations; that

Page 12. the marshal and Mr. Villiers had '*a world of difficulties*' to obtain the necessary powers, which were '*most reluctantly conceded to the determined representations of the British Minister.*' Of those negotiations I found no trace in lord Castlereagh's despatches, nor in lord Wellington's letter, nor in sir J. Cradock's correspondence; hence my error, insignificant in itself, was difficult to avoid: nevertheless I stated the fact with some doubt, as the expression '*whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation*' sufficiently proves. This is the only foundation for the abuse so liberally bestowed.

I will now show that this writer has greatly exaggerated the difficulty of the negotiations; and when he states that one of marshal Beresford's qualifications for the command was his being '*perfectly conversant with the language of the people*,' he states that which a better authority than he can be contradicts.

Page 8.

Extract of a letter from marshal BERESFORD to lord WELLINGTON, Chamusca, 4th Jan. 1811.

'On lord Castlereagh's communicating to me his Majesty's pleasure that I should proceed to Portugal to fill the situation I now hold, it was my duty to point out to his lordship what my experience in the country had made me think absolutely necessary to fulfil, with any prospect of advantage, the views of his Majesty, and of his royal highness the prince regent, in giving to a British general the command of the Portuguese army; and, amongst other things, I represented it as necessary that in all things respecting the organization and discipline of the army, the commander-in-chief should be perfectly independent of the government, and that it was absolutely necessary rewards and punishments should be exclusively with him. These claims lord Castlereagh told me Mr. Canning would give directions to his Majesty's envoy here to stipulate for, and that I need not undertake the task until they were granted. I consequently, on my arrival, declined accepting the command, on waiting on the regency, till Mr. Villiers should have made these necessary stipulations, and in consequence of which, *after he had some conference with the regency*, I put down, at his desire, in English, something to the purport (for it appears a very bad translation or ill-copied) of the propositions in one of the papers enclosed, and to which the answer annexed to it was given. *I was not then very much master of the Portuguese*, but I recollect observing to Mr. Villiers that the answer appeared to me ambiguous, and wishing further explanation. He, however, assured me that it was quite proper, and that the *government intended fully to accede to my desires*, and to support me fully in everything, and I remained with the understanding that though for the dignity of the government it might desire particular forms, that virtually the power in everything respecting the formation, organization, and discipline of the army remained with me; and on this principle I have ever since acted, with the full acquiescence and sanction of government.'

Here we find no reluctance, and no difficulty, except that which the marshal, from his imperfect knowledge of the

language, experienced in trying to read the answer of the regency.

3°. The pamphleteer says, *That although many officers at a later period, wanted lord Beresford's situation, none were discontented at the time; and only sir J. Murray objected to the local rank of lieutenant-general which accompanied it.*

But this local rank was a necessary adjunct to the command of the Portuguese troops, and any discontent occasioned thereby was a discontent at lord Beresford's appointment. Sir J. Murray's displeasure is admitted; and the following letter from general Sherbroke to sir John Cradock speaks for itself:—

‘Lisbon, March 12.

‘SIR,—Hearing, upon my landing here this day, that his Majesty has been pleased to confer upon major-general Beresford the local rank of lieutenant-general in Portugal, I wish to submit to your excellency that I am three years a senior major-general in the British army; and although I shall, under the present circumstances, perform with the greatest cheerfulness the duties which you may require of me; yet I think on reference to the customs of the service you will see my present situation in such a point of view as shall induce your excellency, to lay my humble request before his royal highness the commander-in-chief, that he will be graciously pleased to move his Majesty to confer on me the local rank of lieutenant general also while serving in this country.’

Thus it appears, the discontent, even at the moment, was not, as this author *positively asserts*, confined to sir John Murray; and though he labours hard to show lord Beresford's superior claims were at the time ‘*very visible to any person whose intellectual eye was not blinded by prejudice.*’ I have yet to learn that in the opinion of the army, his lordship's merits, though they should even be enhanced by his share of the glory of Albuera, were greater than general Sherbroke's.

II. The writer is angry at my saying, lord Beresford could never have overcome the difficulties of his situation if he had not been *directed, sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under whom he worked.*

Whether I am correct, or otherwise, will be made manifest in the course of my work; but this author discovers irritable haste in commenting upon the expression; he supposes it applied wholly to the difficulties of discipline, whereas it evidently refers to political obstacles. Yet I will say, even the discipline of the troops was not more indebted to lord

Beresford's than it was to the excellent English officers who served under him. Madden, Harvey, Ashworth, Elder, Oliver, Douglas, and others like them, were the spirits animating the system that raised the Portuguese troops so high in the scale of European armies; those officers were not instructed by marshal Beresford—some of them were capable of instructing him.

III. The pamphleteer denies the truth of the following passage in my History.—‘*In time almost all the military situations of emolument and importance were held by Englishmen.*’

The word emolument is used in its simple sense. The nation was at war for its existence, the whole population in arms, the country lately ravaged by an enemy, the treasury quite empty. In such a crisis all military situations were more or less places of ‘*emolument and importance*,’ England paying the greatest part of the army. Lord Wellington, admiral Berkeley, and Mr. Stuart were members of the regency. The first was also captain-general of the Portuguese forces, regular or irregular;—that is to say, of the whole population able to bear arms. The second was admiral of the fleet in the European waters. Marshal Beresford commanded the regular land armies. Sir Thomas Hardy was commandant of the port and arsenal of Lisbon. To all these places salaries were attached. Lord Wellington, indeed, gave his Portuguese as he also did his Spanish pay, to the military chest; but this was a private act of disinterestedness. I believe his example was not followed.

Let us proceed.

Colonel Trant was governor of Oporto; colonel Cox, governor of Almeida; colonel Austen, of Algarve; general Blunt, of Peniché. Sir Robert Wilson commanded the Lusitanian Legion; Trant, John Wilson, and Miller were at the head of different brigades of militia and ordenança; colonel Grant and major Fenwick commanded smaller bodies of the same species of troops; colonel D’Urban, colonel John Campbell, and colonel Madden, had high commands in the cavalry; generals Hamilton, Spry, Harvey, Pack, Ashworth, and Collins, commanded divisions or brigades of the regular infantry: others held commands in the artillery; Hardinge, Arbuthnot, Warre, &c., were on the staff; and nearly all the regiments of the line were commanded by Englishmen, or had English majors, captains, and subalterns: nor were these names, which readily occur to me, the whole



Situations of importance were held by Englishmen without any particular title; thus a British engineer, especially appointed, had a voice in the council of war at Abrantes, so potential the governor could make no capitulation without his consent. No doubt all this was necessary—I never said or thought otherwise—but it shocked Portuguese pride, and this was clearly shown when the crisis of danger passed away.

IV. I come now to the most elaborate portion of this pamphlet, where the writer seeks to uphold the superiority of marshal Beresford in a discussion with sir John Cradock on a military movement, and to expose the partiality and hollowness of my observations in a contrary sense.

The argument is thus commenced. *'It is difficult to understand why the consideration of this difference between two general officers, from which colonel Napier intimates, though I think erroneously, that no results ensued, should occupy so large a space in his History.'*

I have intimated nothing of the kind, and the difficulty is removed by my opponent himself, because, in the same page, he says, *'It must be owned that the subject is in itself a fair theme of historical discussion.'*

Proceeding in the same vein, he affirms that I *'sought for and procured all the arguments on one side, and never took the trouble to inquire for any on the other.'* Subsequently he says, *'with the aid of these four documents, I shall, I think, be enabled to set aside the arguments of the historian, and consequently overthrow the conclusion he has founded upon them.'*

But those *'four documents'* are extracted from my History; two of them are letters of sir John Cradock and marshal Beresford discussing the very movement in question! They were printed at full length in my Appendix; the substance of each fairly given in the body of the work; they tell their own story; the only help given by me to sir John Cradock's view is, an opinion that marshal Beresford's proposition was, for certain stated reasons, 'unsound.' How, then, can this writer venture to assert, that I *'sought for and procured only the arguments on one side,'* that I have *'descended from the seat of calm and impartial judgment, to exercise my powers of special pleading in favour of the views of one party'?*

The point of dispute was, whether the allied army should *move to the succour of Oporto, or remain near Lisbon?* I condemned Beresford's arguments in favour of the first, partly because Cradock's appeared to me conclusive; partly

from my after-acquired knowledge of the real state of affairs. The pamphleteer, changing the proposition, asserts, I censured Beresford for proposing a *march to Leiria*, when my observations were expressly directed against a *march to Oporto*. I will set down what I did write and my authority.

History.—‘ While thus engaged, intelligence arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida: that Soult, having crossed the Minho and defeated Romana and Silveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto; that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo. The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency; and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop’s party, proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and march to the *succour of Oporto*.

Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command among the mutinous multitudes in that city; but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to follow this plan.’

‘ Marshal Beresford’s plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock could engage Soult *at Oporto* and yet quit him and return at his pleasure to Lisbon if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious: the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive data; it was conjectural that they could *relieve Oporto*, it was positive they would endanger Lisbon.’

*Authorities*.—1°. Extracts from marshal Beresford’s letter to sir John Cradock, 29th March, 1809.

‘ Upon the subject of marching a British force to *Oporto* under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leiria, to be thence pushed on *to Oporto*, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was, that as there appeared an intention of co-operation (*of which, however, there is no certainty*) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by

either driving back or overcoming one, before the other could give his co-operating aid, to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able to do this, would be merely a matter of calculation of time; as, supposing on our arrival at Leiria Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army pushing from Leiria to Oporto without apprehension from the army of Victor.' 'It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of *this movement towards Oporto.*'

2°. Extracts from sir John Cradock's reply to the above. 29th March, 1809.

'I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your excellency's letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the regency, &c., that I should move the British troops to the *succour of Oporto,*' &c.—'To venture upon an advance *to Oporto*, two hundred miles from Lisbon, when the very object is perhaps at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feeling of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding. If the British army sets out with the declared object to *succour Oporto*, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same. Nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character!'

These extracts contradict the pamphleteer's assertions that I 'completely misunderstood the nature of marshal Beresford's views and intentions,' and 'strangely perverted his meaning by making him say it was doubtful if Victor and Soult intended to co-operate on a single plan.' It is most disingenuous, also, to assume that I objected to a march upon Leiria, and then argue on that false assumption in the following manner:—

'*This same military movement cannot be both right and wrong, politic and impolitic, correct and erroneous.*'—'*If the proposal of advancing the army to Leiria was evidently unsound when suggested by marshal Beresford, the movement itself ought, in impartial justice, to have been condemned by the historian as at least equally unsound when put in execution by sir John Cradock.*'

How was it the same military movement? Every circumstance was different.—1°. It was a movement to Leiria—not to Oporto. 2°. It took place ten or twelve days later, during which time 5000 British infantry, and 300 artillery horses, had reinforced Cradock's army, and a regiment of dragoons

was hourly expected. '*Since the present accession of strength,*' says sir J. Cradock, '*it may be advisable to make a short movement in advance as far as Leiria.*' 3°. Victor, instead of threatening Portugal, as the reports of the 26th March represented him, had engaged with Cuesta, and just fought the battle of Medellin; moreover, a march to *Leiria only* did not open Lisbon to that marshal. 4°. Lapisse, instead of joining Soult, was moving towards the Tagus by the passes of the Gredos; thus, the French were weakened by a diversity of plans while the allies were become stronger. And what more absurd than this writer's notion that the same military movements must be equally good at one time as at another? After all, Cradock's march to Leiria was made entirely at the request of lord Beresford: '*I consented to general Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance, as he said it would give confidence to the body of Portuguese troops assembled at Thomar, and enable him to undertake the defence of the bridge and station at Abrantes.*'—Sir John Cradock to general Richard Stewart, April 8, 1808.

Sir John  
Cradock  
to general  
Richard  
Stewart,  
5th April,  
1809.

The author having made this use of the march to Leiria, changes his ground to magnify lord Beresford's military genius in recommending a *march to Oporto*.

'*It appears,*' he says, '*from the evidence afforded by colonel Napier himself, that lord Beresford had exactly divined the intention of the enemy—nay, that he had anticipated the very orders of Buonaparte, in which the three corps of Soult, Victor, and Lapisse are directed to co-operate—and yet his reasoning, the wisdom of which is proved by facts and by the documents recorded in the author's own volume, is condemned.*' '*Colonel Napier, forsooth, with a very superficial knowledge of the circumstances of the time, and scarcely any of the localities, has the presumption to record that these views are evidently unsound.*'

Hard words these, if founded in reason; if otherwise, they are foolish words. Let us test them. Three invading corps were hanging on the frontier: '*there appeared,*' says lord Beresford, '*an intention of co-operation.*' Here was no great divination; moreover other things were divined, such as the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida which did not happen. Let that pass. The preservation of Lisbon was the primary object of the allies. Beresford proposed to combine a march against one of the three invading corps, and he was bound to show,—1°. That while thus operating against one enemy, another

See his letter  
to sir John  
Cradock  
Appendix.



could not take possession of Lisbon. 2°. That there should be some prospect of beating that body which the allies intended to fight. Were either of these things reasonably secure?

Victor, rated 35,000 strong, and having just defeated Cuesta, was at Merida and Caceres, the head of his columns reported to be pointing towards Portugal. Was the safety of Lisbon cared for, in a plan to march all the allied forces against Soult, who was two hundred miles from that capital, when Victor, a more powerful enemy, was threatening it from a nearer point?

The author of this pamphlet says yes, because '*Victor had no means of crossing the Tagus; he had with him neither pontoon nor bridge equipage of any kind, and the river from the frontier of Portugal was rolling down, as is always the case at this season of the year, a rapid, heavy, mighty, unfordable mass of water*'

Indeed! What, then, is the meaning of the following extract from admiral Berkeley's correspondence with sir John Cradock, April 6th, 1809?—'There is a circumstance upon which, if both yourself and general Beresford are absent from Lisbon, it may be necessary that some decisive knowledge should be obtained—I mean *the boats and craft upon the Tagus*, the disposal of which seems to be confided to the commissary-general. That gentleman, I suppose, will naturally attend the army, and of course, if we should suddenly require them, or if the enemy made a rapid movement across the Alemtejo, *he might become master of the boats* before an express could reach the commissary-general to remove them.' What also is the meaning of the following passages in sir John Cradock's despatches to lord Castlereagh, 12th April, 1809?—'There is *a ferry* at Salvatierra, near Alcantara, and *another* up the left bank of the Tagus, in the Alemtejo, where there is also a *ford*, and the river may be easily passed.'

It was soon found that, not the commissary-general but the regency held the craft,—that no registry of the boats was made, and nothing useful was done or likely to be done in the matter. Wherefore, Victor could have passed the Tagus, and Lisbon was not secure during the march to Oporto.

Now as to the chance of success against Soult, who had above 20,000 men, his cavalry numerous and excellent. Could 12,000 British infantry, having no cavalry, few guns, no transport, and embarrassed rather than assisted by an ill-disciplined Portuguese force, have brought Soult to battle? Could they have beaten him decisively and returned to cover

Lisbon? Was Lapisse with his 12,000 men and thirty guns to remain passive? Would he not have joined Soult or marched on Coimbra in rear of the allies?

The writer intimates that Wellington did march to Oporto and defeated Soult. Yes! but five weeks later, when the English ministers' intentions were no longer doubtful—when, partly by Beresford's vigour, partly from the stunning effect of Soult's capture of Oporto—chiefly from the reputation of Wellington—the Portuguese troops had from a lawless mob become an orderly force—when the army was reinforced by 7000 English infantry, four regiments of cavalry, artillery, horses, money, and stores—more troops being on the voyage to Lisbon. It happened when Cradock's efforts, followed up by Wellington, had procured country supplies—when Lapisse, by a false movement to Lower Estremadura, had marred the French combinations, placing a whole nation with its fortresses and all its forces, regular and irregular, between Soult and Victor, leaving them no power of concert or communication. It happened when Victor, whose troops were suffering from the Guadiana fever, was forming an entrenched camp at Medellin, instead of moving on Portugal—when Cuesta at the head of more numerous forces than before, had promised to follow Victor closely in any march towards Portugal—when intercepted letters of king Joseph's indicated Seville, not Portugal, as Victor's object—when Venegas was threatening La Mancha with a fresh army—when Soult, having lost time at Amarante and men at Chaves, had spread his troops over a wide extent of country and exhausted his offensive strength—when there was a conspiracy in his camp the leaders being in communication with the English general, and when the real numbers of the French were unknown and underrated. Notwithstanding all this, the operation would have failed of any great result, but for the astonishing passage of the Douro, an action not to be expected from ordinary generals.

Different also were the measures taken to secure the Tagus. Beresford wanted Cradock *to move at once with the whole allied force*, depending only on some calculations of time. When lord Wellington moved, the false march of Lapisse had enabled him to draw down the Lusitanian legion and the militia of the Beira frontier to defend the bridge of Alcantara, which was mined. Three English battalions drafted from the army at Leiria, were united with two others and two regiments of cavalry just landed at Lisbon, and with 8000 Portuguese regulars forming together an army under one general to defend the line of the Tagus from Abrantes to Lisbon. An

additional corps of observation was also formed from the garrisons of Badajos and Elvas, to watch the movements of Victor on the Guadiana; and finally, the seamen, marines and the civic legions of Lisbon formed a reserve. Hence it was truly said Wellington's plans were 'neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward.' He made, indeed, a daring movement, but it was the daring of a great general; whereas Beresford proposed a rash march of two hundred miles to succour a place which had actually fallen the very day on which he made the proposal. Nor is this all.\* Marshal Beresford desired Cradock to march with the Portuguese and British troops combined; and the pamphleteer says, 'the allied force would have been *in every respect superior to Soult's whole army.*' Now this movement was proposed the 29th of March, and the British had two hundred miles to move; wherefore, allowing two days for preparations and unforeseen obstacles, the allies would have been in front of Soult about the ninth of April. At that period, however, marshal Beresford thus described the Portuguese portion of this army, which, so '*superior in every respect*' to the enemy, was to drive Soult's veteran infantry and powerful cavalry out of the kingdom.

Mr. Beresford to sir John Cradock, Santarem, April 7, 1809. 'I this morning met no less than three expresses, communicating to me the *horrible state of mutiny*—for I can call it no less—in which the *troops everywhere are, and the inhabitants are in equal insubordination; and they encourage each other.*' And what said sir J. Cradock?—

Sir John Cradock to lord Castle-reagh, April 3. 'No reliance whatever can be placed on the Portuguese troops. *If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford's sentiments.*'

In fine, that Beresford could not control the Portuguese troops, nor Cradock procure equipments or supplies for the British, are proved by the letters of those generals. But Cradock's difficulties, the pamphleteer says, could not have been known to marshal Beresford at the moment of suggesting the plan; be it so; his proposition, then, was founded in utter ignorance of the real state of affairs, and therefore '*evidently unsound.*'

V. Of the points which I have enumerated above as marking the difference between marshal Beresford's proposal and sir Arthur Wellesley's operation, the following have been either denied, doubted, or ridiculed, by the writer of this pamphlet.

1°. *Cuesta's promise to wait on Victor's movements.* 2°. *The*

*amount of Cuesta's force. 3°. That the conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies when sir Arthur Wellesley decided to march against that general. 4°. That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c. &c. was, by the false march of Lapisse, placed between Victor and Soult. 5°. That Abrantes was a fortress. 6°. That Soult's offensive was exhausted. 7°. That the intention of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.*

The following are however my authorities.

1°. *Cuesta's promise.*—MR. FRERE to sir JOHN CRADOCK.

*Seville, April 21st, 1809.*

‘If general Victor should evacuate the country which he now occupies, and undertake a march to the relief of marshal Soult, general Cuesta would advance in proportion, and endeavour to harass and detain him, as far as possible, without risking a general action. This latter part I consider as agreed.’

There was a direct communication between Seville and Lisbon, and this letter reached sir A. Wellesley either the 24th or 25th of April.

2°. *Amount of Cuesta's force.*—This was rated by me at 35,000 in the gross, and 25,000 actually in his camp.

*Authorities.*—Sir A. WELLESLEY to lord CASTLEREAGH.

*April 24th, 1809.*

‘CUESTA is at Llerena collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, a part of them good troops.’

Mr. FRERE to sir A. WELLESLEY.

*Seville, 4th May.*

‘WE have here 3000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of Estremadura.’—‘General Cuesta has with him 4000 cavalry.’

In addition to this, recruits were daily arriving in his camp, and he had several partisan detachments. Thus it appears I have underrated the actual force immediately in front of Victor.

3°. *The conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies, when sir Arthur Wellesley, &c. &c.*

This is proved by the following facts, drawn from the original narrative of the English officer employed.

‘John Viana, the agent of the conspirators, reached Thomar



in the middle of April; and in consequence of his information, an English field-officer was sent to Aveiro to meet D'Argenton the principal conspirator; he did so, and returned with the letter to Lisbon, whither Beresford had meanwhile repaired to meet sir Arthur Wellesley.' It is evident, therefore, Beresford knew of the conspiracy before sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival at Lisbon, and consequently, the latter knew it when he planned his operations.

4°. *That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c. &c.*

When Victor was on the upper Guadiana, Soult was on the Douro; their most direct line of communication was by Alcantara, and coasting the Beira frontier. As long as Lapisse protected this line with a strong corps, their operations were connected; when that general joined Victor on the Guadiana, nearly all the central parts of Portugal and the allied armies were between the latter and Soult. The frontier line of Portugal, and the part of Spain adjoining it, immediately became insurgent, and the partisan corps before employed to watch Lapisse, guarded the bridge of Alcantara. My expressions are therefore strictly correct.

5°. *Abrantes.*—The pamphleteer says, '*there was not the vestige of a fortification,*' at this place in May, 1809.

*Authority.*—Major Patton, employed to examine and strengthen Abrantes, reported 22nd April, 1809, the castle as commanding all around, and secure from escalade; the town as having 4000 and requiring 6000 men as a garrison when completely fortified. The additional fortifications were then being made, and hence in May the state of the place was as I said, 'already capable of a short resistance.'

6°. *Soult's offensive was exhausted.* This the writer of the pamphlet says was not more visible in May than in March. Now, in March, Soult was, in one compact mass, bearing down upon Oporto with the avowed intention of afterwards marching to Lisbon, having assurance from the emperor that Victor and Lapisse were co-operating. In May, Lapisse had abandoned all co-operation; so had Victor; both were cut off from any direct communication with Soult; the latter had remained five weeks inactive in Oporto; his troops were scattered, and he had shown, by feeling towards his left in force, that his views were no longer fixed upon Lisbon. It was therefore much more visible. Finally, sir A. Wellesley judged it so, for in a letter to Mr. Frere, 24th April, he says, 'they (the French) have not passed the Vouga to the south, nor have they extended themselves into Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves; but they have made some movement

towards the Tamega which divides Tras os Montes from Minho; and it is supposed they intend to acquire for themselves the option of retreating into Spain.'—'It is probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego.'

7°. *That the intentions of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.*

*Authorities.*—Extract from sir JOHN CRADOCK'S Correspondence, 1809.

*January 19th.*—'We are determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of receiving orders from England.'

*February 9th.*—'The orders we daily expect may be either for immediate embarkation, or to maintain Portugal.'—'We have but this one wish, to act for the credit of our country, and endeavour, under the want of all information, to *discover what may be the object of the government we serve.*'

*February 26th.*—'Since the 14th of January we are *without instructions from England.*'

Extract of a despatch from Mr. CANNING to Mr. FRERE.

*April 11th.*—'You will observe that in the alternative for which it is necessary to provide (though I trust nevertheless it is not likely to take place), of the evacuation of Portugal by his Majesty's forces, sir A. Wellesley is directed to proceed with the army to Cadiz, to be landed there on the acceptance, by the Spanish government, of the condition *which you have already been instructed to propose*, of the admission of British troops,' &c. &c.

Other proofs also exist, but it is ridiculous to deny a fact which is continually complained of in sir John Cradock's correspondence; and I have neither space nor inclination to unravel all the tedious confusion of this author's arguments. Having shown that he is inconsistent, and not very scrupulous in misrepresenting my statements, I proceed to point out his errors as to facts.

Page 40.—He asserts that '*there is no other possible route from Portugal to Madrid than by the valley of the Tagus.*'

*Answer.*—In 1812 lord Wellington moved from the Beira frontier, through the pass of Guadarama to Madrid, *without touching on the valley of the Tagus.* In the same year lord Hill moved from Alemtejo, passed through Lower Estremadura, entered La Mancha, and arrived at Madrid *without moving along the valley of the Tagus.*

Page 43.—‘*It is demanded, and with great apparent emphasis, by colonel Napier, was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto?*’

*Answer.*—This question is not put at all as if from myself, it is a part of the summary of sir John Cradock’s arguments.

Page 45.—‘*He (colonel Napier) conceives that marshal Victor could pass the Tagus at any point, from its source to its mouth.*’—‘*Indeed he appears to assert this as a fact.*’

*Answer.*—I profess never to have conceived this; neither have I anywhere asserted it. I have, indeed, called the Tagus ‘*a river fordable in almost all seasons*,’ and the pamphleteer says, ‘it exhibits a very culpable disregard of accuracy and precision, in any military man, to speak thus generally of a river of such extent!’ I have the utmost respect for the Tagus; but in an elaborate manuscript memoir on the defence of Portugal, drawn up by Dumouriez, that general, arguing like this writer on the assumption that *the Tagus is a strong barrier*, says ‘even if Alemtejo and Algarve fell into the hands of the enemy, it would not decide the war, which would become more dangerous for him, because all the means would be united in the four northern provinces.’ Against this passage lord Wellington has written the following marginal note:—‘*He does not seem to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season.*’

I am thus well supported, but my expression was a general one. It is not found in reference to the dispute between Cradock and Beresford, but in another part of my work; and as this writer has been at the pains to search for it, let us see how accurate his own assertions with reference to this river are.

At page 47 he says I ‘err most widely in supposing that river has *any ford in any place* except during *the very height of summer*. From the time of the first rains, which fall towards the latter end of *September* to the month of *June*, it would be a very rare occurrence to find a ford below Abrantes, or indeed within the frontier of Portugal.’

I reply by an extract from a memoir upon the defence of Portugal, addressed to admiral Berkeley by lord Wellington, 26th October, 1809. ‘From what I have above stated, you will observe that in the event of an attack being made within the *months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable*, the operations of the army would be carried on in a part of the country which would be cut off from Peniché,’ &c. &c.

Here we have it fordable for six months, and November is

certainly not *the very height of summer*. Further on we shall find even this fall short of the fact; there are fords at other periods also.

Page 48.—The author, continuing his reprimand, says, ‘the Tagus could not be forded by Victor.’

*Answer*.—The question is not whether he could *ford*, but whether he could *pass*; but even as to fording, the extract from sir John Cradock’s letter to lord Castlereagh, dated 12th April, before quoted, proves this writer’s error.

Page 49.—It is asked, ‘*Supposing marshal Victor had, as colonel Napier points out, marched to Almada, what result would have ensued?*’

*Answer*.—The allies’ advance to Oporto would have been changed to a retreat; but I have nowhere pointed out such a march for marshal Victor.

Pages 50 and 51.—‘*The historian recommends Saccavem and Lumiar as advantageous and proper posts for the defence of Lisbon.*’

‘*Place the British army at Saccavem and Lumiar and the enemy could, without difficulty, turn it by Loures and Bemfica.*’

*Answer*.—It is again sir John Cradock, and not the historian, who recommends those positions; neither are they, as this writer would have it believed, spoken of at all as fields of battle, but as positions on which to concentrate the whole allied forces, with a view of covering Lisbon. Where is the position that may not be turned? The thing to look to is, whether an army, in position, can by shorter routes intercept the march of the enemy, and offer battle again. In this view the French engineer, St. Vincent, after a careful examination, recommended those posts to Junot, and in this view sir John Cradock decided to occupy them. ‘I shall,’ he writes to lord Castlereagh, ‘collect the British force on the heights of Lumiar, my cavalry and light troops at the passes of Monte Cabeços and Bucellar, and a supporting corps at Bucellar. From this station at Lumiar *I can move in any direction where the enemy can present himself.*’

Page 52.—The pamphleteer says, ‘*He has shown, and he trusts to the satisfaction of the reader, that the position so much recommended in the History of the Peninsular War, was improper in every point of view; that looking to the position of the enemy’s corps, neither Lisbon nor its environs could be considered as affording a central, but, on the contrary, a very retired position.*’

*Answer*.—The posts alluded to, namely Saccavem and



Lumiar, were neither commended nor discommended by me, nor are they anywhere expressly called a central position. I said, 'sir John Cradock resolved to preserve his central position; covering the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being cut off by one army, while he was engaged with another.' This refers, not to one, but to any place suiting that plan of action. Again, I remarked, 'it must not be objected to sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand with the enemy in covering Lisbon if the latter should march on his flank.'

But Cradock's position at Lumiar was, in regard to Lisbon and the expected advance of the enemy, a central position. Victor and Soult, marching direct upon Lisbon, could not have formed a junction without giving Cradock an opportunity to push between and fight either separately. Here, as this writer makes himself merry with what he calls my central position, I will take the trouble to inform him that, in a military sense, a central position is one from which a general can, when opposed by two adversaries, acting on different lines of operations, prevent his opponents from uniting except by circuitous marches; wherefore it may be central, and at the same time retired. Napoleon's position at the siege of Mantua was central, yet so retired, that his opponents were close upon Mantua ere he could fight them.

Page 63.—*'Lord Beresford departed from Lisbon on the 8th of April, leaving sir John Cradock still opposed to his views of marching to Leiria.'*

*Answer.*—'I consented to general Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance.'—*Letter from sir John Cradock to general R. Stewart, 8th of April.*

Page 76.—*'But where are these mountains which colonel Napier has placed between Oporto and Lisbon.'*

*Answer.*—Between Lisbon and Oporto!

They have various names—there is the Sierra de Caramula, Sierra de Busaco, Monte Junto, and the mountains of Torres Vedras, Mafra, Montechique, &c., on which lord Wellington's famous lines were established in 1810.

Page 77, the pamphleteer says, I have mentioned many reasons, but not the real and substantial one why lord Wellington moved against Soult instead of Victor, namely—*Lisbon would have been left open to the former general.'*

*Answer.*—The reasons given by me were,—

1°. Sir Arthur Wellesley preferred attacking Soult, because *he held a rich province, and Oporto the second city of Portugal which both regent and people desired to recover.*

2°. To attack Victor, it was requisite to combine operations with Cuesta, which required time, *which might be employed against Soult.*

*Authorities.*—Sir A. Wellesley's correspondence:—

‘I should prefer an attack upon Victor in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of the kingdom, and of the favourite town of Oporto;’—‘and if any operation against Victor, connected with Cuesta's movements, did not require time to concert it, *which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult.*

To lord  
Castlereagh,  
April 5.

‘An operation against Victor is attended by those advantages,—if successful, *it relieves effectually Seville and Lisbon,*’ &c. &c. To Mr. Frere.

Thus the ‘*substantial reason*’ falls to the ground. Sir Arthur does not mention it; and if he thought a movement against Victor would *effectually relieve Lisbon*, he could have had no fear of Soult.

Page 78.—The pamphleteer ‘*is at a loss to see how their (Soult's and Victor's) operations could have been carried on by the Zézere.*’

*Answer.*—My expression was not ‘*carry on,*’ but ‘*connect their operations,*’ and the Zézere was only mentioned as the line by which Soult and Victor, after reaching the Mondego and the Tagus, could best communicate, or, if necessary, form a junction,—and why not? If two armies make a flank march to effect a junction, to cover their movements by a river will not only protect their march, but render their junction militarily secure long before the troops actually meet, the enemy cannot safely pass the river to prevent it.

Pages 93, 94, contain a laboured rebuke, for, that I have called small bodies of troops ‘*corps.*’

*Answer.*—It may be that ‘*corps*’ is a barbarism, but it is found in Johnson's Dictionary, and there defined ‘*a body of soldiers.*’

Page 101.—It is asserted that on Soult's retreat from Oporto, Silveira, in disobedience of the most positive orders, ‘*never turned his troops on the Mondin road or towards Salamonde,*’ and that early on the 15th ‘*lord Beresford, leaving Amarante on his way to Chaves, overtook general Silveira's division.*’

*Answer.*—These assertions have little reference to anything I have said, but they are meant to explain the ‘*failure in marshal Beresford's operations*’ to which the French owed their safety. I will not contradict them; yet Silveira always affirmed that *his division did march on the 14th to Mondin, and thence through Cavex to Ginzo, where he took thirty prisoners on the 15th and where his farther progress was arrested*

by unexpected orders from marshal Beresford's head-quarters. He also affirmed that the troops Beresford overtook, as above stated, were not his, but *Baccellar's Beira division*, which at that time was only an auxiliary. I have, therefore, in nowise misrepresented the matter in saying, '*there was a failure in Beresford's operations,*' and '*there seemed to be some misunderstanding between him and Silveira.*'

Page 104.—Adverting to my praise of Trant's advance to the Vouga, the writer says, '*the author, for a military man, has an extraordinary method of separating the subordinate or executive officer from the general under whose direction that officer acts.*'

*Answer.*—General Trant assured me that his advance to the Vouga was his own sudden and spontaneous act.

Page 110.—The following passage from my work is quoted. '*Early in June marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed on Castello Branco,*' upon which the writer observes, '*lord Beresford was neither directed on that place, nor did he go there.*'

*Answer.*—Lord Londonderry, in his '*Narrative of the War,*' p. 305, says, '*marshal Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the north, was ordered to proceed with one British and two Portuguese brigades by Castello Branco to the Tietar.*' As his lordship was adjutant-general at the time, and must, therefore, have issued the order himself, I adopted his assertion without a suspicion of its incorrectness.

Page 115.—The pamphleteer says, '*the duke del Parque would not give lord Beresford some British biscuit left in store at Ciudad Rodrigo by the commissariat of sir John Moore's army,*' and he appends to this the following note: '*Colonel Napier, with his usual inaccuracy, says by order of sir Arthur Wellesley,*'—that is, I said, '*the store was formed by sir Arthur Wellesley's order.*'

*Answer.*—Extract from sir A. Wellesley's correspondence:

To the	'It is a curious circumstance respecting marshal
marquis	Beresford's corps, that the Cabildo of Ciudad
Wellesley,	Rodrigo actually refused to allow them to have
Merida,	30,000 lbs. of 100,000 lbs. of biscuit which <i>I had</i>
September 1,	<i>prepared there</i> in case the operations of the army
1809.	should be directed to that quarter.'

I now come to the last, not the least of this writer's mistakes. In my History it is said, marshal Beresford was so credulous of French weakness in the number of troops, as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos, that '*Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to 8000 or 10,000 soldiers,*' upon which the pamphleteer (p. 112) remarks,



‘ lord Beresford will, I apprehend, be surprised at this information: although reading of events with which he had no inconsiderable concern, he must feel himself indebted to lieutenant-colonel Napier for a great deal of very important intelligence relating both to them and to himself. The above relation will, I suspect, be received by his lordship as news of the very newest description. I doubt whether lord Beresford, in the whole course of his life, ever communicated with the junta of Badajoz.’—‘ Of course the historian will give his authority for the fact.’—‘ This public announcement to the junta of Badajoz—this numerical accuracy with which lord Beresford’s estimate of Soult’s force is set down—all these particularities remind one vastly of the veracious anecdotes of the worthies of the ‘ School for Scandal,’ and I can only reply to them in the words of sir Benjamin,—the lieutenant-colonel’s account is more circumstantial, I confess but I believe mine is the only true one, for all that.’

‘ *Authority.*—Letter from his excellency marshal Beresford, to the junta of Badajoz; extracted from the *British Press* of July 7, 1809.

‘ *To his excellency the president and the lords of Junta of Estremadura.*

‘ I have already transmitted you an account of the forces I sent to Alcantara, and which were obliged to abandon that position to the enemy on account of his superior numbers. The resistance they made, however, was highly honourable to the small corps which ultimately remained to defend that pass, though the loss and damage sustained by the town in consequence gave me great concern. I have again sent to Alcantara four battalions under the same brave officer, colonel Mayne. I flatter myself that in a short time all that part of Spain will be freed from its oppressors. I have much pleasure in transmitting to the junta copies of the letters received yesterday from Galicia, and congratulate it on the favourable appearance of things in that province. You already know that upon the defeat of the corps of marshal Soult by general sir Arthur Wellesley, the enemy were reduced to a most disgraceful flight, abandoning their ammunition, &c., and the soldiers throwing away their arms; after which, they made such forced marches that it was impossible to come up with the main body of the army before it had passed the bridge of Breuga. Our troops followed them with all expedition to that place between which and Alariz we made some prisoners. I have previously communicated to all the juntas and generals in Galicia the pro-



bability that *the remnant of this army, amounting only to about 8000 or 10,000 men, without any cannon or ammunition, and in every respect in the most wretched condition, flying from our troops,* would retire into that country, in order that they might be prepared in the best manner to receive them; and I entertain no doubt that the consequences of the capture of Lugo, and of Ney having left Galicia, will be fatal to Soult. I have the honour to remain, with the most profound respect,

‘Your most obedient servant,  
G. C. BERESFORD.’

Coimbra, May 29.

Is that sufficient authority? or will it be called a forgery, as some other letters have been, because the initial of the first Christian name is given according to the Spanish spelling, namely, Guilhelmo for William? But having now tracked the pamphleteer through most of his tortuous statements, I pray my readers to observe, that this mass of errors and scurrility is contained in a pamphlet of less than 130 pages; it is the production of a writer who acknowledges to have spent three months in its preparation, because he was ‘*anxious that nothing should be published in reply to my mistakes which could be justly cited as a mistake of his own;*’ and who, after roughly noticing even a false punctuation, in such an extensive work as mine, lays down the following rules for the guidance of contemporary historians. ‘*That they should not attempt to go farther than a bare register of facts.*’ That they must ‘*cast aside all evidence which would be scouted in a court of justice;* and that they must ‘*never allow the words, ‘it is said,’ to disgrace their work.*’ In fine, that the public must be content, by a species of comparative anatomy, to judge of the size and form of the great transactions of the world from a few dry bones presented by the grubbers for small facts.

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Since writing the above, *Further Strictures* from the same pen have appeared. The author is surprised that his former admonitions have had no effect upon me; perhaps he will be more surprised to find that his present corrections are likely to have the same fate; for being written in the same style, and as inaccurate as those I have just analysed, it would be waste of time to notice them. Sir Benjamin D’Urban has however now mixed himself up in this controversy, and his objections shall have an answer.

His account of the battle of Albuera I had before me when I wrote mine;—if I have not quoted him, it is because that was the condition on which a copy was placed in my hands;—if I have not followed him as a guide exactly, it is because other information justified me in quitting him at certain points with respect to matters of fact, and his opinions and conclusions I was in no manner bound to.

1°. I acknowledge an involuntary error in saying marshal Beresford's failure at Badajos kept lord Wellington for nearly *two years* on the frontier of Portugal. I should have said more than one year; how the mistake crept in I cannot say, but I had already detected and corrected it in my copy for the second edition.

2°. I know that marshal Beresford obeyed lord Wellington's instructions by crossing the Guadiana at Jerumenha, it is so stated in my History; but lord Wellington had also given him a discretionary power of acting, and to invest Badajos quickly was the principal object. It is marshal Beresford's judgment in the use of that discretionary power that I have censured.

3°. In opposition to sir Benjamin, I adhere to my assertion that marshal Beresford fought an unnecessary battle, and *fought it against his own judgment*. Nor was it upon slight authority that I said the impatient feeling of the army was so strongly represented to him as to affect his decision. I am not bound to name that authority because sir Benjamin chooses to 'regard the fact as imaginary,' but that lord Beresford fought the battle against his own judgment is undeniable, or there is no truth in the following extract from general Harvey's journal.

24th May, 1811.—'Met general Beresford, and rode to Villalba, where there is an old castle,' &c. &c. '*The marshal was remarkably communicative as to the policy of fighting at Albuera, which he blames himself much for, depicting the consequences of defeat in most serious colours.*'

Here I must notice the Second Strictures. If marshal Beresford is content to have such a defender, I have no reason to regret his taste; but should the production reach a second edition, I would advise the writer not to let his authorities contradict his text.

Page 125, he says, sir Alexander Dickson having '*furnished me with the number of guns, I arbitrarily decided as to their calibre.*' But in page 51, Appendix, No. IV., general D'Urban (whom I followed) sets down, under the head of artillery employed in the battle of Albuera, six German, six Portuguese,

and six British nine-pounders; wherefore, if nine is nine, and three sixes make eighteen, *I did not 'arbitrarily decide as to their calibre.'*

Page 35, it is said, '*as to the author's assertion that the Tagus might have been forded after a week's dry weather, nothing can be more imaginary. The whole allied army, and the whole French army, know the absurd incorrectness of this statement.*' But at p. 3, Appendix, sir Benjamin D'Urban says, '*The Tagus between Golegao and Rio Moinhos was known to offer several fords after a few days' dry weather.*'

Page 36, he says, 'The whole army was about 20,000,' but at page 13, Appendix, D'Urban gives 20,000 infantry and 1400 cavalry, besides artillery.

Page 75, it is affirmed that Beresford could form his bridge and pass over his troops in the sight and in despite of the French; and that it was '*perfectly impossible for them to frustrate the operation;*' but at page 12, D'Urban's Appendix, it is said, the French '*might have opposed the operation with a rational prospect of success.*'

Page 77, 'the night was so dark that the enemy neither was *nor could be seen;*' but page 12 of D'Urban's Appendix, says, the enemy '*observed the heights occupied,*' and gave up his design.

Page 80, '*the army did not halt at Olivenza;*' page 13 of the Appendix, sir Benjamin says, the army being without provisions, '*encamped in the woods round that town.*'

Page 162, '*the sudden shift of wind which colonel Napier has introduced with somewhat of dramatic effect, to clear away the obscurity of mist and smoke in which he had veiled the scene, never occurred;*' page 31 of the Appendix, sir B. D'Urban says, '*the wind at this moment blew aside the smoke and rain.*'

This suffices to prove my opponent vulnerable. But I have stated no fact without authority, and I shall hereafter show this, on all important points that may be contradicted. To fix exactly all the periods and circumstances of a battle is nearly impossible, and I admit that on some minor points this writer seems better informed than general D'Urban or myself. Wherefore, in a second edition I will accept and use his corrections; and also other recent information, showing that lord Beresford's errors at Albuera and Campo Mayor were greater than I have represented them. I cannot promise to say with Dumouriez, who it would seem is angler enough to know a trout from a gudgeon, that marshal Beresford at Albuera '*did more than Cæsar at Pharsalia,*' but I will endeavour to chas-



tise '*the spirit of the inquisitor*,' and retain only the '*liberal*' in my composition; meanwhile this writer who 'being pestered with a popinjay answers he knows not what,' may recover temper, which, next to '*parmaceti*, is the sovereignest thing on earth for an inward bruise.'

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From the tedium of personal justification, I turn to the more grateful task of replying to some unfounded criticisms on sir John Moore's campaign.

It might be imagined, when time had blunted the edge of political malice, Moore's heroic death would have arrested censure which could not be substantiated; but in this, as in other human affairs, all opinions are not to be bound in one fetter. Yet will I show, that his censurers have only opinions unsupported by facts to offer. To effect this, I must again advert to *Colonel Sorrel's Notes*, classing them with *Hamilton's Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*, and *Sherer's Life of the Duke of Wellington*, quoting and answering all indifferently, as their arguments or assertions present themselves.

They accuse sir John Moore—1°. Of vacillation and of losing time at Salamanca. 2°. Of taking counsel from others rather than from his own judgment. 3°. Of neglecting Galicia as a defensive position. These are their words :

*'That time was lost at Salamanca is a matter of fact, and a great subject of regret. The value of a day, or an hour in war is great. It is in vain to ask what might have been the consequences of a movement into the heart of Spain which was never made, and which, according to able and acute men, should never have been contemplated; but it is certain that between that measure and a retreat on Portugal, sir John Moore wavered long in his designs.'*—*Life of the Duke of Wellington*, page 163.

*'Part of his difficulties must be admitted to have proceeded from his own arrangements.'*—*'While the infantry proceeded by Almeida, the cavalry and artillery were directed to advance by Merida and Truxillo; and the consequence was, that the difficulty of collecting his army was prodigiously enhanced, and sir John Moore was compelled to remain above a month inactive at Salamanca. Precious time was there lost. The thoughts of the general were bent on a retreat. The army did not move until the eleventh hour, and action was unfortunately delayed till the precise period when action could no longer be available.'*—*Annals of the Campaign*, page 102.

*'It is much to be lamented that sir John Moore did not feel*



*himself fully at liberty to follow the dictates of his own excellent judgment, instead of yielding to suggestions and opinions which, being founded on false data, scarcely merited attention.*'—Sorrel's Notes on the Campaigns, 1808-9, page 41.

These three writers here agree in censuring sir John Moore, yet afterwards all disagree on what he should have done. The author of *The Life* would have had him retreat at once upon Portugal; the author of *The Notes* insists on the primary importance of defending Galicia; the author of *The Annals* vacillates between that and '*retiring*,' as he phrases it, '*across the Tagus to the south.*' This discrepancy shows a variety of fancy, no difference of judgment, because none of them have examined the subject with a reference to facts. This shall be demonstrated.

*'He was compelled to remain a month inactive at Salamanca.'*—Annals.

Two thousand men, the head of sir John Moore's column, reached Salamanca the 13th of November, the rear did not arrive until the 25th, and on the 11th of December the army marched towards Sahagun; thus, if the troops could have commenced operations the day after they arrived, the month is reduced to fifteen days. Were those days wasted in inactivity? Was it inactivity to keep so near a powerful enemy until Baird and Hope effected their junction? Was it inactivity to fix in that short period, amidst a thousand conflicting and false representations and reports, the true character of the Spanish insurrection, and with so sure a judgment that every operation founded upon a different view failed even to the end of the war? Was it inactivity to have arranged the means of throwing the army into the heart of Spain? And when the battle of Tudela, breaking that measure, obliged Moore to prepare for a retreat, was it inactivity, amidst such difficulties and anxieties, when without money to establish sure intelligence, he had new prospects opened, to arrange a forward movement in the face of three hundred thousand men, at the same time changing the line of operations from Portugal to Galicia? Are these things the work of a moment?

Suppose the artillery under Hope had moved with sir John Moore, had been at Salamanca on the 25th November; the junction with Baird was still to be effected, and the separation of that general was not the work of Moore. Would this writer, then, have had the latter advance with fourteen or fifteen thousand men to Burgos, or to Aranda de Duero, or to Madrid? If to the last, Baird must have been abandoned, because the fourth corps, which was at Rio Seco the 25th

November, would have intercepted his line of march. Burgos? He was still too late, because Blake's and Belvedere's armies had been dispersed on the 10th and 11th. Say they had not been dispersed; then the arrangement of sending Hope by Madrid was better than marching in one column to Salamanca; because the latter, enlarged and troubled with a great train of carriages and guns, could not have reached that town so soon as the 25th; but moving as they did on separate roads, all marched more rapidly, and Hope could have united at Burgos with a difference of only twelve leagues and at Aranda with a difference only of one league in the distance traversed. Wherefore it is clear that sir John Moore's mind was not 'continually bent on retreat,' that his arrangements did not in any manner oblige him to remain a month inactive at Salamanca. In fine, he was not inactive at all.

But says the author of the Annals, '*the time chosen for action was precisely when action could not avail.*' And '*On the advance of the British, Soult, as a matter of course, would have fallen back to Burgos, where his corps would have effected a junction with that of Junot. Nothing therefore could be more visionary than the project of defeating Soult.*'

Is there any foundation for all this? Sir John Moore reasoned thus, 'Soult knows nothing of my march—he may be surprised and beaten; if he retreats the French grand communications are exposed: in either case Napoleon must come to his succour. If he come with a small force, he also may be fought withal. If with a large force, I incur danger, but a diversion for the south is effected.' What was the result? Soult instead of '*retiring as a matter of course,*' stood his ground, the emperor came back with his whole army, and the only thing visionary is the argument of this writer.

'*It is certain that he long wavered.*'—Life of Wellington.

When only two thousand British had reached Salamanca, Blake and Belvedere, whose armies were to cover the junction of Moore's divisions, were utterly routed, and the French cavalry entered Valladolid. Moore then told the junta that if the enemy advanced he must go back; they did not advance and he remained at Salamanca.

On the 25th his column was closed up, and on the 27th the state of affairs being more clearly known, he prepared to throw himself into the heart of Spain.

On the 28th, news of Castaños' destruction and of Napoleon's movement on Madrid arrived; the British flanks were not then united to the centre, and the proposed measure became impracticable; wherefore, Moore resolved, when his

artillery and cavalry should have joined to retreat to Portugal.

The 4th of December Hope arrived; the 5th, information came that Napoleon was resisted at Madrid, and by the 7th, from every quarter came news, which, whether from natives or Englishmen, private or official, was all of the same tenor—namely, that the enthusiasm of Spain was again awakened. Moreover, Napoleon's march from Burgos to the capital, not only permitted a junction with Baird's division, but opened a point of attack to the now united British army. On the 7th, therefore, sir John, seizing the opportunity thus suddenly offered, resolved to advance on Sahagun, thereby meeting new combinations with fresh dispositions. Is that wavering? Is a general to shut his eyes to what is passing around him, and stupidly follow a plan preconceived upon circumstances totally different from the actual ones?

*'He should have followed his own excellent judgment,'* says the author of the Notes.—*'He should have retired across the Tagus to the south,'* says the author of the Annals.

He could not have done both. When Napoleon was at Burgos, Moore might have retired across the Tagus; but the author of the Annals speaks of the period when the advance to Sahagun was commenced; at that time Napoleon was at Madrid with 60,000 men, and the 4th corps was moving on Talavera; wherefore any movement towards the Tagus would have been an advance, and Moore's excellent judgment certainly would not have let him call an advance a retreat. But did he not follow his own judgment? Mr. Frere and the Spaniards wanted him to move upon Madrid, and he went towards Burgos. Sir David Baird wanted him to take a defensive position in Galicia, and he made a forward movement to Sahagun. Others wanted him to retreat to Portugal, and militarily speaking that was most advisable: Moore said so. But the awakening enthusiasm offered a hope for Spain, and he advanced on political grounds, calculating, as indeed happened, that he should always be able to retreat by Galicia, which was not worse than a retreat on Portugal. There was danger, yet war is never a safe game; and when, as in this case, all the difficulties are foreseen and boldly met or skilfully evaded, a dangerous operation is not rash but great.

Let me now prove, that he acted upon such a calculation,—that he foresaw and judged all the difficulties and results, military and political—that he adopted no man's recommendations, but executed his own plan.

Salamanca, December 6th.—*'What is passing at Madrid*

may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us with whatever risk it may be attended; yet I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for, if the bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it.'

Sir John  
Moore's Cor-  
respondence.

Salamanca, 8th December.—'Madrid still holds out, and I have some reason to believe that efforts are making to collect a force at Toledo, and a still larger one on the other side of the Sierra Morena: as long as there is a chance we must not abandon this country.'

Ibid.

Salamanca, 9th December.—'After Castaños' defeat the French marched for Madrid, the inhabitants flew to arms,' &c. 'This is the first instance of enthusiasm shown; there is hope that the example may be followed, and the people be roused, in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and have taken measures to form our junction, whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid: we are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail, or, at any rate, they may not be able to resist—in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever.'

Sir John  
Moore's  
Journal.

11th December.—'I shall assemble the army at Valladolid. —'By this movement I shall threaten the French communications, which will make some diversion in favour of the Spaniards if they can take advantage of it; but I much fear they will not move, but leave me to fight the battle by myself, in which case I must keep my communications open with Astorga and Galicia.'

Sir John  
Moore's Cor-  
respondence.

Sahagun, December 24.—'I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken but with the view of attracting the enemy's attention from the armies assembled in the south, and in the hopes of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps, while it was still thought that the British were retreating into Portugal.'

'*The experiment failed,*' says the author of the Annals. In what manner? 'The object of my movement,' says sir John Moore, on the 12th of December, '*is to threaten the French communications, and attract their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and favour any movement which may be made by the Spanish armies forming to the south of the Tagus.*' Now, what was the result? The 5th corps left Zaragoza; the 4th corps withdrew from Estremadura; the 2nd corps came from



New Castille; the 8th corps from Navarre; Napoleon, with 50,000 men, returned from Madrid—the whole plan of his campaign was overturned! Cuesta was then enabled to move an army from the Morena to the Tagus, Infantado to obtain refuge at Cuenca, Palacios to descend into La Mancha; the siege of Zaragoza was delayed, Portugal was saved, and the conquest of Andalusia deferred. This is to fail! And it is thus, turning from the steady light of facts, this writer endeavours by the feeble glimmer of his own imagination to trace Moore's career?

These authors seem bad generals in the plains of Castille; let us see if they are better on the mountains of Galicia.

*'Had the information of the general, with regard to the country traversed by his army, been more accurate and extensive, he would have known that there was no road leading to Betanzos and Coruña by which the enemy could at any season have advanced with rapidity sufficient to have endangered his communications—in fact, the roads on the right and left occupied by the British, most difficult at any season, must, at the period in question, when covered with deep snow and intersected by swollen torrents from the mountains, have been utterly impracticable.'*—Annals, pages 112, *et seq.*

The brigades of Alten and Craufurd, quitting Moore's main body near Astorga, marched by Domingo Flores and the Puente de Bibey to Orense and Tuy; from Orense there is a cavalry road to St. Jago; from Tuy there is an artillery road by Ponte Vedra to St. Jago; from St. Jago there is a royal road to Coruña. Soult desired Ney to march the whole of the 6th corps by this last route to Coruña, and general Marchand's division did actually so move, reaching St. Jago soon after the battle of Coruña.

From Villa Franca, Franceschi marched with his cavalry into the Val des Orres, and then, remounting the Minho, rejoined Soult between Villa Franca and Lugo. This march took place during Moore's retreat; after that event, Soult moved from Coruña by Ponte Vedra and Tuy to Orense, sending La Houssaye's dragoons through Mellid to the same place: from Orense there is also a direct route to St. Jago.

From Lugo there is a carriage road to St. Jago, through Mellid. This was the route by which sir John Moore intended to retreat to Vigo, and along which Mackenzie Frazer's division did actually march and then return, and there were magazines at all three places.

From Lugo there is a road by Monforte to the Val des Orres, closely flanking the royal road from Villa Franca, by

which Moore retired. Soult marched his whole corps by this route when operating against Romana, after the retreat from Oporto.

From Benevente there is a high road by Mombuey and Puebla de Senabria leading to Orense. Soult also traversed this route in June, 1809.

From the Asturias there is a road by the Conceja de Ibas to Lugo. This route was followed by Ney, in May, 1809.

From the Asturias here is a high road through Mondonedo to Betanzos and Coruña, and there is also the coast road by Ribadeo to Ferrol. These roads were marched by Ney, and by Romana, in April and May; moreover, Romana moved from Mondonedo to the sources of the Neyra, and thence into the Val des Orres, his route being by the line of the Asturian frontier, and consequently flanking the royal road of Lugo. So much for '*impracticable roads.*'

These writers think Moore ought to have defended Galicia.

*'It has been matter of regret to many that sir John Moore was not led to regard with a more favourable eye the project of defending Galicia. No part of Spain offers equal advantages for a defensive war.'*

*'The documents given in the appendix to colonel Napier's History, abundantly prove, that it was to this quarter that the anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed.'*—Annals, p. 140, *et seq.*

*'Perhaps it is to be regretted that the suggestion thrown out by sir David Baird's letter of the 8th December, from Villa Franca, was not adopted.'*

*'Had the British army been collected on the frontier of Galicia, about the middle of December, there can be little doubt that it would have been able to have maintained itself, at least during the winter; and long before spring the face of affairs was completely changed by the departure of Napoleon, and of the force which followed him, to the Austrian war.'*

*'When the suggestion was offered, our strength was unimpaired, our equipment perfect, and the great body of the French was occupied with Madrid.'*

*'Lugo and other points might have been fortified, positions taken up and strengthened, depôts established, and, by a judicious disposition of our force, the danger of being turned by the road through Orense, and by those from the north of Portugal and the Asturias, might have been sufficiently guarded against.'*

*'The opinion of Buonaparte on the influence which the occu-*

*pation of Galicia, by an enemy to France, might have had on the war in Spain, is recorded in a letter, which was written under his dictation to general Savary.*—Sorrel's Notes, page 41, *et seq.*

The argument of the author of the *Annals* being but a meagre copy of colonel Sorrel's *Notes*, to answer one is to answer both; but previous to examining the question of the defence of Galicia, I will mark some stumbling-blocks in the way of both.

1°. On the 8th of December say the *Notes*, '*our strength was unimpaired, and the French were occupied with Madrid.*'

The strength of the British army was the same on the 24th as on the 8th of December; no loss, save a few men hurt in the cavalry skirmishes, had been sustained. Madrid capitulated the 3rd of December; on the 4th the French took possession; Napoleon was so little occupied with it on the 8th of December, that he had, on the 4th, detached his cavalry in pursuit of Castaños' fugitive army, sent the 1st corps to La Mancha to menace Andalusia, and the fourth corps to Talavera to form an advanced guard for the march against Lisbon!

2°. '*The anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed towards Galicia.*'—*Annals.*

This expression is not very intelligible, but taken with the context, it means that Napoleon feared opposition in Galicia more than in any other quarter; yet two pages after we find the same author asserting that Moore should have '*retired across the Tagus,*' because '*There it was that he was most dreaded by Napoleon.*'

3°. The documents quoted from my Appendix, instead of being favourable to, are directly opposed to the views of these writers.

Before the battle of Rio Seco, Napoleon tells Savary that '*Bessières had to fight for the communications of the French, and that a wound received by him would give a spasm to the whole army.*' Nothing could be better expressed or more applicable to the state of affairs. The French then in the Peninsula were about 135,000, of which 48,000 were in Portugal and Catalonia. Of the remainder, 50,000 were scattered in Valencia, Andalusia, and the borders of Murcia. 10,000 were at Zaragoza, some at Madrid, and only 15,000 *under Bessières* were left to protect the communications from Cuesta and Blake; whose united force, exceeding 40,000, the best regular troops in Spain, was entering the plains of Leon: moreover the king was then on his journey to the capital, and had Bessières been defeated would have been forced to fly. It



was, therefore, the comparative strength of the Spaniards on this point, combined with the danger of the king and the scattered state of the other French corps, especially that of Dupont's, which drew Napoleon's attention, not the geographical advantages of Galicia.

What a vast difference also, between the circumstances at the two periods brought into comparison by these writers!

When the emperor wrote, the heads of the French invasion were engaged in Valencia, Andalusia, and Aragon; the whole country was in insurrection. Spanish armies gathering in every quarter, Spanish courage untried, the French communications protected by a force only one third of that opposed to it. When Moore retreated, 90,000 men, that is, four times his force, were united in pursuit of him; all the Spanish armies had been dispersed, the insurrections quelled; Zaragoza was menaced by 35,000 French, 20,000 were at Talavera, 30,000 in La Mancha, 10,000 in Madrid, Burgos was in a state of defence, many thousand soldiers were distributed on the lines of correspondence, and 50,000 were marching under Napoleon upon Astorga. All that great man's combinations were compact, his communications protected, and the head of the principal operation turned, not as in the former case away from but against Galicia; and this, not because of its geographical advantages (which it is evident he disregarded when he went from Burgos to Madrid although he knew Baird's division was at Astorga), but because the united British army was on his communications. 'Napoleon's dread,' and 'Napoleon's anxieties,' sound grandly; but his opinions should be understood before they are quoted. At that time he feared neither British nor Spanish armies in Galicia, nor any other part; his force was overpowering, and the head of his invasion was wherever he chose to place it. If Moore had retired on Lisbon, Napoleon would have followed him to Lisbon. As Moore went to Galicia, against that point the emperor immediately drove.

*'Bessières is to-day at Medina Rio Seco: he will open communication with Portugal, force the rebels into Galicia, and seize Leon.'*

*'If Cuesta throws himself into Galicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will be improved. If he does so after a defeat it will be still better.'*

*'By driving Cuesta into Galicia we deprive him of his communications with Madrid, Andalusia, and Estremadura.'*

*'The two important points, and where they can make a real regular warfare, are Galicia and Andalusia, because the troops*



*of San Roque, of Cadiz, and Algarve, are nearly 25,000 men, who have taken part with the sedition of Seville; and all those who were at Oporto have taken part with the rebels of Galicia.'*

*'Not a peasant of the valleys but sees that the affairs of Spain at this moment depend upon Bessières. How foolish, then, it is to have in this great affair voluntarily given twenty chances against him!'*

*'A defeat of Bessières will be a blow at the heart; it will be felt at all the extreme points of the army.'*

*'The army of Bessières ought to have at the least 8000 men more to obviate all chances against him.'*

*'The great object of the army's efforts should be to secure Madrid. Madrid can only be menaced by the army of Galicia.'*

*'If Bessières is checked, his object should be to protect Burgos.'*

Such were Napoleon's expressions; not a word about the geographical importance of Galicia,—he only considers the dangers from such a comparatively large Spanish force entering the plains of Leon: and in his own campaign he did not move against Madrid until he believed Moore was in full retreat upon Portugal. The instant he discovered his mistake, he returned with incredible rapidity, not because he feared opposition in Galicia, but because it was necessary to protect his communications in the plains of Leon. Soult was in the same situation as Bessières had been; but, as the British were more formidable opponents than the Spaniards, Napoleon came with his whole army to protect the communications. Thus it is clear that sir John Moore's march against Soult was in the very spirit of Napoleon's warfare; they who would have had him go to Galicia, understood neither his views nor the emperor's reasoning.

Let us now examine whether Galicia could be defended. The arguments, or rather lamentations of these writers, rest on a letter of sir David Baird: it will be fitting therefore to see how far their foundation is secure.

Sir David Baird commanded only a division, and his knowledge of the real state of affairs was necessarily more confined than that of the commander-in-chief. He was ignorant of the numbers and position of the French armies, and not fully acquainted with the extreme imbecility and falseness of the supreme junta. Any proposition made by him on the spur of the moment, must therefore be taken as the suggestion of a man who had no means of judging largely; and

that his proposal to defend Galicia bore that impress is easily shown.

*'It has frequently,' he says, 'occurred to me, that in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Galicia and part of Leon, than by proceeding to join you at Salamanca to abandon those provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the marquess of Romana; and if you judged it proper by a flank movement to join us in the neighbourhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed and determined to make in defence of the national independence.'*

*'The royal road from Coruña to this place and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous, and with the sea open to us we should be able to receive, with facility, such reinforcements and supplies as the British government might deem it proper to send. The country abounds in cattle; bread indeed would be required, but flour might be obtained from England, and in the meantime Galicia would have an opportunity of arming under our protection, and our presence in Spain would furnish a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spaniards.'*

Sir David puts the case hypothetically. He would cover part of Leon and Galicia, Romana might occupy the Asturias,—all were to wait for the Spanish efforts. He was but slightly acquainted with the state of affairs; for how could the plains of Leon be covered by 25,000 men against 200,000?—how could Romana with 6000 ill-equipped men defend the Asturias against Napoleon, after flying from thence at the sight of Soult's foragers. Sir David thought it easy to get provisions, yet in a manifesto, published a few days before, he writes thus:—

*'The kingdom of Galicia, strong from the nature of the country, will require no force to defend it beyond its own brave army now assembling at Leon, under the marquess of Romana; the presence of an additional number of troops in its passes and on its mountains, would but tend to exhaust its resources without adding to its security.'* But the best comment is, that sir John Moore did not only authorize, but pressed Baird, to prepare provisions for the army in Galicia, and he was unable to procure more than a few days supply for each station.

*Authorities.*—*Sir John Moore to sir David Baird.*

6th December.—‘*Establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two farther back.*’

12th December.—‘*I am much obliged to you for your opinion upon the Gallicias and Vigo, and it is that which probably I shall now follow, should such a measure become necessary I am therefore most anxious that magazines should be formed on that communication.*’

16th December.—‘*I cannot help again pressing upon you to take every measure for the forming of magazines at Astorga, Villa Franca, and on the road to Coruña, for though we may do something here, we must always look to a retreat upon Galicia.*’

*To lord Castlereagh.* 30th Dec. Astorga.—‘*I found no provision here: the little which had been collected had been consumed by sir David’s corps in their passage. There is not two days’ bread to carry the army to Villa Franca,—there are no means of carriage,—the people run away,—the villages are deserted.*’

14th Jan. 1809.—‘*The want of provisions would not permit me to wait longer (at Lugo). I marched that night.*’

Let us now examine the question by dates.

Sir David’s letter was written the 8th December. The 10th it reached sir John Moore. The 12th it was answered. The 16th, orders might possibly have reached Coruña, to forward stores and ammunition to the different positions intended to be occupied; on the 25th Moore commenced his retreat before 90,000 men. This gives ten days for ‘*fortifying Lugo and other points,*’—‘*taking up judicious positions to secure the lateral roads from the north of Portugal,*’—‘*establishing a regular system of supply from England,*’—‘*calling forth and arming the population of Galicia,*’—‘*enforcing the necessary requisitions for transport, and persuading the junta of the province to give the requisite aid.*’ Ten days to do all this! with a junta which had kept sir David’s troops seventeen days in harbour ere it would suffer them even to land!—a junta that made a trading profit of his necessities; and after extracting nearly half a million of dollars from him, had at last so scantily furnished him with transport, that he was obliged to leave his spare ammunition behind, and to march his troops by *half battalions*, to lessen the burden of provisioning them!

*Authorities.*—*Sir J. Moore to lord Castlereagh.* 13th November.—‘*I am sorry to say, from sir David I have*

nothing but complaints of the junta of Coruña, who afford him no assistance. They promise everything, but give nothing.'

Do. 24th Nov.—'The 500,000 dollars your lordship mentions, sir David Baird considered as sent to him; he detained them, and has nearly expended them.'

Sir David Baird to sir J. Moore. 19th Nov.—'Every possible effort has been made to complete the equipment of this division: but owing to the total want of assistance which we have experienced in Galicia from the local authorities, our success has not been great.'

Do. 21st Nov.—'We are at this moment destitute of spare ammunition.'

But Romana's army was to defend the Asturias! Romana's army, which is thus described by colonel Symes, by himself, and by Moore.

Colonel Symes to sir D. Baird. Dec. 14.—'It is morally impossible that they can stand before a line of French infantry. A portion, of at least one-third, of the Spanish muskets will not explode: and a French soldier will load and fire his piece with precision three times before a Spaniard can fire twice.'

Romana to sir J. Moore. 14th Dec.—'I have begun to clothe and to organize, but much is wanting. There are still at least two-thirds who are in want of clothing from head to foot. Almost the whole army are without haversacks, cartouche-boxes, and shoes; and notwithstanding all the exertions I have made, I have not been able to succeed,—the country offering so few resources.'

Moore to lord Castlereagh. 31st Dec.—'Nobody can describe Romana's troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do at the indifference of the inhabitants.'

Was ever so wild, so visionary a proposition made by a general, as this of sir David Baird's, if we are to suppose he made it with a knowledge of the real state of affairs, and with a reference to a permanent defence? But it is evident he suggested it with reference to an enemy not much superior in numbers; it was so considered by sir J. Moore; and those writers who lament its non-adoption, understood Baird's views as little as they did Moore's and Napoleon's.

Suppose '*Lugo fortified*,' and '*the army judiciously posted*' by the 25th December.

What system, what arrangements, could have obliged the poor mountaineers of Galicia to bring in provision and



means of transport for stores? Was this part of the plan to be effected by the contemptible junta; or by the people themselves? Was it to be effected by force or by money? If by money, where was it to be had? If by force, where was the force? Would these writers have sir J. Moore detach from his 25,000 men, to raise contributions in a friend's country, when Napoleon, with 90,000 men was in his front? Finally what is meant by '*a judicious distribution of the troops?*'

There were two, only two points, where a maritime base of operations could have been established, namely, Vigo, and Coruña which includes Betanzos and Ferrol. Now let us examine in succession the different positions of defence which an army could take up with reference to those bases.

1°. *Manzanal or Rodrigatos*. This position is immediately behind Astorga. It is strong to the front, but unfavourable for a retreat to Villa Franca; it is turned by the whole road of Foncebadon, which comes into the new road at Calcabellos near Villa Franca. The British must therefore have retired to Calcabellos, or occupied that place in force. If the latter, 25,000 men would have been spread over thirty miles of ground; the enemy, 90,000 strong, could have thrown his whole force against either extremity of the line, and Calcabellos once carried, there was no retreat for the troops at Rodrigatos.

2°. *Calcabellos or Villa Franca*. To hold this position permanently, magazines must have been established at Lugo, and strong corps of observation placed, one at Orense to cover the establishments of Vigo; one at Mondonedo to cover those of Coruña; one at Lugo. The first, because from Benevente the French could move a force against Orense and Vigo by the Puebla de Senabria; the second, because they might do the same through the Asturias to Betanzos and Coruña; the third, partly to connect these detachments, but principally to watch the road of Concija de Ibas, leading from the Asturias directly upon Lugo. From whence were these three detachments to be drawn?—would these writers have had the British army depend upon the peasants of the mountains for the protection of its flanks, its magazines, and base of operations—or upon Romana's army, such as he described it—or would they have had Moore to divide the 25,000 British into four parts on a line of one hundred and fifty miles, when Napoleon had 90,000 men massed in his front?

3°. *Lugo*. Here was the first position in which a small

army could pretend to make a permanent stand. The communication with Betanzos is good, not above thirty miles; the army could have moved between those two points, and delivered battle at either, with good retreat to Coruña, or by St. Jago to Vigo; that is, if the French operated only from Astorga and the Asturias. But the roads to Vigo were still open by the Val des Orres and by Puebla Senabria, and the position of Lugo and Betanzos could be taken in reverse. What was to be the gain of all this? To preserve an unsteady footing in a barren corner of the Peninsula, while the French rioted in the conquest of the south of Spain and Portugal!

Reference to sir John Cradock's papers in my Appendix, second volume, will show that Lisbon must have fallen the moment the 4th corps arrived there; from Lisbon the French would have sped to Oporto and the Minho, thus opening another line of operation against Vigo. Galicia has no geographical advantages for defence by an inferior force; it is, when an enemy possesses the Asturias and Portugal, indefensible, especially by a maritime power. 1°. It offers a salient angle to the adversary. 2°. The harbours at its base are wide apart, situated on a dangerous coast, and the lines of communication from them to Villa Franca are separated by difficult mountains. 3°. The lines of communication run along the frontiers of Asturias and Portugal; the enemy, embracing as it were the whole country, would be nearer to the harbours at the base on both sides than the army to whom they belonged, and could attack any point he pleased. It would be impossible, then, to remain about Villa Franca, and this was proved in after-times; for the Gallician army, although Portugal was in the possession of the allies, was always brought back to Lugo by the slightest demonstration of Bonnet's division from the Asturias. To call such a district strong in any other view than when the contending parties are equal in numbers, or as it affords a fugitive native force shelter in its mountains, is to discover a total ignorance of war.

Shall it be said Napoleon had not troops enough to operate in this extended manner? The 1st corps was left in La Mancha, and proved more than sufficient to beat all the Spanish forces that rallied in the south. 10,000 men garrisoned Madrid. The 4th corps was on its way to Portugal. 90,000 men were collected at Astorga the 30th of December, and 60,000 of those actually followed Moore to Coruña. Lapisse, with 12,000, was sent to Salamanca, and could have

marched upon Orense by the Puebla Senabria road. Bonnet's division was already in the eastern passes of the Asturias. The 5th corps was actually drawn off from Zaragoza, and could have been sent into the Asturias also. The reserve of heavy cavalry could have occupied all the plains of Leon, and the imperial guards, the only troops Napoleon withdrew when he returned to France, remained for two months near Vitoria guarding the line of communication. The withdrawal of the guards and departure of the emperor himself were all the changes consequent upon the announcement of the Austrian war. Napoleon's absence was doubtless an immense event, yet he did not know he was to depart until he reached Astorga; sir John Moore therefore could not before that period have foreseen both the event and its consequences.

Colonel Sorrel refers me to lord Wellington's campaigns, and dwells upon the population of Galicia, which he estimates at a million and a half, as if all the population had been actually in arms and organized to give battle—or as if they could have been so armed and organized in ten days! Lord Wellington's campaigns! Why, there it is I find the illustration I want! Portugal had three millions of inhabitants; Portugal had fine harbours; Portugal had a regular government; Portugal had an army organized and disciplined; Portugal had an armed militia; Portugal had, an established vigorous system for forcing the people to defend the country; Portugal had strong mountains, difficult roads, great rivers; Portugal had actually in the field a regular force of 40,000 men, a militia of 45,000, an auxiliary British army of 30,000 men; Portugal had more than a year to prepare—and yet when Portugal was invaded by 70,000 French, lord Wellington retired from the frontier, and would have retired from the country altogether, if he had not had time, and money, and means, to fortify a position which could neither be turned by the flanks nor stormed in front. Without any of these advantages either as to time, or system, or numbers, or local advantages, these writers would have had sir John Moore defend Galicia against more than double the number of troops which invaded Portugal! In defending Portugal, lord Wellington also defended the cause of the Peninsula. Spain was prostrate—he relinquished nothing. But when Moore retreated, the south of Spain and Portugal were not even invaded, and they offered a thousand times the advantages of Galicia!

Having thus shown how little these writers have considered their subject, I take the opportunity of correcting an involun-

tary error of my own, and explaining how it arose. When narrating Charmilly's mission at Salamanca, I said sir John Moore '*tore the letter in pieces.*' It was not so. The story was first published by Charmilly to create a notion, which has been greedily received and propagated by Moore's enemies, that, oppressed by the difficulties of his situation, he was peevish and irritable. Mr. James Moore '*disdaining,*' as he says, '*to answer the knave,*' not only did not in his Narrative contradict this misstatement, but rather confirmed it by his mode of treating the matter. The story was repeated, and I adopted it without further examination. Yet it is certain that the original letter is at this moment in existence without a rent or injury! Moore's enemies foiled even on this trifling point, must therefore continue to draw upon their imaginations for facts, upon their prejudices for arguments, and their malice for conclusions: and when they have done so, there will always be persons willing and able to defend him.





# SEQUEL

OF

NAPIER'S REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,

CONTAINING SOME

NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS RELATIVE TO

THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

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‘There was a man in Islington,  
And he was wondrous wise,  
He jumped into a quickset hedge,  
And scratched out both his eyes.’

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IN my *Reply to various Opponents*, I pledged myself to give authorities for certain important facts disputed by the author of the work entitled, *Further Strictures on colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War*. I now redeem that pledge, which I gave, not as thinking it necessary to take more notice of a writer whose ill-founded pretensions to authority, and whose incorrectness, I had so thoroughly exposed in my Reply, but to show that no weakness then withheld me from dissecting his second production as completely as I had done his first; and also because I thought it due to my readers to substantiate the accuracy of my third volume before the publication of a fourth. In this view, I will now take the disputed facts in the order of events, and, placing my own statement first, in each case support it by authority.

*Almeida*.—The lieutenant-governor Da Costa was tried and shot. ‘*The only evidence against him was an explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool by colonel Cox, when a prisoner at Verdun.*’—History.

*Authority*.—Mr. Stuart to lord Castlereagh, Lisbon, July 25th, 1812.

‘MY LORD,—It may not be irrelevant to mention to your lordship that, upon the evidence of a despatch which general Cox, the late governor of Almeida, while a prisoner in France addressed to lord Liverpool, relating the circumstances which

led to the fall of that fortress in 1810, the person who exercised the functions of lieutenant-governor at the time of the capture has been condemned to death by a court-martial.'

*Battle of Busaco.*—'*The eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces.*'—History.

*Authorities.*—1°. Extract from a memoir drawn up by colonel Waller, staff-officer of the second division and an eye-witness. 'As the French formed on the plateau, they were cannonaded from our position, and a regiment of Portuguese, either *the eight or sixteenth* infantry, which were formed in advance of the *seventy-fourth*, threw in some volleys but *was quickly driven into the position.*'

2°. Extract of a letter from an officer of the ninth British regiment, also an eye-witness. '*The eighth Portuguese regiment is extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very foremost of the ranks of the ninth British.*'

Before quitting this point I will notice an accusation made by the author of the *Further Strictures*, namely, that I have, from partial motives, been silent upon a gallant charge made by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment. To which I answer, on my own authority as an eye-witness, that *no such charge as this writer has described took place.* The nineteenth Portuguese were not posted in front of the convent, that ground was occupied by the light division in first line and by the Germans in second line. There was indeed a Portuguese regiment (possibly the nineteenth) which was posted on the mountain, nearly a mile to the right of the convent and in front of the brigade of guards. When the skirmishers of Marchand's division pushed back their opponents, this regiment made an advance in support of the covering light troops; it was a handsome demonstration, but it is exaggeration to call it a fine charge; the line never was nearer to the enemy's skirmishers than a hundred yards: for the truth of this I appeal to the light division, and especially to the artillery, who were at the time firing upon the main body of the French troops said to have been charged.

*Operations in the Alemtejo.*—Here it is scarcely necessary to notice the special pleading in the *Further Strictures* relative to captain Squire and the batteries constructed on the left of the Tagus during Massena's stay at Santarem. Both that officer and colonel Jones say the batteries were meant *to command the mouth of the Zezere.* It is ridiculous to suppose captain

Vide Jones's  
History of the  
War, p. 444.

Squire who constructed them did not know the object, or whether they could effect it. Let that suffice. On other points my answers shall be full.

1°. '*Beresford arrived at Portalegre with 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 18 guns.*'—History.

*Authority.*—Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, Louzao, March 16, 1811.

'I heard of the fall of Badajos on the night of the 13th and 14th, and major-general Cole's division was moved on Espinhal on the 14th, in order afterwards to continue its route into the Alemtejo, and it marched in that direction yesterday. *We shall have in that province 22,000 men, of which nearly 2200 will be cavalry.*'

In sir B. D'Urban's memoir it is also stated that *after the passage of the Guadiana* the army was still 21,400 strong, with 18 guns.

2°. *Combat of Campo Mayor.*—*The French and the thirteenth dragoons charged through each other twice.*—History.

My authority was an eye-witness, whose testimony is confirmed in the following memoir, the production of an officer of the thirteenth dragoons who was one of those engaged. I give it entire, because it confirms my account of the affair in other important points also.

'On the morning of the 25th March, 1811, the army moved from its bivouac position towards Campo Mayor, the thirteenth light dragoons in its proper place in the column of march, until the ground in front was found sufficiently open for the operations of cavalry, when the whole were ordered to the front. The cavalry consisted of the third-dragon guards, and fourth dragoons, under the command of colonel De Grey; the first and seventh regiments of Portuguese cavalry, under the command of colonel Otway; and the thirteenth dragoons, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Head and brigadier-general Long.

'On gaining the front contiguous columns of half squadrons were formed, and the whole moved forward at a brisk trot, under the guidance of general Long who directed the movements of the cavalry on that morning. A troop from the thirteenth dragoons, and detachments from the other regiments, were sent to act as skirmishers on the rising ground on the right, and to protect the right flank of the column. At this period the strength of the thirteenth dragoons was reduced to two squadrons, having one squadron detached with the light division under the command of colonel Colborne, a troop with a Portuguese infantry brigade under the command of colonel



Colliers, and the troop employed as skirmishers; in consequence, the actual strength of the two squadrons did not exceed forty-eight file each squadron, making a total of 192 men.

‘General Long having found a fit opportunity, ordered a line to be formed, which moved on and gained the top of the rising ground, when the enemy were perceived on the plain below, formed up and presenting three strong bodies of cavalry. From an intelligent troop-serjeant-major of the enemy, who was this day wounded and taken prisoner, and who, from being employed in the office of the French adjutant-general, had a perfect knowledge of the force now opposite; it was learned that it consisted of the following numbers and regiments:—second hussars, 300 men; tenth hussars, 350; twenty-sixth heavy dragoons, 150; and fourth Spanish chasseurs, 80: making a total of 880 men. The Portuguese regiments formed on the left of the thirteenth and received orders to support; the heavy brigade were formed at some distance in the rear of the thirteenth and outflanked it on the right; the British and Portuguese infantry and artillery were forming as fast as they arrived on the ground, coming up in double quick time.

‘On the thirteenth being formed, which was done with as much regularity and precision as on a field-day, general Long gave his final orders to colonel Head to attack the enemy; and the two squadrons moved forward, receiving the words, march, trot, canter, charge, from their respective leaders. The enemy came on in a gallant and determined style, and on the word charge being given, *every horse was let out, and the men cheered; the enemy did the same. The crash was tremendous; both parties passed each other, and at some short distance in the rear of the enemy, the thirteenth came about; the enemy did the same, and a second charge took place with equal violence, when the conflict became personal with the sabre. After some hard fighting in this manner, the enemy gave way and the pursuit commenced.* During this time, two battalions of French infantry, which were in the rear of their cavalry, formed line; and on their cavalry clearing their front, pursued by the thirteenth, they opened a heavy fire of musketry on the latter, by which many men and horses fell: in this pursuit, the two regiments of Portuguese cavalry under the command of colonel Otway joined. For some time on the road, the French dragoons in small parties made fight, but being at length totally dispersed, they no longer made resistance and surrendered when come up with.

‘The pursuit now continued at a rapid rate, it being the object to gain their front and capture the whole, as well as the enormous quantity of baggage on the road, with their artillery; it was taken for granted a proper support would have been sent after the regiment, and that there was not anything to be apprehended from the enemy’s infantry which was behind; we supposed a good account would be given of them, when we considered the force of British and Portuguese that was left on the ground. The pursuit did not cease till stopped at the bridge of Badajos, when, on consultation being held, it was judged prudent to fall back on the support and secure all prisoners and captures. Sixteen pieces of artillery, each drawn by eight mules, numbers of waggons, immense quantities of baggage of all descriptions, provisions, stores, horses and mules; in short, the whole of the stores which the enemy had collected in Campo Mayor, and which on that morning were removed from thence to be placed at Badajos, were, owing to the rapidity of the pursuit, captured.

‘On nearing Badajos, some of the drivers, supposing themselves safe when within the fire of the guns on the fortifications, refused to surrender, and kept whipping on their mules: those were sabred and the mules mounted by men of the thirteenth. The retreat was continued for some miles in the most orderly manner, the men in high spirits, until information not to be doubted was received, that the French infantry which was left on the ground were coming forward, supported by a considerable body of that cavalry which had surrendered, but which, on seeing their infantry coming on, recovered their horses and arms. To attack this force was considered so imprudent, that it was decided (as there appeared no hopes of support) to abandon all the captures, make a detour to the right of the road, and endeavour to join the army. It can only be felt by those in similar situations, what the feelings of all were, when this decision was found to be absolutely necessary.’

To this authentic statement, I add the following observations by captain Arthur Gregory and colonel William Light, both serving at the time in the fourth dragoons.

‘The surprise of the French troops at Campo Mayor was so complete, that when the cavalry had got abreast of the fortress the enemy’s infantry were only just turning out on their alarm post outside, arriving by twos and threes. The heavy brigades were bringing up their right shoulders to charge, *when the marshal himself rode up and stopped them.* The artillery which had opened its fire on the

Captain  
Gregory.

retiring column, were ordered to cease after a very few rounds, and the enemy allowed to retire, unfollowed and unmolested, to Badajos, over a perfectly open and flat country.'

'As they (the French infantry) were retreating in close column a very short distance in advance and on our left, I had a better opportunity of seeing them than those in the centre or right of our brigade, as I was on the left of the left half squadron of the whole brigade; consequently, nearer to them than any one else. We were so near that the whole nearly of the rear rank and some officers of the flank turned round, made a sudden stop, and it appeared to me they were going to lay down their arms. I recollect saying to the serjeant next to me, 'If we go on a few yards further they will throw down their arms, for, look, they are ready to do so now.' *At this very moment we were halted, the French shouldered their arms again, gave a shout of joy, faced about and marched off.*

This testimony, joined to the acknowledged fact that the French did triumphantly carry off their recovered guns to Badajos, verifies the main points in my account of the affair of Campo Mayor; and with respect to the presence of colonel Colborne, which the author of the *Strictures* so flippantly denies, I reaffirm it upon the authority of colonel Colborne.

The author of the *Strictures*, although equivocally, denies that the thirteenth dragoons were reprimanded by marshal Beresford for pursuing the French; the fact was notorious, and the actual reprimand, a very severe one, has been published by Mr. C. E. Long in reply to this writer's aspersions on the late lieutenant-general Long. In my work it is said they were, perhaps, *justly* reprimanded. I retract that assertion. More full information leads me to think they were *unjustly* reprimanded; they deserved praise, and the '*unsparing admiration of the whole army*' was well founded.

3°. '*The breach of Badajos was not closed,*' &c. &c.

4°. '*Beresford should have marched upon Merida.*'

5°. '*Beresford believed that Soult would only act on the defensive.*'—History.

These assertions involve matter of opinion and matter of fact. The opinions I leave to others. The matters of fact are as follows:—

1°. If Beresford had moved by Merida or been less slow in his after operations, *Badajos was in no condition to resist.*

2°. The road to Merida *was practicable for troops.*

3°. The fear created by the sudden appearance of so large



a force, and the valour of the thirteenth dragoons at Campo Mayor, *rendered the movement by Merida a sure operation.*

4°. Beresford, unable to judge rightly of the real state of affairs, *thought Badajos would be evacuated, whenever the allies passed the Guadiana.*

5°. Up to the 21st of April at least, *lord Wellington did not think well of the marshal's operations.*

The first of these facts scarcely requires authority, seeing that Badajos must necessarily have been ill-prepared for a siege, yet I have abundant proof.

Colonel Jones in his *Sieges*, page 3, writes thus:—‘At this time (26th March) the French had been in possession of Badajos only a fortnight, and the works and batteries of their recent siege still afforded considerable cover. *The breach was open* and the garrison ill-supplied with provisions, ammunition, stores; the re-capture, therefore, not only seemed inevitable but easy if speedily invested; but the river Guadiana interfered, and there was neither a pontoon-train nor other means with the army for crossing the river.’

The last passage of this quotation proves that Merida was the true line, because there was a bridge there. It is foolish to plead in bar lord Wellington's instructions to pass at Jerumenha. They were given in the notion that all things for an *immediate passage* were in readiness; but it was not so, and Beresford, following the letter, neglected the spirit of his instruction, which was to recover Badajos as speedily as possible. The denuded state of Badajos does not rest on colonel Jones's single testimony. Colonel Lamarre, the commander of the French engineers in that town, says, ‘The English committed a great fault in wasting eight days before Olivenza which must have fallen after the taking of Badajos, and *with a little more boldness and penetration Badajos might have been attacked with success in the beginning of April.* From the 12th of March the French had been working to fill up the trenches, to repair the breach, and to make other restorations, especially the Pardaleras which was a heap of ruins. But materials were rare, and masons scarce. It was not until the 21st of April that the breach was closed, and the state of the said breach had been a source of great uneasiness, because if *five or six thousand men had appeared before Badajos at the end of March, that place, in a bad state and feebly garrisoned, must have fallen in a short time.*’

This last paragraph also proves that Merida would have been the best line. But to proceed with Lamarre.

‘The armament of the place was augmented by the *guns*



*brought from Campo Mayor.* (Those very guns which the thirteenth dragoons took and marshal Beresford lost again). 'The former siege and the preparations for defence had, however, exhausted all the resources of the town, and the neighbouring country, and yet so pressed were the engineers for wood, that so late as the 22nd of April,' (fourteen days after Beresford had crossed the Guadiana,) 'a strong detachment was sent out to fetch timber.' This detachment, as may be seen in the body of my work, was nearly cut off by lord Wellington, who lost no time after he arrived in ascertaining the real state of the garrison. There is, however, other and even better proof of the denuded state of Badajos, namely, the original register-book of the French governor's orders and correspondence, from which I extract the following passages:—

1<sup>o</sup>. *To the royal commissary of the province, 10th April, 1811.*—'The place of Badajos being unfurnished of timber, it is proper to fix upon some place to cut it,' &c. &c. 'I pray you to make all diligence on this subject, and to employ all means in your power.'

12th April. *To the same.*—'I send you two states of the articles wanting in Badajos to complete us for three months' consumption of 4630 rations of food, and 300 of forage per day, besides the objects necessary for the sick.' 'I pray you, in consequence, to make *immediate requisitions on the villages of the province* for the quick supply of the same.' 'The paymaster-general *has no funds to pay for the works of the place.*'

*Order of the day, 10th April.*—'From to-morrow the troops of the garrison will receive only *three quarters ration of bread daily.*'

14th April.—'Our mills can make no more flour for want of charcoal,'—*à faire battre les meulles.* 'The engineers also are much embarrassed for want of this article, which is, however, indispensable.'

26th April. *To the royal commissary, &c.*—'No brandy can be given to the workmen; there is none in the magazines, except that which I have reserved for the gunners in case of a siege.'

These extracts show the state of Badajos to the end of April. But I have said 'general Imas, when he surrendered to Soult, *had plenty of provisions,*' and it is asked how that agrees with the French *being in want.*

Lord Wellington writing to lord Liverpool proves the fact as to Imas. 'Louzao, March 16th. *The garrison (that is the Spanish) wanted neither ammunition nor provisions.*'

But after Imas surrendered, not only his garrison but the other prisoners, and the French army were fed from the resources of Badajos, and the French garrison also lived for a fortnight in the town. Imas might therefore have had plenty, and the French garrison very little. Captain Malet, the English agent living with Mendizabel at the period of Soult's siege, writes thus:—

‘Badajos, 8th February. There are sufficient provisions for several months for a garrison of 6000 men, but if the present number of troops are kept here, amounting to *nearly sixteen thousand men*, the place cannot hold out long.’

I now come to the other four facts, namely, *the practicability of the road to Merida, the impression of terror made upon the French, the false notions of Beresford relative to the enemy, and lord Wellington's opinion of the operations.*

The proof of the three first will be found in the extract from a letter addressed by marshal Beresford to the plenipotentiary, Mr. C. Stuart. For it is not a little curious, that the writer of the *Strictures*, who pretends to have direct authority from the marshal to contradict my statement and who accuses me of ignorance, should yet be so ignorant himself, that I am able to rebut his charges by the testimony of the very man whose cause he espouses. Meanwhile I make little account of his argument about the army of the centre advancing, and the dangerous position beyond the Guadiana; the latter would have been the same as it was after passing at Jerumenha; and it is evident from the marshal's letter, that the army of the centre, if its existence was even known by him, did not enter into his calculations: it is only introduced to mystify the subject. The notion that Latour Maubourg, for Mortier was not as this ill-informed writer supposes then with the army, could by passing through Badajos cut off the retreat, is also unsustainable. My proposition was to place the allies *between Badajos and the French army*; because the latter was feeble, surprised by the former, and astounded by the charge of the thirteenth dragoons. Moreover, Beresford in his public despatch calls Latour Maubourg's army only five thousand; he could therefore have had no fear of it; and with the allied army on both sides of the Guadiana it would have been easier to throw a bridge than when possessing only the right bank. But the danger of having the line by Merida, is thus disproved; lord Wellington ordered Beresford, when the bridge at Jerumenha was swept away, to occupy Merida, establish his communications by that very line and alter his cantonments accordingly.

*Authorities.*—Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, Elvas, April 1, 1811.

*'I scarcely think the French will remain in Badajos, as I cannot believe they will let so considerable a force as will be necessary for its defence be isolated from their field army, which of itself is not very great, and cannot relieve that part so isolated but by abandoning Andalusia, and then perhaps not equal to it. I hope to be able to pass the Guadiana at all events the 4th; but most vexatiously a vagabond officer of the drivers corps, in conducting the five Spanish boats saved from Badajos, absolutely overset two in as fair a road as any in England; and which, with the present swell of the river, will give me some difficulty. The pontoons sent from Lisbon (English) were only fit for infantry.'* *'I have got the Spaniards at Albuquerque, at least all the armed; and the sooner the arms are sent for the others the better, that we may send them to their own country, that I have now opened for them. I propose, in passing the Guadiana, that they march to Merida; and, if the enemy remain in Badajos, I shall bring them on my right to Lobau or Talavera. The chase which my countrymen of the thirteenth dragoons gave on the 25th was literally a fox-chase of two leagues without drawing bit; and which, though it lost me three battalions of infantry that must else have been surrounded, has given a terror to the French that is, perhaps, equal to the capture of the infantry. The Portuguese joined very handsomely, and appear equally to have enjoyed the chase.'*

How the thirteenth dragoons by beating the cavalry, taking the convoy, and interposing between the infantry and Badajos, while the heavy dragoons, the artillery, and infantry of the allies were on the flank and rear of the French infantry; how this prevented the latter from being surrounded does not very clearly appear; but it is clear, 1°. that the road to Merida was practicable, or he would not have sent the Spaniards that way; 2°. that *'he anticipated little or no opposition from the French after the Campo Mayor affair,'* seeing *'he had then opened the Spaniards' country for them;* 3°. that the enemy were struck with terror; 4°. that their field-army was not great.' Finally, that he was unable to judge of the true state of affairs, inasmuch as his expectations were all signally frustrated by the course of events. *Badajos was not evacuated; it would have been strange if it had. The French did suffer its garrison to be isolated, and they did also relieve it, and without abandoning Andalusia.* This letter confirms also my assertion that marshal Beresford thought Soult would act



*entirely on the defensive*; and that no doubt may exist on that head, I will give an extract from another of his own letters, supporting it by one from lord Wellington, which I transpose from my Appendix to this place.

Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, 27th April, 1811.  
Extract.

*'It is said Soult is assembling a force on our side of Seville; his number is, however, I think, much exaggerated, but I cannot speak certain about it.'*

Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, Elvas, May 2, 1811.

*'On the night of the 15th instant, I received from marshal sir William Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that marshal Soult had broke up from Seville about the 10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously received, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville and the approaches to that city by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia; I therefore set out on the following morning!'*

The last paragraph indicates that Wellington had not much confidence in Beresford when opposed to Soult; but the following extract from another letter more fully discloses the cause of his repairing in person to Estremadura.

Elvas, April 21st, lord Wellington to Mr. C. Stuart.

*'I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here, and I am come to put matters in the right road; and to come to an understanding with Castaños and if possible with Blake, respecting our future operations.'*

6°. *Want of guns, stores, provisions, and pontoons.*—My charge against the Portuguese government was perhaps put too broadly: yet it is untrue to say, as this writer has done, that the government had not to do with these matters; they had a great deal to do with them, and also with the storing of the fortresses, the food of the Portuguese troops, and the means of transport for everything. If the writer of the *Strictures* has really received any information from the marshal upon this subject, he must know that on all those points the negligence of the government, and of their '*Junta de Viveres*,' and the false reports and assertions by which they endeavoured to cover that negligence, were sources of continual and most serious distress to lord Wellington, who could not until the end of the year procure even a decree for the abolition of the '*Junta de Viveres*,' and could at no time get delinquents punished. He must know also, that after the battle of Fuentes, the Portuguese troops were without any ammunition because



of the negligence of the government; that one of the principal reforms in the administration sought for by lord Wellington was the consolidation of the branches of the arsenal under one head; and that it was not till February, 1812, one year after this period, that Mr. D. Lemos returned from the Brazils with full authority for Beresford to control the administration in all that regarded the Portuguese army. This writer should also have known that the engineer's stores ordered up to Elvas for Beresford's siege were not, as colonel Jones in his journal supposes, kept back because *the exhausted state of the country would not afford carriages*, but because *government would not enforce the requisitions for them*.

Lord Wellington's operations depended much upon the Portuguese government, and that government almost always failed to do its duty. I am unwilling therefore, on this pamphleteer's authority, to diminish the censure. I am unwilling to suppose lord Wellington relied not upon the government but upon Beresford; because if the guns and ammunition were under the control of the marshal, he alone would be answerable for deficiencies of that kind, which would be a most serious charge. Let us now hear colonel Jones upon the extent of those deficiencies.

Journal of Sieges, by colonel J. Jones. 'The strength of Badajos had not been duly appreciated, and the means prepared for its reduction in artillery, ammunition, and stores, were altogether too inconsiderable.'—'It may be considered fortunate that the approach of marshal Soult's army caused the siege to be raised, as otherwise, after a further sacrifice of men in other feeble attempts, it would have brought itself to a conclusion from *inability to proceed*.'

I might here leave marshal Beresford to the care of his kind friend; but as I am desirous of clearing myself from the charge of unjustly blaming the Portuguese government, I will insert some extracts from lord Wellington's correspondence which bear more directly on the question; and which show that if Beresford had nominally the control of the arsenals, the government, through the junta of the arsenal, had in reality the charge of supplying the guns, ammunition, and provisions.

Wellington to Mr. Stuart, Celorico, March 31, 1811.

'I also beg you to draw the attention of the government to the operations on the frontiers of Alemtejo; these are becoming of the utmost importance not only to Portugal, but to the allies in general. It is obvious they cannot be carried on without a constant communication with the maga-

zines, as well at Abrantes as with those at Lisbon; for the inhabitants of Alemtejo supply nothing to the troops. I now request you will give notice to the government that *they must either enforce their own law strictly, and oblige the inhabitants of Alemtejo to give the commissaries of the army the use of their carriages for the payment of hire, or the operations upon that frontier must be discontinued, and I must draw the army back to its magazines. That province has been untouched by the enemy, the carriages must be in it, and yet I have been able to procure only thirty-four, to remove the articles necessary to establish an hospital for marshal Beresford's corps at Estremos. If the government are tired of the war, and do not choose to exert themselves to oblige the people to bring forward the means which are requirrd to enable the army to carry on its operations at a distance from its magazines, it is necessary that it should be known to the British government, that they may adopt such measures as they may think proper.*

Elvas, May 20, 1811.

*'I enclose the copy of a memorial which has been put into my hands by major Dickson of the artillery, regarding the march of certain guns demanded for the service of this garrison from Lisbon. I trust that the movement of the guns has not been suspended, as their early arrival is very important; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make inquiry upon the subject.'*

*'It is perfectly true that major Arentschild left the reserve of his artillery, that is, his spare ammunition, at Sorogozo between Celorico and Ponte Murcella. Why? Because his mules and cattle had been starved on the Rio Mayor, and could not draw it any farther; and because the magistrates of the country would supply no means of transport to draw it on.'*

Elvas, May 27.

*'I hear from colonel Le Mesurier that, notwithstanding the breeze which colonel Rosa has made about Arentschild, there is no ammunition for the Portuguese troops and artillery, even at Coimbra!'*

Let me now close this part of the subject by a conclusive extract from marshal Beresford's own correspondence. In a letter to lord Wellington, dated January 25, 1811, he says:—

*Their difficulties were increasing fast; matters, in his opinion, were coming to a crisis; he was in the greatest alarm about them, and was afraid to look at the state of things, as far as any Portuguese authority was concerned.*

*Siege of Badajos.*—On this head, the main fact disputed is

*the want of due concert in the double attack.* In my History I gave ample authority, and this writer's cavils merely prove that he is angry, and does not know the meaning of the word concert, which he thinks to be synonymous with simultaneous.

I am also accused of having, from inadvertence, marked the investment on the 5th instead of the 4th of May. So nice a critic should himself have avoided marking the Campo Mayor affair on the 26th instead of the 25th. Yet I did not commit the error, if error it be, from '*inadvertence*.' I find my authority, as usual, in the author's own Appendix. Colonel D'Urban says, 'On the morning of the 4th, general Stewart was put in movement,' &c., and '*on the morning of the 5th invested Badajoz.*'

In like manner this writer, curiously exact, asserts that the army '*was not over the Guadiana until the 8th.*' By his Appendix, however, it appears, that on the 7th only one brigade of guns was left on the other side. He says, also, '*no Spaniards joined the marshal from Montijo,*' and two of the ten days assigned to his operations by me are to be deducted; yet in the next page he himself assigns the same term of ten days! and with reason, because it was not till the 18th Latour Maubourg retired to Guadalcanal, and ten and eight make eighteen. Moreover, the operations were begun the 7th, for on that day the piquet of cavalry was surprised.

As to the Spaniards from Montijo, *I did not say they joined the marshal*, I said he commanded 25,000 men including them, for which I adduce D'Urban's memoir, given in this writer's own Appendix—viz., 'On the 10th, general Castaños (*at sir William Beresford's desire*) had caused Count Penne Villemur with the Spanish cavalry from the side of Montejo, followed by general Morillo with his division of infantry, to occupy Merida, from which the French garrison had withdrawn, and the count pushed on his advanced posts to Almendralejo.' These men, acting in concert with the marshal, and by his desire, were certainly under his command. Let these trifles pass. I will now give another extract from captain Squire, who, notwithstanding this writer's displeasure, is good authority for what fell under his own observation; and not the less so that he supports my opinion as to the marshal's want of skill at the siege, corroborates the account of his blunder at Campo Mayor, and attests the fact, that the army did generally hold his talents in scorn, and were tired of his command.

'17th May, 1811. Thank God! they say lord Wellington or general Hill may be soon expected in the neighbourhood; *this will be a revival to our spirits*, for we have lost our cha-

racter on this part of the frontier. On the night of the 12th the real attack on the east side of the town was begun, but suspended by the marshal after one hour's work; the soil was excellent. *Had we begun there on the 9th, Badajos would have been our own on the morning of the 15th. But after the affair of Campo Mayor, &c. &c.!!! what can be expected?*

*Battle of Albuera.*—1°. *'Thus the youngest officer commanded.'*—History.

This is true. Blake's appointment as captain-general of Valencia and Murcia took place indeed after the battle of Albuera, but he had been created captain-general of the Coronilla in March, 1809, and as one of the Spanish regents was of a higher rank than Beresford.

2°. *'The position was about four miles long.'*—History.

It was so, from the extreme left where the Portuguese cavalry were placed, to the extreme right where the battle ceased. My plan is carped at by this author; it was only given as an explanatory sketch, but it was taken from the same source as his, and does not, as he asserts, extend the wood over the tongue of land to the banks of the Albuera, although some plans of the position that I have seen do so. Moreover, in describing the ground, this writer, as usual, forgets to make his Appendix agree with his text. At page 113 he says, *'the rear of the position was only practicable for infantry;*' but D'Urban's memoir says, *'it was easy for cavalry throughout.'* Which is right?

3°. *'The position was occupied by 30,000 infantry, above 2000 cavalry, and 38 guns.'*—History.

This author's disingenuous manner of bolstering up a bad cause is here evident. Having printed a running commentary upon my pages, written by somebody who is not named, he makes this anonymous critic state that the allies had only 34 pieces of artillery, thus leaving out four Spanish guns; and at the end of D'Urban's memoir there is also the same false detail; and yet these persons, who cannot, in so small a matter attain any correctness, are brought forward to censure my inaccuracy! The official returns of sir Alexander Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery in the battle, make the numbers amount, as I have stated, to 38—viz.,

British horse artillery . . . . .	4
Ditto foot ditto . . . . .	6
King's German Legion ditto . . . . .	12
Portuguese ditto . . . . .	12
Spanish artillery . . . . .	4



*Detail of troops.*

Beresford's corps.			Spaniards.		
Infantry,	{	British . . . 7,500	4th army	{	Infantry . . . 11,000
		Germans . . . 1,500			Cavalry . . . 1,100
		Portuguese 10,000			5th { Infantry . . . 2,000
Cavalry,	{	British . . . 700	army	{	Cavalry . . . 500
		Portuguese . . . 300			
		<hr/>	<hr/>		
Total . . .		20,000	Deduct for strag- glers and de- serters from the 4th army . . .		
		<hr/>			
			<hr/>		
			Total . . . 13,500		
Beresford's . . . . .		20,000			
Spaniards . . . . .		13,500			
		<hr/>			
Grand total . . .		33,500			

*Authorities.*—1°. Lord Londonderry, who was adjutant-general, rates the British at . . . . . 7,500

2°. Two battalions of Germans I estimate at . . . . . 1,500

3°. General D'Urban, who rates the Portuguese at . . . . . 10,000

4°. General Harvey's journal, in which the British cavalry are rated at . . . . . 700

And the Portuguese cavalry at . . . . . 300

20,000

I find, also, in a very accurate journal kept by Colonel Thorne, a staff officer, that the heavy British cavalry on the 20th of March, only twenty days previous to the battle, amounted to 752 men under arms—viz.,

3rd dragoon guards . . . . .	379
4th ditto . . . . .	373
	752

Wherefore, taking the 13th dragoons at a low rate, the British cavalry alone had a thousand troopers in the field. But the reader will observe here, a greater number of men than I allowed in my work. The fact is, that being in doubt whether lord Londonderry included Alten's Germans under the general head of British, I deducted the latter from the gross number. I have never been able to procure an official

return of the whole army in the field; probably none was made, and my belief is, that I have understated the number by nearly two thousand men.

Since writing the above, I have obtained the weekly states of general Long's division of cavalry for the 8th and for the 29th of May, that is, one week before and a little more than a week after the battle of Albuera, and unless it can be shown that in the fight there were fewer men in the ranks than at other periods, they will be found conclusive as to the numbers of cavalry.

On the 8th of May, the present under arms at Villa Franca, in front of Albuera, were, exclusive of 230 officers and sergeants, 1429 Portuguese and British troopers, the latter having 1109 men and 1076 horses.

On the 29th of May, there were 1587 men and 225 officers and sergeants and 1489 horses, the increase arising from the junction of men who had been detached. The allied cavalry, including the 13th dragoons, and the Portuguese and Spanish horsemen, was therefore nearly three thousand strong.

My mode of estimating the numbers of the 5th Spanish army was as follows:—

In D'Urban's memoir, Morillo's division of the 5th Spanish army is said to consist of a few weak battalions, and Carlos d'España's brigade of five battalions, is called 2000 strong. One battalion of the latter was sent to Olivenza, the remaining four battalions I therefore took to be 1600 men; to these I added 400, as supposing that Castaños must have brought up some of Morillo's people to the action; Penne Villemur's cavalry I know, from several sources, to have been at least 500 strong.

The number of the 4th army I found in a letter of lord Wellington, dated Nissa, April 18, 1811:—

'From a letter from Mr. Wellesley, of the 11th, I learn that general Blake was himself about to come into the Condado de Niebla, to take the command of general Ballesteros' division, and of the troops which had been under the command of general Zayas, and which were to return to that quarter. *The whole corps will amount to 12,000 men, of which 1100 are cavalry.*

I subtracted 1100 men, as stragglers or deserters during the long march from Ayamonte, which I believe was too many, because lord Wellington, in a letter dated the 4th July, 1811, six weeks after the battle, says Blake's corps was still from 10 to 12,000 strong; and in an abstract of the head-quarters returns, made 1st July, Quinta St. Joa, Blake's corps is again

set down at 12,000. My estimate is thus borne out; and what does a thousand or two, more or less, signify, when it is plain there were already more than marshal Beresford was able to handle, seeing that in so bloody and critical a battle one-third of his troops never fired a shot.

4°. *The French had 'above 4000 veteran cavalry, but only 19,000 chosen infantry.'*—History.

The imperial muster-rolls of the 1st of May, the present under arms of the 5th corps, including the garrison of Badajos and 3500 reinforcements in march to join, were 15,885, of which 752 were cavalry and 590 artillery,

leaving . . .	14,543	infantry.
Deduct garrison	2,887	

Total . . .	11,656
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Soult drew from the 1st corps one batttalion of grenadiers . . . . .	500
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Ditto from 4th corps, two regiments of infantry forming Werle's brigade . . . .	4,000
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From Dessolles' reserve at Cordova, Godinot's brigade . . . . .	4,000
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20 156

For officers and non-combatants, who are always included in French returns, I deducted . . . . .	1,156
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Total infantry . . .	19,000
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The division of heavy dragoons was . . .	3,000
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The light cavalry of the 5th corps . . .	752
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Drawn from the 4th corps two regiments .	500
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Including officers, total cavalry,	4,252
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Grand total, including a detachment left at Villalba . . . . .	23,252
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Having thus worked out my estimate from authentic documents, I turned to the French authors who have treated of this battle—viz., Jomini, *Vie de Napoleon*,—Lamarre, *Relation du Siège de Badajos*,—Lapene, *Conquête d'Andalusie*,—Bory St. Vincent, one of Soult's staff, *Guide des Voyageurs en Espagne*. They make the French twenty-two thousand men of all arms, while the *Victoires et Conquêtes Français* reduces them much lower. I have, therefore, most probably over-stated the force of the French.

5°. 'Nearly 7000 of the allies,' and 'above 8000 of the French were struck down.'—History.

*Authorities.*—The official returns make the loss of the Anglo-Portuguese . . . . . 4547

The loss of the Spaniards I estimated from common report at the time, from the authority of Colonel Jones's History, and from the Spanish accounts of the day . . . . . 2200

Total . . . 6747

The British official return does not include a number of men, who having been made prisoners escaped and rejoined their regiments in a few days after the action. The writer of the *Strictures* reduces the British loss, and estimates the Spanish at only 1700; but to effect the first, he strikes out the officers and sergeants, and with respect to the last, he knows well that it is under-rated; indeed in his own text there is proof of the inaccuracy of his statement, for he says that before the British came into action, the Spaniards had lost 1500; yet he would have us believe that in all the after-fight, though they were constantly exposed to the fire, they only lost 200 more!

As to the French loss, general Gazan, in an intercepted letter, says he had, a few days after the battle, more than 4000 wounded under his charge, and some had died on the road. By marshal Beresford's despatches, I found 350 wounded discovered at Almendral, and 3000 lying killed or mortally wounded on the field. This loose estimation, taken at the highest, accounts for about 8000; taken at the lowest, about 7000. This last number is what French writers admit, and it is confirmed in the official abstract of lord Wellington's analysis of the numbers opposed to him in July, 1811. He there twice estimates the French loss at 7000 men; but with that liberality which is usually practised towards enemies on such occasions, marshal Beresford added 2000, sir Benjamin D'Urban adds 3000, and the author of the *Strictures* adds 4000 to this number. How far will future writers of this school go?

6°. 'Already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority.'—History.

This is verified in D'Urban's memoir.

'Although Blake's corps had little more than a league to march from Almendral, by a good road, guided by an officer sent for the purpose, and which the general had engaged



should be upon its ground at noon, did not commence arriving till eleven at night, and was not all up till three in the morning of the 16th—‘the posting of the corps was only effected after much delay upon the part of general Blake.’

If the exquisitely bad grammar of this extract will permit any meaning to be attached thereto, it is, *that Blake was not acting cordially with the marshal*; but this shall be made clearer. I wrote with allusion to Blake’s *refusal to change his front*; my authority was a staff officer of high rank present. In the first impression of general D’Urban’s memoir, I also found written against that part of the memoir which says, that ‘*Blake only delayed the execution of the order*,’ the following note by sir H. Hardinge, who carried Blake the order, ‘*He, Blake, positively refused*; saying the attack was evidently on the front by the village. When told that the village was sufficiently occupied, *he still persisted in his refusal*; and when he consented at length to do so, gave such tedious pedantic orders of countermarch, that Beresford was obliged to interfere and direct the movement himself.’ This is precisely what I have stated.

Here may be noticed another of those absurd charges made in the *Strictures*, but contradicted in Beresford’s own correspondence. In a note on D’Urban’s memoir, it is said that by a misprint in the first impression, the words *first and second* (referring to the Spanish lines) *were reversed, and I adopted the error*. Now, without stopping to remark upon the *generalship* of drawing off the first line when Godinot’s attack was commencing in its front, and when from being on the edge of a descent the evolutions must have been cramped, confused, and like a retreat; whereas the second line, having more room, could have more easily changed its front without offering any advantage or encouragement to Godinot’s people;—without stopping, I say, to dilate upon this, I answer that *I did not follow the misprint in sir B. D’Urban’s memoir, but I did follow marshal Beresford’s despatches to lord Wellington and to the Portuguese government, in both of which he says, ‘I requested general Blake to form a part of his first line and all his second to that front.’* And so runs my text.

7°. ‘*The narrow ravine of the Aroya*,’ &c.—History.

The *Strictures* say there was *no ravine*, but if the rear of the position was, as he also asserts, ‘*practicable only for infantry*,’ my expression is just. Nevertheless, I have changed the word to valley, to which he cannot object until he finds two hills together without a valley between them.

8°. ‘*The right of the allies and the left of the French were*

only divided by a wooded hill, about cannon-shot distance from each. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult.'—History.

The plan given by the writer of the *Strictures* makes the hill, as I have said, 'about cannon-shot from each army:' and my text proves I did never argue, as the writer asserts, that a large corps should have been placed there. But I do maintain, if a small body had been there, Soult could not have united fifteen thousand men and forty guns behind it without Beresford knowing anything of the matter; and if, as is probable, the French had first driven this party away, it would have indicated their intentions, and the right of the army could not have been surprised as it was. Moreover, patrols of cavalry and single mounted officers might have gone across the Albuera higher up, and so have looked behind this hill, which was entirely neglected by Beresford. It was a gross error; and it was more gross to permit the French army to pass over that hill, cross the Albuera, and mount the opposite height without the slightest resistance, the whole movement being within cannon-shot of the right of the allies' position. Why were they not watched? where was the allied cavalry? We shall see anon! But what sort of a general is he who suffers his enemy to move for an hour unmolested within cannon-shot against a position which did not exceed three miles in length? Why Mendizabel himself did not discover greater incapacity at the Gebora! But his troops were not so good! English soldiers can sustain even a Mendizabel.

9°. '*The French cavalry outflanking the front and charging here and there,*' &c.—History.

The idiomatic expression, '*here and there,*' shows I meant not to say the French cavalry charged home, but that they *menaced* the Spaniards' flank. Nevertheless I have authority for an actual charge. The author of the *Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*, who I believe served with the 29th regiment in the battle, writes thus: 'An endeavour was made to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge. This failed. A heavy fire was kept up by the French artillery, and a *charge of cavalry again forced them to retire in confusion.*'

10°. '*The Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, although the British were before them.*'—History.

This fact was related to me by a staff officer of high rank present; but the *Strictures* say the *English fired upon the Spaniards*. The confusion on the right in the beginning of the action is thus very clearly shown.

11°. '*At this critical moment general Stewart arrived at the foot of the height with Colborne's brigade,*' &c.—History.

The author of the *Strictures* says, *there was no hill, 'only a gradual slope,' that the troops did not mount it, they 'came up it in the regular manner!'* The regular manner of coming up a slope without ascending is, no doubt, very modest and unassuming, but until I know what it is I cannot describe it. However, there was a *height* if there was not a *hill*.

Extract from D'Urban's memoir. '*This height was of great importance, inasmuch as it commanded the right of the position; and the second division, under the honourable major-general William Stewart, which was now rapidly advancing to support the Spaniards, and which arrived just as they had been forced to abandon it, was immediately ordered by sir William Beresford to attack and recover it.*' The writer of the *Strictures* says *they never lost it!*

12°. '*The 31st still maintained the height.*'—History.

*Authority.*—D'Urban's memoir. Extract. '*Favoured by this (darkness from smoke and rain) as the first brigade under colonel Colborne fell upon the enemy with the bayonet, and were driving him before them, some squadrons of Polish lancers, &c., charged.*' '*The 31st regiment, which was on the left of the brigade, &c. &c., extricated itself from the confusion, and continued the attack alone.*' The word should be defence.

13°. '*Houghton's regiments soon got footing on the summit.*—'*Dickson placed the artillery in line. The 2nd division came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward.*'—History.

*Authority.*—D'Urban's memoir. Extracts. '*The 3rd brigade of the 2nd division, under major-general Houghton, following the first with equal intrepidity and better fortune, deployed very judiciously, and with admirable precision, under cover of the lower falls of the heights, moved on in line to the attack, and supported and followed by the 2nd brigade, under the hon. colonel Abercromby, and the Spaniards under generals Ballesteros and Zayas, carried all before it, gained the contested ground and took post upon it.*' The writer of the *Strictures* says I cannot name the Spanish corps, because none moved forward!

I will now give the version of these attacks which I adopted, copied from a note made by sir Henry Hardinge in the margin of the original impression of D'Urban's memoir.

'The 1st brigade, when they had gained the crest of *the hill*, found it so hot that Stewart ordered a charge, which the Buffs and 48th alone made in line against the enemy's column



of at least 10,000 men. Fortunately the 31st, being the left regiment, had not had time to deploy when the two other regiments charged; it therefore held the ground while Houghton's brigade deployed in the rear, and under cover, and moved up to the support of the 31st, holding the position and keeping up a hot fire in line against the close column of the enemy which attempted to advance, and sometimes to deploy; keeping however within short musket-shot, both sides firing grape: the destruction being infinitely greater in the dense order of the enemy than in our thin order.'

In conjunction with the above, may be taken the following extract of a letter from major Elliot, of the 29th regiment, an actor in what he describes.

'The attack of the 16th May commenced on the right; and most correctly is it described by colonel Napier. The fate of the 1st brigade, except the 31st regiment, was very soon decided; our brigade moved to the right in open column of companies under a very heavy cannonade, by which we had a captain and a good many men killed. The 29th led the brigade; the deployment was made very steadily under this fire, and we became hotly engaged. At this time a body of Polish lancers appeared on our right, charged, and attempted the attack on us which had proved so successful against the 1st brigade; but major Way (now sir Gregory) foiled them by throwing back the grenadiers and 1st battalion company, who with an oblique fire sent them off and we saw no more of them. We kept at it while our ammunition lasted, then the fourth division came up.'

This last passage verifies the fact that *ammunition failed*; a circumstance which is also mentioned in the *Annals of the Peninsular Campaign*. It shows also there were more charges of cavalry made than the writer of the *Strictures* knows of: and here I may mention a curious example of the impudent falsehood of the Spanish accounts of this war.

That Penne Villemur's cavalry fled in a shameful manner, the following statement by colonel Light proves.

'After our brigades of infantry first engaged were repulsed, I was desired by general D'Urban to tell the count de Penne Villemur to charge the lancers, and we all started, as I thought, to do the thing well; but when within a few paces of the enemy, the whole pulled up, there was no getting them farther, and in a few moments after I was left alone to run the gauntlet as well as I could.'

The comment of the Spanish government in their official gazette at Cadiz upon this part of the action was, that Penne



Villemur, seeing three English regiments broken by the French cavalry, withstood the latter, protected the former and was fired upon by the very regiments he had saved: finally, that the Spaniards alone defeated the whole French army!!

Having thus established most of the important disputed facts related in my History, truth being my object, I will notice the errors I have really made.

1°. I supposed the second charge of the lancers (that against the 29th) took place at a later period, and was that in which the guns were captured; it appears the guns were taken in the charge against Colborne's brigade. Here be it noticed that Beresford's despatch suppresses the fact of more than one gun being taken, although six pieces of artillery and other trophies fell into the lancers' hands. Five of the guns were, indeed, afterwards recovered; but in the first instance they were captured and might have been carried off.

2°. I supposed the mutual firing between a British and Spanish regiment happened when the fusileers were mounting the hill. I had understood colonel Robert Arbuthnot so, and that he rode between both parties; the writer of the *Strictures* says he has sir Robert's letter contradicting the fact. Nevertheless, that such an event did take place at one period of this battle, is proved by the contradictory evidence as to which party fired upon the other. Many circumstances may be satisfactorily verified to a historian by conversation and other means, and he may not be allowed to give the chain of evidence in print, but he may claim confidence if he shows he has been diligent in searching for truth. I have, I think, shown, 1°. That my inquiries were extensive; 2°. That my authorities, even for trifling points, were sound and numerous; 3°. That the writer of the *Strictures*, being a person of no knowledge and very unscrupulous, cannot be marshal Beresford, but is probably some expectant ready to vouch for anything, 'if thrift might follow fawning.' I leave unnoticed his scurrility because I despise it. And I have not exposed above one-half of his misrepresentations thinking it waste of time; and that his arguments are upon a par with his facts, one or two examples will suffice to prove.

1°. He says Soult took an hour to execute his movement across the Albuera against the right; and that the Spaniards resisted afterwards for an hour and a half! That is to say, the French general was permitted, for two hours and a half, freely to act against a point of the position on the pos-

session of which depended the safety of the army, to act there unopposed, save by a few thousand Spaniards, who were confused and disordered by a sudden change of front and by this unexpected attack; and yet the second division was within a mile of them, and the rest of the army not two miles distant! And this is meant to prove the skill of marshal Beresford! Fortunately for the latter the story of the Spanish resistance is a Spanish romance.

2°. This writer would have it believed Beresford disapproved and does still blame the advance of the fusileer brigade, because the enemy's cavalry might, he says, have penetrated by the gap thus made, and because he was in no danger of being beaten, and never thought of retreating! Marshal Beresford, then, by bringing up general Collins's Portuguese and the Spanish reserves to the aid of Houghton's brigade, and joining them to Abercromby's troops, expected to have defeated the enemy; in other words, to have won, without the assistance of the fusileers, that battle which was so hardly gained with their assistance! Truly he expected much! The regiments of Houghton's brigade, having lost two-thirds of their number, being without ammunition, and having a French column upon their right flank, were to have maintained the height until all the troops above mentioned could be brought into line! and then Spaniards and Portuguese were to do what the fusileers did!

There was no danger of the French cavalry pushing *through the gap* made by the advance of the fusileers. General Cole had provided against that by placing Harvey's Portuguese brigade *in the gap*, and that brigade did actually repulse an attempt made by Latour Maubourg to push his light cavalry through. But if Beresford was so certain of victory, so composed and confident, so little thinking of a retreat, why did he, when the battle was gained, write to lord Wellington that he anticipated defeat if attacked the next day, and was determined not to survive it? But the whole argument is nought, seeing that Beresford, in his despatch, praised the attack of the 4th division, saying, 'it was judicious and opportune.'

There is even a more certain proof that marshal Beresford did contemplate a retreat, namely, that he gave the order; it was in part obeyed! *The bridge and village of Albuera were actually abandoned in obedience to his orders, by Alten's Germans and by the artillery!* and Beresford in person rebuked colonel Halket of the Germans for being slow to obey. This fact, often mentioned, I have ascertained to be true since the

foregoing pages were written; hence, far from being moved by common reports, or by prejudice, I was even too careful to reject doubtful matters.

The annexed extract is from a narrative of the campaign of 1811, written by sir Julius Hartman, who commanded the British artillery in the action. It places the fact beyond contradiction, unless sir Julius be the most imaginative of men; and certainly marshal Beresford had good reason to call the arrival of the fusileers *opportune*, for like Bunyan's Pilgrim, he was then in the 'Slough of Despond.'

'The enemy made repeated and very serious attacks on the bridge, which were unsuccessful until the troops received an order to assemble *to cover the retreat upon Valverde*. The general-in-chief had given this order at a moment, when the result of the struggle for the possession of the heights had appeared to him doubtful. In pursuance of this order, general Von Alten and the commander of the Portuguese artillery, major Dickson, *abandoned the village and bridge, which was immediately occupied by the enemy*. Directly after, the re-taking of this was most urgently ordered, which by the valour of the troops, with great sacrifice and spilling of blood was accomplished; but, notwithstanding, the possession of the bridge was never completely obtained.'

I can now also upon another point show that marshal Beresford's errors were far greater than I had supposed them to be.

Statement of captain Arthur Gregory.

'A deserter came in, about one o'clock A.M. on the 16th; he said that an order was issued for an attack at eight A.M.; he was immediately sent in to head-quarters, and I suppose arrived.'

'Between seven and eight, orders came for the cavalry, and I believe for the horse-artillery, to go to the rear to forage and make themselves comfortable. As there was a difficulty about watering, one regiment went down to the river at a time. The first was the 4th dragoons, which, after watering, went to the rear; the 3rd dragoon guards were going to water and the horses (I believe) were taken off the guns of the horse-artillery for the same purpose, when an orderly of the 13th dragoons came in from a piquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river! General Long immediately galloped off and *found half their army across*, under cover of a hollow, which had completely masked the operation. I was despatched to report it to the marshal, whose head-quarters were in the village of Albuera; after being detained a few

minutes at the door he came out, and after questioning me sharply upon my intelligence, was going in, when I took the liberty of mentioning that the cavalry had been ordered to the rear, and that one regiment had already gone; and I asked him if it should be brought up again, and to where? His orders were, 'Let them go more to the right than they were before.' I galloped off to the spot where the cavalry had been ordered, and found the 4th dragoons with their horses unbridled and linked with the collar chains; the men had taken their accoutrements and jackets off, and were going in all directions to cut forage. A few minutes brought them together. Before I could get back, the cannonade had begun. *Had Soult delayed his attack half an hour, all the British cavalry would have been in the rear dispersed over the country.* I do not know if the brigades of foot artillery had the same orders.'

Extract of a letter to captain Gregory from lieutenant-colonel Wildman, a lieutenant in the 4th dragoons at Albuera.

'I perfectly recollect the 4th dragoons being ordered to the rear on the morning of the 16th May, 1811, to cut forage for our horses, and I think it was you who came to order us up again, but whether we had begun cutting it or not before you arrived, I cannot remember.'

Extract of a letter to captain Arthur Gregory from colonel Leighton, who commanded the 4th dragoons at the battle of Albuera.

'In regard to the morning of the 16th, we had, as usual, been under arms for an hour before daybreak, and to the best of my recollection between seven and eight o'clock received orders to proceed for forage.'

Thus it is proved that if Soult had delayed his attack for half an hour, *not a single British cavalry soldier would have been in the field!!* How was it, then, that marshal Beresford, with the consciousness of this in his heart, did not spurn the ill-timed sarcasm of Dumouriez? Why did he not reply, This is not Pharsalia, but Albuera. Here were not Romans, but Englishmen. The Roman soldiers could not save Pompey, but the English soldier, he who 'comes on with such a conquering bravery,' saved me! I am not Cæsar, but Beresford!

NOTE.—The errors acknowledged will not be found in this Edition of the History.





A LETTER  
TO  
GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD.  
BEING  
*An Answer to his Lordship's Assumed Refutation*  
OF  
COL. NAPIER'S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.

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MY LORD,—You have at last appeared in print without any disguise. Had you done so at first it might have spared us both some trouble; I should have paid more deference to your argument and would willingly have corrected any error fairly pointed out. Now, having virtually acknowledged yourself the author of the two publications entitled *Strictures* and *Further Strictures, &c.*, I will not suffer you to enjoy the advantage of using two kinds of weapons, without making you also feel their inconvenience. I will treat your present publication as a mere continuation of your former two, and then, my lord, how will you stand in this controversy?

Starting anonymously, you wrote with all the scurrility that bad taste and mortified vanity could suggest to damage an opponent, because in the fair exercise of his judgment he had ventured to deny your claim to the title of a great commander: and you coupled this with such fulsome adulation of yourself that even in a dependent's mouth it would have been sickening. Now when you have suffered defeat, when all the errors, misquotations, and misrepresentations of your anonymous publications have been detected and exposed, you come forward in your own name as if a new and unexceptionable party had appeared; and you expect to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and arguments, and fresh assertions, without the least reference to your former damaged evidence. You expect that I should have that

deference for you, which your age, your rank, your services, and your authority under other circumstances might have fairly claimed at my hands ; that I should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in error, or that I should defend myself by another tedious dissection and exposition of your production. You will be disappointed. I have neither time nor inclination to enter for the third time upon such a task, and yet I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not gained. I deny the strength of your arguments, I will expose some prominent inconsistencies, and in answer to those which I do not notice refer to your former publications to show, that in this controversy, I am now entitled to disregard anything you may choose to advance, and am in justice exonerated from the necessity of producing any more proofs.

You have published above six hundred pages at three different periods, and you have taken above a year to digest and arrange the arguments and evidence contained in your present work : a few lines will suffice for the answer. The object of your literary labours is to convince the world that at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an excellent general, and that at Albuera you were superlatively great? Greater even than Cæsar! My lord, the duke of Wellington did not take a much longer time to establish his European reputation by driving the French from the Peninsula; and methinks if your exploits vouch not for themselves your writings will scarcely do it for them. At all events, a plain simple statement, having your name affixed, would have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly have been more dignified than the anonymous publications with which you endeavoured to feel your way. Why should not all the main points contained in the laboured pleadings of your *Further Strictures*, and the still more laboured pleadings of your present work, have been condensed and published at once with your name? if indeed it was necessary to publish at all! Was it that by anonymous abuse of your opponent and anonymous praise of yourself you hoped to create a favourable impression on the public before you appeared in person? This, my lord, seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now adduced should have been thought of before? It is a strange thing that in the first defence of your generalship, for one short campaign, you should have neglected proofs and arguments sufficient to form a second defence of two hundred pages.

You tell us, that you disdained to notice my *Reply to various Opponents*, because you knew the good sense of the public would never be misled by a production containing such numerous contradictions and palpable inconsistencies, and that your friends' advice confirmed you in this view of the matter. There were nevertheless some things in that work which required an answer even though the greatest part of it had been weak; and it is a pity your friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an adversary who has hit hard only makes the bystanders laugh. Having condescended to an anonymous attack it would have been wiser to refute the proofs offered of your own inaccuracy than to shrink with mock grandeur from a contest which you had yourself provoked. My friends gave me the same advice with respect to your anonymous publications, and with more reason, because they were anonymous; but having proofs of their weakness in my hands I preferred writing an answer, and if you had been provided in the same manner you would like me have neglected your friends' advice.

My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the manner before alluded to. You have indeed left me no room for any refined courtesy with which to soften the asperities of this controversy; but be assured, and it is said in all sincerity, that the errors to which I must revert, are not attributed to any wilful perversion or suppression of facts, but entirely to a natural weakness of memory, and the irritation of a mind confused by the working of wounded vanity: it is a hard trial to have long-settled habits of self-satisfaction suddenly disturbed,—

‘Cursed be my harp and broke be every chord,  
If I forget thy worth, *victorious Beresford.*’

It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with her sweet strains into a happy dream of glory, and none can wonder at your irritation when the muse of history awakened you with the solemn clangour of her trumpet to the painful reality that you were only an ordinary person. It would however have been wiser to have preserved your equanimity, there would have been some greatness in that.

In your first *Strictures* you began by asserting that I knew nothing whatever of you or your services; and that I was actuated entirely by vulgar political rancour when I denied your talents as a general. I replied that I was not ignorant of your exploits. Something of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at Coruña were known to me, and in



proof thereof I offered to enter into the details of the first, if you desired it. To this you have given no answer.

You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese language was one of your principal claims to be commander of the Portuguese army. In reply I quoted from your own letter to lord Wellington, your confession, that, such was your ignorance of that language at the time, you could not even read the communication from the regency, relative to your own appointment.

You asserted that no officer, save sir John Murray, objected at the first moment to your sudden elevation of rank. In answer I published sir John Sherbrooke's letter to sir J. Cra-dock complaining of it.

You said the stores (which the cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo refused to let you have in 1809) had not been formed by lord Wellington. In reply I published lord Wellington's declaration that they had been formed by him.

You denied that you had ever written a letter to the junta of Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but positively and accompanied with much scorn and ridicule of my assertion to that effect. You harped upon the new, and surprising information obtained relative to your actions, and were, in truth, very facetious upon the subject. In answer I published your letter to that junta! So much for your first *Strictures*.

In your second publication (page 42) you asserted that colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action at Campo Mayor; and now in your third publication (page 48) you show very clearly that he took an active part in those operations.

You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida *two marches*, and now you say it is *four marches*.

In your first *Strictures*, you declared that the extent of the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated by me; and you were very indignant that I should have supposed you either needed, or had the support and protection of the duke of Wellington while in command of the Portuguese army. In the volumes of my History published since, I have shown what the extent of those intrigues was: and I have still something in reserve to add when time shall be fitting. Meanwhile I will stay your lordship's appetite by two extracts bearing upon this subject, and upon the support which you derived from the duke of Wellington.

1°. Mr. Stuart, writing to lord Wellesley, in 1810, after noticing the violence of the Souza faction relative to the

fall of Almeida, says,—‘I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, and that the regency should send an order to marshal Beresford to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary; followed by reflections on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting the Portuguese who are attached to lord Wellington.’

2°. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira by marshal Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—‘However, as I mentioned, I have no great desire to hold my situation beyond the period lord Wellington retains his situation, or after active operations have ceased in this country, even should things turn out favourably, of which I really at this instant have better hopes than I ever had though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to myself, though I do not pretend to say the situation I hold is not at all times desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded that if tranquillity is ever restored to this country under its legal government, that I should be too much vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts to reconcile either my temper or my conscience to what would then be my situation.’

For the further exposition of the other numerous errors and failures of your two first publications, I must refer the reader to my *Reply* and *Justification*, but the points above noticed it is necessary to fix attention upon, because they give me the right to call upon the public to disregard your present work, and this right cannot be relinquished. I happened fortunately to have the means of repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above mentioned, but may not always be provided with your own letters to disprove your own assertions: the combat is not equal, the odds would be too much, and I must therefore, although reluctantly, use the advantages which the detection of such errors has already furnished. They are strong proofs of an unsound memory upon essential points, and deprive your present work of all weight as an authority in this controversy. Yet the strangest part of your new book (see page 135) is, that you avow an admiration for what you call the *generous principle* which leads French authors to *misstate facts for the honour of their country*; and not only you do this but sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer at me for not falsifying facts to pander to the morbid vanity of my countrymen, and at the same time, with a preposterous inconsistency, condemn me for being an inaccurate historian! I

have indeed yet to learn that the *honour* of my country either requires to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods; your personal experience in the field may perhaps have led you to a different conclusion, but I will not be your historian: and coupling this, your expressed sentiment, with your forgetfulness on the points before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord? like Banquo's ghost you rise, 'with twenty mortal murders on your crown to push us from our stools.' You have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of arguing: all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed, and all my witnesses to facts sound and substantial, are to be discarded for your airy nothings.

Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied, talking, self-sufficient, ignorant officer. The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor! He is nameless, his narrative teems with misrepresentations, he cannot tell whether he charged or not. Colonel Light! sponge him out, he was only a subaltern. Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot be correct, he is too minute, and has no diffidence. Sir Julius Hartman, colonel Wildman, colonel Leighton! Oh! very honourable men, but they know nothing of the fact they speak of, all their evidence put together is worth nothing! But it is very exactly corroborated by additional evidence contained in Mr. Long's publication. Ay! ay! all are wrong; their eyes, their ears, their recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent to judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter!

Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch! Away with it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be trusted! Nothing more likely, but what then, and who is to be trusted? Nobody who contradicts you: everybody who coincides with you, nay, the same person is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports or opposes your assertions, even those French authors whose generous principles lead them to write falsehoods for the *honour of their country*. Such, my lord, after a year's labour of cogitation, is nearly the extent of your *Refutation*.

In your first publication you said all hearsay evidence should have been excluded and nothing related but what could be proved in a court of justice; now when testimony is offered which no court of justice could refuse, with a lawyer's coolness you tell the jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that the witnesses, being generally of a low rank in the army, are not to be regarded, that they were not competent to

judge. This is a little too much. There would be some show of reason if these subalterns' opinions had been given upon the general dispositions of the campaign, but they are all witnesses to facts which came under their personal observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes? Hath he not ears? Hath he not understanding? You were once a subaltern yourself, and you cannot blind the world by such arrogant pride of station, such over-weening contempt for men's capacity because they happen to be of lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious command may have so vitiated your mind that you cannot dispossess yourself of such injurious feelings, yet, believe me it would be much more dignified to avoid this indecent display of them.

Let me now remark upon such parts of your new publication as may be necessary for the further support of my History, that is, where new proofs, or apparent proofs, are brought forward. Your former inaccuracies have exonerated me from noticing any part of your *Refutation* save where new evidence is brought forward, and then only in deference to those gentlemen who, being unmixed with your former works, have a right to my reasons for declining their testimony. I have however on my hands a much more important labour than contending with your lordship, and must therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those who will take the trouble to compare your pretended *Refutation* with my original *Justification*, in combination with this letter, being satisfied that in so doing you will not gain.

1°. With respect to the death of the lieutenant-governor of Almeida, you still harp upon the phrase that it was the *only* evidence. The expression is common amongst persons when speaking of trials; it is said the prisoner was condemned by such or such a person's evidence, never meaning that there was no other testimony, but that in default of that particular evidence he would not have been condemned. You say there was other evidence, yet you do not venture to affirm that Cox's letter was not *the testimony* upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned, while the extract from lord Stuart's letter, quoted by me, says it was. And his lordship's letter to you, in answer to your inquiry, neither contradicts nor is intended to contradict my statement; nor yet does it in any manner deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed were copied verbatim from his letter to lord Castlereagh.

Lord Stuart says, that extract is the only thing bearing on the question *which he can find*. Were there nothing more it



would be quite sufficient, but his papers are very voluminous, more than fifty large volumes, and he would naturally only have looked for his letter of the 25th July, 1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in my notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under the date of August, 1812, the following passage:—

‘The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was executed by Beresford’s order, he, Beresford, having full powers and the government none to interfere. Great interest was made to save him, but in vain. The sentence and trial were published before being carried into execution and were much criticised; both the evidence and the choice of officers were blamed, and moreover the time chosen was one of triumph just after the battle of Salamanca, and the place Lisbon.’

This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as being lord Stuart’s actual words, it must therefore be only taken as an abstract of the contents of one of his papers; but comparing it with the former passage, and with the facts that your lordship’s words are still very vague and uncertain as to the main point in question, namely, the evidence on which this man was really condemned, there is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my first edition, nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in the second edition of my third volume, published many months ago. You will find that I have there expunged the word ‘*only*,’ and made the sentence exactly to accord with the extract from lord Stuart’s letter. You will also observe, that I never did do more than mention the simple fact, for which I had such good authority; and so far from imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence I expressly stated that the man richly deserved death.

Passing now to the subject of the eighth Portuguese regiment, I will first observe, that in saying the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces no blame was imputed; no regiment in the world could have stemmed the first fury of that French column which attacked the mountain where the eighth was posted. If the eighth was not broken by it, as sir James Douglas’s letter would seem to imply, what was it doing while the enemy by their flank movement gained the crest of the position in such numbers as to make it a most daring exploit of the ninth British regiment to attack them there? It is a strange thing that a heavy column of French, resolute to gain the crest of such a position, should have made ‘*a flank movement*,’ to avoid one wing of a regiment of Portuguese conscripts. It may rather be imagined,

with all deference, that it was the conscripts who made the flank movement, and that some optical deception had taken place, like that which induces children while travelling in a carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of themselves. However my authority is given, namely, the statement of major Waller, a staff officer present, and the statement of colonel Taylor (for he is the nameless eye-witness) of the ninth, the very regiment to which sir James Douglas appeals for support of his account. These are good authorities, and if their recollections are irreconcilable with that of sir James Douglas it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy of detail. Sir James Douglas's negative testimony was unknown to me, but there were two positive testimonies to my statement, and therefore it is within the rules of those courts of justice to which your lordship would refer all matter of history: moreover, some grains of allowance must be made for the natural partiality of every officer for his own regiment. The following extract from sir James Leith's report on the occasion is also good circumstantial evidence in favour of my side of the question.

'The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant, *having dispersed or driven everything there opposed to him*, was in possession of the rocky eminence of the sierra at this part of major-general Picton's position *without a shot being fired at him*. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in columns in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude accuracy and coolness under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time also perceived the British brigade under him. Major-general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth, second battalion, should have moved on in the rear and to the left of the ninth regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence, which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height, the royals to have been posted (as they were) in reserve; but the enemy *having driven everything before them in that quarter*, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for

the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting and frequently in double quick time.'

Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a wing of Portuguese conscripts, but the plain and distinct assertion twice over, that *everything in front was dispersed or driven away*—and that not even a shot was fired at the enemy. Where then was the eighth Portuguese? Did the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks of these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not been placed to keep the crest of the position. There is also another difficulty. Sir James Douglas says he was with the royals in the attack, and sir James Leith says that the royals were held in reserve while the ninth drove away the enemy; besides which, the eighth Portuguese might have been broke by the enemy when the latter were mounting the hill, and yet have rallied and joined in the pursuit when the ninth had broken the French. Moreover, my lord, as you affirm that both yourself and the duke of Wellington *saw* all the operations of the eighth Portuguese on this occasion, the former extract from colonel Taylor's letter shall be enlarged whereby you will perceive something which may lead you to doubt the accuracy of your recollection on that head.

'No doubt general Leith's letter to the duke was intended to describe the aspect of affairs in so critical a situation, and where the duke himself could not *possibly* have made his observations; and also Leith wished to have due credit given to his brigade, which was not done in the despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made light of, and the eighth Portuguese regiment was extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very foremost ranks of the ninth British.'—'General Leith's correspondence would be an interesting document to colonel Napier, as throwing considerable light upon the operations at Busaco, between Picton and Hill's corps, a very considerable extent of position *which could not of possibility be overlooked from any other part of the field.*'

*Charge of the nineteenth Portuguese.*—Your lordship has here gained an advantage; some of general M'Bean's expressions are to me obscure, but it is impossible to doubt his positive statement that he was in front of the convent wall and that he charged some body of the enemy. It is however



necessary to restore the question at issue between your lordship and myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to damage the reputation of the Portuguese army, and you ask why no mention was made of a particular charge effected by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment at Busaco. This charge you described as being against one of *Ney's attacking columns*, which had, you said, *gained the ascent of the position and then forming advanced on the plain above* before it was charged by the nineteenth regiment. As this description was certainly wrong, it was treated as a magniloquent allusion to an advance made by a Portuguese regiment posted on the mountain to the right. General M'Bean is mistaken when he quotes me as saying *his* line was never nearer to the enemy's lines than a hundred yards. I spoke of a Portuguese regiment, which might possibly be the nineteenth. I never denied that any charge had been made, but only a charge *such as described by you*; and in fact general M'Bean's letter while it confirms the truth of your general description, by implication denies the accuracy of the particulars. Certainly Ney's columns never passed the front of the light division nor advanced on the plain behind it.

The difficulty of reconciling general M'Bean's statement with my own recollections and with the ground and position of the light division, may perhaps arise from the general's meaning to use certain terms in a less precise sense than I take them. Thus he says he was posted in front of the convent wall, and also on the right of the light division; but the light division was half a mile in front of the convent wall, and hence he probably does not mean, as his words seem to imply, immediately under the wall. He speaks also of the light division being to his left, but unless he means the line of battle with reference to the sinuosities of the ground, the light division was, with respect to the enemy and the convent, in his front; and if he does speak with regard to those sinuosities, his front would have been nearly at right angles to the front of the fifty-second and forty-third, which most likely was the case. Again he says he charged and drove the French from *their position* down to the bottom of the ravine; but the enemy's position, properly so called, was on the opposite side of the great ravine; and as all his artillery and cavalry, all the eighth corps and the reserves of the sixth corps, were in order of battle there, not ten regiments, much less one, dared have crossed the ravine, which was of such depth it was difficult to distinguish troops at the bottom: general M'Bean probably means by the word position some accidental ground on which



the enemy had formed. Taking this to be so, let me endeavour to reconcile general M'Bean's statement with my own recollection, because certainly I do still hold my description of the action at that part to be accurate as to all the main points.

The edge of the table-land or tongue on which the light division stood was very abrupt, and formed a salient angle, behind the apex of which the forty-third and fifty-second were drawn up in a line, the right of the one and the left of the other resting on the very edges; the artillery was at the apex looking down the descent, and far below, the caçadores and the ninety-fifth were spread on the mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only two columns of attack. The one came straight against the light division, the head of it, striking the right company of the fifty-second and the left company of the forty-third, was broken as against a wall; at the same time the wings of those regiments, reinforced by the skirmishers of the ninety-fifth who had retired on the right of the forty-third, advanced and lapped over the broken column on both sides. No other troops fought with them at that point. In this there can be no mistake, because my company was in the right wing of the forty-third, and followed the enemy down to the first village which was several hundred yards below the edge; it returned leisurely, the ground was open to the view on the right and on the left, we saw no other column, and heard of none save that which we were pursuing. When we returned from this pursuit the light division had been re-formed on the little plain above, and some time after several German battalions, coming from under the convent wall, passed through our ranks and commenced skirmishing with Ney's reserve in the woods below.

General M'Bean says he saw no German infantry, and hence it is clear it was not at this point his charge had place; but it is also certain Ney had only two columns of attack. Now his second under general Marchand moved up the hollow curve of the great mountain to the right of the light division, and having reached a pine-wood, far below the height on which the light division stood, he sent skirmishers out against Pack's brigade which was in his front. A part of Ross's troop of artillery under the direction of lieutenant, now colonel M'Donald, played very sharply upon this column in the pine-wood; I was standing in company with captain Loyd of the forty-third, close to the guns watching their effect, and it was then the advance of the Portuguese regiment to which allusion has been made was effected; but general M'Bean again assures

me the nineteenth regiment was not there, and therefore two suppositions present themselves. The enemy's skirmishers from this column were very numerous; some of them might have passed the left flank of Pack's skirmishers, might have gathered in a body, have reached the edge of the hill on which the light division were posted, and then rising behind it have been attacked by general M'Bean. Or what is more likely, the skirmishers, or a small flanking detachment from the column which attacked the light division, might have passed under the edge of the descent on the right of the light division, and gathering in a like manner have risen under general M'Bean's line. Either of these suppositions, and especially the last, would render the matter clear to me on all points save that of attacking the enemy's position, which as I have before observed, may be only a loose expression of the general's to denote the ground which the French opposed to him had attained on our position. This second supposition seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned by general M'Bean, namely, that the enemy's guns opened on him immediately after his charge. The French guns did open also on that part of the light division which followed the enemy down the hill to the first village; thus the time the nineteenth charged seems marked, and as I was one of those who went to the village it also accounts for my not seeing that charge. However considering all things, I must admit error, inasmuch as I really did not, nor do now possess any clear recollection of this exploit of the nineteenth regiment; and in proof of the difficulty of attaining strict accuracy on such occasions, the observation of general M'Bean may be here adduced, viz., that he saw no Germans save the artillery; yet there was a whole brigade of that nation near the convent wall, and they advanced and skirmished sharply with the enemy soon after the charge of the nineteenth would appear to have taken place. Very often also, things appear greater to those who perform them than to the bystanders, and it may be asked how many men the nineteenth lost in the charge, how many prisoners it took, and how many French were opposed to it? for certainly neither by the nineteenth Portuguese, nor by any other troops, save those of the light division, was any charge made which called for particular notice in a general history. I am not bound to relate all the minor occurrences of a great battle; 'those things belong to the history of regiments,' is the just observation of Napoleon. Yet general M'Bean may be assured no desire to under-rate either his services, or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers ever actuated me; and to prove it if my third

volume should ever come to a third edition, his letter shall be taken as ground for noticing this charge, without however making it so prominent as your lordship desires.

Your lordship closes this subject by the following observation. 'As colonel Napier represents himself as having been an eye-witness of a gallant movement made by a certain Portuguese regiment,—which regiment he does not profess to know,—but which movement took place a mile distant from the position given to the nineteenth regiment, it is evident he could not also have been an eye-witness of what was passing a mile to the left. Nor can he therefore negative what is said to have occurred there. It is extraordinary that the historian should not have perceived the predicament in which he has placed himself.' Now you do not say that the two events occurred at the *same time*, wherefore your conclusion is what the renowned Partridge calls a '*non sequitur*;' and as general M'Bean expressly affirms his charge to have taken place on the *right* of the light division, it was not absolutely necessary that I should look to the *left* in order to see the said charge: hence the predicament in which I am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship's inability to reason upon your own materials.

Your next subject is captain Squire, but that matter has been sufficiently discussed before, and the memory of that very gallant and able officer will never suffer from your lordship's angry epithets. Campo Mayor follows. In your *Further Strictures* you said colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action; you now show in detail that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that he was in support of the advanced guard, and yet quote his own report explaining how he happened to be separated from the advanced guard just before the action, thus proving that he was marching in support of it. You refuse any credit to the statements of captain Gregory and colonel Light, and you endeavour to trample on the evidence of the officer of the thirteenth dragoons who was an actor in the charge of that regiment, but with respect to him a few remarks are necessary.

1°. The accuracy of his narrative concerns my *Justification* very little, except in one part. It was published whole as he gave it to me, because it threw light upon the subject, and there is nothing in your lordship's observations to make me doubt its general correctness. But it was only the part printed in italics that concerned me. I had described a remarkable combat of cavalry wherein the hostile squadrons *had twice passed through each other*, and then the British put the French

to flight. You ridiculed this as a nursery tale; you called the description of it a '*country dance*,' and you still call it a '*scenic effect*.' Did the hostile masses meet twice, and did the British then put their opponents to flight? These were the real questions. The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies charging through each other, was the point in dispute; it is scenic, but is it true? Now my first authority designated as an '*eye-witness*,' was colonel Colborne; my second colonel Dogherty of the thirteenth dragoons, an *actor*; and when you so coolly say the latter's statement does not afford 'the slightest support to the scenic description,' I must take the liberty of laughing at you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat common sense as if it were a subaltern. Colonel Dogherty bears me out even to the letter; for as the second charge took place with the same violence that the third did, if the hostile bodies had not passed through to their original position, the French must have fled towards the allied army: but they fled towards Badajos. The English must therefore have passed through and turned, and it was in that personal conflict with the sabre which followed the second charge the thirteenth dragoons defeated the French.

My lord, you will never by such special pleading, there is no other term by which your argument can be properly designated, you will never by such special pleading hide your bad generalship at Campo Mayor. The proofs of your errors are too many and too clear, the errors themselves too glaring, too gross to leave you the least hope; the same confusion of head which prevented you from seizing the advantages then offered to you seems to prevail in your writing; and yet while impeaching every person's credit where their statements militate against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous arguments. You only fatigue yourself and your readers by your unwieldy floundering, you are heavy and throw much mud about, and like one of those fine Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula, you prance and curvet and foam and labour in your paces but never get on. At Campo Mayor you had an enormous superiority of troops, the enemy were taken by surprise, they were in a plain, their cavalry was beaten, their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry, hemmed in by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were ready to surrender; you suffered them to escape and carry off their captured artillery and then blamed your gallant troops: The enemy escaped from you, my lord, but you cannot escape from



the opinion of the world by denying the truth of all statements which militate against you.

*The march by Merida.*—If you had said at once that the duke of Wellington forbade you to go by Merida, there would have been an end of all my arguments against your skill; yet it does not follow that these arguments would be futile in themselves, though not applicable to you personally: new combinations were presented, and the duke of Wellington might very probably have changed his instructions had he been present on the spot. But, why was this your justification withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so decisive a defence of yourself never thought of before? and why is it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as you have added, to prove that you ought not to have gone by Merida? Have you found out that I am not such a bad reasoner upon military affairs as you were pleased to style me in your former publication? Have you found out that pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and well supported statements? It is good however that you have at last condescended to adopt a different mode of proceeding. I applaud you for it, and with the exception of two points leave you in the full enjoyment of any triumph which the force of your arguments may procure you; always, however, retaining my right to assume, that your lordship's memory with respect to the duke of Wellington's negative may have been as treacherous as it was about your own letter to the junta of Badajos. There is therefore nothing to add to the arguments used in my *Justification* and *History*, in favour of the march to Merida; if I am wrong the world will so judge me. But the two points reserved are, 1°. That you assert now, in direct contradiction to your former avowal, that the march to Merida would have been one of *four* days instead of *two*; and that the road by Albuquerque was the only one which you could use. In answer to this last part be it known, that the French before, the Spaniards then, marched by the road of Montijo; and that a year after, when lord Hill's expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his battering and pontoon-train, with all the ammunition belonging to it, moved with great facility in three days from Elvas, by this very road of Montijo, to Merida; and Elvas, as your lordship knows is rather further than Campo Mayor from Merida.

The second point is that mode of conducting a controversy which has been before exposed in your former publications, viz., misstating my arguments to suit your own reasoning.

I never said you should have attempted, or could have succeeded in a '*coup de main*' against Badajos, not even that you should have commenced the siege immediately. But that marching through Merida you could have placed your army at once between Badajos and the French army, have thrown the former upon its own resources at a most inconvenient time, and in that situation could have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and proceeded at your convenience.

Further than this it is not necessary to dissect and expose your new fallacies and contradictions, it requires too much time. You have written upwards of six hundred pages, four hundred of them were before demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick and to me at least more important than yours; your lordship must therefore spare me the other two hundred, or at least permit me to treat them lightly. The whole siege of Badajos is resigned to you, it is matter of opinion, and your example in overloading what is already clear by superfluity of argument, need not be followed: one error only into which you have been led by colonel La Marre's work shall be exposed. On his authority you say the garrison on the 10th of April had three months' provisions; but the following extract from a letter of marshal Soult's to the prince of Wagram will prove that La Marre is wrong:—

‘*Seville, 18th April.*

‘From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned, according to the report of general Phillipon, for *two months and some days* as to subsistence; and there are 100 milliers of powder,’ &c. &c.

Let us now come to the *battle of Albuera*.

You still doubt that the position as explained by me is four miles long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of major Mitchell's plan on which you have measured the distance with your compasses. I also am in possession of one of major Mitchell's plans, and find by the aid of my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the Portuguese *infantry* (without noticing Otway's squadron of cavalry) to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the termination of the battle, is exactly four miles; and everybody knows that a line over the actual ground will from the latter's rises and falls exceed the line on paper. Wherefore as this measurement does not coincide with your lordship's, and as we are both Irishmen, it may be concluded that your compasses are too short or mine are too long. Your grand *cheval de bataille* is, however, the numbers of the armies on each side. Thirty-eight long pages you give us, to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that my

estimate is wrong and yours right; and at the end you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there are no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess, of probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so also with respect to the French. Mine was a very plain statement. Certain numbers were assumed by me as the nearest approximation, and when the accuracy of the ciphers were questioned by you, the foundation for assuming them was briefly explained; you in refutation give thirty-eight pages of most confused calculations, and what is the result? why that the numbers of the allies on your own showing still remain uncertain; and your estimate of the French is quite erroneous.

In my History it was said you had more than two thousand cavalry in the field, and in my *Justification* reasons were adduced for believing you had nearly three thousand; you now acknowledge two thousand, and my History is therefore not far wrong. But you do not seem to know the composition of your own divisions. General Long's morning states, now before me, do not include general Madden's cavalry. That officer's regiments were the fifth and eighth, and the sixth and ninth also were under him; those in general Long's division are the first and seventh. General Madden's account of his services, given in the *Military Calendar*, states that a part of his brigade, namely, the eighth regiment under colonel Wyndham, was in the battle of Albuera. Now taking the eighth to be between two hundred and seventy and two hundred and eighty-one troopers, which were the respective strengths of the first and seventh regiments in Long's division on the 29th of May, we have above eighteen hundred troopers, namely, fifteen hundred and eighty-seven in Long's division, and two hundred and seventy-five in the eighth regiment, to these add two hundred and fifty officers and sergeants, and there will be in all more than two thousand sabres. In general Long's states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then six hundred and eighty-nine men and forty-four sergeants and trumpeters were on command, of which more than four hundred belonged to those two Portuguese regiments. Many of them must surely have joined before the battle, because such an unusual number on command could only be temporary. Again in the state of the 29th of May, one hundred and fifteen sergeants trumpeters and troopers are returned as prisoners of war; and when the killed and wounded in the battle are added, we may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above two thousand. Your lordship admits the

Spaniards to have had seven hundred and fifty; but for clearness let this be placed in a tabular form:

## GENERAL LONG'S STATES.

8th May.

Serjeants, trumpeters, and troopers.

Present under arms . . . . .	1576
On command . . . . .	733
Prisoners of war . . . . .	115
	<hr/>
	2424

29th May.

Present . . . . .	1739
Command . . . . .	522
Prisoners of war . . . . .	127
	<hr/>
	2388

Medium estimate for the 16th of May.

Present 8th May . . . . .	1576
Ditto, 29th May . . . . .	1739

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2)3315

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1657½

270 8th Portuguese regt.

---

1927

127 Prisoners of war.

---

2054

750 Spaniards.

---

2804

Deduct prisoners on the 8th . 115

---

Total . . . . . 2689

To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the Anglo-Portuguese, and the men rejoined from command.

Thus, the statements in the *History* and *Justification* are both borne out; for the numbers are above two thousand as



set down in the first, and nearly three thousand as stated in the last. Moreover a general historian is not blameable for small inaccuracies; if he has reasonably good authority for any fact he cannot be justly censured for stating that fact, and you should make a distinction between that which is stated in the History and that which is stated in the controversial writings: all mistakes in the latter however trifling are fair, but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts yourself. Now with respect to the artillery there is an example of this cavilling, and also an illustration of your lordship's mode of raising a very confused argument on a very plain fact. I said there were so many guns in the field, a given number being nine-pounders. You accused me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre; but in reply you were shown, that the *number* was given on the report of colonel Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery; the *calibre* upon the authority of your own witness and quarter-master-general sir Benjamin D'Urban. The latter was wrong, and there the matter should have ended. Your lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of ingenuousness, to acknowledge as my mistake that which is the mistake of sir Benjamin D'Urban, and you give a grand table with the gross number of pounds of iron, as if the affair had been between two ships. You set down in your columns the statements of the writer of a note upon your *Strictures*, the statement of the *Strictures* themselves, and my statement; and then come on with your own observations as if there were three witnesses on your side. But the author of the note is again your witness D'Urban, who thus shows himself incorrect both as to number and weight; and the author of the *Strictures* is yourself. This is an *ingenious* not an *ingenuous* mode of multiplying testimony. In your *Further Strictures* also you first called in sir B. D'Urban in person, you then used his original memoir, you also caused him to write anonymously a running commentary upon yours and his own statements, and now you comment in your own name upon your own anonymous statements, thus making five testimonies out of two.

The answer is simple and plain. Where sir Benjamin D'Urban was the guide he led me wrong; you instead of visiting his error upon his own head visit it upon mine, and require me and your readers to follow him implicitly upon all points while to do so avails for your defence, but not when they contradict it. From sir B. D'Urban the *calibre* of the allies' guns employed in the battle of Albuera was taken and he was wrong! From him, if sir A. Dickson's official return had not been available, the *number* of guns would also

have been taken, and they would have been wrong, because he calls them thirty-four instead of thirty-eight. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to your *Further Strictures*) says the Spaniards had six guns, whereas Dickson says they had but four; and if his six guns were reckoned there would have been forty pieces of artillery; which he however reduced to thirty-four by another error, namely, leaving out a whole brigade of German artillery. On sir Benjamin's authority major Dickson was called the commander of the artillery, and this also was wrong. From sir Benjamin D'Urban's memoir, the statement that the fourth division arrived on the field of battle at *six o'clock in the morning* was made, and yet it seems certain they did not arrive until nine o'clock, and after the action had commenced. And this last is a very serious error because it gives the appearance of skill to your lordship's combinations for battle, and to sir Benjamin's arrangements for the execution, which they do not merit, if that division arrived at nine o'clock. But the latter hour would be quite in keeping with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and both together would confirm another report very current, namely, that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the 16th of May. Setting this however aside, why, in the face of all these glaring errors and a multitude of smaller ones, is sir Benjamin D'Urban's authority to be taken upon any disputed point?

Now, my lord, one complete triumph you have attained in your dissertation upon the numbers of the troops. I did say that from the 20th of March to the 16th of May, was only twenty days, and though the oversight is so palpably one that could not be meant to deceive, your right to laugh at it is not denied. I have laughed at so many of your lordship's oversights that it would be unfair to deny you this opportunity for retaliation, which you have certainly used moderately.

Since my *Justification* was written some proofs about the French numbers have reached me. You will find them in the following extracts from the duke of Dalmatia's correspondence of that time, and they are worth your attention; they throw light upon the numbers of the allies, and one of them shows unquestionably that my estimate of the French numbers was, as before said, too high instead of too low. Translations are given to avoid the trouble and expense of printing in two languages, and your lordship will observe that these extracts are not liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they were written before the action and for the emperor's informa-

tion, and because it was the then interest of the writer rather to exaggerate than to lessen his own numbers, in order to give his sovereign an idea of his activity and zeal.

Extract of a letter from MARSHAL SOULT to the PRINCE  
of WAGRAM.

*Seville, 22nd April, 1811.*

‘General Latour Maubourg announces to me that general Beresford commanding the Anglo-Portuguese army, and the Spanish generals Castaños and Ballesteros with the remains of the corps of their nation are united at Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their forces is twenty-five thousand men, of which three thousand are cavalry.’

‘Colonel Quennot of the ninth regiment of dragoons, who commands upon the lines of the Tinto and observes the movements on that side as far as Ayamonte, informs me that on the 18th and 19th, general Blake disembarked ten thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry between the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These troops come from Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake can unite in that part fifteen thousand men.’

Ditto to ditto.

*May 4th, 1811.*

‘Cordova is menaced by a corps of English Portuguese and Spaniards, many troops are concentrated in Estremadura, Badajos is invested, Blake *has* united on the Odiel an army of fifteen to sixteen thousand men.’—‘I depart in four days with *twenty thousand men, three thousand horses, and thirty pieces of cannon* to drive across the Guadiana the enemy’s corps which are spread in Estremadura, to disengage Badajos and to facilitate the arrival of count D’Erlon. If the troops which that general brings can unite with mine, and if the troops coming from the armies of the north and centre, and which I have already in part arranged, arrive in time, I shall have in Estremadura, thirty-five thousand men five thousand horses and forty pieces of artillery.’

Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that count D’Erlon marched towards Andalusia with twelve thousand men present under arms, and that he did not arrive until the 14th June. There remain three thousand men as coming from the armies of the north and centre, to make up the thirty-five thousand men mentioned by Soult, and I find the following passage in his letter to the prince of Wagram, dated the 19th of May.

‘The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, general Bron com-

mands there, he brings with him the first reinforcement coming from the armies of the north and centre, and I shall employ him in the expedition.'

Hence, if we take the first reinforcement at half of the whole number expected; we add one thousand five hundred men and five guns to the twenty thousand, making a total for the battle of Albuera of twenty-one thousand five hundred men of all arms, and thirty-five guns. From these must be deducted the detachments left at Villalba, stragglers on the march, and some hussars sent to scout on the flanks, for I find in general Madden's narrative of his services, that he was watched by part of the enemy's cavalry on the day of the battle.

You have now, my lord, positive and undeniable testimony that the French numbers were over-rated instead of being under-rated by me, and you have corroborative evidence, that the number of the allies was as great as stated by me; for we find in the above extracts Soult giving Blake fifteen thousand men, of which, at least, seven hundred are cavalry, *before* the battle, and twenty-five thousand, of which three thousand are cavalry, to your lordship, Castaños, &c. We find the French general's information, taking into consideration the troops which joined Blake in the Niebla, not differing essentially from Mr. Henry Wellesley's report of the numbers of Blake's army, namely twelve thousand, of which one thousand one hundred were cavalry; and we find both in some manner confirmed by lord Wellington's repeated statements of the forces of Blake's army after the battle, that is to say, making a reasonable allowance for the numbers lost in the action. Soult and Mr. Wellesley also agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous than your lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from seven to eleven hundred cavalry, following the statement of these persons, and there was in addition the corps of Penne Villemur, which, as said in my *Justification*, was not less than five hundred.

In closing your calculation of numbers you exultingly observe that it is the first time you ever heard of a general's being censured for keeping one-third of his force in reserve and *beating the enemy with the other two*. Ay—but this involves the very pith of the question. At Albuera the *general* did not beat the enemy. My lord, you have bestowed great pains on your argument about the battle of Albuera, and far be it from me to endeavour to deprive you of any addition to your reputation which you may thus obtain, there is no desire to rob you of well-earned laurels, my observations were



directed against what appeared to me your bad generalship; if that has not been pointed out to the satisfaction of the public I have nothing further to offer in fairness, and certainly will not by any vile sophistry endeavour to damage your fame. But do not think the force of your present arguments is admitted; if they are not here carefully dissected it is not from any want of points to fasten upon; indeed, my lord, your book is very weak, there are many failures in it, and a few more shall be noticed that you may estimate my forbearance at its proper value. We will begin with your observations on captain Gregory's testimony, not in defence of that gentleman's credit, for in truth, as his and the other officers' evidence is given to facts of which they were personally cognizant, not the slightest regard can be paid to your confused arguments in opposition to their honour. You do not indeed mean to impeach anything but their memory; but to attempt to defend them from your observations would make it appear as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you have missed captain Gregory, but you have hit yourself very hard.

Behold the proof.

At page 167 you say, 'I will now point out the gross and palpable errors of captain Gregory's narrative.—He says, that on receiving the intelligence from an orderly of the thirteenth dragoons who came in from a piquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river, general Long galloped off—I conclude to the right,—and found half the army across,—and to the right. *Why, every other authority has stated that the enemy's first movement was from the wood along the right bank of the Albuera upon our left; and that we were not at all aware of their intention to cross above our right and there make an attack, till after their first movement was considerably advanced and the action had actually commenced with Godinot's corps on the opposite side of the river to our left. It is quite surprising that colonel Napier should have overlooked a blunder so gross as to destroy the value of the whole of his friend's testimony.*'

Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics (pardon me the italics) in the above, with the following extract from your own despatch.

'The enemy on the 16th did not long delay his attack: at eight o'clock' (the very time mentioned by captain Gregory) 'he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry were seen passing the rivulet of Albuera considerably *above our right, and shortly after* he marched out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry and two heavy columns of

infantry, posting them to our front, *as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera*. During this time he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river *beyond our right*, and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank.' Your lordship has, indeed, in another part discarded the authority of your despatch, as appears most necessary in treating of this battle, but it is rather hard measure to attack me so fiercely for having had some faith in it.

With respect to sir Wm. Lumley's letter I cannot but admire his remembrance of the exact numbers of the British cavalry; a precise recollection after twenty-three years, of a few hasty words spoken on a field of battle, is certainly a rare thing; yet such precision did not take me quite by surprise, for if I do not greatly mistake, sir William was the general, who at Santarem edified the head-quarters by a report, that '*the enemy were certainly going to move either to their right or to their left, to their front or to their rear*.' One would suppose that so exact a person could never be in error; and yet the following extract from general Harvey's journal would lead me to suppose his memory was not quite so clear and powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that to the best of his recollection he was not aware of the advance of the fuzileers and Harvey's brigade until they had passed his left flank; that they then came under his eye, and as the rain and smoke cleared away he saw them in one body moving to engage; and although they had become so oblique relative to the point where he stood that he could not well speak as to their actual distance from one another, there did not appear any improper interval between them.

Now hear general Harvey!

'The twenty-third and one battalion of the seventh fuzileers were in line. The other battalion at quarter distance, forming square, at every halt to cover the right which the cavalry continued to menace. *Major-general Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column of half squadrons in rear of our right and moved with us, being too weak to advance against the enemy's cavalry.*

There, my lord, you see that generals as well as doctors differ. Sir W. Lumley, twenty-three years after the event, recollects seeing the fuzileers and Harvey's brigade at such a distance and so obliquely, that he could not speak to their actual distance from one another. General Harvey writing the day after the event, says, sir William Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons close in rear of these very brigades, and was moving with them! This should convince your lord-

ship that it is not wise to cry out and cavil at every step in the detail of a battle.

As to the term *gap*, the word was used without the mark of quotation, because it was my own and it expressed mine and your meaning very well. You feared the cavalry of the French would overpower ours and break in on your rear and flank when the support of the fuzileers was taken away; I told you general Cole had placed Harvey's brigade in the *gap*, that is, in such a situation that the French could not break in. I knew very well Harvey's brigade followed in support of the attack of the fuzileers because he says so in his journal; but he also says, that both ours and the enemy's cavalry made a corresponding movement. Thus the fear of the latter breaking in was chimerical, especially as during the march Harvey halted, formed, received and beat off a charge of the French horsemen.

But we have not yet done with sir W. Lumley's numbers. How curious it is that brigade-major Holmes's verbal report on the field of battle, as recollected by sir William, should give the third dragoon-guards and the fourth dragoons, forming the heavy brigade, the exact number of five hundred and sixty men, when the same brigade-major Holmes in his written morning state of the 8th of May, one week before the battle, gives to those regiments seven hundred and fifty-two troopers present under arms, and one hundred and eighty-three on command. What became of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of May, thirteen days after the battle, he writes down these regiments six hundred and ninety-five troopers present under arms, one hundred and eighty-two on command, and thirty-two prisoners of war. In both cases also the sergeants, trumpeters, &c., are to be added; and this circumstance must be marked, because in the French returns all persons from the highest officer to the conductors of carriages are included in the strength of men: it is probable neither of the distinguished regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that their ranks were full before and after, but empty on the day of battle, it is contrary to the English custom. Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (page 125) says the thirteenth dragoons had not three hundred men at this time to produce; but this perverse brigade-major Holmes writes that regiment down also on the 8th of May, at three hundred and fifty-seven troopers present under arms, and sixty-three on command; and on the 29th of May, three hundred and forty-one present, seventy-nine on command, eighty-two prisoners of war. Staff-officers are notoriously troublesome people.



One point more.

You accuse me of having placed sir A. Dickson in a position where he never was, and you give a letter from that officer to prove the fact. You also deny the correctness of sir Julius Hartman's statement, and you observe that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now to say that Dickson is placed in a wrong position by me is scarcely fair, because sir Julius Hartman's words are used, and that in the *Justification*; whereas in the History, colonel Dickson's guns are placed exactly in the position where he himself says they were. If you refer to the work you will see that it is so; and surely it is something akin to quibbling, to deny, that artillery posted to defend a bridge was not at the bridge, because its long range enabled it to effect its object from a distance.

You say also that there was your quarter-master-general's evidence to counteract sir Julius Hartman's relative to this retreat. But sir Benjamin D'Urban had already misled me more than once; and why did you garble sir A. Dickson's communication? I will answer for you. It contained positive evidence that *a retreat was ordered*. You may ask how I know this. I will tell you that also. Sir Alexander Dickson sent me the substance of his communication to you. You are now I hope convinced that something else than weakness makes me neglect a complete analysis of your work, which is in every part open to animadversion.

My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which you have received from different officers, colonel Arbuthnot, colonel Colborne, &c., as confirming your statements, but you have not, as in the cases of sir James Douglas and general M'Bean, where they were wholly on your own side, given these letters in full; wherefore, seeing the gloss you have put upon lord Stuart's communication, and this garbling of sir A. Dickson's letter, there is reason to suppose the others do not bear up your case very strongly,—probably they contradict it on some points, as sir Alexander Dickson's, which is here given entire, does.

'The Portuguese artillery under my command (twelve guns) attached to general Hamilton's division was posted on favourable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and at least 700 yards S.W. of the village of Albuera; their fire bore effectually upon the bridge and the road from it to the bridge, and I received my orders to take this position from lord Beresford when the enemy threatened their main attack at the bridge. At a certain period of the day, I should judge it to



have been about the time the fourth division moved to attack, *I received a verbal order in English from Don Jose Luiz de Souza* (now Conde de Villa Real, an aid-de-camp of lord Beresford) *to retire by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not sure which*; to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and he then rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see no reason for falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged to being at hand, I continued in action, and though I believe I limbered up once or twice previous to the receipt of this message and moved a little to improve my position, I never did so to retire. Soon after Don Jose left me, seeing lord Beresford and some of his staff to my right, I rode across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly; but perceiving that the French were giving way I did not mention the order I had received, and as soon as lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state my guns were in, and then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could with my nine-pounders to the right; which I did in time to bring them into action against the retiring masses of the enemy. The foregoing is the substance of an explanation given to lord Beresford which he lately requested.'

Thus you have the whole of what sir Alexander Dickson (as he tells me) wrote to you. Here therefore I might stop, my lord, to enjoy your confusion, and harp upon this fact, which is so formidable a bar to your lordship's argument, that rather than give it publicity, you garbled your own correspondent's letter. But my object is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the truth, and I will not follow your example in suppressing what may tend to serve your argument or weaken mine. It is of no consequence to me whether you gave orders for a retreat or not, it was said in my History that you did not do so, the weight of testimony being on that side; it was only when your anonymous publications called forth new evidence that doubt as to the correctness of the first statement entered my mind.\* But if the following observation in sir Alexander Dickson's letter can serve your argument, you are welcome to it, although it is not contained in the substance of what he wrote to you; and here also be it remembered that sir Alexander's letter was written *after my Justification* was printed.

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\* Since the first publication of this Letter I have learned from excellent authority that marshal Beresford did actually in person order general sir Colin Halket to retreat from the bridge, and rebuked him for being slow to obey.

‘I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except to Hartman, with whom I was on the greatest habits of intimacy, and indeed I was from the first induced to attribute Souza’s message to some mistake, as neither in my conversation with lord Beresford was there any allusion to it, nor did anything occur to indicate to me that he was aware of my having received such an order.’

Your lordship will no doubt deny that the count of Villa Real had authority from you to order this retreat, so be it; but then you call upon me and others to accept this count of Villa Real’s evidence upon other points, and you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses, because their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the count of Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have him at Campo Mayor. And behold another difficulty you thus fall into. Your publications are intended to prove your talent as a general, and yet we find you acknowledging, that in the most critical period of this great and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little confidence in your ability, that sir Henry Hardinge took upon himself to win it for you while the conde de Villa Real took upon himself to lose it, the one ordering an advance, which gained the day, the other ordering a retreat which would have ruined all: be assured such liberties are never taken by the staff of great commanders.

In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold the mirror of truth up to men placed in high stations, when the partiality of friends, the flattery of dependents, and their own human vanity had given them too exalted notions of their importance. You, my lord, are a man in a high station, and you have evidently made a false estimate of your importance, or you would not treat men of inferior rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly will be just, to let you know the judgment which others have formed of your talents. The following character was sketched about two months after the battle of Albuera. The author was a man of great ability, used to public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed to you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent opportunities of observing your disposition; and surely his acuteness will not be denied by those who have read your three publications in this controversy.

‘Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of information upon all subjects connected with the military establishments of the kingdom, the departments attached to the army, and the resources of the country. But nothing appears to be

well arranged and digested in his head ; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his subject, and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument by a profusion of illustrations, stories, and anecdotes, most of which relate to himself. He is captious and obstinate, and difficult to be pleased. He appears to grasp at everything for his own party, without considering what it would be fair, and reasonable, and decent to expect from the other party.'

I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding all that has passed, with respect, because I think you a brave soldier, and even an able organizer of an army. You have served your country long and to the utmost of your ability, and I admit that ability to have been very considerable ; but History, my lord, deals with very great men and you sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a general far above mediocrity, as one who has done much and a great deal of it well ; yet when she looks at Campo Mayor and Albuera she will not rank you amongst great commanders ; and if she should ever cast her penetrating eyes upon this your present publication, she will not class you amongst great writers.

ANSWER  
TO  
THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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THIS is but a sorry attack to repel. '*Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*,' but 'rats and mice and such small deer have been Tom's food for many a year.'

The reviewer does not like my work, and he invokes the vinous vagaries of Mr. Coleridge in aid of his own spleen. I do not like his work, or Mr. Coleridge's either, and I console myself with a maxim of the late eccentric general Meadows, who being displeased to see his officers wear their 'cocked hats awry, issued an order beginning thus:—'All men have fancy, few have taste.' Let that pass. I am ready to acknowledge real errors, and to give my authorities for disputed facts.

1°. I admit that the road which leads over the Pyrenees to Pampeluna does not *unite* at that town with the royal causeway; yet the error was *typographical*, not *topographical*, because the course of the royal causeway was shown, just before, to be through towns very distant from Pampeluna. The true reading should be '*united with the first by a branch road commencing at Pampeluna.*'

2°. The reviewer says, the mountains round Madrid do not touch the Tagus at both ends within the frontier of Spain, that river is not the chord of their arc; neither are the heights of Palmela and Almada near Lisbon one and the same. This is very true, although not very important. I should have written the heights of Palmela *and* Almada, instead of the heights of Palmela *or* Almada. But though the mountains round Madrid do not to the westward actually touch the Tagus within the Spanish frontier, their shoots are scarcely three miles from that river near Talavera; and my



description was general, being intended merely to show that Madrid could not be approached from the eastward or northward, except over one of the mountain ranges, a fact not to be disputed.

3°. It is hinted by the reviewer that lord Melville's degrading observation, namely, that 'the worst men made the best soldiers,' was picked by me out of general Foy's historical fragment. Now, that passage in my History was written many months before general Foy's work was published; and my authority was a very clear recollection of lord Melville's speech, as reported in the papers of the day.\*

General Foy's work seems a favourite authority with the reviewer, and he treats general Thiebault's work with disdain; yet both were Frenchmen of eminence, and the ennobling patriotism of vituperation might have been impartially exercised, the weakness of discrimination avoided. However general Thiebault's work, with some apparent inaccuracies as to numbers, is written with great ability and elegance, and is genuine; whereas general Foy's history is not even general Foy's writing; colonel D'Esmenard, in his recent translation of the Prince of Peace's memoirs, has the following conclusive passage upon that head.

*'The illustrious general Foy undertook a history of the war in Spain, his premature death prevented him from revising and purifying his first sketch, he did me the honour to speak of it several times, and even attached some value to my observations; the imperfect manuscripts of this brilliant orator have been re-handled and re-made by other hands. In this posthumous history, he has been gratuitously provided with inaccurate and malignant assertions.'*

While upon this subject, it is right to do justice to Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace. A sensual and corrupt man he was generally said to be, and I called him so, without suffi-

See Memoirs  
of Manuel  
Godoy, trans-  
lated by  
colonel  
D'Esmenard  
See also  
London and  
Westminster  
Review.  
No. 1.

cient consideration for the extreme exaggerations which the Spaniards always display in their hatred. The prince has now defended himself; colonel D'Esmenard and other persons well acquainted with the dissolute manners of the Spanish capital, and having personal experience of Godoy's character and disposition, have testified that his social demeanour was decent and reserved, and his disposition generous; wherefore

\* See note at the end of my *Reply to the third article in the Quarterly*.

I express my regret at having ignorantly and unintentionally calumniated him.

To return to the reviewer. He is continually observing that he does not know my authority for such and such a fact, and therefore he insinuates that no such fact had place, thus making his ignorance the measure of my accuracy. This logic seems to be akin to that of the wild-beast showman, who declares that 'the little negro boys tie the ostrich bird's leg to a tree, which fully accounts for the milk in the cocoanuts.' I might reply generally as the late alderman Coombe did to a certain baronet, who, in a dispute, was constantly exclaiming, 'I don't know that, Mr. Alderman! I don't know that! 'Ah, sir George! all that you *don't know* would make a large book!' However it will be, though less witty, more conclusive to furnish at least some of my authorities.

1°. In opposition to the supposititious general Foy's account of Solano's murder, and in support of my own History, I give the authority of sir Hew Dalrymple, from whom the information was obtained; a much better authority than Foy, because he was in close correspondence with the insurgents of Seville at the time, and had an active intelligent agent there.

2°. Against the supposititious Foy's authority as to the numbers of the French army in June, 1808, the authority of Napoleon's imperial returns is pleaded. From these returns my estimate of the French forces in Spain during May, 1808, was taken, and it is so stated in my Appendix. The inconsistency of the reviewer himself may also be noticed, for he marks my number as *exclusive* of Junot's army, and yet *includes* that army in what he calls Foy's estimate! But Junot's army was more than 29,000 and not 24,000 as the supposititious Foy has it; and that number taken from 116,000 which, though wrong, is Foy's estimate of the whole, leaves less than 87,000. I said 80,000. The difference is not great, yet my authority is the best, and the reviewer feels that it is so, or he would also have adopted general Foy's numbers of the French at the combat of Rorica. In Foy's history they are set down as less than 2500, in mine they are called 5000. He may be right, but it would not suit the reviewer to adopt a *truth* from a French writer.

3°. On the negative proofs afforded 1°. by the absence of any quoted voucher in my work, 2°. by the absence of any acknowledgment of such a fact in general Anstruther's manuscript journal, which journal may or may not be garbled, the reviewer asserts that the English ministers never contem-

plated the appointing of a military governor for Cadiz. Against this, let the duke of Wellington's authority be pleaded, for in my note-book of conversations held with his grace upon the subject of my History, the following passage occurs:—

‘The ministers were always wishing to occupy Cadiz, lord Wellington thinks this a folly, Cadiz was rather a burthen to him, but either general Spencer or general Anstruther was intended to command there, thinks it was Anstruther, he came out with his appointment.’

Now it is possible that as Acland's arrival was also the subject of conversation, his name was mentioned instead of Anstruther's; and it is also possible, as the note shows, that Spencer was the man, but the main fact relative to the government could not have been mistaken. To balance this, however, there undoubtedly is an error as to the situation of general Anstruther's brigade at the battle of Viniero. It appears by an extract from his journal, that it was disposed, not, as the reviewer says, on the right of Fane's brigade, but at various places, part being on the right of Fane, part upon his left, part held in reserve. The forty-third were on the left of Fane, the fifty-second and ninety-seventh on his right, the ninth in reserve, the error is therefore very trivial, being simply the describing two regiments as of Fane's brigade, when they were of Anstruther's without altering their position. What does the public care whether it was a general called Fane, or a general called Anstruther, who was on the right hand if the important points of the action are correctly described? The fighting of the fifty-second and ninety-seventh has indeed been but slightly noticed, in my History, under the denomination of Fane's right, whereas those regiments make a good figure, and justly so, in Anstruther's journal, because it is the story of the brigade; general history ought not to enter into the details of regimental fighting, save where the effects are decisive on the general result, as in the case of the fiftieth and forty-third on this occasion. The whole loss of the ninety-seventh and fifty-second together did not exceed sixty killed and wounded, whereas the fiftieth alone lost ninety, and the forty-third one hundred and eighteen.

While on the subject of Anstruther's brigade, it is right also to admit another error, one of place; that is if it be true, as the reviewer says, that Anstruther landed at Paymayo bay, and not at Maceira bay. The distance between those places may be about five miles, and the fact had no influence what-

ever on the operations; nevertheless the error was not drawn from Mr. Southey's history, though I readily acknowledge I could not go to a more copious source of error. With respect to the imputed mistake as to time, viz., the day of Anstruther's landing, it is set down in my first edition as the 19th, wherefore the 18th in the third edition is simply an error of the press! Alas! for the reviewer.

But there are graver charges. I have maligned the worthy bishop of Oporto; and ill-used the patriotic Gallician junta! Reader, the bishop of Oporto and the patriarch of Lisbon are one and the same person! Examine then my History and especially its Appendix and judge for yourself, whether the reviewer may not justly be addressed as the pope was by Richard I. when he sent him the bishop of Beauvais' bloody suit of mail. 'See now if this be thy son's coat.' But the junta! Why it is true that I said they glossed over the battle of Rio Seco after the Spanish manner; that their policy was but a desire to obtain money, and to avoid personal inconvenience; that they gave sir Arthur Wellesley incorrect statements of the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards at Oporto, and a more inaccurate estimate of the French army under Junot. All this is true. It is true that I have said it, true that they did it. The reviewer *says* my statement is a 'gratuitous misrepresentation,' I will *prove* that the reviewer's remark is a gratuitous impertinence.

1°. The junta informed sir Arthur Wellesley, that Bessières had twenty thousand men in the battle, whereas he had but fifteen thousand.

2°. That Cuesta lost only two guns, whereas he lost eighteen.

3°. That Bessières lost seven thousand men and six guns, whereas he lost only three hundred and fifty men, and no guns.

4°. That the Spanish army had retired to Benevente as if it still preserved its consistence, whereas Blake and Cuesta had quarrelled and separated, all the magazines of the latter had been captured, and the whole country was at the mercy of the French. This was glossing it over in the Spanish manner.

Again the junta pretended that they desired the deliverance of Portugal to enable them to unite with the southern provinces in a general effort; but Mr. Stuart's letters prove that they would never unite at all with any other province, and that their aim was to separate from Spain altogether and join Portugal. Their wish to avoid personal inconvenience was



notorious; it was the cause of their refusal to let sir David Baird's troops disembark, it was apparent to all who had to deal with them, and it belongs to the national character. Then their eagerness to obtain money, and their unpatriotic use of it when obtained, have been so amply set forth in various parts of my History, I need not do more than refer to that, and to my quoted authorities, especially in the second chapters of the 3rd and 14th Books. Moreover the reviewer's quotations belie his comments, and like the slow-worm defined by Johnson to be 'a blind worm, a large viper, *venomous, not mortal*,' he is at once dull and malignant.

The junta told sir Arthur Wellesley that ten thousand Portuguese troops were at Oporto, and that two thousand Spaniards, who had marched the 15th, would be there on the 25th of July; yet when sir Arthur arrived at Oporto, on the 25th, he found only fifteen hundred Portuguese and three hundred Spaniards; the two thousand men said to be in march had never moved and were not expected. Here then, instead of twelve thousand men, there were only eighteen hundred! At Coimbra, indeed, eighty miles from Oporto, there were five thousand militia and regulars, one-third of which were unarmed, and according to colonel Browne's letter, as given in the folio edition of the inquiry upon the Cintra convention, there were also twelve hundred armed peasants which the reviewer has magnified into twelve thousand. Thus without dwelling on the difference of place, the difference between the true numbers and the statements of the Gallician junta was four thousand; nor will it mend the matter if we admit the armed peasants to be twelve thousand, for that would make a greater difference on the other side.

Again, the junta estimated the French at fifteen thousand men, but the embarkation returns of the number shipped after the convention gave twenty-five thousand seven hundred and sixty; making a difference of more than ten thousand men, exclusive of those who had fallen or been captured in the battles of Vimiero and Rorica, and of those who had died in hospital! Have I not a right then to treat these as inaccurate statements, and the reviewer's remark as an impertinence?

The reviewer, speaking of the battle of Baylen, scoffs at the inconsistency of calling it an insignificant event and yet attributing to it immense results. But my expression was, an insignificant *action in itself*; which at once reconciles the seeming contradiction, and this the writer, who has no honest criticism, suppresses. My allusion to the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, as being the saviours of American indepen-

dence, also excites his morbid spleen, and assuming what is not true, namely, that I selected that period as the time of the greatest improvement in American discipline, he says, their soldiers there were few, as if that bore at all upon the question.

But my expression is *of*\* Valley Forge not '*at*\* Valley Forge.' The allusion was used figuratively to show that an armed peasantry cannot resist regular troops, and Washington's correspondence is one continued enforcement of the principle, yet the expression may be also taken literally. It was with the battalions *of* Valley Forge that Washington drew Howe to the Delawarre, and twice crossing that river in winter, surprised the Germans at Trenton and beat the British at Prince Town. It was with those battalions he made his attacks at German's Town; with those battalions he prevented Howe from sending assistance to Burgoyne's army, which was in consequence captured. In fine, to use his own expression, 'The British eagle's wings were spread, and with those battalions he clipped them.' The American general, however, at one time occupied, close to Valley Forge, a camp in the Jerseys, bearing the odd name of *Quibble Town*, on which probably the reviewer's eye was fixed.

See Stedman's  
History, 4to,  
p. 285.

But notwithstanding *Quibble Town*, enthusiasm will not avail in the long run against discipline. Is authority wanted? We have had Napoleon's and Washington's and now we have Wellington's; for in the fifth volume of his *Despatches*, p. 215, as compiled by colonel Gurwood, will be found the following passage upon the arming of the Spanish and Portuguese people.

'Reflection and above all experience have shown me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view, and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies by any notion that the people when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much use to them. The subject is too large for discussion in a paper of this description, but I can show hundreds of instances to prove the truth of as many reasons why exertions of this description ought not to be relied on. At all events no officer can calculate upon an operation to be performed against the French by persons of this description, and

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\* In the first edition these words were by mistake transposed.

I believe that no officer will enter upon an operation against the French without calculating his means most anxiously.'

It is said that some officer of rank has furnished the reviewer's military criticisms; I can understand why, if the fact be true, but it is difficult to believe that any officer would even for the gratification of a contemptible jealousy, have lent himself to the assertion that sir Arthur Wellesley could not have made a *forced* or a *secret* march from Vimiero to Mafra, because he was encumbered with four hundred bullock-carts.

See his  
evidence,  
Court of  
Inquiry  
on the Con-  
vention of  
Cintra.

Sir Arthur did certainly intend to make that march, and he would as certainly not have attempted such a flank movement *openly and deliberately* while thus encumbered, and moving at the rate of two miles an hour, within a short distance of a general having a more experienced army and an overwhelming cavalry. The sneer

is therefore directed more against sir Arthur Wellesley than against me.

This supposed officer of rank says, that because the enemy had a shorter road to move in retreat, his line of march could not even be manaced, still less intercepted by his opponent moving on the longer route! How then did Cæsar intercept Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's lieutenants, on the Sicoris? How Pompey himself at Dyrrachium? How did Napoleon pass Beaulieu on the Po and gain Lodi? How did Massena dislodge Wellington from Busaco? How did Marmont turn him on the Guarena in 1812? How did Wellington himself turn the French on the Douro and on the Ebro in 1813? And above all, how did he propose to turn Torres Vedras by the very march in question, seeing that from Torres Vedras to Mafra is only twelve miles, and from Vimiero to Mafra is nineteen miles, the roads leading besides over a river and through narrow ways and defiles? But who ever commended such dangerous movements, if they were not masked or their success insured by some peculiar circumstances, or by some stratagem? And what is my speculation but a suggestion of this nature? 'Under certain circumstances,' said sir Arthur Wellesley at the inquiry, 'an army might have gained three hours' start in such a march.' The argument of the supposititious officer of rank is therefore a foolish sophism; nor is that relative to sir John Moore's moving upon Santarem, nor the assertion that my plan was at variance with all sir Arthur Wellesley's objects, more respectable.

My plan, as it is invidiously and falsely called, was simply a reasoning upon the advantages of sir Arthur Wellesley's



plan, and the calculation of days by the reviewer is mere mysticism. Sir Arthur wished sir John Moore to go to Santarem, and if sir Arthur's recommendation had been followed, sir John Moore, who instead of taking five days as this writer would have him do actually disembarked the greatest part of his troops in the Mondego in half a day, that is before one o'clock on the 22nd, might have been at Santarem the 27th even according to the reviewer's scale of march, ten miles a day! Was he to remain idle there, if the enemy did not abandon Lisbon and the strong positions covering that city? If he could stop Junot's retreat either at Santarem or in the Alemtejo, a cavalry country, he could surely as safely operate towards Saccavem, a strong country. What was sir A. Wellesley's observation on that head? 'If the march to Mafra had been made as I had ordered it on the 21st of August in the morning, the position of Torres Vedras would have been turned, and there was no position in the enemy's possession, excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montechique and those in rear of it. And I must observe to the court that if sir John Moore's corps had gone to Santarem as proposed as soon as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great safety in those positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in our power to beat the French.' Lo! then, my plan is not at variance with sir Arthur Wellesley's object. But the whole of the reviewer's sophistry is directed, both as to this march and that to Mafra, not against me, but through me against the duke of Wellington whom the writer dare not attack openly; witness his cunning defence of that '*wet-blanket*' counsel which stopped sir Arthur Wellesley's pursuit of Junot from the field of Vimiero. Officer of rank! Ay, it sounds grandly! but it was a shrewd thing of Agesilaus when any one was strongly recommended to him to ask, 'who will vouch for the voucher!'

Passing now from the officer of rank, I affirm, notwithstanding Mr. Southey's 'magnificent chapters' and sir Charles Vaughan's 'brief and elegant work,' that the statement about Palafox and Zaragoza is correct. My authority is well known to sir Charles Vaughan, and is such as he is not likely to dispute; that gentleman will not, I feel well assured, now guarantee the accuracy of the tales he was told at Zaragoza. But my real offence is not the disparagement of Palafox, it is the having spoiled some magnificent romances, present or to come; for I remember the Roman saying about the 'Lying Greek fable,' and endeavoured so to record the glorious feats of my countrymen, that even our enemies should admit the



facts. And they have hitherto done so, with a magnanimity becoming brave men who are conscious of merit in misfortune, thus putting to shame the grovelling spirit that would make calumny and vituperation the test of patriotism.

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Since writing the above, a second article has appeared in the same review, to which the only reply necessary, is the giving of more proofs, that the passages of my History, contradicted by the reviewer, are strictly accurate. And to begin, it is necessary to inform him, that a man may be perfectly disciplined and a superb soldier, and yet be a raw soldier as to real service; and further, that staff officers may have been a long time in the English service, and yet be quite inexperienced. Even a quarter-master-general of an army has been known to commit all kinds of errors, and discover negligence and ignorance of his duty, in his first campaigns, who yet by dint of long practice became a very good officer in his line, though perhaps not so great a general as he would pass himself off for; for it was no ill-saying of a Scotchman, that some men, if bought at the world's price, might be profitably sold at their own. Now, requesting the reader to observe that in the following quotations the impugned passages of my History are first given, and are followed by the authority, though not all the authority which might be adduced in support of each fact, I shall proceed to expose the reviewer's fallacies.

1°. History.—‘*Napoleon, accompanied by the dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vitoria in the evening.*’

The reviewer contradicts this on the authority of Savary's *Memoirs*, quoting twice the pages and volume, namely vol. iv. pages 12, 40, and 41. But Savary is a writer so careless about dates and small facts, as to have made errors of a month as to time in affairs which he conducted himself. Thus he says king Joseph abandoned Madrid on the 3rd of July, 1808, whereas it was on the 3rd of August. He also says the landing of sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal was made known to him, before the council of war relative to the evacuation of Madrid was held at that capital; but the council was held the 29th of July, and sir Arthur did not land until the 1st of August! Savary is therefore no authority on such points. But there is no such passage as the reviewer quotes, in Savary's work. The reader will look for it in vain in

pages 12, 40, and 41. It is neither in the fourth volume nor in any other volume. At page 8 of the second volume, second part, he will indeed find the following passage. 'L'empereur prit la route d'Espagne avec toute son armée. Il arriva à Bayonne avec la rapidité d'un trait, de même que de Bayonne à Vittoria. Il fit ce dernier trajet à cheval *en deux courses*, de la première il alla à Tolosa et de la seconde à Vittoria.' The words '*deux courses*' the reviewer with his usual candour translates, '*the first day to Tolosa, the second day to Vittoria.*' But notwithstanding this I repeat, that the emperor made his journey in one day. My authority is the assurance of a French officer of the general staff who was present; and if the value of the fact were worth the pains, I could show that it was very easy for Napoleon to do so, inasmuch as a private gentleman, the correspondent of one of the newspapers, has recently performed the same journey in fourteen hours. But my only object in noticing it at all is to show the flagrant falseness of the reviewer.

2°. History.—'*Sir John Moore had to organize an army of raw soldiers, and in a poor unsettled country just relieved from the pressure of a harsh and gripping enemy, he had to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance of the officers' baggage. Every branch of the administration civil and military was composed of men zealous and willing indeed, yet new to a service where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience being severely felt.*'

*Authorities.*—Extracts from sir John Moore's journal and letters.

'I am equipping the troops here and moving them towards the frontier, but I found the army without the least preparation, without any precise information with respect to roads, and no arrangement for feeding the troops upon their march.' — 'The army is without equipments of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or any other appendage to an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes.' — 'The commissariat has at its head Mr. Erskine, a gentleman of great integrity and honour, and of considerable ability, but neither he nor any of his officers have any experience of what an army of this magnitude requires to put it in motion.' — 'Everything is however going on with zeal; there is no want of that in an English army, and though the difficulties are considerable, and we have to move through a very impracticable country: I expect to be past the frontier early in November.'

Extract from a memoir by sir John Colborne, military secretary to sir John Moore.

'The heads of departments were all zeal, but they had but little experience, and their means for supplying the wants of the army about to enter on an active campaign were in many respects limited.'

3°. History.—'One Sataro, the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of Junot's in the negotiations engaged to supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract so embarrassed the operations,' &c. &c.

Authority.—Extract from sir John Colborne's memoir quoted above.

'Sataro, a contractor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the divisions on the march through Portugal. He failed in his contract, and daily complaints were transmitted to headquarters of want of provisions on this account. The divisions of generals Fraser and Beresford were halted, and had it not been for the exertions of these generals and of the Portuguese magistrates the army would have been long delayed.'

4°. History.—'General Anstruther had unadvisedly halted the leading columns in Almeida.'

Authority.—Extract from sir John Moore's journal.

'Br.-general Anstruther, who took possession of Almeida from the French, and who has been there ever since, and to whom I had written to make preparations for the passage of the troops on this route and Coimbra, has stopped them within the Portuguese frontier instead of making them proceed as I had directed to Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca.'

5°. History.—'Sir John Moore did not hear of the total defeat and dispersion of Belvedere's Estremaduran army until a week after it happened, and then only through one official channel.' That channel was Mr. Stuart. Sir John had heard indeed that the Estremadurans had been forced from Burgos, but nothing of their utter defeat and ruin: the difference is cunningly overlooked by the reviewer.

Authority.—Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Nov. 16th, 1808.

'I had last night the honour to receive your letter of the 13th, together with letters of the 14th, from Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck.'—'I did not know until I received Mr. Stuart's letter that the defeat of the Estremaduran army had been so complete.'

Now that army was destroyed on the morning of the 10th, and here we see that the intelligence of it did not reach sir John Moore till the night of the 15th, which if not absolutely a whole week is near enough to justify the expression.



6°. History.—‘*Thousands of arms were stored up in the great towns.*’

Authority.—Extract from sir John Moore’s letter to Mr. Stuart.

1st December, 1808. ‘At Zamora there are *three or four thousand* stand of arms, in other places *there may be more*. If they remain collected in town, they will be taken by the enemy.’

7°. History.—‘*Sir John Hope’s division was ordered to pass the Duero at Tordesillas.*’

Authority.—Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to sir David Baird, 12th December, 1808.

‘Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve and general Beresford’s brigade, the rest of the troops from thence are moving to the Duero, my quarters to-morrow will be at Alaejos, *Hope’s at Tordesillas.*’

Now it is true that on the 14th sir John Moore, writing from Alaejos to sir David Baird, says that he had *then* resolved to change his direction, and instead of going to Valladolid should be at Toro on the 15th with all the troops; but as Hope was to have been at Tordesillas the same day that Moore was at Alaejos, namely, on the 13th, he must have marched from thence to Toro: and where was the danger? The cavalry of his division under general C. Stewart had already surprised the French at Rueda, higher up the Duero, and it was well known no infantry were nearer than the Carrion.

8°. History.—‘*Sir John Moore was not put in communication with any person with whom he could communicate at all.*’

Authority.—Extracts from sir John Moore’s letters and journal, 19th and 28th November.

‘I am not in communication with any of the Spanish generals, and neither know their plans nor those of their government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what as a stranger I picked up.’—‘I am in communication with no one Spanish army, nor am I acquainted with the intentions of the Spanish government or any of its generals. Castaños with whom I was put in correspondence is deprived of his command at the moment I might have expected to hear from him, and La Romana, with whom I suppose I am now to correspond, (for it has not been officially communicated to me,) is absent, God knows where.’

9°. History.—‘*Sir John’s first intention was to move upon Valladolid, but at Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the prince of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters, and the contents*



were important enough to change the direction of the march. *Valderas was given as the point of union with Baird.*'

*Authority.*—Extract from sir John Moore's journal.

'I marched on the 13th from Salamanca; head-quarters, Alaejos; *there* I saw an intercepted letter from Berthier, prince of Neufchatel, to marshal Soult, duke of Dalmatia, which determined me to unite the army without loss of time. I therefore moved on the 15th to Toro instead of Valladolid. At *Valderas* I was joined by sir David Baird with two brigades'

10°. History.—'No assistance could be expected from *Romana*.'—'He did not destroy the bridge of *Mansilla*.'—'Contrary to his promise he pre-occupied *Astorga*, and when there proposed offensive plans of an absurd nature.'

*Authorities.*—1°. Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Dec. 12th, 1808.

'I have heard nothing from the marquis de la Romana in answer to the letters I wrote to him on the 6th and 8th instants. *I am thus disappointed of his co-operation or of knowing what plan he proposes.*'

2°. Colonel Symes to sir David Baird, 14th Dec.

'In the morning I waited on the marquis and pressed him as far as I could with propriety on the subject of joining sir John Moore, to which he evaded giving any more than general assurances.'

3°. Extract from sir John Moore's journal.

'At two I received a letter from *Romana*, brought to me by his aide-de-camp, stating that he had twenty-two thousand (he only brought up six thousand), and would be happy to co-operate with me.'—'At *Castro Nuevo* sir D. Baird sent me a letter he had addressed to him of rather a later date, stating that he was retiring into the *Gallicias*. I sent his aide-de-camp back to him with a letter requesting to know if such was his intention, but without expressing either approbation or disapprobation. *In truth I placed no dependence on him or his army.*'

4°. Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, *Astorga*, 31st December.

'I arrived here yesterday, when *contrary to his promise* and to my expectations I find the marquis de la Romana with a great part of his troops.'—'He said to me in direct terms that had he known how things were, he neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are *quite absurd*, and then returns to the helpless state of his army.'—

'He could not be persuaded to destroy the bridge at Mansillas, he posted some troops at it which were forced and taken prisoners by the French on their march from Mayorga.'

The reviewer must now be content to swallow his disgust at finding Napoleon's genius admired, Soult's authority accepted, and Romana's military talents contemned in my History. These proofs of my accuracy are more than enough, and instead of adding to them, an apology is necessary for having taken so much notice of two articles only remarkable for a malevolent imbecility and a systematic violation of truth. But if the reader wishes to have a good standard of value, let him throw away this silly fellow's carpings, and look at the duke of Wellington's *Despatches*, 5th and 6th volumes. He will there find that my opinions are generally corroborated, never invalidated by the duke's letters, and that while no fact of consequence is left out by me, new light has been thrown upon many events, the true bearings of which were unknown at the time to the English general. Thus at page 337, vol. 4, of the *Despatches*, lord Wellington speaks in doubt about some obscure negotiations of marshal Victor, which I have shown in my History, book vii. chap. iii., to be a secret intrigue for the treacherous surrender of Badajos. In the proceedings of Joseph's council of war, related by me, and I am the first writer who was ever informed of them, are to be found the real causes of the various attacks made by the French at the battle of Talavera. I have shown also, and I am the first English writer who has shown it, that the French had in Spain one hundred thousand more men than the English general knew of; that Soult brought down to the valley of the Tagus after the fight of Talavera, a force which was stronger by more than twenty thousand men than sir Arthur Wellesley estimated it to be; and without this knowledge the imminence of the danger which the English army escaped by crossing the bridge of Arzobispo cannot be understood.

Again, the means of correcting the error which Wellington fell into in 1810 relative to Soult, who he supposed to have been at the head of the second corps in Placentia when he was really at Seville, has been furnished by me; insomuch as I have shown that it was Mermet who was at the head of that corps, and that Wellington was deceived by the name of the younger Soult who commanded Mermet's cavalry.

See Wellington's  
*Despatches*,  
vol. v. p. 488,  
et passim.

Two facts only have been misstated in my History.

1°. Treating of the conspiracy in Soult's camp at Oporto, I said that D'Argentou, to save his life, readily told all he

knew of the British, but *with respect to his accomplices, was immoveable.*

2°. Treating of Cuesta's conduct in the Talavera campaign I have enumerated amongst his reasons for not fighting that it was Sunday.

Now the duke of Wellington says D'Argentou did betray his accomplices, and yet my information was drawn from authority only second to the duke's, viz., major-general sir James Douglas, who conducted the interviews with d'Argentou, and was the suggester and attendant of his journey to the British head-quarters. He was probably deceived by that conspirator, but the following extract from his narrative proves that the fact was not lightly stated in my History.

'D'Argentou was willing enough to save his life by revealing everything he knew about the English, and among other things assured Soult it would be nineteen days before any serious attack could be made upon Oporto; and there can be little doubt that Soult, giving credit to this information, lost his formidable barrier of the Douro by surprise. *As no threats on the part of the marshal could induce D'Argentou to reveal the names of his accomplices,* he was twice brought out to be shot and remanded in the expectation that between hope and intimidation he might be led to a full confession. On the morning of the attack he was hurried out of prison by the gens-d'armes, and, no other conveyance for him being at hand, he was placed upon a horse of his own, and that one the very best he had. The gens-d'armes in their hurry did not perceive what he very soon found out himself, that he was the best mounted man of the party, and watching his opportunity he sprung his horse over a wall into the fields, and made his escape to the English, who were following close.'

For the second error so good a plea cannot be offered, and yet there was authority for that also. The story was circulated, and generally believed at the time, as being quite consonant with the temper of the Spanish general; and it has since been repeated in a narrative of the campaign of 1809, published by lord Munster. Nevertheless it appears from colonel Gurwood's compilation, 5th vol. page 343, that it is not true.

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Having thus disposed of the *Quarterly Review* I request the reader's attention to the following corrections of errors as to facts, which have lately reached me, and are inserted here in preference to waiting for a new edition of the volumes to which they refer.

1°. *The storming of Badajos.*

'General Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Christoval, where they all surrendered the next morning to lord Fitzroy Somerset.'—History.

*Correction by colonel Warre, assented to by lord Fitzroy Somerset.*

'Lieut.-colonel Warre was the senior officer present at the surrender, having joined lord Fitzroy Somerset (who was in search of the governor and the missing part of the garrison) just as he was collecting a few men wherewith to summon in his capacity of aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, the tête-du-pont of San Christoval.'

2°. *Assault of Tarifa.*—'The Spaniards and the forty-seventh British regiment guarded the breach.'

*Correction by sir Hugh Gough.*

'The only part of the forty-seventh engaged *during the assault* were two companies under captain Livelesly, stationed on the east bastion one hundred and fifty paces from the breach, and the Spaniards were nowhere to be seen, except behind a palisade in the street, a considerable way from the breach. *The eighty-seventh, and the eighty-seventh alone, defended the breach.* The two companies of the forty-seventh, I before mentioned, and the two companies of the rifles, which latter were stationed on my left, but all under my orders, did all that disciplined and brave troops could do in support, and the two six-pounders under lieut.-colonel Mitchel of the artillery, most effectively did their duty while their fire could tell, the immediate front of the breach from the great dip of the ground not being under their range.'

This correction renders it proper that I should give my authority for saying the Spaniards were at the breach.

Extract from a letter of sir Charles Smith, the engineer who defended Tarifa.

'The next great measure of opposition was to assign to the Spaniards the defence of the breach. This would have been insupportable: the able advocacy of lord Proby proved that it would be a positive insult to the Spanish nation to deprive its troops of the honour, and all my solemn remonstrances could produce, was to split the difference, and take upon myself to determine which half of the breach should be entrusted to our ally.'

The discrepancy between sir Charles Smith's and sir Hugh Gough's statement is however easily reconciled, being more apparent than real. The Spaniards were *ordered* to defend half the breach, but in *fact* did not appear there.



To the above it is proper here to add a fact, made known to me since my account was published, very honourable to major Henry King, of the eighty-second regiment. Being commandant of the town of Tarifa, a command distinct from the island, he was called to a council of war on the 29th of December, and when most of those present were for abandoning the place he gave in the following note:

‘I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tarifa will afford the British garrison an opportunity of gaining eternal honour, and it ought to be defended to the last extremity.

‘I. H. S. KING,

‘*Commandant of Tarifa.*’

3°. *Battle of Barosa.*—‘The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry turned indeed without orders, coming up just as the action ceased, and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an Englishman, commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as much; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division, have rendered the defeat ruinous.’—History.

Extract of a letter from Sir Samford Whittingham.

‘I am free to confess that the statement of the historian of the Peninsular War, as regards my conduct on the day of the battle of Barosa, is just and correct; but I owe it to myself, to declare that my conduct was the result of obedience to the repeated orders of the general commanding in chief under whose command I acted. In the given strength of the Spanish cavalry under my command on that day, there is an error. The total number of the Spanish cavalry, at the commencement of the expedition, is correctly stated; but so many detachments had taken place by orders from head-quarters that I had only one squadron of Spanish cavalry under my command on that day.’

# REPLY

TO A

## THIRD ARTICLE IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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‘Now there are two of them; and one has been called *Crawley*, and the other is *Honest Iago*.’—OLD PLAY.

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THIS Article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth. The malice is apparent to all; it remains to show the imbecility and falseness.

The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that valour which belongs to the *incognito* menaces me with his literary vengeance for my former comments. His vengeance! Bah! The ass’ ears peep too far beyond the lion’s hide. He shall now learn that I always adapt my manners to the level of the person I am addressing; and though his petty industry indicates a mind utterly incapable of taking an enlarged view of any subject, he shall feel that chastisement awaits his malevolence. And first with respect to the small sketches in my work which he pronounces to be the very worst *plans* possible. It is expressly stated on the face of each that they are only ‘*Explanatory Sketches*,’ his observations therefore are a mere ebullition of contemptible spleen; but I will now show my readers why they are only sketches and not accurate plans.

When I first commenced my work, amongst the many persons from whom I sought information was sir George Murray, and this in consequence of a message from him, delivered to me by sir John Colborne, to the effect that if I would call upon him he would answer any question I put to him on the subject of the Peninsular War. The interview took place in the presence of admiral sir Graham Moore, but sir George

Murray, far from giving me information, seemed intent upon persuading me to abandon my design; repeating continually that it was his intention to write the History of the war himself. He appeared also desirous of learning what sources of information I had access to. I took occasion to tell him that the duke of Wellington had desired me to ask him particularly for the '*Order of Movements*,' as essentially necessary to a right understanding of the campaign and the saving of trouble; because otherwise I should have to search out the different movements through a variety of documents. Sir George replied that he knew of no such orders, that he did not understand me. To this I could only reply that I spoke as the duke had desired me, and knew no more.\* I then asked his permission to have reduced plans made from captain Mitchell's fine drawings, informing him that officer was desirous so to assist me. His reply was uncourteously vehement—'No! certainly not!' I proposed to be allowed to inspect those drawings if I were at any time at a loss about ground. The answer was still 'No!' And as sir George intimated to me that my work could only be a momentary affair for the booksellers and would not require plans I took my leave. I subsequently discovered that he had immediately caused captain Mitchell's drawings to be locked up and sealed.

I afterwards waited on sir Willoughby Gordon, the quartermaster-general, who treated me with great kindness, and sent me to the chief of the plan department in his office with an order to have access to everything which might be useful. From that officer I received every attention; but sir George Murray had been there the day before to borrow all the best plans relating to the Peninsular War, and consequently little help could be given to me. Now captain Mitchell's drawings were made by him after the war, by order of the government, and at the public expense. He remained in the Peninsula for more than two years with pay as a staff officer, his extra expenses were also paid:† he was attended constantly by two Spanish dragoons as a protection and the whole mission was costly. Never was money better laid out, for I believe no

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\* I have since obtained from other sources many of those orders of movements, signed George Murray, and addressed to the generals commanding divisions. Had they been given to me according to the duke of Wellington's desire when I first commenced my work they would have saved me much time much expense and much labour; but I repeat that from sir George Murray and from him only I have met with hostility. He has not been able to hurt me but I take the will for the deed.

† About five thousand pounds.

topographical drawings, whether they be considered for accuracy of detail, perfection of manner, or beauty of execution, ever exceeded Mitchell's. But those drawings belong to the public and were merely placed in sir George Murray's official keeping. I believe they are still in his possession and it would be well if some member of parliament were to ask why they are thus made the property of a private man?\*

Here I cannot refrain from observing that, in the course of my labours, I have asked information of many persons of various nations, even of Spaniards, after my first volume was published and when the unfavourable view I took of their exertions was known. And from Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, and Germans, whether of high or low rank, I have invariably met with the greatest kindness, and found an eager desire to aid me. Sir George Murray only has thrown obstacles in my way; and if I am rightly informed of the following circumstance, his opposition has not been confined to what I have stated above. Mr. Murray, the bookseller, purchased my first volume with the right of refusal for the second volume. When the latter was nearly ready a friend informed me that he did not think Murray would purchase, because he had heard him say that sir George Murray had declared it was not '*The Book*.' He did not point out any particular error; but it was not '*The Book*;' meaning doubtless that his own production, when it appeared, would be '*The Book*.' My friend's prognostic was good. I was offered just half of the sum given for the first volume. I declined it, and published on my own account; and certainly I have had no reason to regret that Mr. Murray waited for '*The Book*:' indeed he has since told me very frankly that he had mistaken his own interest. Now whether three articles in *The Quarterly*, and a promise of more,† be a tribute paid to the importance of '*My Book*,' or whether they be the puff preliminary to '*The Book*,' I know not; but I am equally bound to Mr. Editor Lockhart for the distinction, and only wish he had not hired such a stumbling sore-backed hackney for the work. Quitting this digression, I return to the *Review*.

My topographical ignorance is a favourite point with the

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\* Since this was written Mr. Leader did put the question in the house when sir George Murray's conduct was strongly animadverted upon by lord Howick, and his lordship's observations were loudly cheered. Sir George is now publishing these maps, but they belong to the public.

† Another has appeared since, but I have not read it, being informed that it was precisely like its predecessors.



writer, and he mentions three remarkable examples on the present occasion:—1. That I have said Oporto is built in a hollow; 2. That I have placed the Barca de Avintas only three miles from the Serra Convent, instead of nine miles; 3. That I have described a ridge of land near Medellin where no such ridge exists.

These assertions are all hazarded in the hope that they will pass current with those who know no better, and will be unnoticed by those who do. But first a town may be *on* a hill and yet *in* a hollow. If the reader will look at lieutenant Godwin's Atlas,\* or at Gage's Plan of Oporto, or at Alvis' Plan of that city—all three published by Mr. Wyld of Charing Cross—he will find that Oporto, which by the way is situated very much like the hot wells at Bristol, is built partly on the slopes of certain heights partly on the banks of the river; that it is surrounded on every side by superior heights; and that consequently my description of it, having relation to the Bishop's lines of defence and the attack of the French army, is militarily correct. Again, if the reader will take his compasses and any or all of the three maps above mentioned, he will find that the Barca de Avintas is, as I have said, just three miles from the Serra Convent, and not nine miles as the reviewer asserts. Lord Wellington's despatch called it four miles *from Oporto*, but there is a bend in the river which makes the distance greater on that side.

Such being the accuracy of this very correct topographical critic upon two or three examples, let us see how he stands with respect to the third.

*Extracts from marshal Victor's Official Report and Register of the Battle of Medellin.*

'Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To arrive there, a handsome stone-bridge is passed. On the left of the town is a very high hill (*mamelon très élevé*), which commands all the plain; on the right is a ridge or steppe (*rideau*), which forms the basin of the Guadiana. Two roads or openings (*débouchés*) present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one conducts to Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse a vast plain, bounded by a ridge (*rideau*), which, from the right of the Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and Villa Nueva de la Serena.' . . . 'The ridge which confines the plain of Medellin has many rises and falls (*movemens de*

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\* This work has been since discontinued by lieutenant Godwin in consequence as he told me of foul play in a high quarter where he least expected it, in truth, where I also had met with it.

*terrain*) more or less apparent. *It completely commands (domine parfaitement) the valley of the Guadiana; and it was at the foot of this ridge the enemy's cavalry was posted. Not an infantry man was to be seen; but the presence of the cavalry made us believe that the enemy's army was masked behind this ridge of Don Benito.'* . . . 'Favoured by *this ridge, he could manœuvre his troops, and carry them upon any point of the line he pleased without being seen by us.'*

Now '*rideau*' can only be rendered, with respect to ground, a *steppe* or a *ridge*; but, in this case, it could not mean a *steppe*, since the Spanish army was hidden *behind it*, and on a *steppe* it would have been seen. Again, it must have been a *high ridge*, because it not only *perfectly commanded the basin* of the Guadiana, overlooking the *steppe* which formed that basin, but was itself not overlooked by the very high hill on the left of Medellin. What is my description of the ground? — 'The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a *high ridge of land*,'—mark, reader, not a mountain ridge,—'behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and guns in advance.' Here then we have another measure of value for the reviewer's topographical pretensions.

The reference to French military reports and registers has not been, so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; and yet he rests the main part of his criticisms upon such documents. Thus, having got hold of the divisional register of general Heudelet, which register was taken, very much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, he is so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles over it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in my possession the general report and register of Soult's army, which enables me to show what a very little callow bird his treasure is. And first, as he accuses *me* of painting the wretched state of Soult's army at St. Jago, previous to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of giving a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult's own account, and the account of *Le Noble*, historian of the campaign, and *ordonnateur en chef* or controller of the civil administration of the army.

*Extract from Soult's Official Journal of the Expedition to Portugal, dated Lugo, 30th May, 1809.*

'Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be surmounted, the *shattered and exhausted state* ('*delabrement et epuisement*') of the '*corps d'armée*,' and the insufficiency of the means of which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it was neces-

sary to obey.' . . . 'The march was directed upon St. Jago, where the troops took the first repose it had been possible to give them since they quitted the Carrion River in Castille.' . . . 'Marshal Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed some shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the horses shod; the parc, which since the Carrion had not been seen, now came up, and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared at Coruña), together with various detachments that the previous hardships and the exhaustion of the men had caused to remain behind. He would have prolonged his stay until the end of February because he could not hide from himself that his troops had the most urgent need of it; but his operations were connected with the duke of Belluno's, &c. &c., and he thought it his duty to go on without regard to time or difficulties.'

*Extract from Le Noble's History.*

'The army was without money, without provision, without clothing, without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to the latter, not even ordinarily complete, when they should have been doubled to profit from the feeble resources of the country.'

Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected from a writer so shameless in his statements as this reviewer? Let the reader look to the effrontery with which he asserts that I have *celebrated marshal Soult* for the reduction of two fortresses, Ferrol and Coruña, which were not even defended, whereas my whole passage is a censure upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and without one word of praise towards the French marshal.

To return to general Heudelet's register. The first notable discovery from this document is, that it makes no mention of an action described by me as happening on the 17th of February at Ribadavia; and therefore the reviewer says no such action happened, though I have been so particular as to mention the strength of the Spanish position, their probable numbers, and the curious fact that twenty priests were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he contradicts. Now this is only the old story of '*the big book which contains all that sir George does not know.*' For, first, Heudelet's register, being only divisional, would not, as a matter of course, take notice of an action in which other troops were also engaged, and where the commander-in-chief was present. But that the action did take place, as I have described it, and on the 17th February, the following extracts will prove, and also the futility of the reviewer's other objections. And I request the reader, both now and always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the work itself, and not trust the garbled



extracts of the reviewer, or he will have a very false notion of my meaning.

*Extract from Soult's General Report.*

'The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, and the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the approach of La Romana's corps, organized itself in the province of Orense.

'The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the monks and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and extended itself to the quarters of general La Houssaye at Salvaterra. *It was said the corps of Romana was at Orense* (on disait le corps de Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at Ribadavia.

'The 16th of February the troops commenced their march upon Ribadavia.

'The left column, under general Heudelet, found the route intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents eight hundred strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night, overthrew them *in the morning of the 17th*, and pursued them to the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a body *far more numerous*. General Heudelet having come up with the rest of his division, and being sustained by Maransin's brigade of dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many. *Twenty monks at the least perished, and the town was entered fighting.*

'The 18th, general Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia, where *three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves*. Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was before him.'

The reviewer farther says that, with my habitual inaccuracy as to dates, I have concentrated all Soult's division at Orense on the 20th. But Soult himself says, 'The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet marched upon Orense, and seized the bridge. *The 20th, the other divisions followed the movement upon Orense.*' Here then, besides increasing the bulk of the book, containing what sir George *does not know*, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual want of truth.

In the above extracts nothing is said of the '*eight or ten thousand Spaniards*;' nothing of the '*strong rugged hill*' on which they were posted; nothing of '*Soult's presence in the action.*' But the reader will find all these particulars in the appendix to the *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*, and in Le Noble's *History of Soult's Campaign*. The writers in each work were present, and the latter, notwithstanding the reviewer's sneers, and what is of more consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors as to the projects and numbers



of his enemies, is highly esteemed by his countrymen, and therefore good authority for those operations on his own side which he witnessed. Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000 insurgents and some regular troops in position, and he describes that position as very rugged and strong, which I can confirm, having marched over it only a few weeks before. Nevertheless, as this estimate was not borne out by Soult's report, I set the Spaniards down at 8000 or 10,000, grounding my estimate on the following data: 1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body *far more numerous*. 2nd. It required a considerable body of troops and several combinations to dislodge them from an extensive position. 3rd. *Three or four thousand fugitives went off by one road only.* Finally, the expression *eight or ten thousand* showed that I had doubts.

Let us proceed with Heudelet's register. In my History it is said that Soult softened the people's feelings by kindness and by enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this the reviewer quotes, from Heudelet's register, statements of certain excesses, committed principally by the light cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the enemy—excesses, however, which he admits that count Heudelet blamed and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth of my statement instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm is strong within him. Yet I will not rely upon this curious stupidity of the reviewer. I will give absolute authority for the fact that Soult succeeded in soothing the people's feelings, begging the reader to observe that both Heudelet and my History speak of Soult's stay at Orense immediately after the action at Ribadavia.

*Extract from Soult's General Report.*

'At this period the *prisoners of Romana's corps* (note, the reviewer says none of Romana's corps were there) had all demanded to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve king Joseph. The Spanish general himself was far off (*fort éloigné*). The inhabitants of the province of Orense were returning to their houses, breaking their arms, and cursing the excitement and the revolt which Romana had fomented. The priests even encouraged their submission, and offered themselves as sureties. These circumstances appeared favourable for the invasion of Portugal.'

Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always distinguished the *Quarterly Review* to pander to the bad feelings of mankind by making the vituperation of an enemy the test of patriotism, this critic accuses me of an unnatural bias, and an inclination to do injustice to the Spaniards, because I have not made the report of some outrages, committed by Soult's

cavalry, the ground of a false and infamous charge against the whole French army and French nation. Those outrages, which I did notice, and which he admits himself were vigorously repressed, were committed by troops in a country where all the inhabitants were in arms, where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived from day to day on what they could take in the country. I shall now put this sort of logic to a severe test, and leave the reviewer's patriots to settle the matter as they can. That is, I shall give from lord Wellington's despatches, through a series of years, extracts touching the conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula, where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, tortured, assassinated, but well provided and kindly treated.

*Sir A. Wellesley to Mr. Villiers.*

*Extract, May 1, 1809.*—‘I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly.’—‘They have plundered the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again.’

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, May 31, 1809.*

‘The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success more than sir John Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavouring to tame them, but if I should not succeed I shall make an official complaint of them and send one or two corps home in disgrace; they plunder in all directions.’

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, June 13, 1809.*

‘It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded; it is probable that all three have been put to death by the peasantry of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants may have had some provocation for their animosity against the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the peasantry of the country in general as well as to the army.’

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to colonel Donkin, June, 1809.*

‘I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the greatest pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters of the disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of the — and — regiments.’

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June, 1809.*

'It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers of the army, that outrages are not committed.' . . . 'Not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. *There is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment* suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation.' . . . 'It is most difficult to convict any prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to say that soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them; and the officers who are sworn, 'well and truly to try and determine *according to evidence*, the matter before them,' have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered to them.' . . . 'There ought to be in the British army a regular provost establishment.' . . . 'All the foreign armies have such an establishment. The French *gendarmerie nationale* to the amount of forty or fifty with each corps. The Spaniards have their police militia to a still larger amount. *While we who require such an aid more, I am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe*, have nothing of the kind.'

'We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect that British soldiers will be orderly or regular.' . . . 'I believe I should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence.' . . . 'We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, *but we are worse than an enemy in a country*, and take my word for it that either defeat or success would dissolve us.'

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, July, 1809.*

'We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of criminal outrages of British officers and soldiers.' . . . 'As matters are now conducted, the government and myself stand complimenting each other while no notice is taken of the murderer.'

*Sir Arthur to lord Wellesley, August, 1809.*

'But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad as the men.'

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809.*

‘In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct of detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our law is not what it ought to be and I cannot prevail upon government even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts having been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear to decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we have obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the witnesses being in almost every instance common soldiers whose conduct this tribunal was constituted to control; *the consequence is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness and plunder.*’

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Villiers, September, 1809.*

‘I really believe that *more plunder and outrage have been committed by this army than by any other that ever was in the field.*’

*Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, January, 1810.*

‘I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains taken by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of the soldiers is infamous.’ . . . ‘At this moment there are three general courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers guilty of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been killed by them since we returned to Portugal,) robberies, thefts, robbing convoys under their charge, &c. &c. Perjury is as common as robbery and murder.’

*Lord Wellington to the adjutant-general of the forces, 1810.*

‘It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer (which rarely happens,) that a murder or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by the British soldiers composing it: they have killed eight people since the army returned to Portugal.’

*Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810.*

‘Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general court-martial and have been executed.’ . . . ‘I am still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder or wine is within reach.’

*Lord Wellington to sir S. Cotton, 1810.*

‘I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct



of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country.' . . .  
 'It has gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether they might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service of the French.'

*Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, May, 1812.*

'The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so injurious to the army itself, that I request your lordship's early attention to the subject.'

Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see what was the conduct of the French towards men who did not murder and mutilate prisoners:—

*Lord Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, August, 1810.*

'Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might fall into their hands; and I must do the French the justice to say that they have been universally well treated, and in recent instances *the wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.*'

*Lord Wellington to admiral Berkeley, October, 1810.*

'I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners whom they take from us and the Portuguese treat their prisoners exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the hands of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government.'

Having thus displayed the conduct of the British army, as described by its own general through a series of years; and having also from the same authority, shown the humane treatment English officers and soldiers, when they happened to be made prisoners, experienced from the French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour, truth or conscience in his composition,—of any man, in fine, who is not at once knave and fool, whether these outrages perpetrated by British troops upon a friendly people can be suppressed, and the outrages of French soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged upon with justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute relentless ferocity, atrocious villany, to the whole French army, and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses

of some bad soldiers, prating at the same time of the virtue of England and the excellent conduct of her troops; and this too in the face of Wellington's testimony to the kindness with which they treated our men, and in the face also of his express declaration (see letter to lord Wellesley, 26th January, 1811), that the majority of the French soldiers were '*sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.*' But what intolerable injustice it would be to stigmatize either nation for military excesses which are common to all armies and to all wars; and when I know that the general characteristic of the British and French troops alike, is generosity, bravery, humanity, and honour.

And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the Spaniards because I do not laud them for running away in battle; because I do not express my admiration of their honour in assassinating men whom they dared not face in fight; because I do not commend their humanity for mutilating, torturing, and murdering their prisoners! I have indeed heard of a British officer, a chief of the staff, who, after the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction at a Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman's brains out with a stone, and even sneered at the indignant emotion and instant interference of my informant. Such an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such cold-blooded men in the British army. But what have I said to the disparagement of the Spaniards in my History without sustaining it by irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely nothing! I have quoted the deliberate judgment of every person of note, French and English, who had to deal with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I have brought forward the testimony of sir Hew Dalrymple, of sir John Moore, of sir John Cradock, of Mr. Stuart, of Mr. Frere, of general Graham, of lord William Bentinck, of sir Edward Pellew, of lord Collingwood, of sir Edward Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony of the duke of Wellington; and I will now add more proofs that his opinion of the Spanish character coincides with that expressed in my History.

*Extracts from lord Wellington's Correspondence, 1809.*

'I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration.' . . . 'That is the frequent, I ought to say constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy; we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and

twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo.' . . . 'In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms and ran off *in my presence* when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own fire.' . . . 'I have found, upon inquiry, and from experience, the instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish troops to be so numerous and those of their good behaviour to be so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon.'

'The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without discipline; they are in general well clothed armed and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition; but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an enemy.' . . . 'In respect to that great body of all armies—I mean the infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is.' . . . 'It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill.' . . . 'Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual.' . . . 'I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature.'

'The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest.'

### *Extracts, 1810.*

'The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected only success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no measures; they have never looked to or prepared for a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had anything to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the same sentiments.'

'Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as I have I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country.'

'The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people amongst them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and instead of making them acquainted with their real situation and calling upon them to make the exertions and

sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked-for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will at last become fatigued with the succession of their disasters which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented.'

*Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810.*

'In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I enclose you a report which sir William Beresford has received from general Madden the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word in this letter that is not true. *Yet these are the soldiers who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!*

'There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be established. *It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other manner.* Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the guerillas and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies, are calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field.

'But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. *Their courage, and even their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances and is never a matter of choice or of foresight.*

*Wellington to lord Wellesley, 1810.*

'There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has in my opinion been the cause of the *dastardly conduct* which we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and *they have become odious to the country, The peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph's government to be protected from the outrages of their own troops.*

*Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, Dec. 1810.*

'I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocana, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of



their government—upon having one or two, more or less, British regiments: and that after having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of general Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them.

‘The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities—that is, *boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.*’

*Wellington to general Graham, 1811.*

‘The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition (Barosa) is *precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be.* They march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, and abuse everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, when the moment of action arrives they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal.’\*

So much for Wellington’s opinion of the Spanish soldiers and statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish generals:—

1809. ‘Although the Duque de Albuquerque is *proné*, by many, amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out. I think the marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is certainly a sensible man and has seen much of the world.’

Now, reader, the following is the character given to Romana in my History: compare it with the above:—

‘Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command.’ And again, speaking of his death, I say, ‘He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss.’ If the expressions are more positive than Wellington’s, it is because this was the duke’s first notion of the marquis; he was more positive afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown to him, and after circumstances known

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\* That very successful Spanish general and very temperate English politician, sir De Lacy Evans, pronounces all such animadversions upon the Spanish armies to be ‘*a most deplorable defect in a historian, and the result of violent partialities.*’ I dare to say the Spaniards will agree with him.

to him, gave me a right to be more decided. The following additional proofs, joined to those already given in my former reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one of his letters, says, '*I am sorry to find that Romana is a shuffler.*' And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about the same period to general Doyle to urge the advance of Palafox and Infantado, says, '*I know that Romana has not supported the British as he ought to have done, and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported it with a tolerably efficient force.*'

In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, expressing lord Wellington's opinions, after saying that Wellington declared he had never met with a really able man in Spain, while in Portugal he had found several, proceeds thus:—

'It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the present state of Spain, that *the Spaniards are incapable of forming either a good government or a good army.*' . . . 'With respect to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant materials for good common soldiers. But where is one general of even moderate skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and Sarsfield, but assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst Castaños, Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabel, Santocildes, Abadia, Duque del Parque, La Peña, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O'Donnel.' . . . '*You cannot make good officers in Spain.*'

If to this the reader will add what I have set forth in my History about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde, Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and that he is not yet satisfied, I can still administer to his craving. In 1809 Wellington speaks with dread of '*Romana's cormorants flying into Portugal,*' and says, '*that foolish fellow the Duque del Parque has been endeavouring to get his corps destroyed on the frontier.*' Again:—

'The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may be the consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to advance when their front is clear of an enemy.'

'There never was anything like the *madness, the imprudence, and the presumption* of the *Spanish officers* in the way they risk their corps, knowing that the *national vanity* will prevent them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only chance of safety for the Duque del Parque's corps; but instead of making it he calls upon you for cavalry.' . . . 'I have ordered magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego to assist in providing *these vagabonds* if they should retire into Portugal, which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation.'

Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation made

by the Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of Valencia, he says, 'the misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to *Blake's ignorance of his profession* and to *Mahy's cowardice and treachery.*'

Now if any passage in my History can be pointed out more disparaging to the Spaniards than the expressions of lord Wellington and the other persons quoted above, I am content to be charged with an 'unnatural bias' against that people. But if this cannot be done, it is clear that the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the French, but his own natural bias to calumny. He has indeed a wonderful aversion to truth, for close under his eye, in my volume which he was then reviewing, the following passage occurs, and there are many of a like tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards all of which he leaves unnoticed.

'Under such a system it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not active supporters of their country's cause; but *with a wonderful constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all their actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity and merits respect*, though the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the effect nugatory.'—*History.*

I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice, and the interests of society require that I should thoroughly expose this reviewer. Let the reader therefore mark his reasoning upon Soult's government of Oporto and the intrigue of the *Anti-Braganza* party. Let him however look first at the whole statement of these matters in *my book*, and not trust the garbled extracts made by the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet's expedition to Tuy is by this shameless writer, at one time made to appear as if it took place *after* Soult had received the deputations and addresses calling for a change of dynasty; and this to show that no beneficial effect had been produced in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at another time this same expedition of Heudelet is used as happening *before* the arrival of the addresses and deputations, with a view to show that Soult had laboured to procure those addresses, a fact which, far from denying, I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression in my History, namely, that Soult was *unprepared* for one effect of his own vigorous conduct, has been perverted, for the purpose



of deceit; and all this with a spirit at once so malignant and stupid, that the reviewer is unable to see that the garbled extracts he gives from Heudelet's and Riccard's registers, not only do not contradict but absolutely confirm the essential point of my statement.

Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission of the Portuguese to the French arms because it was the object and bent of his invasion to make them so submit. But there is a great difference between that submission of which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the proposal coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a *new and independent dynasty*; a still greater difference between that and *offering the crown to Soult himself*; and it was this last which the word *unprepared* referred to in my History. So far from thinking or saying that Soult was unprepared for the deputations and addresses, I have expressly said, that he '*encouraged the design*,' that he '*acted with great dexterity*,' and I called the whole affair an '*intrigue*.' But if I had said that he was unprepared for the whole affair it would have been correct in one sense. He was unprepared to accede to the extent of the *Anti-Braganza* party's views. He had only received authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not to establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French prince upon the throne; still less to accept that throne for himself. These were dangerous matters to meddle with under such a monarch as Napoleon; but the weakness of Soult's military position made it absolutely necessary to catch at every aid, and it would have been a proof that the duke of Dalmatia was only a common man and unsuited for the great affairs confided to his charge if he had rejected such a powerful auxiliary to his military operations: wisely, therefore, and even magnanimously did he encourage the *Anti-Braganza* party, drawing all the military benefit possible from it, and trusting to Napoleon's sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification. Nor was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit that all this must appear very strange to Quarterly reviewers and parasites, whose knowledge of the human mind is confined to an accurate measure of the sentiments of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves incapable of true greatness and therefore always ready to ridicule it.

The facts stand thus. Heudelet's expedition through the *Entre Minho e Douro* took place between the 5th of April and the 27th of that month, and the country people being then in a state of exasperation opposed him vehemently; in my History the combats he sustained are mentioned, and it is said that



previous to the *Anti-Braganza* intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had been carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the malcontents was not completed until the end of April, and the good effect of it on the military operations was not apparent until May, consequently could not have been felt by Heudelet in the beginning of April. In my History the difference of time in these two affairs is expressly marked, inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue I have anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if Mr. Lockhart has paid for this part of the review as criticism Mr. Murray should disallow the unfair charge in his accounts.

I shall now give two extracts from Soult's general report, before quoted, in confirmation of my statements:—

‘ Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favour the party of the malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself strong enough in the province of *Entre Minho e Douro*, to propose to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the deposition of the house of Braganza, and that the emperor of the French should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in Portugal. In a political view, marshal Soult could not without express authority, permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask for such authority, having lost his own communication with France and being without news of the operations of any of the other corps which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of view the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there saw the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him.’

‘ These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity was re-established, and in the province of *Entre Minho e Douro* the inhabitants returned to their labours, supplied the markets, and familiarized themselves with the idea of an approaching change.’ . . . ‘ Marshal Soult received numerous deputations of the clergy to thank him for his attentions, and for the order which he had restored. Before this no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and killed. The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful to God to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated the most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell into their hands.’

It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to continue thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, neglecting his farrago about the principles of war, and his application of them to show the error of my statement, viz.,

*'that in a strategic point of view it was better to attack Victor, but especial reasons led sir Arthur to fall upon Soult,'* I proceed to lay sir Arthur's own statement before the reader, and leave him to compare it with mine.

*Lisbon, April 24, 1809.*

'I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, which can give me any security for the safety of this place during my absence to the northward.'

'I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good to the general cause by combining with general Cuesta in an operation against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the last if Soult was not in possession of a part of this country very fertile in resources, and of the town of Oporto, and if to concert the operations with Cuesta would not take time which might be profitably employed in operations against Soult. I think it probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego. If he does I shall attack him. *If he should retire, I am convinced that it would be most advantageous for the common cause that we should remain upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with Cuesta against Victor.*

'An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages—if successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the king's ministers to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation impossible; and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort made by a combined and concentrated force.'

The assertion of the reviewer that I have overrated Cuesta's force, inasmuch as it was only 19,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, instead of 30,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, as I have stated it to be, and that consequently the greatest numbers could not be brought to bear on Victor, is one of those curious examples of elaborate misrepresentation in which this writer abounds. For first, admitting that Cuesta had only 20,000 men, sir Arthur would have brought 24,000 to aid him, and Victor had only 30,000. The allies would then have had double the number opposed to Soult. But the pith of the misrepresentation lies in this, that the reviewer has taken Cuesta's account of his actual force on the 23rd of April, and suppresses the facts, that reinforcements were continually pouring in to him at that time, and that he actually did advance against Victor with rather greater numbers than those stated by me.

## PROOFS.

*Sir Arthur to lord Castlereagh, April 24, 1809.*

‘Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry.’

*To general Mackenzie, May 1, 1809.*

‘They (Victor’s troops) have in their front a Spanish army with general Cuesta at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of *twenty thousand men.*’ . . . ‘They will be attacked by Cuesta, who is *receiving reinforcements.*’

*Mr. Frere to sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, May 4.*

‘We have here 3000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of Estremadura (under Cuesta). Cuesta has with him 4000 cavalry.’

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Castlereagh, June 17, 1809.*

‘We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted of about 27,000, of which 7000 were cavalry; and the combined British and Portuguese force which I was in hopes I should have been enabled to march upon this expedition would have amounted to about 24,000 men.’

*To lord Wellesley, August 8, 1809.*

‘The army of Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus *thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand strong*, does not now consist of 30,000.’

*Extract from a Memoir by sir A. Wellesley, 1809.*

‘The Spanish army under general Cuesta had been *reinforced with cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary celerity after the action of Medellin.*’

All the reviewer’s remarks about Cuesta’s numbers, and about the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction of misrepresentations and objections before exposed and refuted by me in my controversy with marshal Beresford; but as it is now attempted to support them by garbled extracts from better authorities, I will again and completely expose and crush them. This will however be more conveniently done farther on. Meanwhile, I repeat, that the Tagus is only unfordable during the winter, and not then if there are a few days dry weather; that six months of the year it is always fordable in many places, and as low down as Salvaterra near Lisbon; finally, that my expression, ‘*a river fordable at almost every season,*’ is strictly correct, and is indeed not mine but lord Wellington’s expression. To proceed with the rest;—

Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the reviewer charges me with having *exaggerated the importance of D'Argentou's conspiracy for the sole purpose of excusing Soult's remissness in guarding the Douro*. But my account of that conspiracy was compiled from the duke of Wellington's letters—some public, some private addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy written expressly for my guidance by major-general sir James Douglas, who was the officer employed to meet and conduct D'Argentou to and from the English army;—from Soult's own official report; from Le Noble's history; and from secret information which I received from a French officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not of that particular conspiracy—but of a general one of which the one at Oporto was but a branch.

Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying, that Soult thought Hill's division had been disembarked from the ocean; that he expected the vessels would come to the mouth of the Douro; and that considering that river secure above the town his personal attention was directed to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer this.

*Extract from Soult's General Report.*

'In the night of the 9th and 10th the enemy made a *considerable disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar*. The 10th, at daybreak, they attacked the right flank of general Franceschi, while the *column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra* attacked him in front.'

*Extract from Le Noble.*

'The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high, and from thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from the convent to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the left bank of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning, and the position of his troops, rendered him confident that no passage would take place above Oporto; *he believed that the enemy, master of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the mouth of the Douro.*'

Such is the value of this carping disingenuous critic's observations on this point; and I shall now demolish his other misstatements about the passage of the Douro.

1st. The poor barber's share in the transaction is quite true; my authority is major-general sir John Waters who was the companion of the barber in the daring exploit of bringing over the boats. And if Waters had recollected his name, it is not the despicable aristocratic sneer of the reviewer about the '*Plebeian*' that would have prevented me from



giving it. 2nd. *The Barca de Avintas*, where sir John Murray crossed, has already been shown by a reference to the maps and to lord Wellington's despatch, to be not nine miles from the Serra Convent as the reviewer says, but three miles as I have stated: moreover, two Portuguese leagues would not make nine English miles. But to quit these minor points, the reviewer asks, '*Why colonel Napier departed from the account of the events given in the despatch of sir Arthur Wellesley?*' This is the only decent passage in the whole review, and it shall have a satisfactory answer.

Public despatches, written in the hurry of the moment, immediately after the events and before accurate information can be obtained, are very subject to errors of detail, and are certainly not what a judicious historian would rely upon for details without endeavouring to obtain other information. In this case I discovered several discrepancies between the despatch and the accounts of eye-witnesses and actors written long afterwards and deliberately. I knew also, that the passage of the Douro, though apparently a very rash action and little considered in England, was a very remarkable exploit, prudent skilful and daring. Anxious to know the true secret of the success, I wrote to the duke of Wellington, putting a variety of questions relative to the whole expeditions. In return I received from him distinct answers, with a small diagram of the seminary and ground about it to render the explanation clear. Being thus put in possession of all the leading points relative to the passage of the Douro by the commanders on each side, for I had before got Soult's, I turned to the written and printed statements of several officers engaged in the action for those details which the generals had not touched upon.

Now the principal objections of the reviewer to my statement are,—1st. That I have given too many troops to sir John Murray. 2nd. That I have unjustly accused him of want of military hardihood. 3rd. That I have erroneously described the cause of the loss sustained by the fourteenth dragoons in retiring from their charge. In reply I quote my authorities; and first, as to the numbers with Murray.

*Extract from lord Wellington's answers to colonel Napier's questions.*

'*The right of the troops which passed over, to the seminary which in fact made an admirable tête de pont, was protected by the passage of the Douro higher up by lieutenant-general sir John Murray and the king's German legion, supported by other troops.*'

Armed with this authority, I did set aside the despatch, because, though it said that Murray was *sent* with a battalion and a squadron, it *did not say* that he was not followed by others. And in lord Londonderry's narrative I found the following passage:—

‘General Murray, too, who had been detached with *his division* to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession of as many boats as enabled him to pass over with *two battalions of Germans and two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons.*’

And his lordship, further on, says, that he himself charged several times and with advantage at the head of those squadrons. His expression is ‘*the dragoons from Murray's corps.*’

With respect to the loss of the dragoons sustained by having to fight their way back again, I find the following account in the narrative of sir James Douglas, written, as I have before said, expressly for my guidance:—

‘Young soldiers like young greyhounds run headlong on their prey; while experience makes old dogs of all sorts run cunning. Here *two squadrons* actually rode over the *whole rear French guard*, which laid down upon the road; and was, to use their own terms, *passé sur le ventre*: but no support to the dragoons being at hand no great execution was done; and the *two squadrons themselves suffered severely in getting back again through the infantry.*’

Thus, even in this small matter, the reviewer is not right. And now with the above facts fixed I shall proceed to rebut the charge of having calumniated sir John Murray.

First, the reviewer's assertion, that Murray's troops were never within several miles of the seminary, and that they would have been crushed by Soult if they had attacked the enemy, is evidently false from the following facts. Lord Wellington expressly says, in his answer to my questions quoted before,—That the *right* of the troops in the seminary *was protected* by the troops under Murray; which could not be if the latter were several miles off. Again, if the dragoons of Murray's corps could charge repeatedly with advantage, the infantry and guns of that corps might have followed up the attack without danger upon a confused, flying, panic-stricken body of men who had been surprised and were at the same time taken both in flank and rear. But if Murray dared not with any prudence even approach the enemy,—if it were absolutely necessary for him to retire as he did,—what brought him there at all? Is the duke of Wellington a

general to throw his troops wantonly into such a situation—and on ground which his elevated post at the Serra Convent enabled him to command perfectly, and where the men and movements of both sides were as much beneath his eye as the men and movements on a chess-board? Bah!

But the fact is that a part of the Germans under Murray, ay!—a very small part! did actually engage the enemy with success. Major Beamish, in his *History of the German Legion*, on the authority of one of the German officers' journals, writes thus:—

'The skirmishers of the first line under lieutenant Von Hölle, and two companies of the same regiment under ensign Hodenberg, were alone brought into fire. The skirmishers made several prisoners, and one rifleman (Henry Hauer) was lucky enough to capture a French lieutenant-colonel. Seven of the legion were wounded.'

Murray wanted hardihood. And it is no answer to say lord Wellington did not take notice of his conduct. A commander-in-chief is guided by many circumstances distinct from the mere military facts, and it might be, that on this occasion he did not choose to judge rashly or harshly a man who had other good qualities, for an error into which perhaps a very bold and able man might have fallen by accident. And neither would I have thus judged sir John Murray from this fact alone, although the whole army were disgusted at the time by his want of daring and openly expressed an unfavourable opinion of his military vigour. But when I find that the same want of hardihood was again apparent in him at Castalla, as I have already shown in my *History*, and still more glaringly displayed by him at Tarragona, as shall be shown hereafter, the matter became quite different, and the duty of the historian is to speak the truth even of a general, strange as that may and I have no doubt does appear to this reviewer.

Having disposed of this matter, I shall now set down some passages evincing the babbling shallowness and self-conceit of the critic, and beneath them my authorities, whereby it will appear that the big book containing all sir George does not know is increasing in bulk:—

'Sir Arthur Wellesley was detained at Oporto neither by the instructions of the English cabinet nor by his own want of generalship, *but simply by the want of provisions.*'—*Review.*

Indeed! Reader, mark the following question to, and answer from the duke of Wellington.

*Question to the duke of Wellington by colonel Napier.*

Why did the duke halt the next day after the passage of the Douro?

*Answer.*—‘The halt was made next day,—first, because the whole army had not crossed the Douro and none of its supplies and baggage had crossed. Secondly, on account of the great exertion and fatigue of the preceding days particularly the last. Thirdly, because we had no account of lord Beresford being in possession of Amarante, or even across the Douro; we having, in fact, out-marched everything. Fourthly, the horses and animals required a day’s rest as well as the men.’

And, in the answer to another question, the following observation occurs:—‘The relative numbers and the nature of the troops must be considered in all these things; *and this fact moreover, that excepting to attain a very great object we could not risk the loss of a corps.*’

I pass over the reviewer’s comments upon my description of Soult’s retreat, because a simple reference to my work will at once show their folly and falseness; but I beg to inform this acute and profound historical critic that the first field-marshal captured by an English general was marshal Tallard, and that the English general who captured him was called John, duke of Marlborough. And, with respect to his sneers about the *little river of Ruivaens*,’ ‘*Soult’s theatrical speech*,’ ‘*the use of the twenty-five horsemen*,’ ‘*the non-repairs of the Ponte Nova*.’ and the ‘*Romance composed by colonel Napier and Le Noble*,’ I shall, in answer, only offer the following authorities, none of which, the reader will observe, are taken from *Le Noble*.

*Extract from Soult’s General Report.*

‘The 15th, in the morning, the enemy appeared one league from Braga; our column was entangled in the defile; the rain came down in torrents; and the wind was frightful. On reaching Salamonde we learned that *the bridge of Ruivaens, over the little river (ruisseau) of that name was cut, and the passage guarded by 1200 men with cannon.* It was known also that the *Ponte Nova on the route of Montelegre*, which they had begun to destroy, was feebly guarded; and the marshal gave to major Dulong the command of 100 brave men, of his own choice, to carry it. The valiant Dulong under cover of the night reached the bridge, passed it notwithstanding the cuts in it, surprised the guard, and put to the sword those who could not escape. *In four hours the bridge was repaired*; general Loison passed it and marched upon the bridge of Misserella, near Villa da Ponte, where 800 Portuguese well retrenched defended the passage. *A battalion and some brave men, again led by the*



*intrepid Dulong, forced the abbatis entered the entrenchments and seized the bridge.'*

*Extract from the 'Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.'*

'The marshal held a council, at the end of which he called major Dulong. It was nine o'clock in the evening. 'I have selected you from the army, he said to that brave officer, to seize the bridge of Ponte Nova which the enemy are now cutting: you must endeavour to surprise them. The time is favourable. Attack vigorously with the bayonet, you will succeed or you will die. I want no news save that of your success, send me no other report, your silence will be sufficient in a contrary case. Take a hundred men at your choice; they will be sufficient; add *twenty-five dragoons, and kill their horses to make a rampart, if it be necessary, on the middle of the bridge to sustain yourself and remain master of the passage.*'

'The major departed with determined soldiers and a Portuguese guide who was tied with the leather slings of the muskets. Arrived within pistol-shot of the bridge he saw the enemy *cutting the last beam.* It was then one o'clock, the rain fell heavily and the enemy's labourers being fatigued thought they might take some repose before they finished their work. The torrents descending from the mountains and the cavado itself made such a noise that the march of the French was not heard, the sentinel at the bridge was killed without giving any alarm, and *Dulong with twenty-five grenadiers passed crawling on the beam, one of them fell into the cavado but happily is fall produced no effect.* The enemy's advanced post of twenty-four men was destroyed, &c. &c. The marshal, informed of this happy event, came up in haste with the first troops he could find to *defend the bridge and accelerate the passage of the army; but the repairing was neither sufficiently prompt or solid to prevent many brave soldiers perishing.* The marshal embraced major Dulong, saying to him, 'I thank you in the name of France brave major; you have saved the army.'

Then follows a detailed account of the Misserella bridge, or Saltador, and its abbatis and other obstacles; of Dulong's attack; of his being twice repulsed; and of his winning that bridge, the Leaper as it was called, at the third assault, falling dreadfully wounded at the moment of victory; finally, of the care and devotion with which his soldiers carried him on their shoulders during the rest of the retreat. And the reader will observe that this account is not a mere description in the body of that work, but a separate paper in the Appendix, written by some officer evidently well acquainted with all the facts, perhaps Dulong himself, and for the express purpose of correcting the errors of detail in the body of the work. Theatrical to the critic, and even ridiculous it may likely enough appear; the noble courage and self-devotion of such

a soldier as Dulong is a subject which no person will ever expect a *Quarterly* reviewer to understand.

In the foregoing comments I have followed the stream of my own thoughts, rather than the order of the reviewer's criticisms; I must therefore retrace my steps to notice some points which have been passed over. His observations about Zaragoza have been already disposed of in my published reply to his first articles, but his comments upon Catalonian affairs shall now be noticed.

The assertion that lord Collingwood was incapable of judging of the efforts of the Catalans, although he was in daily intercourse with their chiefs, co-operating with their armies and supplying them with arms and stores, *because he was a seaman*, is certainly ingenious. It has just so much of pertness in it as an Admiralty clerk of the Melville school might be supposed to acquire by a long habit of official insolence to naval officers, whose want of parliamentary interest exposed them to the mortification of having intercourse with him. And it has just so much of cunning wisdom as to place it upon a par with that which dictated the inquiry which we have heard was sent out to sir John Warren during the late American war, namely, 'whether *light—very light* frigates, could not sail up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario?'—and with that surprising providence, which did send out birch-brooms and tanks to hold *fresh water* for the use of the ships on the said Lake of Ontario! But quitting these matters, the reviewer insinuates what is absolutely untrue, namely, that I have only quoted lord Collingwood as authority for my statements about Catalonia. The readers of my work know that I have adduced in testimony the Spanish generals themselves, namely, Contreras, Lacy, and Rovira; the testimony of sir Edward Codrington, of sir Edward Pellew, of colonel Doyle, and of other Englishmen. That I have referred to St. Cyr, Suchet, Lafaille, and other French writers; that I have quoted Vacani and Cabane's Histories, the first an Italian serving with the French army in Catalonia, the last a Spaniard and chief of the staff to the Catalan army: and now, to complete the reviewer's discomfiture, I will add the duke of Wellington, who is a landsman and therefore according to this reviewer's doctrine, entitled to judge:—

*Letter to lord Liverpool, 19th Dec. 1809.*

'In Catalonia the resistance is more general and regular; but still the people are of a description with which your armies could not co-operate with any prospect of success, or even of safety. You see what Burghersh says of the somatenes; *and it is*

*notorious that the Catalans have at all times been the most irregular, and the least to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards.'*

So much for light frigates, birch-brooms, fresh-water tanks, and Collingwood's incapacity to judge of the Catalans, *because he was a seaman*; and as for Reding's complaints of the Spaniards when dying, they must go to sir George's big book with this marginal note, that St. Cyr is not the authority. But for the grand flourish, the threat to prove at another time, '*from Wellington's despatches*,' that the Spaniards gave excellent intelligence and made *no false reports*, let the reader take the following testimony in anticipation:—

*Extracts from lord Wellington's Correspondence, 1809.*

'At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense I receive occasionally from —; *as the Spaniards have defeated all my attempts to obtain any by stopping those whom I sent out to make inquiries.*'

'I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed 8000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted with the exact extent of it, *because, the Duque del Albuquerque, who is appointed to command it, is interested in making known the truth*; but they have *lied* about the cavalry ordered to the Duque del Parque.'

'It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at Seville *with their own false intelligence.*'

'It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads, or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the decisions to be formed respecting the march of troops.'

1810. 'We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that we know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably after it is made.'

'I have had accounts from the marquis de la Romana: he tells me that the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 23rd, *which cannot be true.*'

'I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at Madrid.'

'There is so far a foundation for the report of O'Donnel's action, as that it appears that Suchet's advanced guard was at Lerida on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, *according to my experience of Spanish reports*, whether O'Donnel was beaten or gained a victory.'

'I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the marquis de la Romana, *and all the Spanish officers.* It is obvious there is nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations. This is evident both from the letters of the marquis himself, and from the *false reports* made to lieutenant Heathcote of the firing heard from Badajos at Albuquerque.'

*Wellington to lord Liverpool, 1810. Cartago.*

'The circumstances which I have related above will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with a corps so ill-organized, *in possession of so little intelligence*, and upon whose actions no reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that *the first intelligence which general Mendizabal received of the assembling of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence.*'

*Wellington to sir H. Wellesley, 1810.*

'Mendizabel, &c. &c., have sent us so many *false reports* that I cannot make out what the French are doing.'

'This is a part of the system on which *all the Spanish authorities have been acting*, to induce us to take a part in the desultory operations which they are carrying on. *False reports and deceptions of every description are tried*, and then popular insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct.'

'The Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops the blow has been struck.'

'It is strange that the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have no intelligence of the enemy's movements near his garrison, of which we have received so many accounts.'

'We hear also a great deal of Blake's army in the Alpujarras, and of a corps from Valencia operating upon the enemy's communications with Madrid; but I conclude that there is as little foundation for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection of Ronda.'

'I enclose a letter to general Carrera, in which I have requested him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe, however, that very little reliance can be placed on the report made to you *by any Spanish general at the head of a body of troops*. They generally exaggerate on one side or the other; and *make no scruple of communicating supposed intelligence, in order to induce those to whom they communicate it to adopt a certain line of conduct.*'

The reader must be now somewhat tired of quotations; let us therefore turn for relaxation to the reviewer's observations about light troops,—of which he seems indeed to know as much as the wise gentleman of the Admiralty did about the facility of sailing up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; but though that wise gentleman did not know much about sailing-craft, the reviewer knows something of another kind of craft—namely misrepresentation. Thus he quotes a passage from captain Kincaid's amusing and clever work, as if it told in his favour, whereas it in no manner supports his foolish insinuation—namely, that the forty-third and fifty-second regiments



of the light division were not light troops, never acted as such, and never skirmished! Were he to say as much to the lowest bugler of these corps, he would give him the fittest answer for his folly—that is to say, laugh in his face.

‘There are but two kinds of soldiers in the world,’ said Napoleon, ‘the good and the bad.’

Now, the light division were not only good but, I will say it fearlessly, the best soldiers in the world. The three British regiments composing it had been formed by sir John Moore precisely upon the same system. There was no difference save in the colour of the riflemen’s jackets and the weapons which they carried. Captain Kincaid’s observation, quoted by the reviewer, merely says, what is quite true, that the riflemen fought in skirmishing order more frequently than the forty-third and fifty-second did. Certainly they did, and for this very sufficient reason—their arms, the rifle and sword, did not suit any other formation; it is a defect in the weapon, which is inferior to the musket and bayonet, fitted alike for close or open order. Napoleon knew this so well that he had no riflemen in his army, strange as it may appear to those persons who have read so much about French riflemen. The riflemen of the light division could form line, columns, and squares—could move as a heavy body—could do, and did do everything that the best soldiers in the world ought to do; and in like manner the fifty-second and forty-third regiments skirmished and performed all the duties of light troops with the same facility as the riflemen; but the difference of the weapon made it advisable to use the latter nearly always in open order: I do not indeed remember ever to have seen them act against the enemy either in line or square. Captain Kincaid is too sensible and too good a soldier, and far too honest a man, to serve the purpose of this snarling blockhead, who dogmatizes in defiance of facts and with a plenitude of pompous absurdity that would rise the bile of an alderman. Thus, after quoting from my work the numbers of the French army, he thus proceeds:—

‘Notwithstanding that this enormous force was *pressing* upon the *now unaided* Spanish people with *all its weight*, and acting against them with its *utmost energy*, it proved wholly unable to put down resistance.’—*Review*, page 497.

Now this relates to the period following sir John Moore’s death, which was on the 16th of January. That general’s fine movement upon Sahagun, and his subsequent retreat, had drawn the great bulk of the French forces towards Galicia.

and had paralysed many corps. The war with Austria had drawn Napoleon himself and the imperial guards away from the Peninsula. Joseph was establishing his court at Madrid; Victor remained very inactive in Estremadura; Soult marched into Portugal;—in fine, this was precisely the period of the whole war in which the French army were most inert. Napoleon has fixed upon the four months of February, March, April, and May, 1809, as the period in which the king let the Peninsula slip from his feeble hands.

Let us see then what the Spaniards did during that time. And first it is false to say that they were unaided. They were aided against Victor by the vicinity of sir John Cradock's troops; they were aided on the Gallician coast by an English squadron; they were aided on the Beira frontier, against Lapisse, by the Portuguese troops under sir Robert Wilson; they were aided on the Catalonian coast by lord Collingwood's fleet; they were aided at Cadiz by the presence of general M'Kenzie's troops, sent from Lisbon; and they were aided everywhere by enormous supplies of money arms and ammunition sent from England. Finally, they were aided, and most powerfully so, by sir John Moore's generalship, which had enabled them to rally and keep several considerable armies on foot in the southern parts of the country. What did these armies—these invincible Spaniards—do? They lost Zaragoza, Monson, and Jaca, in the east; the fortresses of Ferrol and Coruña, and their fleet, in the north; they lost Estremadura, La Mancha, Aragon, the Asturias, and Galicia; they lost the battles of Ucles and of Valls; the battle of Monterrey, that of Ciudad Real, and the battle of Medellin. They won nothing! they did not save themselves, it was the *British army and the indolence and errors of the French that saved them.*

*Extract from Napoleon's Memoirs.*

'After the embarkation of the English army, the king of Spain did nothing; *he lost four months*; he ought to have marched upon Cadiz, upon Valencia, upon Lisbon; political means would have done the rest.'

*Extracts from lord Wellington's Correspondence. 1809.*

'It is obvious that the longer and the more intimately we become acquainted with the affairs of Spain the less prospect do they hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent of the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an enemy, and the enmity of the people towards the French may spin out the war into length, and at last the French may find it impossible to establish a government in the country; but there is no prospect of a glorious termination to the contest.'

‘After the perusal of these details, and of Soult’s letters, can any one doubt that the evacuation of Galicia was occasioned by the operations of the British troops in Portugal?’

‘The fact is, that the British army *has saved Spain and Portugal* during this year.’

The reviewer is not only a great critic, he is a great general also. He has discovered that there are no positions in the mountains of Portugal; nay, he will scarcely allow that there are mountains at all; and he insists that they offer no defence against an invader, but that the rivers do—that the Douro defends the *eastern* frontier of Beira, and that the frontier of Portugal generally is very compact and strong for defence, and well suited for a weak army to fight superior numbers;—that the weak army cannot be turned and cut off from Lisbon, and the strong army must invade in mass and by one line.

Now first, it so happened, unluckily for this lucid military notion of Portugal, that in Massena’s invasion lord Wellington stopped to fight on the mountain of Busaco, and stopped Massena altogether at the mountains of Alhandra, Aruda, Sobral, and Torres Vedras—in other words at the lines, and that he did not once stop him or attempt to stop him by defending a river. That Massena, in his retreat, stopped lord Wellington on the mountain of Santarem, attempted to stop him on the mountains of Casal Nova, Moita, and Guarda, but never attempted to stop him by defending a river, save at Sabugal, and then he was instantly beaten. Oh, certainly, ’tis a most noble general, and a very acute critic! Nevertheless, I must support my own opinions about the frontier of Portugal, the non-necessity of invading this country in one mass, and the unfordable nature of the Tagus, by the testimony of two generals as distinguished as honest Iago.

*Extract of a letter from sir John Moore.*

‘I am not prepared at this moment to answer minutely your lordship’s question respecting the defence of Portugal; but I can say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated.’

*Extracts from lord Wellington’s Correspondence.*

‘In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably make his attack by *two distinct lines*, the one north the other south of the Tagus; and the system of defence must be founded upon this general basis. In the summer season, however, the *Tagus being fordable*, &c. &c., care must be taken that the enemy does not by his attack directed from the south of the

Tagus and by the passage of that river, *cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in operations to the north of the Tagus.*'

'The line of frontier to Portugal is so long in proportion to the extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is so open in many parts, that it would be *impossible for an army acting upon the defensive to carry on its operations upon the frontier without being cut off from the capital.*'

'In the summer it is probable as I have before stated that the enemy will make his attacks in two principal corps, and that he will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco and Abrantes. His object will be by means of his corps, *south of the Tagus, to turn the positions which might be taken in his front on the north of that river; to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed to him; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the same time. This can be avoided only by the retreat of the right centre and left of the allies, and their junction at a point at which from the state of the river they cannot be turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy's left.* The first point of defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases to be fordable, is the river Castanheira close to the lines.'

In the above extracts, the fordable nature of the Tagus has been pretty clearly shown, but I will continue my proofs upon that fact to satiety.

*Lord Wellington to Charles Stuart, Esq.*

'The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the defence of Lisbon and for our own embarkation necessarily throws us back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which place, and I believe lower, *the Tagus is fordable during the summer;* and we should be liable to be turned or cut off from Lisbon and the Tagus if we were to take our line of defence higher upon the river.'

*Lord Wellington to general Hill, August.*

'I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might move across the fords of the Tagus at Villa Velha and thus turn your right.'

*Lord Wellington to general Hill, October.*

'If there are no boats, send them (the sick and encumbrances) across the Tagus by the ford (at Santarem).'

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to general Hill.*

'I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have with some of the fords of the Tagus marked upon it, but I believe *the whole river from Barquina to Santarem is fordable.*'

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to marshal Beresford.*

'I enclose a letter which colonel Fletcher has given me, *which*



*affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus. I think that if captain Chapman's facts are true his arguments are unanswerable, and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy ordnance should be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus.'*

*Sir Arthur Wellesley to admiral Berkeley.*

*'But if the invasion should be made in summer, when the Tagus is fordable in many places.' . . . 'In the event of the attack being made between the months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable, at least as low down as Salvaterra (near the lines).'*

*Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April.*

*'There is a ferry at Salvaterra, near Alcantara, and another up the left bank of the Tagus in the Alemtejo, where there is also a ford and the river may be easily passed.'*

*Extract from a Memoir by sir B. D'Urban, quarter-master-general to Beresford's army:—'The Tagus, between Golegao and Rio Moinhos was known to offer several fords after a few days' dry weather.'\**

Thus we see that, in nearly every month in the year, this unfordable Tagus of the reviewer is fordable in many places, and that in fact it is no barrier except in very heavy rains. But to render this still clearer I will here give one more and conclusive proof. In an elaborate manuscript memoir upon the defence of Portugal, drawn up by the celebrated general Dumourier for the duke of Wellington, that officer argues like this reviewer, that the Tagus is unfordable and a strong barrier. But a marginal note in Wellington's handwriting runs thus:—*'He (Dumourier) does not seem to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season.'*

What can I say more? Nothing upon this head, but much upon others. I can call upon the reader to trace the deceitful mode in which the reviewer perverts or falsifies my expressions throughout. How he represents the Spaniards at one moment so formidable as to resist successfully the utmost efforts of more than 300,000 soldiers, the next breath calls them a poor unarmed horde of peasants incapable of making any resistance at all. How he quotes me as stating that the ministers had unbounded confidence in the success of the struggle in Spain; whereas my words are, that the ministers *professed* unbounded confidence. How he represents me as saying, the *Cabinet* were too much dazzled to analyse the real causes of the

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\* This was in February.

Spanish Revolution; whereas it was the *nation* not the *Cabinet* of which I spoke. And this could not be mistaken, because I had described the ministers as only anxious to pursue a war-like system necessary to their own existence, and that they were actuated by a personal hatred of Napoleon. Again, how he misrepresents me as wishing the British to *seize* Cadiz, and speaks of a *mob* in that city, when I have spoken only of the *people* (oh, true Tory!); and never proposed to seize Cadiz at all, and have also given the unexceptionable authority of Mr. Stuart, general M'Kenzie, and sir George Smith, for my statement. And here I will notice a fine specimen of this reviewer's mode of getting up a case. Having undertaken to prove that every river in Portugal is a barrier, except the Zezere which I had fixed upon as being an important line, he gives an extract of a letter from lord Wellington to a general *Smith*, to the effect that, as the Zezere might be *turned at that season* in so many ways, he did not wish to construct works to defend it then. Now, first, it is necessary to inform the reader that there is no letter to general Smith. The letter in question was to general Leith, and the *mistake* was not without its object, namely, to prevent any curious person from discovering that the very next sentence is as follows:—‘If, however, this work can be performed, either by the peasantry or by the troops, without any great inconvenience, *the line of the Zezere may, hereafter, become of very great importance.*’

All this is very pitiful, and looks like extreme soreness in the reviewer; but the effrontery with which he perverts my statements about the Austrian war surpasses all his other efforts in that line, and deserves a more elaborate exposure.

In my History it is stated, that some obscure intrigues of the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies on the continent, emanating from patrician sources, excited the sympathy, and nourished certain *distempered feelings* in the English ministers, *which feeling* made them see only weakness and disaffection in France. This I stated, because I knew that those intrigues were, in fact, a conspiracy concocted with Talleyrand's connivance, for the dethronement of Napoleon; and the English ministers neglected Spain and every other part of their foreign affairs for the moment, so intent were they upon this foolish scheme and so sanguine of success. These facts are not known to many, but they are true.

In the same paragraph of my History it is said, *the warlike preparations of Austria*, and the reputation of the archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon's,

*had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions*; meaning, as would be evident to any persons not wilfully blind, had awakened that dormant spirit in the English ministers.

Now reader mark the candour and simplicity of the reviewer. He says that I condemned these ministers, 'for nourishing their distempered feelings by combining the efforts of a German monarch in favour of national independence.' As if it were the *Austrian war*, and not the *obscure intrigues for dethroning Napoleon* that the expression of *distempered feelings* applied to. As if the awakening the *dormant spirit of coalitions*, instead of being a reference to the sentiments of the English ministers, meant the exciting the Austrians and other nations to war, and the forming of a vast plan of action by those ministers! And for fear any mistake on that head should arise, it is so asserted in another part of the review in the following terms:—

'To have '*awakened the dormant spirit*' of coalitions, is another of the crimes which the British ministers are charged with, as if it would have been a proof of wisdom to have abstained from forming a combination of those states of Europe which still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist a conqueror,' &c. &c.—*Review*.

The *Quarterly's* attention to Spanish affairs seems to have rendered it very intimate with the works of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto. But since it has thus claimed the Austrian war as the work of its former patrons, the ministers of 1809, I will throw some new light upon the history of that period, which, though they should prove little satisfactory to the *Quarterly*, may, as the details are really curious, in some measure repay the reader for his patience in wading through the tedious exposition of this silly and unscrupulous writer's misrepresentations.

After the conference of Erfurth, the Austrian count Stadion, a man of ability and energy, either believing or affecting to believe, that Napoleon was determined to destroy Austria and only waited until Spain was conquered, resolved to employ the whole force of the German empire against the French monarch in a war of destruction for one or other of the contending states. With this view his first efforts were directed to change the opinions of the archduke Charles and those immediately about him who were averse to a war; and though he was long and vigorously resisted by general Grün, an able man and the archduke's confidant, he finally succeeded. Some time before this France had insisted upon a reduction of the Austrian forces, and being asked if she would do the same for the sake of peace, replied that she would

maintain no more troops in Germany than should be found necessary; but the army of the confederation must be kept up as a constitutional force, and it was impossible during the war with England to reduce the French troops in other quarters. To this succeeded an attempt at a triple treaty, by which the territories of Austria, Russia, and France, were to be mutually guaranteed. Champagne and Romanzow suggested this plan, but the Austrian minister did not conceive Russia strong enough to guarantee Austria against France. Stadion's project was more agreeable, and a note of a declaration of war was sent to Metternich, then at Paris, to deliver to the French government. The archduke Charles set off for the army, and was followed by the emperor.

When the war was thus resolved upon, it remained to settle whether it should be carried on for the sole benefit of Austria, or in such a manner as to interest other nations. Contrary to her usual policy Austria decided for the latter, and contrary to her usual parsimony she was extremely liberal to her general officers and spies. It was determined that the war should be one of restitution, and in that view secret agents had gone to Italy, and were said to have made great progress in exciting the people; officers had been also sent to Sicily and Sardinia to urge those courts to attempt their own restoration to the continental thrones. The complete restoration of Naples, of Tuscany, and the Pope's dominions, and large additions to the old kingdom of Piedmont were proposed, and Austria herself only demanded a secure frontier, namely, the Tyrol, the river Po, and the Chiusa, which was not much more than the peace of Campo Formio had left her.

Such were her views in the south where kings were to be her coadjutors, but in the north she was intent upon a different plan. There she expected help from the people, who were discontented at being parcelled out by Napoleon. Treaties were entered into with the elector of Hesse, the dukes of Brunswick and Oels, and it was understood that the people there and in the provinces taken from Prussia, were ready to rise on the first appearance of an Austrian soldier. Hanover was to be restored to England; but Austria was so discontented with the Prussian king, that the restoration of the Prussian provinces, especially the duchy of Warsaw, was to depend upon his conduct in the war.

The means of effecting this mighty project were the great resources which Stadion had found or created; they were greater than Austria had ever before produced and the enthu-



siasm of her people was in proportion. The landwehr levy had been calculated at only 150 battalions; it produced 300 battalions, besides the Hungarian insurrection. The regular army was complete in everything, and the cavalry good, though not equal to what it had been in former wars. There were nine '*corps d'armée*.' The archduke Ferdinand with one was to strike a blow in the duchy of Warsaw. The archduke Charles commanded in chief. Marching with six corps, containing 160,000 regular troops besides the landwehr attached to them, he was to cross the frontier and fall on the French army, supposed to be only 40,000. That is to say, the first corps, under Belgarde and Klenau, were to march by Peterwalde and Dresden against Bernadotte who was in that quarter. The second corps, under Kollowrath and Brady, were to march by Eger upon Bareith and Wurzburg, to prevent the union of Davoust and Bernadotte. The third corps, under prince Rosenberg, was to move by Waldmunchen, in the Upper Palatinate, and after beating Wrede at Straubingen, to join the archduke Charles near Munich. The archduke himself was to proceed against that city with the reserves of prince John of Lichtenstein, Hiller's corps, Stipchitz, and those of Hohenzollern's, and the archduke Louis'. The archduke John was to attack Italy; and the different corps, exclusive of landwehr, amounted to not less than 260,000 men.

The project was gigantic, the force prodigious, and though the quarter-master-general Meyer, seeing the vice of the military plan, resigned his situation, and that Meerfelt quarrelled with the archduke Charles, the general feeling was high and sanguine; and the princes of the empire were, with the exception of Wirtemberg and Westphalia, thought to be rather favourable towards the Austrians. But all the contributions were in kind; Austria had only a depreciated paper currency which would not serve her beyond her own frontiers; wherefore England, at that time the paymaster of all Europe, was looked to. England however had no ambassador, no regular accredited agent at Vienna; all this mighty armament and plan were carried on without her aid, almost without her knowledge; and a despatch from the Foreign Office, dated the 8th of December, but which only arrived the 10th of March, *refused all aid whatsoever! and even endeavoured to prove that Austria could not want, and England was not in a situation to grant.* Yet this was the period in which such lavish grants had been made to Spain without any condition—so lavish, that, in Cadiz, nearly four hundred thousand pounds,

received from England, was lying untouched by the Spaniards. They were absolutely glutted with specie, for they had, at that moment, of their own money, and lying idle in their treasury, *fourteen millions of dollars*, and *ten millions more were on the way from Vera Cruz and Buenos Ayres*. Such was the wisdom, such the providence of the English ministers! heaping money upon money at Cadiz, where it was not wanted, and if it had been wanted, ill bestowed; but refusing it to Austria to forward the explosion of the enormous mine prepared against Napoleon in Germany and Italy. Their agent, Mr. Frere, absolutely refused even to ask for a loan of some of this money from the Spaniards. This is what the reviewer, wilfully perverting my expression, namely, '*awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions*,' calls '*the forming a combination of the states of Europe*!' The English ministers were treated as mere purse-bearers, to be bullied or cajoled as the case might be; and in these two instances, not without reason, for they neither know how to give nor how to refuse in the right time or place. Nor were their military dispositions better arranged, as we shall presently see.

To proceed with the narrative. Stadion, to prevent the mischief which this despatch from England might have produced, by encouraging the peace party at the court, and discouraging the others, only imparted it to the emperor and his secret council, but hid it from those members of the cabinet who were wavering. Even this was like to have cost him his place; and some members of the council actually proposed to reduce one-third of the army. In fine, a cry was arising against the war, but the emperor declared himself on Stadion's side, and the cabinet awaited the result of count Walmoden's mission to London. That nobleman had been despatched with full powers to conclude a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England, and to learn the feeling of the English cabinet upon an extraordinary measure which Austria had resorted to; for being utterly unable to pay her way at the outset, and trusting to the importance of the crisis, and not a little to the known facility with which the English ministers lavished their subsidies, she had resolved to raise, through the principal bankers in Vienna, 150,000*l.* a month, by making drafts through Holland upon their correspondents in London, *to be repaid from the subsidy* to be granted by England! Prince Staremberg was sent at the same time with a special mission to London, to arrange a definite treaty for money, and a convention regulating the future object and conduct of the war—a very curious proceeding—because

Staremborg had been recalled before for conduct offensive to the English cabinet; but he was well acquainted with London, and the emperor wished to get him away lest he should put himself at the head of the peace-party in Vienna. Thus the English ministers continued so to conduct their affairs, that, while they gave their money to Spain and their advice to Austria, and both unprofitably, they only excited the contempt of both countries.

From the conference of Erfurth France had been earnest with Russia to take an active part according to treaty against Austria; and Romanzow, who was an enemy of England, increased Alexander's asperity toward that country, but nothing was done against Austria; and when Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at Petersburg, became clamorous, Alexander pretended to take the Austrian ambassador Swartzenberg to task for the measures of his court, but really gave him encouragement, by repairing immediately afterwards to Finland without inviting Caulaincourt. A contemporaneous official note from Romanzow to Austria, was indeed couched in terms to render the intention of Alexander apparently doubtful, but this was only a blind for Napoleon. There was no doubt of the favourable wishes and feelings of the court, the Russian troops in Poland did not stir, and Stadion, far from having any dread of them, calculated upon their assistance in case of any marked success in the outset. The emperor Alexander was however far from inattentive to his own interests, for he sent general Hitroff at this time to Turkey to demand Moldavia and Wallachia as the price of a treaty, hoping thus to snatch these countries during the general commotion. He was foiled by the Austrian cabinet, which secretly directed the Turks sent to meet Hitroff to assume a high tone and agree to no negotiation in which England was not a party: hence, when the Russians demanded the dismissal of Mr. Adair from Constantinople Hitroff was himself sent away.

While the affairs with Russia were in this state, the present king of Holland arrived, incognito, at Vienna, to offer his services either as heir to the stadtholdership, as a prince of the German empire, or as a near and confidential connexion of the house of Brandenburg; but it was only in the latter view he could be useful, and it was evident he expected the Austrian court would make their policy in the north coincide with that of the Prussian court. He said the secret voyage of the royal family to Petersburg had exposed them to mortifications and slights which had changed the sentiments of both the king and queen towards France, and the queen, bowed down by misfor-



tune, dreaded new reverses and depressed the spirit of the king. They stood alone in their court, ministers and officers alike openly maintained opinions diametrically opposed to the sovereign, and at a grand council held in Königsberg every minister had voted for war with Napoleon. The king assented, but the next day the queen induced him to retract. However, the voice of the people and of the army was for war, and any order to join the troops to those of the Rhenish confederation was sure to produce an explosion. There were between 30,000 and 40,000 regular troops under arms, and Austria was assured, that if any Austrian force approached the frontier, the Prussian soldiers would, bag and baggage, join it, despite of king or queen.

In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen between Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of that country were ill-disposed towards the French), it is evident that a large English army appearing in the north of Germany would have gathered around it all the people and armies of the north, and accordingly Stadion proposed a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England had at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren, the army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that under sir John Stuart in Sicily, that is to say, she had about 80,000 or 90,000 men disposable; and yet so contriving were the ministers, that they kept Wellington too weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily; and instead of acting in the north of Germany where such a great combination awaited them, they sent their most powerful force to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only diversion they caused was the bringing together a few thousand national guards from the nearest French departments. And this the reviewer calls '*the forming a combination of those states in Europe which still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition of a conqueror.*' What a profound, modest, and, to use a *Morning Post* compound, not-at-all-a-flagitious writer this reviewer is.

Well, notwithstanding this grand '*combination*,' things did not turn out well. The Austrians changed their first plan of campaign in several particulars. Napoleon suddenly and unexpectedly appeared at the head of his army, which, greatly inferior in number, and composed principally of German contingents, was not very well disposed towards him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of this man's genius and bravery, he in a few days by a series of movements unequalled in skill by any movement known in military records, broke



through the Austrian power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of those minor accidents so frequent in war, which enabled the archduke Charles to escape over the Danube at Ratisbon, he would have terminated this gigantic contest in ten days. The failure there led to the battle of Esling, where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him, and produced another crisis, which might have been turned to his hurt if the English army had been in the north of Germany; but it was then perishing amongst the stagnant ditches of Walcheren, and the only combination of the English ministers to be discovered was a combination of folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done with the review. Had all the objections contained in it been true, it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious mind more than any just or generous interest in the cause of truth; but being, as I have demonstrated, false even in the minutest particular, I justly stigmatize it as remarkable only for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth.

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The reviewers having asserted that I picked out of Foy's history the charge against lord Melville of saying 'the worst men made the best soldiers,' I replied that I drew for it on my own clear recollection of the fact.

Since then a friend, the Rev. Mr. Rowlatt, has sent me lord Melville's speech, extracted from the *Annual Register* (Baldwin's) 1808, p. 112; and the following passage proves the effrontery with which the reviewers deny facts.

'What was meant by a better sort of men? Was it that they should be taller or shorter, broader or thinner? This might be intelligible, but it was not the fact. The men that had hitherto formed the British armies were men of stout hearts and habits; men of spirit and courage; lovers of bold enterprise. These were the materials of which an army must be composed. Give him such men though not of the better description. *The worse men were the fittest for soldiers.* Keep the better sort at home.'

# REMARKS

ON

## ROBINSON'S LIFE OF PICTON.

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'Many there are that trouble me and persecute me; yet do I not swerve from the testimonies.'—PSALM CXXX.

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THIS writer of an English general's life is so entirely unacquainted with English military customs, that he quotes a common order of the day, accrediting a new staff officer to the army, as a remarkable testimony to that staff officer's talents. And he is so unacquainted with French military customs, that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he places a French marshal, Marmont, who by the way was not then even in Spain, at the head of a *division* of Ney's corps. He dogmatizes upon military movements freely, and is yet so incapable of forming a right judgment upon the materials within his reach, as to say, that sir John Moore should not have retreated, because as he was able to beat the French at Coruña he could also have beaten them in the heart of Spain. Thus setting aside the facts that at Coruña Moore had fifteen thousand men to fight twenty thousand, and in the heart of Spain he had only twenty-three thousand to fight more than three hundred thousand!

Life of Picton,  
page 31.

Page 325.

And lest this display of incompetency should not be sufficient, he affirms, that the same sir John Moore had, comparatively, greater means at Sahagun to beat the enemy than lord Wellington had in the lines of Torres Vedras.\*

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\* In a recent number of the *Quarterly Review* the writer of an article upon the correspondence of Louis the XVIII. quotes me as saying that Massena had *one hundred and thirty-five thousand men* under his orders, as if he had invaded Portugal with an army of that amount, whereas I have expressly said that he invaded Portugal with *sixty-five thousand*, the rest being extended as far as Biscay. The assertion of the

Now those lines, which Wellington had been fortifying for more than a year, offered three impregnable positions, defended by more than a hundred thousand men. There was a fortress, that of St. Julian's, and a fleet, close at hand as a final resource, and only sixty thousand French commanded by Massena were in front. But sir John Moore having only twenty-three thousand men at Sahagun, had no lines, no fortifications for defence, and no time to form them, he was nearly three hundred miles from his fleet, and Napoleon in person had turned one hundred thousand men against him, while two hundred thousand more remained in reserve!

Any lengthened argument in opposition to a writer so totally unqualified to treat of warlike affairs, would be a sinful waste of words; but Mr. Robinson has been at pains to question the accuracy of certain passages of my work, and with what justice the reader shall now learn.

1°. *Combat on the Coa.*—The substance of Mr. Robinson's complaint on this subject is, that I have imputed to general Picton, the odious crime of refusing, from personal animosity, to support general Craufurd;—that such a serious accusation should not be made without ample proof;—that I cannot say whether Picton's instructions did not forbid him to aid Craufurd;—that the roads were so bad, the distance so great, and the time so short, Picton could not have aided him;—that my account of the action differs from general Craufurd's;—that I was only a lieutenant of the forty-third and consequently could know nothing of the matter;—that I have not praised Picton—that he was a Roman hero and so forth. Finally it is denied that Picton ever quarrelled with Craufurd at all; and so far from having an altercation with him on the day of the action he did not even quit his own quarters at Pinhel. Something also there is about general Cole's refusing to quit Guarda.

To all this I reply that I never did accuse general Picton of acting from personal animosity; neither the letter nor the

reviewer is therefore essentially false with the appearance of truth. The same writer, while rebuking the Editor of the Correspondence for ignorance, asserts, that the battle of Busaco was fought between the 9th of October and the 5th of November! It was fought on the 27th of September.

Another writer in the same No. treating of Professor Drumann's work, speaks of '*following* an impulse which is from *behind*,' a figure of speech which must appear singularly felicitous to those who have watched a puppy dog chasing his own tail; but your Quarterly reviewers are your only men for accuracy of fact and expression!

spirit of my statement will bear out such a meaning, which is a pure hallucination of this author. That the light division was not supported is notorious; that it ought to have been supported I have endeavoured to prove; why it was not supported I have not attempted to divine. Yet it was neither the distance nor the badness of the roads, nor the want of time, as Mr. Robinson gratuitously supposes; for the action, which took place in July, lasted from daybreak until late in the evening, the roads, and there were several, were good at that season and the distance not more than eight miles.

It is quite true, as Mr. Robinson observes, that I cannot affirm of my own knowledge whether the duke of Wellington forbade Picton to succour Craufurd; but I can certainly affirm that he ordered him to support him, because it is so set down in his grace's *Despatches*, volume 5th, pages 535 and 547; and it is not probable that this order should have been rescinded and one of a contrary tendency substituted, to meet an event, namely the action on the Coa, which Craufurd had been forbidden to fight. Picton acted no doubt upon the dictates of his judgment, but all men are not bound to approve of that judgement; and as to the charge of faintly praising his military talents, a point was forced by me in his favour when I compared him to general Craufurd, of whose ability there was no question; more could not be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson's assurance that he was a Roman hero.

The exact object of Mr. Robinson's reasoning upon the subject of general Cole's refusal to quit Guarda it is difficult to discover; the passage to which it relates, is the simple enunciation of a fact, which is now repeated, namely, that general Cole being requested by general Craufurd to come down with his whole division to the Coa refused; and lord Wellington approved of that refusal, though he ordered Cole to support Craufurd under certain circumstances. Such however is Mr. Robinson's desire to monopolize all correctness, that he will not permit me to know anything about the action, though I was present, because, as he says, being only a lieutenant, I could not know anything about it. He is yet abundantly satisfied with the accuracy of his own knowledge, although he was not present, and was neither a captain nor lieutenant. I happened to be a captain of seven years' standing; and surely, though we should admit all subalterns to be blind like young puppies, and that rank in the one case as age in the other is absolutely necessary to open their eyes, it might still be asked, why I should not have been able, after



having obtained a rank which gave me the right of seeing, to gather as good information from others as Mr. Robinson has done? Let us to the proof.

In support of his views, he has produced the rather vague testimony of an anonymous officer on general Picton's staff, which he deems conclusive as to the fact that Picton never quarrelled with Craufurd, that he did not even quit Pinhel on the day of the action and consequently could not have had any altercation with him on the Coa. But the following letters from officers on Craufurd's staff, not anonymous, show that Picton did all these things. In fine, that Mr. Robinson has undertaken a task for which he is not qualified.

*Testimony of lieutenant-colonel Shaw Kennedy, who was on general Craufurd's staff at the action of the Coa, July 24. 1810.*

*'Manchester, 7th November, 1835.*

'I have received your letter in which you mention *Robinson's Life of Picton*; that work I have not seen. It surprises me that any one should doubt that Picton and Craufurd met on the day the French army invested Almeida in 1810. I was wounded previously, and did not therefore witness their interview; but I consider it certain that Picton and Craufurd did meet on the 24th July, 1810, on the high ground on the left bank of the Coa during the progress of the action, and that a brisk altercation took place between them. They were primed and ready for such an altercation, as angry communications had passed between them previously regarding the disposal of some sick of the light division. I have heard Craufurd mention in joke his and Picton's testiness with each other, and I considered that he alluded both to the quarrel as to the sick, and to that which occurred when they met during the action at Almeida.

*'J. S. KENNEDY.*

*'Col. Napier, &c. &c. &c.'*

*Testimony of colonel William Campbell, who was on general Craufurd's staff at the action on the Coa, July 24, 1810.*

*'Esplanade, Dover, 13th Nov. 1835.*

'Your letter from Freshford has not been many minutes in my hands; I hasten to reply. General Picton *did* come out of Pinhel on the day of the Coa combat, as you term it. It was in the afternoon of that day when all the regiments were in retreat, and general Craufurd was with his staff and others on the heights above. that, I think, on notice being

given of general Picton's approach, general Craufurd turned and moved to meet him. Slight was the converse, short the interview, for upon Craufurd's asking inquiringly, whether general Picton did not consider it advisable to move out something from Pinhel in demonstration of support, or to cover the light division? in terms not bland, the general made it understood that 'he should do no such thing.' This as you may suppose put an end to the meeting, further than some violent rejoinder on the part of my much-loved friend, and fiery looks returned! We went our several ways, general Picton, I think, proceeding onwards a hundred yards to take a peep at the bridge. This is my testimony.

'Yours truly,

'WILLIAM CAMPBELL.

'Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c.'

*Battle of Busaco.*—Mr. Robinson, upon the authority of one of general Picton's letters, has endeavoured to show that my description of this battle is a mass of errors; it shall however be proved that his criticism is so, and that general Picton's letter is very bad authority.

In my work it is said that the allies resisted vigorously, yet the French gained the summit of the ridge, and while the leading battalions established themselves on the crowning rocks, others wheeled to their right, intending to sweep the summit of the Sierra, but were driven down again in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

Picton's letter says, that the head of the enemy's column got possession of a rocky point on the crest of the position, and that they were followed by the remainder of a large column which was driven down in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

So far we are agreed. But Picton gives the merit of the charge to the light companies of the seventy-fourth and eighty-eighth regiments, and a wing of the forty-fifth aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment under major Birmingham, whereas, in my History the whole merit is given to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth regiments. Lord Wellington's despatch gives the merit to the forty-fifth and eighty-eighth, aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment, under colonel Douglas. The *Reminiscences of a Subaltern*, written by an officer of the eighty-eighth regiment, and published in the *United Service Journal*, in like manner, gives the merit to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth British regiments, and the eighth Portuguese.

It will presently be seen why I took no notice of the share the eighth Portuguese are said to have had in this brilliant achievement. Meanwhile the reader will observe that Picton's letter indicates the *centre* of his division as being forced by the French, and he affirms that he drove them down again, with his *left* wing without aid from the fifth division. But my statement makes both the *right* and *centre* of his division to be forced, and gives the fifth division, and especially colonel Cameron and the ninth British regiment, a very large share in the glory of recovering the position; moreover I say that the *eighth Portuguese was broken to pieces*. Mr. Robinson argues that this must be wrong, for, says he, the eighth Portuguese *were not broken*, and if the right of the third division had been forced, the French would have encountered the fifth division. To this he adds, with a confidence singularly rash, his scanty knowledge of facts considered, that colonel Cameron and the ninth regiment would doubtless have made as good a charge as I have described, '*only they were not there.*'

In reply, it is now affirmed, distinctly and positively, that the French did break the eighth Portuguese regiment, did gain the rocks on the summit of the position, and on the *right* of the third division; did ensconce themselves in those rocks, and were going to sweep the summit of the Sierra when the fifth division under general Leith attacked them; and the ninth regiment led by colonel Cameron did form under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the enemy out of those rocks; and if they had not done so, the third division, then engaged with other troops, would have been in a very critical situation. Not only is all this re-affirmed, but it shall be proved by the most irrefragable testimony. It will then follow that my History is accurate, that general Picton's letter is inaccurate, and the writer of his life incompetent to censure others.

Mr. Robinson may notwithstanding choose to abide by the authority of general Picton's letter, which he 'fortunately found amongst that general's manuscripts,' but which others less fortunate had found in *print* many years before; and he is the more likely to do so, because he has asserted that if general Picton's letters are false, they are wilfully so, an assertion which it is impossible to assent to. It would be hard indeed if a man's veracity was to be called in question because his letters, written in the hurry of service gave inaccurate details of a battle. General Picton wrote what he believed to be the fact, but to give any historical weight to

his letter on this occasion, in opposition to the testimony which shall now be adduced against its accuracy, would be weakness. And with the more reason it is rejected, because Mr. Robinson himself admits that another letter written by general Picton on this occasion to the duke of Queensbury, was so inaccurate as to give general offence to the army; and because his letters on two other occasions are as incorrect as on this of Busaco. Thus writing of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, Picton says, 'about this time, namely, when the third division carried the main breach, the light division which was rather late in their attack, also succeeded in getting possession of the breach they were ordered to attack.' Now it has been proved to demonstration, that the light division carried the small breach, and were actually attacking the flank of the French troops defending the great breach, when the third division carried that point. This indeed is so certain, that Mr. Uniacke of the ninety-fifth, and others of the light division, were destroyed on the ramparts close to the great breach by that very explosion which was said to have killed general M'Kinnon; and some have gone so far as to assert that it is doubtful if the great breach would have been carried at all but for the flank attack of the light division.

Again, general Picton, writing of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, says 'the light division under general Craufurd was rather *roughly handled by the enemy's cavalry*, and had that arm of the French army been as daring and active upon this occasion, as they were when following us to the lines of Torres Vedras, they would doubtless have cut off the light division to a man.' Nevertheless as an eye-witness, and being then a field-officer on the staff I was by Mr. Robinson's rule entitled to see, I declare most solemnly that the French cavalry, though they often menaced to charge never came within sure shot distance of the light division. The latter, with the exception of the ninety-fifth rifles, who were skirmishing in the wood of Pozo Velho, was formed by regiments in three squares, flanking and protecting each other, they retired over the plain leisurely without the loss of a man, without a sabre-wound being received, without giving or receiving fire; they moved in the most majestic manner, secure in their discipline and strength, which was such as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged under Tamerlane or Genghis.

But it is time to give the proofs relative to Busaco, the reader being requested to compare them with the description of that battle in my History.



*Extracts from major-general sir John Cameron's letters to colonel Napier.*

*'Government House, Devonport, Aug. 9th, 1834.*

'— I am sorry to perceive in the recent publication of lord Beresford, his '*Refutation of your Justification of your third volume*,' some remarks on the battle of Busaco which disfigure, not intentionally I should hope, the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith's corps on that occasion, of which I, as commanding officer of one of the regiments composing it, may perhaps be permitted to know something. I shall however content myself at present with giving you a detail of the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith's *own words*, extracted from a document in my possession, every syllable of which can be verified by many distinguished officers now living, some of them actors in, all of them eye-witnesses to the affair.

'The ground where the British brigade was now moving, was behind a chain of rocky eminences where it had appeared clearly the enemy was successfully pushing to establish himself, and precluded major-general Leith from seeing at that moment the progress the enemy was making, but by the information of staff officers stationed on purpose who communicated his direction and progress. Major-general Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavour to meet and check the enemy when he had gained the ascendancy. At this time a heavy fire of musketry was kept up on the height, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state of things. When however the rock forming the high part of the Sierra became visible, the enemy appeared in full possession of it, and a French officer was in the act of cheering with his hat off, while a continual fire was kept up from thence and along the whole face of the Sierra, in a diagonal direction towards the bottom, by the enemy ascending rapidly from the successive columns formed for the attack on a mass of soldiers from the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments, who having been severely pressed had given way and were rapidly retiring in complete confusion and disorder. Major-general Leith on that occasion spoke to major Birmingham (who was on foot, having had his horse killed), who stated that the fugitives were of the ninth Portuguese as well as the eighth regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check their retreat. Major-general Leith addressed and succeeded in stopping them, and they cheered when he ordered them to be collected and formed in the rear. They were passing as they retired diagonally to the right of

the ninth British regiment. The face of affairs in this quarter now bore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant having dispersed or driven everything opposed to him was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Sierra at this part of major-general Picton's position without a shot then being fired at him. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which had hitherto been moving rapidly by its left in column in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time perceived the British brigade under him. Major-general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth regiment should have moved on in rear of and to the left of the ninth British regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the Sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the royal Scots to have been posted (as they were) in reserve. But the enemy having driven everything before him in that quarter afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting, and frequently in double-quick time. The thirty-eighth regiment was therefore directed to form also and support when major-general Leith led the ninth regiment to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, which they did without firing a shot. That part which looks behind the Sierra (as already stated) was inaccessible and afforded the enemy the advantage of outflanking the ninth on the left as they advanced, but the order, celerity, and coolness with which they attacked panic-struck the enemy, who immediately gave way on being charged with the bayonet, and the whole was driven down the face of the Sierra in confusion and with immense loss, from a destructive fire which the ninth regiment opened upon him as he fled with precipitation after the charge.

‘I shall merely add two observations on what has been asserted in the *Refutation*.

‘First with regard to the confusion and retreat of a portion

of the Portuguese troops, I certainly did not know at the moment what Portuguese corps the fugitives were of, but after the action I understood they were belonging to the eighth Portuguese; a very considerable number of them were crossing the front of the British column dispersed in sixes and sevens over the field just before I wheeled the ninth regiment into line for the attack. I pushed on a few yards to entreat them to keep out of our way, which they understood and called out '*viva los Ingleses, valerosos Portugueses.*'

'As regards any support which the Portuguese afforded the British brigade in the pursuit, I beg to say that during the charge, while leading the regiment in front of the centre, my horse was killed under me, which for a moment retarded my own personal advance, and on extricating myself from under him, I turned round and saw the thirty-eighth regiment close up with us and the royal Scots appearing over the ridge in support, but did not see any Portuguese join in the pursuit; indeed it would have been imprudent in them to attempt such a thing, for at the time a brisk cannonade was opened upon us from the opposite side of the ravine.

'This, my dear colonel, is, on my honour, an account of the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith's corps at Busaco. It will be satisfactory to you to know that the information you received has been correct. The anonymous officer of the ninth regiment I do not know. There were several very capable of furnishing you with good information on the transactions of that day, not only as regarded their own immediate corps but those around them. Colonel Waller I should consider excellent authority; that gallant officer must have been an eye-witness to all that passed in the divisions of Picton and Leith. I remember on our approach to the scene of confusion he delivered me a message from general Picton, intended for general Leith, at the time reconnoitring, to hasten our advance.'

*Government House, Devonport, Aug. 21st, 1834.*

'—— The fact really is that both the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments gave way that morning, and I am positive that I am not far wrong in saying, that there were not of Portuguese troops within my view, at the moment I wheeled the ninth regiment into line, one hundred men prepared either for attack or defence. Sir James Douglas partly admits that his wing was broken when he says that 'if we were at any time *broken* it was from the too ardent wish of a corps of boy recruits to close.' Now it is perfectly clear that



the wing of the regiment under major Birmingham fled, from what that officer said to general Leith. Sir James Douglas states also that 'no candid man will deny that he supported the royals and ninth regiment, though before that he says, that 'by an oblique movement he joined in the charge.' I might safely declare on oath that the Portuguese never showed themselves beyond the ridge of the Sierra that morning.

'Very faithfully yours,

'JOHN CAMERON.'

As these letters from general Cameron refer to some of marshal Beresford's errors, as well as Mr. Robinson's, an extract from a letter of colonel Thorne's upon the same subject will not be misplaced here.

*Colonel Thorne to colonel Napier.*

*'Harborne Lodge, 28th Aug. 1834.*

Extract.—'Viscount Beresford in the *'Refutation of your Justification of your third volume,'* has doubted the accuracy of the strength of the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons on the 20th March, 1811, as extracted by you from the journal which I lent to you. As I felt confident I had not inserted anything therein, which I did not obtain from *official documents*, that were in my possession at the time it was written, I have, since the perusal of the *Refutation*, looked over some of my Peninsula papers, and I am happy to say I have succeeded in finding amongst them, the monthly returns of quarters of the division of cavalry commanded by brigadier-general Long, dated Los Santos, April 20th, 1811, which was then sent to me by the deputy assistant quarter-master-general of that division, and which I beg to enclose for your perusal, in order that you may see the statement I have made of the strength of that force in my journal *is to be relied upon, although his lordship insinuates to the contrary*, and that it contains *something more than 'the depositary of the rumours of a camp.'*

*Extract from memorandum of the battle of Busaco, by colonel Waller, assistant quarter-master-general to the second division.*

'—The attack commenced on the right wing, consisting of Picton's division, by the enemy opening a fire of artillery upon the right of the British which did but little injury, the range being too great to prove effective. At this moment were seen



the heads of the several attacking columns, THREE, I THINK, in number, and deploying into line with the most beautiful precision, celerity, and gallantry.

‘As they formed on the plateau they were cannonaded from our position, and the regiment of Portuguese, either the eighth or the 16th *infantry*, which were formed in advance in *front* of the 74th *regiment*, threw in some volleys of musketry into the enemy’s columns in a flank direction, but the regiment was quickly driven into the position.

‘More *undaunted* courage never was displayed by *French* troops than on *this* occasion, it could not have been surpassed; for their columns advanced in despite of a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from our troops in position in the rocks, and overcoming all opposition although repeatedly charged by Lightburne’s brigade, or rather by the whole of Picton’s division, they advanced, and fairly drove the BRITISH RIGHT wing from the rocky part of the position.

‘*Being an eye-witness* of this critical moment, and seeing that unless the ground was quickly recovered *the right flank* of the army would *infallibly* be turned, and the *great road*, to Coimbra *unmasked*, seeing also that heavy columns of the enemy were descending into the valley to operate by the *road*, and to support the attack of the Sierra, and to cut off lord Wellington’s communication with Coimbra, I instantly galloped off to the rear to bring up general Hill’s corps to Picton’s support. Having proceeded about *two* miles along the upper edge and reverse side of the Sierra, I fell in with the head of general Leith’s column moving *left in front*, at the head of which was colonel Cameron’s brigade, led by the ninth regiment. I immediately rode up to colonel Cameron, and addressed him in an anxious tone as follows.

‘‘Pray, sir, who commands this brigade?’’ ‘I do,’ replied the colonel, ‘I am colonel Cameron.’

‘‘Then for God’s sake, sir, move off instantly at *double quick* with your brigade to Picton’s support; not *one moment* is to be lost, the enemy in great force are already in possession of the *right of the position* on the Sierra and have driven Picton’s troops out of it. Move on, and when the rear of your brigade has passed the Coimbra road wheel into line, and you will embrace the point of attack.’ Colonel Cameron did not hesitate or *balance* an INSTANT, but giving the word double-quick to his brigade nobly led them to battle and to victory.

The brave colonel attacked the enemy with such a gallant and irresistible impetuosity, that after some time fighting he

recovered the ground which Picton had lost, inflicting *heavy slaughter* on the élite of the enemy's troops. The ninth regiment behaved on this occasion with conspicuous gallantry, as *indeed* did ALL the REGIMENTS engaged. Great numbers of the enemy had descended low down in the rear of the position towards the Coimbra road, and were killed; the whole position was thickly strewed with their killed and wounded; amongst which *were many of our own troops*. The French were the finest men I ever saw. I spoke to several of the wounded men, light infantry and grenadiers, who were bewailing their unhappy fate on being defeated, assuring me they were the heroes of Austerlitz who had never before met with defeat!

‘ROBERT WALLER, *Lieut.-colonel.*’

*Extract of a letter from colonel Taylor, ninth regiment, to colonel Napier.*

‘*Fernhill, near Evesham, 26th April, 1832.*

‘DEAR SIR—I have just received a letter from colonel Shaw, in which he quotes a passage from one of yours to him, expressive of your wish, if necessary, to print a passage from a statement which I made respecting the conduct of the ninth regiment at Busaco, and in reference to which, I have alluded to the discomfiture of the eighth Portuguese upon the same occasion. I do not exactly recollect the terms I made use of to colonel Shaw (nor indeed the shape which my communication wore) but, my object was to bring to light the distinguished conduct of the ninth without any wish to unnecessarily obscure laurels which others wore, even at their expense!

‘To account for the affair in question, I could not however well omit to state, that it was in consequence of the overthrow of the eighth Portuguese, that sir James Leith's British brigade was called upon, and it is remarkable, that at the time, there was a considerable force of Portuguese (I think it was the old Lusitanian Legion which had just been modelled into two battalions) *between* Leith's British and where the eighth were being engaged, Leith pushed on his brigade double-quick, column of sections left in front, past these Portuguese, nor did he halt until he came in contact with the enemy who had *crowned the heights* and were firing from behind the rocks, the ninth wheeled up into line, fired and charged, and all of the eighth Portuguese that was to be seen, at least by me, a company officer at the time, was some ten or a dozen men at *une outside*, with their commanding officer; but he and they were amongst the very foremost in the ranks of the ninth

British. As an officer in the ranks of course I could not see much of what was going on generally, neither could I well have been mistaken as to what I did see, coming almost within my very contact! Colonel Waller, now I believe on the Liverpool staff, was the officer who came to sir James Leith for assistance, I presume from Picton.

‘Yours, &c.

‘J. TAYLOR.’

*Third communication from major-general sir John Cameron to colonel Napier.*

‘Stoke Devonport, Nov. 21st, 1835.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL—Some months ago I took the liberty of pointing out to you certain misstatements contained in a publication of lord Beresford regarding the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps at the battle of Busaco; and as those misstatements are again brought before the public in Robinson’s *Life of sir Thomas Picton*, I am induced to trouble you with some remarks upon what is therein advanced. A paragraph in major-general Picton’s letter to lord Wellington, dated 10th November, 1810, which I first discovered some years ago in the Appendix No. 12 of Jones’s *War in Spain*, &c. &c., would appear to be the document upon which Mr. Robinson grounds his contradiction of your statement of the conduct of the ninth regiment at Busaco; but *that* paragraph, which runs as follows, I am bound to say is *not* the truth. ‘Major-general Leith’s brigade in consequence marched on, and arrived in time to *join* the five companies of the forty-fifth regiment under the honourable lieutenant-colonel Meade and the eighth Portuguese regiment under lieutenant-colonel Douglas, in repulsing the enemy.’ This assertion of major-general Picton is, I repeat, *not true*, for, in the first place, I did not see the forty-fifth regiment on that day, nor was I at any period during the action near them or any other British regiment to my left. In the second, as regards the eighth Portuguese regiment, the ninth British did not most assuredly join *that* corps in its retrograde movement. That major-general Picton left his right flank exposed, there can be no question, and had not assistance, and *British* assistance come up to his aid as it did, I am inclined to believe that sir Thomas would have cut a very different figure in the despatch to what he did!! Having already given you a detail of the defeat of the enemy’s column which was permitted to gain the ascendancy in considerable force on the right of the third division, I beg leave to refer you to the gallant officers I

mentioned in a former letter, who were not only eye-witnesses to the charge made by the ninth regiment but actually distinguished themselves in front of the regiment, at the side of their brave accomplished general during that charge. I believe the whole of sir Rowland Hill's division from a bend in the Sierra could see the ninth in their pursuit of the enemy, and though last not the least in importance, as a party concerned, I may mention the present major-general sir James T. Barns, who commanded the British brigade under major-general Leith (I omitted this gallant officer's name in my former letter), as the major-general took the entire command, and from him alone I received all orders during the action.

'I have now done with Mr. Robinson and his work, which was perhaps hardly worth my notice.

'I am, my dear colonel,

'Very sincerely yours,

'J. CAMERON.'

Having now sufficiently exposed the weakness of Mr. Robinson's attack upon me, it would be well perhaps to say with sir J. Cameron, 'I have done with his work,' but I am tempted to notice two points more.

Treating of the storming of Badajos, Mr. Robinson says,

'Near the appointed time while the men were waiting with increased anxiety Picton with his staff came up. The troops fell in, all were in a moment silent until the general in his calm and impressive manner addressed a few words to each regiment. The signal was not yet given, but the enemy by means of lighted carcasses discovered the position of Picton's soldiers; to delay longer would only have been to expose his men unnecessarily; he therefore gave the word to march.'— 'Picton's soldiers set up a loud shout and rushed forward up the steep *to the ditch at the foot of the castle walls*. General Kempt who had thus far been with Picton at the head of the division was here badly wounded and carried to the rear. Picton was therefore left alone to conduct the assault.'

Now strange to say, Picton was not present when the signal was given, and consequently could neither address his men in his 'usual calm impressive manner,' nor give them the word to march. There was no ditch at the foot of the castle walls to rush up to, and, as the following letter proves, general Kempt alone led the division to the attack.



*Extract of a letter from lieutenant-general sir James Kempt, K.C.B., master-general of the ordnance, &c. &c.*

*' Pall Mall, 10th May, 1833.*

' According to the first arrangement made by lord Wellington, my brigade only, of the third division, was destined to attack the castle by escalade. The two other brigades were to have attacked the bastion adjoining the castle, and to open a communication with it. *However, on the day before the assault* took place, this arrangement was changed by lord Wellington. A French deserter from the castle (a sergeant of sappers) gave information that no communication could be established between the castle and the adjoining bastion, there being (he stated) only one communication between the castle and the town: upon learning this, the whole of the third division were ordered by lord Wellington to attack the castle. But as my brigade only was originally destined for the service, and was to lead the attack, the arrangements for the escalade were in a great measure confided to me by general Picton.

' The division had to *file* across a very narrow bridge to the attack under a fire from the castle and the troops in the covered way. It was ordered to commence at ten o'clock, but by means of fire-balls the formation of our troops at the head of the trench was discovered by the French, who opened a heavy fire on them, and the attack was commenced *from necessity* nearly half an hour before the time ordered. I was severely wounded in the foot, on the glacis after passing the Rivillas, almost at the commencement of the attack, and *in the trenches*. I met Picton coming to the front on my being carried to the rear. If the attack had not commenced till the hour ordered, he, I have no doubt, would have been on the spot to direct in person the commencement of the operations. I have no *personal* knowledge of what took place afterwards, but I was informed that after surmounting the most formidable difficulties, the escalade was effected by means of *two* ladders only in the first instance, in the middle of the night, and there can be no question that Picton was present in the assault. In giving an account of this operation, pray bear in mind that *he* commanded the division, and to *him* and the enthusiastic valour and determination of the troops ought its success alone to be attributed.

' Yours, &c.

' JAMES KEMPT.

' Colonel Napier, &c.'

The other point to which I would allude is the battle of Salamanca. Mr. Robinson, with his baton of military criticism belabours the unfortunate Marmont unmercifully, and with an unhappy minuteness of detail, first places general Foy's troops on the *left* of the French army and then destroys them by the bayonets of the third division, although the poor man and his unlucky soldiers were all the time on the *right* of the French army, and were never engaged with the third division at all. This is however but a slight blemish for Mr. Robinson's book, and his competence to criticise Marmont's movements is no whit impaired thereby. I wish however to assure him, the expression he puts into the mouth of the late sir Edward Pakenham is '*né vero né ben trovato.*' Vulgar swaggering was no part of that amiable man's character, which was composed of as much gentleness, as much generosity, as much frankness, and as much spirit as ever commingled in a noble mind. Alas! that he should have fallen so soon and so sadly!! His answer to lord Wellington, when the latter ordered him to attack, was not, 'I will, my lord, by God!' But with the bearing of a gallant *gentleman* who had resolved to win or perish, he replied, 'Yes, if you will give me one grasp of that conquering right hand.' But these finer lines of character do not suit Mr. Robinson's carving of a here; his manner is more after the coarse menacing idols of the South-Sea islands than the delicate gracious forms of Greece.

Advice to authors is generally thrown away, yet Mr. Robinson would do well to re-write his book with fewer inaccuracies, and fewer military disquisitions for which he is disqualified, avoiding to swell its bulk with such long extracts from my work, and remembering also that English commissaries are not '*feræ naturæ*' to be hanged, or otherwise destroyed at the pleasure of divisional generals. This will save him the trouble of attributing to sir Thomas Picton all the standard jokes and smart sayings, for the scaring of those gentry, which have been current ever since the American war, and which have probably come down to us from the Greeks. The reduction of bulk which an attention to these matters will produce, may be compensated by giving us more information of Picton's real services, towards which I contribute the following information. Picton in his youth served as a marine, troops being then used in that capacity, and it is believed he was in one of the great naval victories. Mr. Robinson has not mentioned this, and it would be well also, if he were to learn and set forth some of the general's generous actions towards the

widows of officers who fell under his command : they are to be discovered, and would do more honour to his memory than a thousand blustering anecdotes. With these changes and improvements, the life of sir Thomas Picton may perhaps, in future, escape the equivocal compliment of the newspaper puffers, namely, that it is 'a military romance

COUNTER-REMARKS  
TO  
MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL'S  
REMARKS

UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER'S HISTORY OF  
THE PENINSULA WAR.

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'The evil that men do, lives after them.'

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IN my History of the Peninsula War I assailed, and very justly, the public character of the late Mr. Perceval. His son has published a defence of it, after having vainly endeavoured in a private correspondence to convince me that my attack was unfounded. The younger Mr. Perceval's motive is to be respected, and had he confined himself to argument and authority, it was my intention to have relied on our correspondence, and left the subject matter in dispute to the judgment of the public. But Mr. Perceval used expressions which compelled me to seek personal explanation, yet fruitlessly, because he, unable to see any difference between invective directed against the public acts of a minister, and terms of insult addressed to a private person, claims a right to use such expressions; and while he emphatically 'disavows all meaning or purpose of offence or insult,' does yet offer most grievous insult, denying my title to redress after the customary mode, and explicitly declining, he says from principle, an appeal to any other weapon than the pen.

It is not for me to impugn this principle in any case, still less in that of a son defending the memory of his father; but it gives me the right which I now assert, to disregard any verbal insult which Mr. Perceval, intentionally or unintentionally, has offered to me or may offer to me in future. When a gentleman relieves himself from personal responsibility by the adoption of this principle, his language can no longer convey



insult to those who do not reject such responsibility; and it would be as unmanly to use insulting terms towards him in return as it would be to submit to them from a person not so shielded. Henceforth therefore I hold Mr. Perceval's language to be innocuous, but for the support of my own accuracy veracity and justice as an historian I offer these my *Counter-Remarks*. They must of necessity lacerate Mr. Perceval's feelings, but they are, I believe, scrupulously cleared of any personal incivility, and if any passage having that tendency has escaped me I thus apologize beforehand.

Mr. Perceval's pamphlet is copious in declamatory expressions of his own sentiments; and it is also duly besprinkled with animadversions on Napoleon's vileness, the horrors of jacobinism, the wickedness of democrats, the propriety of coercing the Irish, and such sour dogmas of melancholy ultra-toryism. Of these I reckon not. Assuredly I did not write with any expectation of pleasing men of Mr. Perceval's political opinions, and hence I shall let his general strictures pass, without affixing my mark to them, and the more readily as I can comprehend the necessity of eking out a scanty subject. But where he has adduced specific argument and authority for his own peculiar cause,—weak argument indeed for it is his own, but strong authority for it is the duke of Wellington's,—I will not decline discussion. Let the most honoured come first.

The duke of Wellington, replying to a letter from Mr. Perceval, in which the point at issue is most earnestly and movingly begged by the latter, writes as follows:—

*London, June 6, 1835.*

DEAR SIR,—I received last night your letter of the 5th. Notwithstanding my great respect for colonel Napier and his work, I have never read a line of it; because I wished to avoid being led into a literary controversy, which I should probably find more troublesome than the operations which it is the design of the colonel's work to describe and record.

I have no knowledge therefore of what he has written of your father, Mr. Spencer Perceval. Of this I am certain, that I never, whether in public or in private, said one word of the ministers, or of any minister who was employed in the conduct of the affairs of the public during the war, excepting in praise of them;—that I have repeatedly declared in public my obligations to them for the cordial support and encouragement which I received from them; and I should have been ungrateful and unjust indeed, if I had excepted Mr. Perceval, than whom a more honest, zealous, and able minister never served the king.

It is true that the army was in want of money, that is to say, *specie*, during the war. Bank-notes could not be used abroad;

and we were obliged to pay for everything in the currency of the country which was the seat of the operations. It must not be forgotten, however, that at that period the bank was restricted from making its payments in *specie*. That commodity became therefore exceedingly scarce in England; and very frequently was not to be procured at all. I believe, that from the commencement of the war in Spain up to the period of the lamented death of Mr. Perceval, the difficulty in procuring *specie* was much greater than it was found to be from the year 1812 to the end of the war; because at the former period all intercourse with the continent was suspended: in the latter, as soon as the war in Russia commenced, the communication with the continent was in some degree restored; and it became less difficult to procure *specie*.

But it is obvious that, from some cause or other there was a want of money in the army as the pay of the troops was six months in arrear; a circumstance which had never been heard of in a British army in Europe: and large sums were due in different parts of the country for supplies, means of transport, &c. &c.

Upon other points referred to in your letter, I have really no recollection of having made complaints. I am convinced that there was no real ground for them, as I must repeat, that throughout the war I received from the king's servants every encouragement and support that they had in their power to give,

Believe me, dear sir,

Ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

*Dudley Montagu Perceval, Esq.*

This letter imports, if I rightly understand it, that any complaints, by whomsoever preferred against the ministers, and especially against Mr. Perceval, during the war in the Peninsula, had no real foundation. Nevertheless his grace and others did make many and very bitter complaints, as the following extracts will prove.

#### No. 1.

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon.*

*'Viseu, February 10th, 1810.*

'I apprised government more than two months ago of our probable want of money, and of the necessity that we should be supplied, not only with a large sum but with a regular sum monthly, equal in amount to the increase of expense occasioned by the increased subsidy to the Portuguese, and by the increase of our own army. *They have not attended to either of these demands*, and I must write again. But I wish you would mention the subject in your letter to lord Wellesley.

## No. 2.

‘ February 23rd, 1810.

‘It is obvious that the sums will fall short of those which *his Majesty's Government have engaged to supply to the Portuguese government, but that is the fault of his Majesty's Government in England, and they have been repeatedly informed that it was necessary that they should send out money.* The funds for the expenses of the British army are insufficient in the same proportion, and all that I can do is to divide the deficiency in its due proportions between the two bodies which are to be supported by the funds at our disposal.’

## No. 3.

‘ March 1st, 1810.

‘In respect to the 15,000 men in addition to those which Government did propose to maintain in this country, I have only to say, that I don't care how many men they send here, *provided they will supply us with proportionate means to feed and pay them;* but I suspect they will fall short rather than exceed the thirty thousand men.’

## No. 4.

‘ March 5th, 1810.

Mr. Stuart, speaking of the Portuguese emigrating, says, ‘*If the determination of ministers at home or events here bring matters to that extremity.*’

## No. 5.

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, in reference to Cadiz.*

‘ 30th March, 1810.

‘I don't understand the arrangement which Government have made of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered them as a part of the army, and from the arrangement which I made with the Spanish government they cost us nothing but their pay, and all the money procured by bills was applicable to the service in this country. *The instructions to general Graham alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as to desire him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that the Spaniards should feed our troops.* The first consequence of this arrangement will be that we shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops at Cadiz so much a part of my army that I had written to my brother to desire his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz when they should attack Portugal he thought I might bring into Portugal, at least the troops which I had sent there. But I consider this now to be at an end.’

## No. 6.

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.**'1st April, 1810.*

'I agree with you respecting the disposition of the people of Lisbon. In fact all they wish for is to be saved from the French, and they were riotous last winter *because they imagined, with some reason, that we intended to abandon them.*'———'*The arrangement made by Government for the command at Cadiz will totally ruin us in the way of money.'*

## No. 7.

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.**'April 20th, 1810.*

'*The state of opinions in England is very unfavourable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public or as the opposition pretend to be, and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle, which is to answer no purpose. Their private letters are in some degree at variance with their public instructions, and I have called for an explanation of the former, which when it arrives will show me more clearly what they intend. The instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them, although they throw upon me the whole responsibility for bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it will be necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer in these times to receive private hints and opinions from ministers, which, if attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, and even to the letter of the public instructions; at the same time that, if not attended to, the danger of the responsibility imposed by the public instructions is increased tenfold.'*

## No. 8.

*Ditto to Ditto.**'May, 1810.*

'It is impossible for Portugal to aid in feeding Cadiz. We have neither money nor provisions in this country, and the measures which they are adopting to feed the people there will positively oblige us to evacuate this country for want of money to support the army, and to perform the king's engagements; unless the Government in England should enable us to remain by sending out large and regular supplies of specie. I have written fully to Government upon this subject.'

## No. 9.

*General Graham to Mr. Stuart.**'Isla, 22nd May, 1810.*

In reference to his command at Cadiz, says, 'lord Liverpool



has decided the doubt by declaring this a part of lord Wellington's army, and saying it is the wish of Government that though I am second in command to him I should be left here for the present.'—*'This is odd enough; I mean that it should not have been left to his judgment to decide where I was to be employed; one would think he could judge fully better according to circumstances than people in England.'*

## No. 10.

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.*

*'June 5, 1810.*

*'This letter will show you the difficulties under which we labour for want of provisions and of money to buy them.'—'I am really ashamed of writing to the government (Portuguese) upon this subject (of the militia), feeling as I do that we owe them so much money which we are unable to pay. According to my account the military chest is now indebted to the chest of the aids nearly 400,000*l*. At the same time I have no money to pay the army, which is approaching the end of the second month in arrears, and which ought to be paid in advance. The b*â*t and forage to the officers for March is still due, and we are in debt everywhere.'—'The miserable and pitiful want of money prevents me from doing many things which might and ought to be done for the safety of the country.'—'The corps ought to be assembled and placed in their stations. But want of provisions and money obliges me to leave them in winter-quarters till the last moment. Yet if anything fails, I shall not be forgiven.'*

## No. 11.

*Mr. Stuart to lord Wellington.*

*'June 9, 1810.*

*'I have received two letters from Government, the one relative to licences, the other containing a letter from Mr. Harrison of the Treasury, addressed to colonel Bunbury, in which, after referring to the different estimates both for the British and Portuguese, and stating the sums at their disposal, they not only conclude that we have more than is absolutely necessary, but state specie to be so scarce in England that we must not rely on further supplies from home, and must content ourselves with such sums as come from Gibraltar and Cadiz,' &c. &c.*

*'From hand to mouth we may perhaps make shift, taking care to pay the Portuguese in kind and not in money, until the supplies, which the Treasury say in three or four months will be ready, are forthcoming. Government desire me to report to them any explanation which either your lordship or myself may be able to communicate on the subject of Mr. Harrison's letter. As it principally relates to army finance, I do not feel myself quite competent to risk an opinion in opposition to what that gentleman has laid down. I have, however, so often and so*

*strongly written to them the embarrassment we all labour under, both respecting corn and money, that there must be some misconception, or some inaccuracy has taken place in calculations which are so far invalidated by the fact, without obliging us to go into the detail necessary to find out what part of the statement is erroneous.'*

## No. 12.

*Wellington to Stuart.*

*'June, 1810.*

*'I received from the Secretary of State a copy of Mr. Hamilton's letter to colonel Bunbury, and we have completely refuted him. He took an estimate made for September, October, and November, as the rate of expense for eight months, without adverting to the alteration of circumstances occasioned by change of position, increase of price, of numbers, &c., and then concluded upon his own statement, that we ought to have money in hand, (having included in it by the bye some sums which we had not received,) notwithstanding that our distress had been complained of by every post, and I had particularly desired in December, that £200,000 might be sent out, and a sum monthly equal in amount to the increased Portuguese subsidy.'*

## No. 13.

*Ditto to Ditto.*

*'June, 1810.*

*'All our militia in these provinces [*Tras os Montes and Entre Minho y Douro*] are disposable, and we might throw them upon the enemy's flank in advance in these quarters [*Leon*] and increase our means of defence here and to the north of the Tagus very much indeed. But we cannot collect them as an army, nor move them without money and magazines, and I am upon my last legs in regard to both.'*

## No. 14.

*Ditto to Ditto.*

*'November, 1810.*

*'I have repeatedly written to Government respecting the pecuniary wants of Portugal, but hitherto without effect.'*

## No. 15.

*Ditto to Ditto.*

*'December 22.*

*'It is useless to expect more money from England as the desire of economy has overcome even the fears of the Ministers. and they have gone so far as to desire me to send home the transports in order to save money!'*

## No. 16.

*Wellington to Stuart.*

‘28th January, 1811.

‘I think the Portuguese are still looking to assistance from England, and I have written to the king’s Government strongly upon the subject in their favour. But I *should deceive myself if I believed we shall get anything, and them if I were to tell them we should; they must, therefore, look to their own resources.*’

## No. 17.

*Ditto to Ditto.**In reference to the Portuguese intrigue against him.*

‘18th February, 1811.

‘I think also that they will be supported in the Brazils, and I have no reason to believe that I shall be supported in England.’

## No. 18.

*Ditto to Ditto.*

‘13th April, 1811.

‘If the Government choose to undertake large services and not supply us with sufficient pecuniary means, and leave to me the distribution of the means with which they do supply us, I must exercise my own judgment upon the distribution for which I am to be responsible.’

## No. 19.

*Ditto to Ditto.*

‘4th July, 1811.

‘The pay of the British troops is now nearly two months in arrears, instead of being paid one month in advance, according to his Majesty’s regulations. The muleteers upon whose services the army depends almost as much as upon those of the soldiers, are six months in arrears; there are now bills to a large amount drawn by the commissioners in the country on the commissary at Lisbon still remaining unpaid, by which delay the credit of the British army and government is much impaired, and you are aware of the pressing demands of the Portuguese government for specie. There is but little money in hand to be applied to the several services; there is no prospect that any will be sent from England, and the supplies derived from the negotiation of bills upon the treasury at Cadiz and Lisbon have been gradually decreasing.’

## No. 20.

*Lord Wellington to lord Wellesley.*

‘26th July, 1811.

‘Although there are, I understand, provisions in Lisbon, in sufficient quantities to last the inhabitants and army for a year,

about 12 or 14,000 Portuguese troops which I have on the right bank of the Tagus are literally starving; even those in the cantonments on the Tagus cannot get bread, because the government have not money to pay for means of transport. *The soldiers in the hospitals die because the government have not money to pay for the hospital necessaries for them; and it is really disgusting to reflect upon the detail of the distresses occasioned by the lamentable want of funds to support the machine which we have put in motion.*

‘Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war in the Peninsula, or she is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of the expediency of making an effort to put in motion against the enemy the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The Spaniards would not allow, I believe, of that active interference by us in their affairs which might affect and ameliorate their circumstances, *but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing.* Subsidies given without stipulating for the performance of specific services would, in my opinion, answer no purpose.’

#### No. 21.

*Mr. Sydenham to Mr. Stuart.*

‘27th September, 1811.

‘I take great shame to myself for having neglected so long writing to you, &c., but in truth I did not wish to write to you until I could give you some notion of the result of my mission and the measures which our government would have adopted in consequence of the information and opinion which I brought with me from Portugal, but *God knows how long I am to wait if I do not write to you until I could give you the information which you must naturally be so anxious to receive.* From week to week I have anxiously expected that something would be concluded, and I as regularly deferred writing; however I am now so much in your debt that I am afraid you will attribute my silence to inattention rather than to the uncertainty and indecision of our further proceedings. During the ten days agreeable voyage in the *Armide* I arranged all the papers of information which I had procured in Portugal, and I made out a paper on which I expressed in plain and strong terms all I thought regarding the state of affairs both in Portugal and Spain. These papers, together with the notes which I procured from lord Wellington and yourself, appeared to me to comprehend everything which the ministers could possibly require, both to form a deliberate opinion upon every part of the subject and to shape their future measures. The letters which I had written to lord Wellesley during my absence from England, and which had been regularly submitted to the prince, had prepared them for most of the opinions which I had to enforce on my arrival. *Lord Wellesley perfectly coincided in all the leading points,* and a short paper of proposals was prepared for the consideration of



the cabinet, supported by the most interesting papers which I brought from Portugal.'

Then followed an abstract of the proposals, after which Mr. Sydenham continues thus :—

'I really conceived that all this would have been concluded in a week, *but a month has elapsed, and nothing has yet been done.*'—'Campbell will be able to tell you that I have done everything in my power to get people here to attend to their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money, money, money in every office to which I have had access. To all my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the same answer 'that the thing is impossible.' The prince himself certainly appears to be *à la hauteur des circonstances*, and has expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the present government that I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate effort on our part to save the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that is in our power; that the rest must be left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious as we deserved. This feeling you will allow is wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more vigorous military system, and a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations.' 'Nothing can be more satisfactory than the state of affairs in the north; all that I am afraid of is that we have not a ministry capable of taking advantage of so fine a prospect.'

Mr. Sydenham's statement of the opinions of Lord Wellesley at the time of the negotiations which ended in that lord's retirement in February, is as follows:—

'1st. That lord Wellesley was the only man in power who had a just view of affairs in the Peninsula, or a military thought amongst them.'

'2nd. That he did not agree with Perceval that they were to shut the door against the Catholics, neither did he agree with Grenville that they were to be conciliated by emancipation without securities.'

'3rd. That with respect to the Peninsula, he rejected the notion that we were to withdraw from the Peninsula to husband our resources at home, *but he thought a great deal more both in men and money could be done than the Percevals admitted, and he could no longer act under Perceval with credit, or comfort, or use to the country.*'

## No. 22.

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Hamilton, Under Secretary of State.*

*' April 9th, 1810.*

' I hope by next mail will be sent something more satisfactory and useful than we have yet done by way of instructions, but *I am afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of our great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget more distant but not less interesting concerns.* With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who are on the spot. *Here we judge only of the results, the details we read over, but being unable to remedy, forget them the next day.'*

*Lord Wellington to marshal Beresford.*

*' 24th January, 1811.*

' But I declare that, notwithstanding all my practice, I have not health nor spirits to go through all the difficulties of carrying on the service, crossed and thwarted as it is by the wants of the Portuguese and Spanish armies; the obstinacy with which they persevere in opposing and rendering fruitless all measures to set them right or save them; and the difficulties thrown in the way by our own government and officers.'

*Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool.*

*' 16th February, 1811.*

' I hope that I have not been induced by the encouragement I have received, to act in the confidence that the king's ministers would approve of the measures I should adopt, to make temporary appointments required for the service, of gentlemen, to whom anybody in London can prevent by his orders their salaries from being paid. *If this be the case, I am sincerely desirous that the king's government would consider of the appointment of some other officer to conduct their concerns in this country, as I am utterly incapable of managing them, if I am to be treated in such a manner.'*

## No. 23.

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.*

*' 6th May, 1812.*

' In regard to money for the Portuguese government, I begged Mr. Bisset to suggest to you, that if you were not satisfied with the sum he was enabled to supply, you should make your complaint on the subject to the king's government. I am not the minister of finance, nor is the commissary-general. *It is the duty of the king's ministers to provide supplies for the service,*

*and not to undertake a service for which they cannot provide adequate supplies of money and every other requisite. They have thrown upon me a very unpleasant task, in leaving to me to decide what proportion of the money which comes into the hands of the commissary-general, shall be applied to the service of the British army; and what shall be paid to the king's minister, in order to enable him to make good the king's engagements to the Portuguese government; and at the same time that they have laid upon me this task, and have left me to carry on the war as I could, they have by their orders cut off some of the resources which I had.'*

*'The British army have not been paid for nearly three months. We owe nearly a year's hire to the muleteers of the army. We are in debt for supplies in all parts of the country; and we are on the point of failing in our payments for some supplies essentially necessary to both armies, which cannot be procured excepting with ready money.'*

## No. 24.

The following extracts are of a later date than Mr. Perceval's death, but being retrospective, and to the point, are proper to be inserted here. In 1813 lord Castlereagh complained of some proceedings, described in my History, as having been adopted by lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, to feed the army in 1810 and 1811, and his censure elicited the letters from which these extracts are given.

## No. 25.

*Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.*

*'3rd May, 1813.*

*'I have read your letter, No. 2, 28th April, in which you have enclosed some papers transmitted by lord Castlereagh, including a letter from the Board of Trade in regard to the purchases of corn made by your authority in concert with me, in Brazil, America, and Egypt. When I see a letter from the Board of Trade, I am convinced that the latter complaint originates with the jobbing British merchants at Lisbon; and although I am delighted to see the Government turn their attention to the subject, as it will eventually save me a great deal of trouble, I am quite convinced that if we had not adopted, nearly three years ago, the system of measures now disapproved of, not only would Lisbon and the army and this part of the Peninsula have been starved; but if we had, according to the suggestions of the commander-in-chief, and the Treasury, and the Board of Trade, carried on transactions of a similar nature through the sharks at Lisbon above referred to, calling themselves British merchants, the army would have been crippled in its operations and depending upon those who I verily believe are the worst subjects that his Majesty has, and enormous as the expense is, it could have been very much increased.'*



‘In regard to the particular subject under consideration, it is obvious to me that the authorities in England have taken a very confined view of the question.

‘It appears to me to be extraordinary that when lord Castlereagh read the statement that the commissary-general had in his stores a supply of corn and flour to last 100,000 men for nine months he should not have adverted to the fact that the greatest part of the Portuguese subsidy, indeed all in the last year but £600,000, was paid in kind, and principally in corn, and that he should not have seen that a supply for 100,000 men for nine months was not exorbitant under these circumstances. Then the Government appears to me to have forgotten all that passed on the particular subject of your purchases. *The advantage derived from them in saving a starving people during the scarcity of 1810-1811; in bringing large sums into the military chest which otherwise would not have found their way there; and in positive profit of money.*’——‘If all this be true, which I believe you have it in your power to prove, I cannot understand why Government find fault with these transactions, unless it is that they are betrayed into disapprobation of them by merchants who are interested in their being discontinued. *I admit that your time and mine would be much better employed than in speculation of corn, &c. But when it is necessary to carry on an extensive system of war with one-sixth of the money in specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider questions and adopt measures of this sort, and we ought to have the confidence and support of the Government in adopting them.* It is only the other day that I recommended to my brother something of the same kind to assist in paying the Spanish subsidy; and I have adopted measures in respect to corn and other articles in Galicia, with a view to get a little money for the army in that quarter. *If these measures were not adopted, not only would it be impossible to perform the king’s engagement, but even to support our own army.*

*Mr. Stuart to Mr. Hamilton.*

*‘8th May.*

‘Though I thank you for the letter from the Admiralty contained in yours of the 21st April, I propose rather to refer Government to the communication of lord Wellington and the admiral, by whose desire I originally adverted to the subject, than to continue my representations of the consequences to be expected from a state of things the navy department are not disposed to remedy. My private letter to lord Castlereagh, enclosing lord Wellington’s observations on the letter from the Treasury, will, I think, satisfy his lordship that the arrangements which had been adopted for the supply of the army and population of this country are of more importance than is generally imagined. *I am indeed convinced that if they had been left to private merchants, and that I had not taken the measures which are condemned, the army must have embarked and a famine must have taken place.*’



Now if these complaints thus made in the duke's letters written at the time were unfounded his grace's present letter is, for so much, a defence of Mr. Perceval; if they were not unfounded his present letter is worth nothing, unless as a proof, that with him the memory of good is longer-lived than the memory of ill. But in either supposition the complaints are of historical interest, as showing the difficulties, real or supposed, under which the general laboured. They are also sound vouchers for my historical assertions, because no man but the duke could have contradicted them; no man could have doubted their accuracy on less authority than his own declaration; and no man could have been so hardy as to put to him the direct question of their correctness.

Mr. Perceval objects to my quoting lord Wellesley's manifesto, because that nobleman expressed sorrow at its appearance, and denied that he had composed it. But the very passage of lord Wellesley's speech on which Mr. Perceval relies, proves, that the sentiments and opinions of the manifesto were really entertained by lord Wellesley, who repudiates the style only; and regrets, not that the statement appeared but that it should have appeared at the moment when Mr. Perceval had been killed. The expression of this very natural feeling, he however took care to guard from any mistake by re-asserting his contempt for Mr. Perceval's political character. Thus he identified his opinions with those contained in the manifesto. And this view of the matter is confirmed by those extracts which I have given from the correspondence of Mr. Sydenham, no mean authority, for he was a man of high honour and great capacity; and he was the confidential agent employed by lord Wellesley to ascertain and report upon the feelings and views of lord Wellington with respect to the war; and also upon those obstacles to his success which were daily arising, either from the conduct of the ministers at home or from the intrigues of their diplomatists abroad. Thus it appears that if lord Wellington's complaints, as exhibited in these extracts, were unfounded, they were at least so plausible as to mislead Mr. Sydenham on the spot, and lord Wellesley at a distance, and I may well be excused if they also deceived me.

But was I deceived? Am I to be condemned as an historian, because lord Wellington, in the evening of his life and in the ease and fulness of his glory, generously forgets the crosses, and remembers only the benefits of bygone years? It may be said indeed that his difficulties were real and yet the government not to blame, seeing that it could not relieve them.

To this I can oppose the ordering away of the transports, on which, in case of failure, the safety of the army depended! To this I can oppose the discrepancy between the public and private instructions of the ministers! To this I can oppose those most bitter passages, ' <i>If anything fails I shall not be forgiven.</i> '—' <i>I have no reason to believe that I shall be supported in England.</i> '	See Extract No. 15.
	Do. No. 7.
	Do. No. 10.
	Do. No. 17.

I say I can oppose these passages from the duke's letters, but I need them not. Lord Wellesley, a man of acknowledged talent, practised in governing, well acquainted with the resources of England and actually a member of the administration at the time, was placed in a better position to make a sound judgment than lord Wellington; lord Wellesley, an ambitious man, delighting in power, and naturally anxious to direct the political measures while his brother wielded the military strength of the state; lord Wellesley, tempted to keep office by natural inclination, by actual possession, by every motive that could stir ambition and soothe the whisperings of conscience, actually quitted the cabinet.

*Because he could not prevail on Mr. Perceval to support the war as it ought to be supported, and he could therefore no longer act under him with credit, or comfort, or use to the country;*

*Because the war could be maintained on a far greater scale than Mr. Perceval maintained it, and it was dishonest to the allies and unsafe not to do it;*

*Because the cabinet, and he particularized Mr. Perceval as of a mean capacity, had neither ability and knowledge to devise a good plan, nor temper and discretion to adopt another's plan.*

Do I depend even upon this authority? No! In lord Wellington's letter, stress is laid upon the word *specie*, the want of which, it is implied, was the only distress, because bank notes would not pass on the continent; but several extracts speak of corn and hospital stores, and the transport vessels ordered home were chiefly paid in paper. Notes certainly would not pass on the continent, nor in England neither for their nominal value, and why? Because they were not money; they were the signs of debt; the signs that the labour, and property and happiness of unborn millions, were recklessly forestalled by bad ministers to meet the exigency of the moment. Now admitting, which I do not, that this exigency was real and unavoidable; admitting, which I do not.

that one generation has a right to mortgage the labour and prosperity of another and unborn generation, it still remains a question, whether a minister only empowered by a corrupt oligarchy has such a right. And there can be no excuse for a man who, while protesting that the country was unable to support the war as it ought to be supported, continued that war, and thus proceeded to sink the nation in hopeless debt, and risk the loss of her armies and her honour at the same time; there is no excuse for that man who, while denying the ability of the country to support her troops abroad, did yet uphold all manner of corruption and extravagance at home.

There was no specie because the fictitious ruinous incontrovertible paper money system had driven it away, and who more forward than Mr. Perceval to maintain and extend that system—the bane of the happiness and morals of the country—a system which then gave power and riches to evil men, and has since plunged thousands of honest men into ruin and misery; a system which, swinging like a pendulum between high taxes and low prices, at every oscillation strikes down the laborious part of the community, spreading desolation far and wide and threatening to break up the very foundations of society. And why did Mr. Perceval thus nourish the accursed thing? Was it that one bad king might be placed on the throne of France, another on the throne of Spain, a third on the throne of Naples? That Italy might be the prey of the barbarian, or last, not least, that the hateful power of the English oligarchy, which he called social order and legitimate rights, might be confirmed? But lo! his narrow capacity! what has been the result? In the former countries insurrection civil war and hostile invasion, followed by the free use of the axe and the cord, the torture and the secret dungeon; and in England it would have been the same, if her people, more powerful and enlightened in their generation, had not torn the baleful oppression down to be in due time trampled to dust as it deserves.

*Mr. Perceval was pre-eminently an 'honest, zealous, and able servant of the king!'*

To be the servant of the monarch is not then to be the servant of the people. For if the country could not afford to support the war as it ought to be supported without detriment to greater interests, the war should have been given up or the minister who felt oppressed by the difficulty should have resigned his place to those who thought differently.



*'It is the duty of the king's ministers to provide supplies for the service, and not to undertake a service for which they cannot provide adequate supplies of money and every other requisite!'*

Extract,  
No. 23.

These are the words of Wellington, and wise words they are. Did Mr. Perceval act on this maxim? No! he suffered the war to starve on *'one-sixth of the money necessary to keep it up,'* and would neither withdraw from the contest, nor resign the conduct of it to lord Wellesley, who, with a full knowledge of the subject, declared himself able and willing to support it efficiently. Nay, Mr. Perceval, while professing his inability to furnish Wellington efficiently for one war in the Peninsula, was by his orders in council, those complicated specimens of political insolence folly and fraud, provoking a new and unjust war with America, which was sure to render the supply of that in the Peninsula more difficult than ever.

But how could the real resources of the country for supplying the war be known until all possible economy was used in the expenditure upon objects of less importance? Was there any economy used by Mr. Perceval? Was not that the blooming period of places, pensions, sinecures and jobbing contracts? Did not the government and all belonging thereto then shout and revel in their extravagance? Did not corruption the most extensive and the most sordid overspread the land? Was not that the palmy state of the system which the indignant nation has since risen in its moral strength to reform? Why did not Mr. Perceval reduce the home and the colonial expenses, admit the necessity of honest retrenchment, and then manfully call upon the people of England to bear the real burthen of the war because it was necessary, and because their money was fairly expended to sustain their honour and their true interests? This would have been the conduct of an able zealous and faithful servant of the country; and am I to be silenced by a phrase, when I charge with a narrow, factious, and contemptible policy and a desire to keep himself in power, the man who supported and extended this system of corruption at home, clinging to it as a child clings to its nurse, while the armies of his country were languishing abroad for that assistance which his pitiful genius could not perceive the means of providing, and which, if he had been capable of seeing it, his more pitiful system of administration would not have suffered him to furnish. Profuseness and corruption marked Mr. Perceval's government at home, but the army withered for want abroad; the loan-contractors got fat in London, but



Extract,  
No. 20.

the soldiers in hospital died because there was no money to provide for their necessities; the funds of the country could not supply both, and so he directed his economy against the troops, and reserved his extravagance to nourish the foul abuses at home. And this is to be a pre-eminently *honest, zealous, and able servant of the king!*

This was the man who projected to establish fortresses to awe London and other great towns. This was the man who could not support the war in Spain, but who did support the tithe war in Ireland, and who persecuted the press of England with a ferocity that at last defeated its own object. This

See further  
on, Second  
Extracts,  
No. 4.

was the man who called down vindictive punishment on the head of the poor tinman, Hamlyn of Plymouth, because in his ignorant simplicity he openly

offered money to a minister for a place; and this also was the man who sheltered himself from investigation under the vote of an unreformed House of Commons, when Mr. Maddocks solemnly offered to prove at the bar, that he, Mr. Perceval, had been privy to and connived at a transaction more corrupt and far more mischievous and illegal in its aim than that of the poor tinman. This is the Mr. Perceval who, after asserting, with a view to obtain heavier punishment on Hamlyn, the

Ditto, No. 6. distinguished purity of the public men of his day, called for that heavy punishment on Hamlyn for the sake of public justice, and yet took shelter himself from that public justice under a vote of an unreformed house; and suffered Mr. Ponsonby to defend that vote by the plea that such foul transactions were as '*glaring as the sun at noon-day.*' And this man is not to be called factious!

Mr. Perceval the younger in his first letter to me says, '*the good name of my father is the only inheritance he left to his children.*' A melancholy inheritance indeed if it be so, and that he refers to his public reputation. But I find that during his life the minister Perceval had salaries to the amount of about eight thousand a-year, and the reversion of a place worth twelve thousand a-year then enjoyed by his brother lord Arden. And also I find that after his death, his family received a grant of fifty thousand pounds, and three thousand a-year from the public money. Nay, Mr. Perceval the son, forgetting his former observation, partly founds his father's claim to reputation upon this large amount of money so given to his family. Money and praise he says were profusely

bestowed, money to the family, praise to the father, wherefore Mr. Perceval must have been an admirable minister! Admirable proof!

But was he praised and regretted by an admiring grateful people? No! the people rejoiced at his death. Bonfires and illuminations signalized their joy in the country, and in London many would have rescued his murderer; a multitude even blessed him on the scaffold. No! He was not praised by the English people, for they had felt his heavy griping hand; nor by the people of Ireland, for they had groaned under his harsh, his unmitigated bigotry. Who then praised him? Why his coadjutors in evil, his colleagues in misrule; the majority of a corrupt House of Commons, the nominees of the borough faction in England, of the orange faction in Ireland; those factions by which he ruled and had his political being, by whose support and for whose corrupt interests he run his public 'career of unmixed evil,' unmixed, unless the extreme narrowness of his capacity, which led him to push his horrid system forward too fast for its stability, may be called a good.

See further  
on, Second  
Extracts,  
No. 5.

By the nominees of such factions, by men placed in the situation but without the conscience of Mr. Quentin Dick, Mr. Perceval was praised, and the grant of money to his family was carried; but there were many to oppose the grant even in that house of corruption. The grant was a ministerial measure, and carried as such, by the same means and by the same men, which and who had so long baffled the desire of the nation for catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. And yet the people! emphatically, the people! have since wrung those measures from the factions; ay! and the same people loathe the very memory of the minister who would have denied both for ever if it had been in his power.

Ditto, No. 7.

*'Mr. Perceval's bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence.'*

This passage in my History, is by the younger Mr. Perceval pronounced to be utterly untrue, because bark is only *one* medicine, and not *medicines*; because there was no raging deadly general pestilence in France at the time; and because the measure was only retaliation for Napoleon's Milan and Berlin decrees—a retaliating war which even quakers might wink at.

What the extent of a quaker's conscience on such occasions may be I know not, since I have heard of one, who, while

professing his hatred of blood-shedding, told the mate of his ship, that if he did not port his helm he would not run down his enemy's boat. But this I do know, that Napoleon's decrees were retaliation for our paper blockades; that both sides gave licences for a traffic in objects which were convenient to them, while they denied to unoffending neutrals their natural rights of commerce; that to war against hospitals is inhuman, unchristianlike, and uncivilized, and that the avowal of the principle is even more abhorrent than the act. The avowed principle in this case was to distress the enemy. It was known that the French were in great want of bark, therefore it was resolved they should not have it, unless Napoleon gave up his great scheme of policy called the continental system. Now men do not want Jesuit's bark unless to cure disease, and to prevent them from getting it was literally to war against hospitals. That was no metaphor of Mr. Whitbread's, it was a plain truth.

Oh! exclaims Mr. Perceval, there was no deadly raging general pestilence! What then? Is not the principle the same? Must millions suffer, must the earth be cumbered with carcasses, before the christian statesman will deviate from his barbarous policy? Is a momentary expediency to set aside the principle in such a case? Oh! no! by no means! exclaims the pious minister Perceval. My policy is just and humane, fixed on immutable truths emanating directly from true religion, and quite consonant to the christian dispensation; the sick people shall have bark, I am far from wishing to prevent them from getting bark. God forbid! I am not so inhuman. Yes, they shall have bark, but their ruler must first submit to me. 'Port thy helm,' quoth the quaker, 'or thee wilt miss her, friend!' War against hospitals! Oh! No! I do not war against the hospital, I see the black flag waving over it and I respect it; to be sure, I throw my shells on to it continually, but that is not to hurt the sick, it is only to make the governor capitulate.' And this is the pious sophistry by which the christian Mr. Perceval is to be defended!

But Mr. Cobbett was in favour of this measure! Listen to him! By all means. Let us hear Mr. Cobbett; let us hear his 'vigorous sentences,' his opinions, his proofs, his arguments, the overflowings of his 'true English spirit and feeling' upon the subject of Mr. Perceval's administration. Yes! yes! I will listen to Mr. Cobbett, and what is more, I will yield implicit belief to Mr. Cobbett, where I cannot with any feeling of truth refute his arguments and assertions.

Mr. Cobbett defended the Jesuit's bark bill upon the



avowed ground that it was to assert our sovereignty of the seas, not our actual power on that element, but our right to rule there as we listed. That is to say, that the other people of the world were not to dare traffic, not to dare move upon that high road of nations, not to presume to push their commercial intercourse with each other, nay, not even to communicate save under the control and with the licence of England. Now, if we are endowed by heaven with such a right, in the name of all that is patriotic and English let it be maintained. Yet it seems a strange plea in justification of the christian Mr. Perceval—it seems strange that he should be applauded for prohibiting the use of bark to the sick people of Portugal and Spain, and France, Holland, Flanders, Italy, and the Ionian islands, for to all these countries the prohibition extended, on the ground of our right to domineer on the wide sea; and that he should also be applauded for declaiming against the cruelty, the ambition, the domineering spirit of Napoleon. I suppose we were appointed by heaven to rule on the ocean according to our caprice, and Napoleon had only the devil to sanction his power over the continent. We were christians, ‘truly British christians,’ as the Tory phrase goes; and he was an infidel, a Corsican infidel. Nevertheless we joined together, each under our different dispensations, yes! we joined together, we agreed to trample upon the rest of the world; and that trade which we would not allow to neutrals, we, by mutual licences, carried on ourselves until it was discovered that the sick wanted bark, sorely wanted it, and then the truly British christians prohibited that article. We deprived the sick people of the succour of bark; and without any imputation on our christianity! no doubt because the tenets of our faith permit us to be merciless to our enemies provided a quaker winks at the act! Truly the logic, the justice, and the christianity of this position seem to be on a par.

All sufferings lead to sickness, but we must make our enemies suffer, if we wish to get the better of them, let them give up the contest and their sufferings will cease: wherefore there is nothing in the stopping of medicine. This is Mr. Cobbett’s argument, and Mr. Cobbett’s words are adopted by Mr. Perceval’s son. To inflict suffering on the enemy was then the object of the measure, and of course the wider the suffering spread the more desirable the measure. Now suffering of mind as well as of body must be here meant, because the dead and dying are not those who can of themselves oblige the government of a great nation to give up a war; it must be the dread of such sufferings increasing, that disposes



the great body of the people to stop the career of their rulers. Let us then torture our prisoners; let us destroy towns with all their inhabitants; burn ships at sea with all their crews; carry off children and women, and torment them until their friends offer peace to save them. Why do we not? Is it because we dread retaliation? or because it is abhorrent to the usages of christian nations? The former undoubtedly if the younger Mr. Perceval's argument adopted from Cobbett is just; the latter if there is such a thing as christian principle. That principle once sacrificed to expediency and there is nothing to limit the extent of cruelty in war.

So much for Mr. Cobbett upon the Jesuit's bark bill, but one swallow does not make a summer; his 'true English spirit and feeling' breaks out on other occasions regarding Mr. Perceval's policy, and there, being quite unable to find any weakness in him I am content to take him as a guide. Something more however there is to advance on the subject of the Jesuit's bark bill, ere I yield to the temptation of enlivening my pages with Cobbett's 'vigorous sentences.'

Mr. Wilberforce, no small name amongst religious men and no very rigorous opponent of ministers, described this measure in the house, as a bill '*which might add to the ferocity and unfeeling character of the contest, but could not possibly put an end to the contest.*'

Hansard's  
Debates.

Mr. Grattan said, '*we might refuse our Jesuit's bark to the French soldiers, we might inflict pains and penalties by the acrimony of our statutes upon those who were saved from the severity of war, but the calculation was contemptible.*'

Mr. Whitbread characterized the bill as '*a most abominable measure calculated to hold the country up to universal execration. It united in itself detestable cruelty with absurd policy.*'

Lord Holland combated the principle of the bill, which he said '*would distress the women and children of Spain and Portugal more than the enemy.*'

Lord Grenville '*cautioned the house to look well at the consideration they were to receive as the price of the honour, justice, and humanity of the country.*' Then alluding to the speech of Lord Mulgrave (who, repudiating the flimsy veil of the bill being merely a commercial regulation, boldly avowed that it was an exercise of our right to resort to whatever mode of warfare was adopted against us), lord Grenville, I say, observed, that such a doctrine did not a little surprise him. '*If,*' said he, '*we are at war with the Red Indians, are we to scalp our enemies because the Indians scalp our men? When*

*Lyons was attacked by Robespierre he directed his cannon more especially against the hospital of that city than against any other part, the destruction of it gave delight to his sanguinary inhuman disposition. In adopting the present measure we endeavour to assimilate ourselves to that monster of inhumanity, for what else is the bill but a cannon directed against the hospitals on the continent.'*

But all this, says Mr. Perceval the younger, is but 'declamatory invective, the answered and refuted fallacies of a minister's opponents in debate.' And yet Mr. Perceval, who thus assumes that all the opposition speeches were fallacies, does very complacently quote lord Bathurst's speech in defence of the measure, and thus in a most compendious manner decides the question. Bellarmin says yes! exclaimed an obscure Scotch preacher to his congregation, Bellarmin says yes! but I say no! and Bellarmin being thus confuted, we'll proceed. Even so Mr. Perceval. But I am not to be confuted so concisely as Bellarmin. Lord Erskine, after hearing lord Bathurst's explanation, maintained that '*the bill was contrary to the dictates of religion and the principles of humanity*,' and this, he said, he felt so strongly, that he was '*resolved to embody his opinion in the shape of a protest that it might go down in a record to posterity*.' It is also a fact not to be disregarded in this case, that the bishops, who were constant in voting for all other ministerial measures, wisely and religiously abstained from attending the discussions of this bill. Lord Erskine was as good as his word, eleven other lords joined him, and their protests contained the following deliberate and solemn testimony against the bill.

Hansard's  
Debates.

'Because *the Jesuit's bark, the exportation of which is prohibited by this bill*, has been found by long experience, to be a specific for many dangerous diseases which war has a tendency to spread and exasperate; and because to employ as an engine of war the privation of the only remedy for some of the greatest sufferings which war is capable of inflicting, is manifestly repugnant to the principles of the Christian religion, contrary to humanity, and not to be justified by any practice of civilised nations.

'Because *the means to which recourse has been hitherto had in war, have no analogy to the barbarous enactments of this bill, inasmuch as it is not even contended that the privations to be created by it have any tendency whatever to self-defence, or to compel the enemy to a restoration of peace, the only legitimate object by which the infliction of the calamities of war can in any manner be justified.*

Such was the religious, moral and political character given to this bill of Mr. Perceval's by our own statesmen. Let us now hear the yet more solemnly recorded opinion of the statesmen of another nation upon Mr. Perceval's orders in council, of which this formed a part. In the American president's message to Congress the following passages occur:—

‘The government of Great Britain had already introduced into her commerce during war, a system *which at once violating the rights of other nations, and resting on a mass of perjury and forgery, unknown to other times, was making an unfortunate progress, in undermining those principles of morality and religion which are the best foundations of national happiness.*’

One more testimony. Napoleon, whose authority, whatever Mr. Perceval and men of his stamp may think, will always have a wonderful influence; Napoleon, at St. Helena, declared, ‘that posterity would more bitterly reproach Mr. Pitt for the hideous school he left behind him than for any of his own acts; *a school marked by its insolent machiavelism, its profound immorality, its cold egotism, its contempt for the well-being of men and the justice of things.*’ Mr. Perceval was an eminent champion of this hideous school, which we thus find the leading men of England, France and America uniting to condemn. And shall a musty Latin proverb protect such a politician from the avenging page of history? The human mind is not to be so fettered. Already the work of retribution is in progress.

Mr. Perceval the younger, with something of fatuity, hath called up Mr. Cobbett to testify to his father's political merit. Commending that rugged monitor of evil statesmen for his ‘*vigorous sentences,*’ for his ‘*real English spirit and feeling,*’ he cannot now demur to his authority; let him then read and reflect deeply on the following passages from that eminent writer's works, and he may perhaps discover, that to defend his father's political reputation with success will prove a difficult and complicate task. If the passages are painful to Mr. Perceval, if the lesson is severe, I am not to blame. It is not I but himself who has called up the mighty seer, and if the stern grim spirit, thus invoked, will not cease to speak until all be told it is not my fault.



## EXTRACTS FROM MR. COBBETT'S WRITINGS.

[History of George IV.]

*Extract 1.—Of Mr. Perceval's harshness.*

'But there now came a man amongst them who soon surpassed all the rest in power, as well as in impudence and insolence towards the people. This was that Spencer Perceval of whose signal death we shall have to speak by and bye. This man, a sharp lawyer, inured from his first days at the bar to the carrying on of state prosecutions; a sort of understrapper in London, to the attorneys-general in London, and frequently their deputy in the counties; a short, spare, pale-faced, hard, keen, sour-looking man, with a voice well suited to the rest, with words in abundance at his command, with the industry of a laborious attorney, with no knowledge of the great interest of the nation, foreign or domestic, but with a thorough knowledge of those means by which power is obtained and preserved in England, and with no troublesome scruples as to the employment of those means. He had been solicitor-general under Pitt up to 1801, and attorney-general under Addington and Pitt up to February, 1806. This man became the *adviser of the princess*, during the period of the investigation and correspondence of which we have just seen the history; and as we are now about to see, the power he obtained by the means of that office, *made him the prime minister of England to the day of his death*, though no more fit for that office than any other barrister in London, taken by tossing up or by ballot.'

*Extract 2.—Of Perceval's illiberal, factious, and crooked policy.*

'We have seen that the king was told that the *publication*,' (the publication of the princess of Wales's justification) 'would take place on *the Monday*. That Monday was *the 9th of March*. In this difficulty what was to be done? The Whig ministry, with their eyes fixed on the *probable speedy succession of the prince*, or at least, *his accession to power*, the king having recently been in a very shaky state; the Whig ministry, with their eyes fixed on this expected event and not perceiving as Perceval did, the power that the *unpublished book* (for 'The Book' it is now called) *would give them with the prince* as well as with the king, the Whig ministry would not consent to the terms of the princess, thinking too, that in spite of her anger and her threats she would not throw away the scabbard as towards the king.

In the meanwhile, however, Perceval, wholly unknown to the Whigs, had got the book actually *printed* and bound up *ready for publication*, and it is clear that it was intended to be published on the Monday named in the princess's letter; namely, on the *9th of March*, unless prevented by the king's *yielding to the wishes of Perceval*. He did yield, that is to say, he resolved



to change his ministers! A ground for doing this was however a difficulty to be got over. To allege and promulgate the *true* ground would never do; for then the public would have cried aloud for the publication, which contained matter so deeply scandalous to the king and all the royal family. Therefore *another ground* was alleged; and herein we are going to behold another and another important consequence, and other national calamities proceeding from this dispute between the prince and his wife. This other ground that was chosen was the Catholic Bill. The Whigs stood pledged to grant a bill for the further relief of the Catholics. They had in September, 1806, *dissolved the parliament*, though it was only *four years* old, for the purpose of securing a majority in the House of Commons; and into this new House, which had met on the 19th of December, 1806, they had introduced the Catholic Bill, by the hands of Mr. Grey (now become lord Howick,) with the *great and general approbation of the House*, and with a clear understanding, that, notwithstanding all the cant and hypocrisy that the foes of the Catholics had at different times played off about the *conscientious scruples* of the king, the king had now explicitly and cheerfully *given his consent* to the bringing in of this bill.

‘The new ministry had nominally at its head *the late duke of Portland*; but Perceval, who was *chancellor of the exchequer*, was in fact the master of the whole affair, co-operating however cordially with Eldon, who now again became chancellor. The moment the dismissal of the Whigs was resolved on, the other party set up the cry of ‘No Popery.’ The walls and houses, not only of London but of the country towns and villages, were covered with these words, sometimes in chalk and sometimes in print; the clergy and corporations were all in motion, even the cottages on the skirts of the commons, and the forests heard fervent *blessings* poured out on the head of the *good old king* for preserving the nation from a rekindling of the ‘*fires in Smithfield!*’ Never was delusion equal to this! Never a people so deceived; never public credulity so great; never hypocrisy so profound and so detestably malignant as that of the deceivers! The mind shrinks back at the thought of an eternity of suffering, even as the lot of the deliberate murderer; but if the thought were to be endured, it would be, as applicable to that awful sentence awarded to hypocrisy like this.’

### *Extract 3.*

‘The great and interesting question was, not whether the act (Regency Act) were agreeable to the laws and constitution of the country or not; not whether it was right or wrong thus to defer the full exercise of the royal authority for a year; *but whether limited as the powers were, the prince upon being invested with them, would take his old friends and companions, the Whigs, to be his ministers.*’—‘Men in general unacquainted with the hidden motives that were at work no more expected that Perceval and Eldon would continue for one moment to be

ministers under the regent than they expected the end of the world.'

'But a very solid reason for not turning out PERCEVAL was found in the power which he had with regard to the PRINCESS and the BOOK. He had, as has been before observed, the power of bringing her forward and making her the triumphant rival of her husband. This power he had completely in his hands, backed as he was by the indignant feelings of an enterprising, brave, and injured woman. But it was necessary for him to do something to keep this great and terrific power in his own hands. If he lost the princess he lost his only prop; and, even without losing her, if he lost the book, or rather, if the secrets of the book escaped and became public, he then lost his power. It was therefore of the greatest importance to him that nobody should possess a copy of this book but *himself*!

'The reader will now please to turn back to paragraph 73, which he will find in chap. 11. He will there find that Perceval ousted the Whigs by the means of the book, and not by the means of the catholic question, as the hoodwinked nation were taught to believe. The book had been purchased by Perceval himself; it had been printed in a considerable edition, by Mr. Edwards, printer, in the Strand; the whole edition had been put into the hands of a bookseller; the day of publication was named, that being the 9th of March, 1807; but on the 7th of March, or thereabouts, the king determined upon turning out the Whigs and taking in Perceval. Instantly PERCEVAL suppressed THE BOOK; took the edition out of the hands of the booksellers, thinking that he had every copy in his own possession. The story has been in print about his having burned the books in the court yard of his country house; but be this as it may, he certainly appears to have thought that no one but himself had a copy of THE BOOK. In this however he was deceived; for several copies of this book, as many as four or five at least, were in the hands of private individuals.'—'To get at these copies advertisements appeared in all the public papers, as soon as the prince had determined to keep Perceval as his minister. These advertisements plainly enough described the contents of the book, and contained offers of high prices for the book to such persons as might have a copy to dispose of. In this manner the copies were bought up: one was sold for £300, one or two for £500 each, one for £1000, and the last for £1500.'

*Extract 4.—Of Mr. Perceval's harshness and illiberality.*

—'Thus Perceval really ruled the country in precisely what manner he pleased. Whole troops of victims to the libel law were crammed into jails, the corrupt part of the press was more audacious than ever, and the other part of it (never very considerable) was reduced nearly to silence. But human enjoyments of every description are of uncertain duration: political power, when founded on force, is of a nature still more mutable

than human enjoyments in general; of which observations this haughty and insolent Perceval was destined, in the spring of 1812, to afford to the world a striking, a memorable, and a most awful example. He had got possession of the highest office in the state, by *his secret*, relative to the princess and her BOOK, had secured his influence with the prince regent for their joint lives; he had bent the proud necks of the landlords to fine, imprisonment and transportation, if they attempted to make inroads on his system to support the all-corrupting paper-money; the press he had extinguished or had rendered the tool of his absolute will; the most eminent amongst the writers who opposed him, Cobbett (the author of this history), Leigh and John Hunt, Finnerty, Drakard, Lovel, together with many more, were closely shut up in jail, for long terms, with heavy fines on their heads and long bail at the termination of their imprisonment. Not content with all this, he meditated the complete subjugation of London to the control and command of a military force. Not only did he meditate this, but had the audacity to propose it to the parliament; and if his life had not been taken in the evening of the 11th of May, 1812, he, that very evening, was going to propose, in due form, a resolution for the establishment of a permanent army to be stationed in Mary-bonne-park, for the openly avowed purpose of *keeping the metropolis in awe*.

*Extract 5.—Mr. Perceval's unpopularity.*

‘Upon the news of the death of Perceval arriving at Nottingham, at Leicester, at Truro, and indeed all over the country, demonstrations of joy were shown by the ringing of bells, the making of bonfires, and the like; and at Nottingham particularly, soldiers were called out to disperse the people upon the occasion.’

——‘At the place of execution, the prisoner (Bellingham) thanked God for having enabled him to meet his fate with so much fortitude and resignation. At the moment when the hangman was making the usual preparations; at the moment that he was going out of the world, at the moment when he was expecting every breath to be his last, his ears were saluted with—*God bless you, God bless you, God Almighty bless you, God Almighty bless you!* issuing from the lips of many thousands of persons.’

——‘With regard to the fact of the offender going out of the world amidst the blessings of the people, I, the author of this history, can vouch for its truth, having been an eye and ear witness of the awful and most memorable scene, standing, as I did, at the window of that prison out of which he went to be executed, and into which I had been put in consequence of a prosecution ordered by this very Perceval, and the result of which prosecution was a sentence to be imprisoned *two years* amongst felons in Newgate, to pay *a thousand pounds* to the Prince Regent at the end of the two years, and to be held in bonds for *seven years* afterwards; all which was executed upon me to the very letter, except that I rescued myself from the society of the felons by a



cost of twenty guineas a week, for the *hundred and four weeks*; and all this I had to suffer for having published a paragraph, in which I expressed my indignation at the flogging of English local militiamen, at the town of Ely, in England, *under a guard of Hanoverian bayonets*. From this cause I was placed in a situation to witness the execution of this unfortunate man. The crowd was assembled in the open space just under the window at which I stood. I saw the anxious looks, I saw the half horrified countenances; I saw the mournful tears run down; and I heard the unanimous blessings.'

'The nation was grown heartily tired of the war; it despaired of seeing an end to it without utter ruin to the country; the expenditure was arrived at an amount that frightened even loan-mongers and stock-jobbers: and the shock given to people's confidence by Perceval's recent acts, which had proclaimed to the whole world the fact of the depreciation of the paper-money; these things made even the pretended exclusively loyal secretly rejoice at his death, which they could not help hoping would lead to some very material change in the managing of the affairs of the country.'

*Extract 6.—Of Mr. Hamlyn, the Tinman.*

'I shall now address you, though it need not be much at length, upon the subject of lord Castlereagh's conduct. The business was brought forward by lord Archibald Hamilton, who concluded his speech with moving the following resolutions: '1°. That it appears to the House, from the evidence on the table, that lord viscount Castlereagh, in the year 1805, shortly after he had quitted the situation of President of the Board of Control, and being a Privy Councillor and Secretary of State, did place at the disposal of lord Clancarty, a member of the same board, the nomination to a writership in order to facilitate his procuring a seat in Parliament. 2°. That it was owing to a disagreement among the subordinate parties, that this transaction did not take effect; and 3°. that by this conduct lord Castlereagh had been guilty of a gross violation of his duty as a servant of the crown; an abuse of his patronage as President of the Board of Control; and an attack upon the purity of that House.'

Cobbett's  
Register.

'Well, but what did the House agree to? Why, to this: 'Resolved, that it is the duty of this House to maintain a *jealous guard* over the *purity of election*; but considering that the attempt of lord viscount Castlereagh to interfere in the election of a member *had not been successful*, this House does not consider it necessary to enter into any criminal proceedings against him.'

'Now, then, let us see what was done in the case of Philip Hamlyn, the tinman of Plymouth, who offered a bribe to Mr. Addington, when the latter was minister. The case was this: in the year 1802, Philip Hamlyn, a tinman of Plymouth, wrote a letter to Mr. Henry Addington, the First Lord of the Treasury



and Chancellor of the Exchequer, offering him the sum of £2000 to give him, Hamlyn, the place of Land Surveyor of Customs at Plymouth. In consequence of this, a criminal information was filed against the said Hamlyn, by *Mr. Spencer Perceval*, who was then the King's Attorney General, and who, in pleading against the offender, asserted *the distinguished purity of persons in power in the present day*. The tinman was found guilty; he was sentenced to pay a fine of £100 to the king, and to be imprisoned for three months. His business was ruined, and he himself died, in a few months after his release from prison.

'Hamlyn confessed his guilt; he stated, in his affidavit, that he sincerely repented of his crime; that he was forty years of age; that his business was the sole means of supporting himself and family; that a severe judgment might be the total ruin of himself and that family; and that, therefore, he threw himself upon and implored the mercy of his prosecutors and the Court. In reference to this, Mr. Perceval, *the present Chancellor of the Exchequer* observe, said: 'The circumstances which the defendant discloses, respecting his own situation in life and of his family are all of them topics very well adapted to affect the private feelings of individuals, and as far as that consideration goes, nothing further need be said; but, there would have been no prosecution at all in this case, upon the ground of personal feeling; it was set on foot upon grounds of a public nature, and the spirit in which the prosecution originated still remains; it is therefore, submitted to your lordships, not on a point of individual feeling, but of PUBLIC JUSTICE, in which case your lordships will consider how far the affidavits ought to operate in mitigation of punishment.'—'For lord Archibald Hamilton's motion, the speakers were, lord A. Hamilton, Mr. C. W. Wynn, lord Milton, Mr. W. Smith, Mr. Grattan, Mr. Ponsonby, sir Francis Burdett, Mr. Whitbread, and Mr. Tierney. *Against it*, lord Castlereagh himself, lord Binning, Mr. Croker, Mr. PERCEVAL, (who prosecuted Hamlyn,) Mr. Banks, Mr. G. Johnstone, Mr. H. Lascelles, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Canning.'

*Extract 7.—Of Mr. Quentin Dick.*

(On the 11th of May, 1809, Mr. Maddocks made a charge against Mr. Perceval and lord Castlereagh, relative to the selling of a seat in Parliament to Mr. Quentin Dick, and to the influence exercised with Mr. Dick, as to his voting upon the recent important question.) Mr. Maddocks, in the course of his speech said:—'I affirm, then, that Mr. Dick *purchased a seat in the House of Commons* for the borough of Cashel, through the agency of the Hon. Henry Wellesley, who acted for and on behalf of, the Treasury; that upon a *recent question* of the last importance, when Mr. Dick had determined to vote according to his conscience, the noble lord, Castlereagh, did intimate to that gentleman the necessity of either his *voting with the government, or resigning his seat in that house*: and that Mr. Dick, sooner than

vote against principle, did make choice of the latter alternative, and vacated his seat accordingly. To this transaction I charge the right honourable gentleman, *Mr. Perceval, as being privy and having connived at it.* This I will ENGAGE TO PROVE BY WITNESSES AT YOUR BAR, if the House will give me leave to call them.' Mr. Perceval argued against receiving the charge at all, putting it to the House, *whether AT SUCH A TIME it would be wise to warrant such species of charges as merely introductory to the agitation of the great question of reform, he left it to the House to determine:* but as far as he might be allowed to judge, he rather thought that it would be more consistent with what was due from him to the House and to the public, *if he FOR THE PRESENT declined putting in the plea* (he could so conscientiously put in) *until that House had come to a determination on the propriety of entertaining that charge or not.'*

The House voted *not* to entertain the charge, and Mr. Ponsonby and others declared, in the course of the debate, that such transactions ought not to be inquired into, because they 'were notorious,' and had become 'as glaring as the noon-day sun.'

Now let the younger Mr. Perceval grapple with this historian and public writer, whose opinions he has invoked, whose '*true English spirit and feeling*' he has eulogized. Let him grapple with these extracts from his works, which, however, are but a tithe of the charges Mr. Cobbett has brought against his father. For my part I have given my proofs and reasons, and authorities, and am entitled to assert, that my public character of Mr. Perceval, the minister, is, historically '*fair, just, and true.*'

THE END.

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